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**THEMATIC BLOCK /
TEMATSKI BLOK**

**Homophobia: a unifying
experience of LGBT people /**

**Homofobija: Izkušnja, ki
povezuje LGBT osebe**

Roman Kuhar and Judit Takács

Introduction to the thematic block / Uvodnik v tematski blok:

HOMOPHOBIA – A UNIFYING EXPERIENCE? / Homofobija – izkušnja, ki povezuje?

In her criticism of gay and lesbian identity politics, Judith Butler famously claimed that the only unifying experience of the LGBT community, which is as diverse as life itself, is the experience of homophobia (Butler 1991). Although it is hard to challenge this observation, there seem to be radically different experiences in how one is faced with homophobia. BBC radio journalist Scott Mills, for example, starts his documentary *The World's Worst Place to Be Gay* (Follmer 2011) about prosecution of homosexuals in Uganda by an assessment that he, as a gay man, has never really experienced any violent homophobic reactions. He admits he never really gave it a lot of thought until he was forced to flee Uganda after revealing his sexual orientation to Uganda's MP David Bahati, the author of the so called "Kill the gays" bill, which specifies the death penalty for homosexual behaviour (Conaway 2010).

Recent developments in Russia, where Putin has pushed a series of three anti-gay laws through the Duma, are other examples of homophobia. The first law of the three prohibits discussions about homosexuality, classifying it as "homosexual propaganda" which, according to the law, equals pornography. Furthermore, Russian police officers were given power to arrest anyone, including tourists, if they suspect them to be LGBT or pro-gay. Finally, Putin also signed a law, which bans adoption of children from Russia by gay couples and by anyone from states where gay marriage is legal (Fierstein 2013). In these legal and social circumstances homophobia flourishes. The most recent media report is about a gay activist, who was killed by Russian neo-Nazis, while the police turned a blind eye on this violence, which was publicly broadcast on the Internet (Schroeder 2013). This death follows one similar in May 2013 when a 23-year old man was beaten, beer bottles were shoved into his anus, after revealing that he was gay, and finally the perpetrators crushed his head with a heavy stone (Grove and Gutterman, 2013).

The Russian situation has received a lot of media attention due to the fact that the 2014 Winter Olympics will take place in Sochi, Russia. For now, the Russian administration has sent out contradictory messages about whether the anti-gay legislation will also apply to sportsmen and sportswomen and spectators at the Olympics. In a passionate and emotional open letter to the International Olympics Committee the British actor and writer Stephen Fry called for "an absolute ban on the Russian Winter Olympics of 2014" because of Russia's anti-gay laws:

I write in the earnest hope that all those with a love of sport and the Olympic spirit will consider the stain on the Five Rings that occurred when the 1936 Berlin Olympics proceeded under the exultant aegis of a tyrant who had passed into law, two years earlier, an act which singled out for special persecution a minority whose only crime was the accident of their birth. In his case he banned Jews from academic tenure or public office, he made sure that the police turned a blind eye to any beatings, thefts or humiliations afflicted on them, he burned and banned books written by them. [...] The Olympic movement at that time paid precisely no attention to this evil and proceeded with the notorious Berlin Olympiad, which provided a stage for a gleeful Führer and only increased his status at home and abroad. It gave him confidence. All historians are agreed on that. What he did with that confidence we all know. Putin is eerily repeating this insane crime, only this time against LGBT Russians. Beatings, murders and humiliations are ignored by the police. Any defence or sane discussion of homosexuality is against the law. [...] The IOC absolutely *must* take a firm stance on behalf of the shared humanity it is supposed to represent against the barbaric, fascist law that Putin has pushed through the Duma. Let us not forget that Olympic events used not only to be athletic, they used to include cultural competitions. Let us realise that in fact, sport *is* cultural. It does not exist in a bubble outside society or politics. The idea that sport and politics don't connect is worse than disingenuous, worse than stupid. It is wickedly, wilfully wrong. Everyone knows politics interconnects with everything for "politics" is simply the Greek for "to do with the people (Fry 2013).

As a reaction to all this, American president Obama has cancelled a bilateral US – Russia summit and a meeting with Putin during the G-20 economic summit (Ehrenfreund 2013). However, the USA cannot be seen as a heaven for LGBT people either. Although Obama has gone a long way from claiming that marriage is only between a man and a woman to defending marriage equality (Mears 2013), consider the following "legal confusion" a married same-sex couple has to deal with when travelling around the USA. Susan Sommer, director of constitutional litigation for Lambda Legal, explains the situation of a married same-sex couple from Washington D.C. taking a train from there to Boston:

You're married in D.C.; everything's fine. Next stop Maryland, which until 2010 wouldn't treat you as married but now would. You get to Delaware, which has a civil-union law, so it treats you not as married but as a civil-union couple. Then you get to Pennsylvania, which has not been recognizing these out-of-state marriages as anything at all, and not allowing divorces, so while there you are potentially a legal stranger to your spouse. That's not a good part of your trip. New Jersey recognizes your marriage only as a civil union. Then, phew, you're in New York and you're married again; same in Connecticut. Then you get to Rhode Island: a civil-union state where the attorney general has said you are married and the government is treating you as married, but the courts have said we won't divorce you. Finally, you reach Massachusetts, and you can breathe a sigh of relief: You're married. And you can divorce. But it's a very complicated legal ride (Green 2013).

Gay and lesbian couples in Europe can experience similar legal roller-coasters considering the fact that the EU Member States have a variety of family policy approaches, which are reflected in the national legislation as there is no EU-level unified family policy. Thus it is often debated especially in Eastern European countries, whether the legal institutions providing equal rights for same-sex couples with different sex couples

in the field of family and social policies can be introduced if homophobia prevails in a country: as if the validity of the equal rights principle depended on a given society's open-mindedness. On the other hand, it is hardly disputable that legal emancipation is a *necessary but not sufficient condition* for long-term social emancipation... In this context awareness-raising is of crucial importance: we have to keep discussing these themes and discursively transform them into components of public space – for which a forum is provided by this special issue of the *Družboslovne razprave*.

Gay and lesbian or LGBT studies and, more recently, queer studies have been developing and growing in Slovenia for over a decade. Abroad the tradition of these studies is much longer and has been overwhelmingly determined by American authors. The journal *Družboslovne razprave* has played its role in the development of these studies in Slovenia, publishing several original scientific articles, dealing with issues pertaining to LGBT studies. This specific issue, however, is the first one to include work from scholars from the region, presenting their own original research dealing with scientific appraisals of homophobia, same-sex families, homosexuality in school curricula and the role of the church in generating homophobic attitudes.

Judit Takács and Ivett Szalma compare attitudes on homophobia in 27 European countries, measured by different variables – “justification” of homosexuality, non-preference for homosexual neighbours and acceptance of gay men and lesbian women – within two large scale longitudinal surveys, the European Social Survey and the European Value Study. According to the findings Turkey, Ukraine, Russia, Romania, Croatia, Lithuania and Estonia belong to the most homophobic countries (among the examined ones), where there is no same-sex partnership or parenting legislation in place, while Denmark, the Netherlands, Sweden and Norway seem to be the least homophobic ones, where various forms of same-sex partnership and parenting legislation are indeed in place. It can also be observed that the most homophobic countries are characterised by the highest levels of gender inequality, and the least homophobic ones by the least traditional views on gender relations.

The framework of Nataša Bijelić and Amir Hodžić's research on attitudes towards homosexuality in pupils and teachers in Croatian secondary schools, is an assessment that the school system as such is based on heteronormativity, which was clearly shown during the recent Croatian public debate on Health Education. In line with this, the study showed an omnipresence of homophobic stereotypes and prejudice in schools as both students and teachers hold highly discriminatory attitudes concerning visible/public expression of non-heteronormative gender and sexual identities. In addition, almost a third of all students reported using verbal/physical violence against a person because of their alleged homosexual orientation.

The latter is of big concern also for those pupils who might not be LGBT themselves, but are coming from same-sex families, an increasing phenomenon in Slovenia and elsewhere. This issue is addressed in an article by Ana M. Sobočan and Uli Streib Brzič, in which they analyse how children from same-sex families face the heteronormativity of schools. The authors found four typical strategies – disclosure, concealment, verbalisation and justification – which leads them to outline ideas on the resilience factors

against de-normalisation. They also emphasise the importance of children and youth not standing alone against it.

Finally, Miloš Jovanović addresses the role of the Church (particularly in Serbia) in generating homophobic attitudes. He points to an ambivalent attitude towards gay people that is usually expressed in the 'hate the sin, love the sinner' formula. There is also a different kind of ambivalence: the Serbian Orthodox Church as well as its faithful either stick to the 'policy of silence' regarding LGBT(Q) issues, or they resort to very strong moralistic judgements and condemnations.

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Judit Takács, Ivett Szalma

HOW TO MEASURE HOMOPHOBIA IN AN INTERNATIONAL COMPARISON?

ABSTRACT: How to measure homophobia in internationally comparable ways is a central issue of the present study. Our main goal was to compare attitudes on homophobia in 27 European countries as measured by different variables within two large-scale longitudinal surveys, the European Social Survey and the European Values Study, with both following multistage probabilistic sampling plans, in order to enable a better understanding of the main determinants of homophobic attitudes at the individual as well as country levels. Our dependent variables were the following: the 'justification' of homosexuality, non-preference for homosexual neighbours, and acceptance of gay men and lesbian women (agreement with the statement that gay men and lesbians should be free to live their own life as they wish). We constructed multilevel fixed-effects linear regression and multilevel logistic regression models in order to test our hypotheses regarding the validity of our homophobia measurement instruments as well as the effects of socio-demographic, attitudinal and country-level variables on homophobic attitudes.

KEY WORDS: homophobia, European Social Survey, European Values Study, multilevel regression

Kako meriti homofobijo v mednarodnih primerjavah?

IZVLEČEK: Osrednje raziskovalno vprašanje članka je, kako mednarodno primerjalno meriti homofobijo. Naš glavni cilj je bil primerjava stališč glede homofobije v 27 evropskih državah, ki so bila izmerjena z različnimi spremenljivkami v okviru dveh velikih longitudinalnih študij – Evropske socialne raziskave in Evropske raziskave vrednot –, ki sta zasnovani na večstopenjskem verjetnostnem vzorcu. S tem smo želeli bolje razumeti glavne determinante homofobičnega vedenja tako na individualni ravni kot na ravni posameznih držav. Uporabili smo naslednje odvisne spremenljivke: »upravičenost« homoseksualnosti, ne želeli homoseksualca za soseda ter sprejemanje gejev in lezbijk (strinjanje s trditvijo, da naj bi geji in lezbijke lahko svobodno živeli svoje življenje, kot ga želijo). Izvedli smo večnivojsko linearno regresijo fiksni učinkov in uporabili večstopenjski logistični regresijski model. Tako smo testirali hipoteze glede veljavnosti našega merskega inštrumenta za homofobijo, hkrati pa tudi učinke socio-demografskih

spremenljivk ter spremenljivk, ki so povezana s stališči in s posameznimi državami, na stališča glede homofobije.

KLJUČNE BESEDE: homofobija, Evropska socialna raziskava, Evropska raziskava vrednot, večstopenjska regresija

1 Introduction

During the 1990s when talking with friends and colleagues from other Eastern European or post-socialist countries there was sometimes a spontaneous contest emerging about which of our countries could claim the title of being “the happiest barracks in the Soviet camp” during the state-socialist past – and, of course, most of us were convinced that it was our own country. Nowadays we can often witness a somewhat similar situation when discussing the social acceptance of lesbian, gay, bisexual and trans (LGBT) people in Europe and especially Southern and/or Eastern European scholars and activists report on perceptions of their own country being probably the most homophobic one in their region, if not in the whole of Europe.¹ These perceptions usually derive from the increasingly well-documented accounts of various direct and indirect forms of discrimination and humiliation experienced by LGBT people – however, it is often hard to find “objective and reliable” indicators of homophobia that are presentable to policy-makers, having a taste for number crunching, to facilitate a diagnostic process of (un)equal treatment of LGBT people at the national and the European levels.

Additionally, homophobia has been a contested term since the 1970s in the sense that it is hard to define its exact scope and content. While it was disparaged by various scholars as a misnomer drawing attention mainly to individual traits, and largely ignoring socio-cultural influences in connection with hostility towards homosexuality (Plummer 1975; Plummer 1981; Kitzinger 1987), others interpreted it as one potential aspect of ‘homonegativism’, a larger, multidimensional “domain or catalogue of anti-gay responses” (Hudson and Ricketts 1980: 358). In the present article homophobia will be used in an interpretational framework centred around the *heteronorm*, a cultural ideology perpetuating sexual stigma (Plummer 1975; Herek 2004, 2011) and heteronormative oppression, implying that LGBT people suffer disadvantage and injustice because of everyday practices resulting from unquestioned norms and assumptions underlying institutional rules (Young 1990). In fact, homophobia could be replaced by a more telling term, *genderphobia* (Wilchins 2004) – i.e. breaking-gender-norms-

1. According to empirical research findings in the European context Eastern European respondents tend to manifest the highest level of rejection when they are asked about “*justification*” of homosexuality or whether *gay men and lesbians should be free to live their lives as gays and lesbians*. However, regarding attitudes toward adoption by same-sex couples Southern European respondents tend to manifest even higher levels of rejection than the Eastern Europeans (Takács and Szalma 2012, 2013a, 2013b).

-phobia² – referring to the strategic avoidance of addressing non-normative gender issues and norms in everyday life as well as policy-making practices. Nevertheless, while being aware of its limitations, in this article we will stick to the use of the more widely known term homophobia as an awareness raising tool about heteronormative oppression.

The possibilities of empirically measuring homophobia in internationally comparable ways are central issues in the present study. During the last few years we have encountered various variables that were assumed to measure homophobia by authors who previously examined them in homophobia or homonegativity related analyses, and probably by those who developed the actual questionnaires of the large scale surveys that included these variables, although researchers rarely have the chance to follow the “genealogy of variables” they use.³ However, we could never be really sure what these variables actually measured, or more precisely, what was the exact understanding of our respondents regarding the potential denotations and connotations of the given terms: one can say that a general weakness and at the same time a general strength of survey research derives from the fact that researchers do not have the opportunity to ask respondents the famous ethnomethodological ‘what do you mean’ questions (Garfinkel 1967) while conducting surveys.⁴ Now one of our main goals is to come up with an at least indirect solution for testing the validity of homophobia-measurement of our examined variables: thus we compare three different variables within two large scale longitudinal surveys that have been used as homophobia-indicators in previous research and – while still being aware of our inability to determine the exact scope and meaning of what they measure, but assuming that at least one of them, which can be any of the three, measures homophobia – check whether they measure (more or less) the same thing. In the course of our measurement-validity testing activities we have constructed multilevel fixed-effects linear regression and multilevel logistic regression models in order to test our hypotheses regarding the effects of socio-demographic, attitudinal and country-level variables on homophobic attitudes, too.

Variables that can potentially be used for measuring various aspects of homophobia can be found in a few large-scale quantitative cross-national surveys. The first attempt to measure homophobic attitudes worldwide was provided by the first wave of the European Values Study (EVS) and the World Values Survey (WVS), where the following variable was used in 1981: *Please tell me whether you think homosexuality can always be justified, never be justified, or something in between.*⁵ Since then this question has been included in all the EVS (1981, 1990, 1999, 2008) and WVS (1981-

2. Thanks to Gudrun Jevne for this form of deciphering genderphobia.

3. Most probably it would be instructive to have more insight into the “genealogy of variables” in the sense of potentially reconstructing the meaning attribution processes and assumptions on the basis of which the questionnaire developers worked.

4. To be fair we have to add that in some cases during qualitative data collection, such as interviewing, when researchers would have the chance to clarify what respondents actually mean, they miss these – i.e. meaning clarification – opportunities, too.

5. Source: <http://www.worldvaluessurvey.org/>

1984, 1989-1993, 1994-1999, 1999-2004, 2005-2008, 2010-2014) data collection rounds that can enable researchers to examine longitudinal changes in homophobic attitudes in several non-European countries, too.

In 2000 the panel surveys of the Generations and Gender Programme (GGP)⁶ were initiated and since then conducted in 15 countries (Australia, Austria, Belgium, Bulgaria, Estonia, France, Georgia, Germany, Hungary, Italy, Lithuania, the Netherlands, Norway, Romania, and the Russian Federation). The GGP survey includes a question that measures the agreement level with the following statement: *Homosexual couples should have the same rights as heterosexual couples do*. However, as this is only an optional question in the GGP surveys, not all of the participating countries include this variable into their questionnaires.⁷

In 2006 the Eurobarometer public opinion survey, conducted in 25 European Union member states and two candidate countries (Bulgaria and Romania) included the following questions: *For each of the following propositions, tell me if you absolutely agree, rather agree, rather disagree or absolutely disagree: Homosexual marriages should be allowed throughout Europe; Adoption of children should be authorized for homosexual couples throughout Europe* (European Commission 2006). Even though social scientists often work with Eurobarometer findings (Murinkó and Szalma 2010), we could not find any research studies analysing Eurobarometer data regarding these variables.⁸

In 2012 the 4th Family, Work and Gender Roles module of the International Social Survey Programme (ISSP)⁹ was extended with two new variables: *A same-sex female couple can bring up a child as well as a male-female couple; A same-sex male couple can bring up a child as well as a male-female couple*.¹⁰ A great advantage of these new variables is that they can enable the examination of attitudes towards same-sex parenting in a gender specific way. For example, by using these variables a hypothesis about potentially higher levels of social acceptance towards lesbian couples in comparison to gay couples can be tested (Takács and Szalma 2013b).¹¹

In this study we will examine data from the European Values Study (EVS)¹² and the European Social Survey (ESS).¹³ The EVS, a large-scale longitudinal survey research programme which has been conducted every nine years since 1981, following multi-stage probabilistic sampling plans. The EVS provides insights into the ideas, beliefs,

6. Source: <http://www.ggp-i.org/>

7. For example, this variable is not included in the Hungarian GGP surveys.

8. This might be explained by the difficulty to get full access to Eurobarometer data: the system files are not made publicly available, only the findings.

9. Source: <http://www.issp.org>

10. Previous ISSP Family, Work and Gender Roles modules were conducted in 1988, 1994 and 2002 but these did not include any variables that might have been used for measuring homophobic attitudes. See: <http://www.gesis.org/en/issp/issp-modules-profiles/family-and-changing-gender-roles/>

11. The 2012 ISSP data will become publicly accessible only in 2014.


12. Source: <http://www.europeanvaluesstudy.eu/>

13. Source: <http://www.europeansocialsurvey.org/>

preferences, attitudes, values and opinions of citizens all over Europe by applying standardized questionnaires. The first three waves of EVS (1981, 1990, 1999) had one variable measuring homosexuality- and homophobia-related attitudes: a general acceptance question *Please tell me ... whether you think homosexuality can always be justified, never be justified, or something in between*,¹⁴ and in 1990 another one was introduced to measure reactions to homosexuality in the immediate setting: *On this list are various groups of people (including people with a criminal record, left wing extremists, heavy drinkers, right wing extremists, people with large families, emotionally unstable people, Muslims, immigrants/foreign workers, people who have AIDS, drug addicts, homosexuals, Jews, Gypsies, Christians) – could you please sort out any that you would not like to have as neighbours?* In the fourth wave of EVS, conducted between 2008 and 2010, a third homosexuality-related variable was introduced, measuring the agreement level with the statement that *homosexual couples should be able to adopt children* – but we will not analyse this variable in detail in the present study.

Diagram 1 provides an overview of the temporal changes of the mean values of the “justification” of homosexuality variable between 1981 and 2008. Diagram 2 provides an overview of the temporal changes of the mean values of the non-preference for homosexual neighbours variable between 1990 and 2008. Even though in 1981 there were only 14 participating countries in the EVS,¹⁵ the longer term trends reflect a general decrease in homophobic attitudes.

Diagram 1.
“Justification” of homosexuality in Europe between 1981 and 2008
 (1 = ‘homosexuality can never be justified’;
 10 = ‘homosexuality can always be justified’)




Source: EVS 1981, 1990, 1999, 2008

14. This variable is also used as a core question in the WVS. Since the timing of data collection is different in the WVS and the EVS, researchers can gain longitudinal data from both datasets regarding at least those countries that participate in both surveys.

15. Belgium, Denmark, France, Germany, Iceland, Ireland, Italy, Malta, the Netherlands, Norway, Spain, Sweden, Great Britain, Northern Ireland.

Diagram 2.
(Non-)Preference for homosexual neighbours in Europe
between 1990 and 2008

(Percentage of those who have not indicated that they would not like to have homosexual neighbours)




Source: EVS 1990, 1999, 2008

The ESS is a large scale, cross-national longitudinal survey initiated by the European Science Foundation in order to study changing social attitudes and values in Europe. The first round of ESS data collection was completed in 2002. Since ESS is a repeat cross-sectional survey, in each round of data collection, following each other every two years, a core module and two rotating modules (focusing on specific academic and policy concerns, being repeated not in every ESS round, but only at certain intervals) are used. The ESS core module also includes a general acceptance question about the agreement level with the statement that *gay men and lesbians should be free to live their own life as they wish* (where freedom of lifestyle is meant as being free and/or entitled to live as gays and lesbians), which has been included in the core module of the main ESS questionnaires since 2002 in all data collection waves already completed (2004, 2006, 2008, 2010, 2012). Diagram 3 provides an overview of the temporal changes of the mean values of the *gay men and lesbians should be free to live their own life as they wish* variable between 2002 and 2010. Even though in comparison to the EVS, the ESS reflects shorter term trends, we can observe a general decrease in homophobic attitudes here, too.

Diagram 3.¹⁶
Social acceptance of gay men and lesbian women in Europe
between 2002 and 2010

(1 = strong disagreement; 5 = strong agreement with the statement that *gay men and lesbians should be free to live their own life as they wish*)



Source: ESS 2002, 2004, 2006, 2008, 2010

2 Data and methods

Using data gathered in 2008 (when both EVS and ESS had a data collection round at the same time) regarding the general acceptance variables of both surveys and the question about non-preference for homosexual neighbours of EVS, we wanted to test the relationship of these variables with other socio-demographic and attitudinal variables that can be found in both surveys. In 2008 the following 27 European countries took part in both the EVS and the ESS data collection rounds: Belgium, Bulgaria, Croatia, Cyprus, Czech Republic, Denmark, Estonia, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Hungary, Latvia, Poland, Portugal, Norway, the Netherlands, Romania, Russia, Slovakia, Slovenia, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, Turkey, Ukraine, and the United Kingdom – thus we have focused only on these countries. This way we could see whether there are differences between the effects of socio-demographic and other attitudinal determinants regarding homophobia related attitudes, if they are measured in different ways – by three different variables within two surveys – in the same time period within the same set of countries. Our three dependent variables were the following: “*justification*” of homosexuality (measured on a ten-point scale in the EVS, where 1 means that *homosexuality can never be justified*, and 10 means that *homosexuality can always be justified*), non-preference for homosexual neighbours (where 1 means that homosexuals were mentioned among those one would not like to have as neighbours, and 2 means that they were not mentioned), and acceptance of gay men and lesbian

16. We used the design weight for each of the rounds in the descriptive statistic. However, we did not use any kinds of weights in the regression models because we included all basic socio-demographic (gender, age, educational level, settlement type) variables in the models, which make it unnecessary to weight the sample.

women (agreement with the statement that *gay men and lesbians should be free to live their own life as they wish* measured in the ESS on a five-point scale, where 1 expresses strong agreement and 5 expresses strong disagreement).

In a previous article we have already emphasized that the ESS variable with direct reference to *gay men and lesbians* seems to be a much less ambiguous utterance than the “justification” of homosexuality variable of the EVS (and the WVS) as it is hard to deduce what kinds of concept, behaviour and identity the respondents might have had in mind about homosexuality when answering (Takács and Szalma 2011). Nevertheless, both variables are often used in studies focusing on homophobic attitudes in an international comparison (Štulhofer and Rimac 2009; Adamczyk and Pitt 2009; Gerhards 2010; Takács and Szalma 2011, 2012; van der Akker, van der Poelg and Scheepers 2012; Hooghe and Meeusen 2013). However, the findings of these studies are hard to compare with each other because of the different time frames of data collection, the different scope of examined countries and independent variables, and the different variable categories. Even though they usually apply similar statistical methods – mainly multilevel regression models that are well-suited for analysing cross-national survey data – and some of the results, especially those regarding gender, age, educational background and religiosity of the respondents, indeed show similar patterns.

In the present study we tried to overcome these difficulties by examining the same time frame (2008), the same 27 countries, and the same kind of independent variables within the EVS and the ESS data sets. However, regarding the independent variables – with the exception of gender, age, educational background, belonging to a religious denomination and frequency of attendance at religious services – there are certain differences in the variable categories used by the ESS and the EVS. For example, the settlement type is measured by a five-category variable in the ESS, while the EVS differentiates according to the number of people living in a settlement. Table 1 provides an overview of all independent variables – from both the ESS and the EVS – that were used in our analyses.

Table 1.
Description of the independent variables

	ESS			EVS		
Variable	Scale range	N	%	Scale range	N	%
Gender	Male	22635	46	Male	17713	43,6
	Female	26608	54	Female	22870	56,4
Age	Continuous variable					
Settlement type	Big city	12749	26	Under 2000	8071	20,8
	Suburbs	4650	9,5	2000-5000	3797	9,8
	Town	14506	29,5	5000 -10000	3721	9,5
	Village	15009	30,6	10000- 20000	3662	9,4
	Farm	2185	4,4	20000- 50000	5010	12,9
	-	-	-	50000-100000	3937	10,1

	-	-	-	100000-500000	6354	16,4
	-	-	-	More than 5000000	4315	11,1
Education level	Lower than secondary education	17906	50,1	Lower than secondary education	12987	32,3
	Secondary education	10735	30	Secondary education	17943	44,5
	Tertiary education	7096	19,9	Tertiary education	9349	23,2
Denomination	Not belonging to any	18486	37,5	Not belonging to any	11867	29,2
	Roman Catholic	12403	25,2	Roman Catholic	11270	27,8
	Protestant	6577	13,4	Protestant	6351	15,6
	Eastern Orthodox	8109	16,5	Eastern Orthodox	6937	17
	Islamic	2834	5,7	Muslim	2907	7,2
	Others	862	1,7	Others	1263	3,1
Attendance at religious services	More than once a week	1898	3,9	More than once a week	1570	3,9
	Once a week	5355	10,9	Once a week	5050	12,7
	Once a month	5089	10,3	Once a month	4017	9,9
	Only on special holy days	10988	22,3	Only on special holy days	9033	22,6
	Never	25530	52,6	Once a year	6879	17,3
	-	-	-	Never	13604	33,6
Men should have more rights...	Agree strongly	3590	7,3	Agree	8362	20,6
	Agree	7684	15,6	Disagree	27662	68,2
	Neither agree nor disagree	7823	15,9	Neither	4559	11,2
	Disagree	15927	32,4	-	-	-
	Disagree strongly	13640	27,8	-	-	-
PARTNERSHIP	Institutionalized	22662	46	Institutionalized	16244	40
	Not institutionalized	26609	54	Not institutionalized	24351	60
Satisfactions with democracy		Continuous		Don't know	2306	5,7
	-	-		Very satisfied	1972	4,9
	-	-		Rather satisfied	15821	38,9
	-	-		Not very satisfied	15418	38
	-	-		Not at all satisfied	5077	12,5
GII		Continuous variable				
Country's cultural life undermined or enriched by immigrants		Continuous variable				
Political view		Continuous variable				

Source: European Value Study 2008 dataset and European Social Survey 2008 dataset

It seems to be a general feature that the ESS uses five-point (between 0 and 5 values) or eleven-point scales (between 0 and 10 values) for attitudinal questions, while the EVS applies less consistent methods by using four-, five- or ten-point scales. In social scientific and psychological survey research the issue of rating scales has generated considerable debate over the optimal number of scale points to be used (Garland 1991; Preston and Colman 2000). The five- and eleven-point scales have neutral points, while four- or ten-point scales do not have neutral points, thus the latter ones can force respondents to make a choice even if their attitudes are neutral. In the ESS questionnaires uneven scales (with neutral points) seem to be preferred, while in the EVS questionnaires there seems to be a preference for the “forced choice” questions. These patterns can be observed in our dependent variables, too: the “justification” of the homosexuality (EVS) variable is measured on a ten-point scale, while the social acceptance of gay men and lesbian women (ESS) variable is measured on a five-point scale.

Additionally, political orientation was measured on an eleven-point scale in the ESS¹⁷ and a ten-point scale in the EVS.¹⁸ Regarding satisfaction with democracy an eleven-point scale was used in the ESS¹⁹ and a four-point scale in the EVS.²⁰ Regarding attitudes on gender (in)equality both surveys used the following variable: *When jobs are scarce, men have more right to a job than women* – but the agreement levels were measured in different scales.²¹ Finally, the variable about the effects of immigrants on a given country’s cultural life was also somewhat differently formulated in the two surveys. The ESS had the following wording: *cultural life is generally undermined or enriched by people coming to live here from other countries*,²² while the EVS presented a ten-point scale where 1 meant that *a country’s cultural life is undermined by immigrants* and 10 meant that *a country’s cultural life is not undermined by immigrants*.

We also wanted to examine the potential effects of three country-level indicators: satisfaction with democracy, institutionalization level of same-sex partnerships (measuring whether same-sex marriage or same-sex registered partnership is a legal option in a given country), and the Gender Inequality Index (GII).²³ Satisfaction with

17. In politics people sometimes talk of “left” and “right” ... where would you place yourself on this scale, where 0 means the left and 10 means the right?

18. In political matters, people talk of ‘the left’ and the ‘the right’. How would you place your views on this scale, generally speaking? 1= left, 10= right.

19. How satisfied are you with the way democracy works in [country]? 0= extremely dissatisfied 10= extremely satisfied.

20. On the whole are you very satisfied, rather satisfied, not very satisfied or not at all satisfied with the way democracy is developing in our country? 1 – very satisfied, 2 – rather satisfied, 3 – not very satisfied, 4 – not at all satisfied.

21. The EVS used a three-point scale (1=agree, 2=disagree, 3= neither) and the ESS a five-point scale (1=agree strongly, 2= agree 3= neither agree nor disagree, 4= disagree, 5= disagree strongly).

22. 0= cultural life undermined, 10= cultural life enriched.

23. The GII measures gender inequality in a given country by reflecting women’s disadvantage in three dimensions: reproductive health, empowerment and the labour market. GII values can range from 0 – indicating that women and men fare equally in a country – to 1, indi-

democracy seemed to be a suitable indicator to predict the level of homophobia in a given country, especially if we agree with the argument – presented by Igor Kon (2010) originally about Russia – that sexual minority rights can contribute to the well-being of all citizens, irrespectively of their sexual orientation, and thus homophobia can be seen as a litmus test for democracy and tolerance. As previous research has also shown that homophobic attitudes are associated with traditional views regarding the roles of women in society (Herek 1984; Agnew et al. 1993; Simon 1998; Kite and Whitley, 1998), acceptance of traditional gender roles was an additional country-level indicator we applied. In this context homophobia was seen to be rooted in a broader gender belief system focusing on the appropriate, and usually not at all overlapping, paths of women and men in society.

For analysing our data sets multiple methods were applied. First, we interpreted descriptive statistics by constructing contingency tables and comparing mean as well as median values, and then we tested the order of the countries on the three measurements of homophobia by using Kendall's tau test. We have also examined the Pearson correlation coefficients between all of the homosexuality-related variables of the EVS and the ESS to measure how strongly the variables are related, and used the Cronbach's Alpha to check the internal consistency among the variables.²⁴

These methods enabled us to estimate the concurrent validity of the pairs of variables which were designed to measure the same features in the different datasets. In the context of research measurement quality, validity is often defined as “the extent to which an instrument measures what it purports to measure” (Kimberlin and Winterstein 2008:2278). There are different categories of validity, including construct, content and criterion validity. In the present study we focus on a specific type of the latter one: concurrent validity – referring to the degree to which the operationalization correlates with other measures of the same construct that are measured at the same time – which is quantifiable by the correlation coefficient between the different sets of measurements.

However, our research aim was more than just measuring the concurrent validity between certain pairs of variables: we would also have liked to examine the validity of our explanatory models, by checking whether they yield similar results or not. This was necessary because the two examined datasets differed from each other regarding not only the dependent variables but also some of the independent variables, which were measured in different ways by different categories even if their conceptual backgrounds were the same. Therefore the models had to be tested too because even if certain pairs of variables from the two datasets might have indicated significant correlation, there was a possibility that we might find different effects of these variables in the regression models because of the differing ways of their measurement.

cating that women fare poorly in all measured dimensions. Source: <http://hdr.undp.org/en/statistics/gii/>

24. The assumption of using Cronbach's Alpha is to measure a single latent trait or construct. Since we suppose that the different variables measure the same latent variable (homophobia) within countries we use it for aggregated data.

At the next stage, explanatory models were constructed by applying multilevel fixed-effects linear regression and multilevel logistic regression.²⁵ Our regression analyses were conducted by the STATA 11.1 statistical program. The statistical argument for using multilevel regression models is that citizens of a given country would not necessarily form views independent from each other according to the dimension of the dependent variable. For example, if same-sex marriage is a legal option in a given country, it is possible that a citizen of this country will manifest a higher level of tolerance towards gays and lesbians than the same citizen would manifest in another country where same-sex partnerships are not at all institutionalized. In this case, it cannot be guaranteed that the independence of observations, being a basic assumptions of standard regression models, is fulfilled, thus estimate results can become distorted. Applying multilevel models have the advantage of recognizing the partial interdependence of individuals within the same group – or citizens within the same country in our case. Multilevel models are useful for analysing data characterised by a complex variance structure, where this complexity of variance is caused by individual observations being nested in groups. During data analyses the total variation in the dependent variable is decomposed into within-group variance and between-group variance, while the two sources of variation can be studied simultaneously. Therefore, at this stage of our analysis we could introduce not only individual- but also various country-level outcome variables into our models.

3 Hypotheses

We have constructed the following hypotheses regarding the validity of our measurement instruments as well as the effects of socio-demographic, attitudinal and country-level variables on homophobic attitudes.

1. Hypothesis on the validity of our measurement instruments

In order to test the validity of our dependent variables for measuring homophobic attitudes in similar ways we have the following assumption:

H1: *If our dependent variables are valid measurement instruments of homophobia, we will have to get very similar results regarding the effects of the various independent and control variables within our regression models.* If our findings differ from each other in the three models, it will mean that (any or all of) our dependent variables measure different features, thus they cannot be defined as valid measurement instruments of homophobia. However, if the effects of the explanatory variables are the same on the dependent variables in our models, it could well mean that these variables are indeed valid measurement instruments of homophobia.²⁶

25. Multilevel logistic regression was applied for the dummy dependent variable: Non-preference for homosexual neighbours (EVS), while linear regression models were applied for the two other dependent variables: "Justification" of homosexuality (EVS) and *Gay men and lesbians should be free to live their own life as they wish* (ESS).

26. In theory it can also happen that we find our dependent variables to be valid in the sense

II. Hypotheses regarding the effects of individual level socio-demographic and attitudinal variables on homophobic attitudes

On the basis of our previous research findings (Takács and Szalma 2011, 2012, 2013a, 2013b) we had the following assumptions about the effects of gender, age, education level, settlement type, religiosity, satisfaction with democracy, xenophobic views and traditional gender beliefs on homophobic attitudes at the individual level.

H2.1: *Women, younger people, those with higher level of education and living in more urbanized environments are less homophobic than men, older people, those with lower level of education, and living in smaller settlements.*

H2.2: *Concerning religiosity we assume that membership in certain churches or denominations can have more significant influence on manifesting homophobic views than not belonging to any denomination. Additionally we also assume that higher frequency of attending religious services can increase homophobic attitudes.*

H2.3: *Lower level of satisfaction with democracy, negative attitudes towards immigrants, and traditional gender beliefs can correspond with homophobic attitudes.*

III. Hypotheses regarding the effects of country-level variables on homophobic attitudes

Also on the basis of our previous empirical findings (Takács and Szalma 2011) we wanted to test the effects of country-level homophobia indicators – being connected to characteristic features of the examined societies, and not only to the personal traits of respondents – including the institutionalisation level of same-sex partnerships, depending on whether the legal institution of same-sex marriage and/or registered partnership exists in a given country, satisfaction with democracy, and traditional views regarding the roles of women in society. We had the following assumptions regarding the potential effects of the country-level variables:

H3.1. *Having same-sex marriage and/or registered partnership as a legal institution in a given country can correspond with decreasing levels of homophobia.*

H3.2. *Satisfaction with democracy can decrease homophobia.*

H3.3. *Acceptance of the traditional role of women in society can correspond with homophobia.*

that they measure the same feature but in reality it might be the case that they measure something else than homophobia. In this case it would be an issue of reliability, instead of validity of our research instruments. In the context of the present study we assume that at least one of our dependent variables measures homophobia. Thus if the regression models constructed around the dependent variables show very similar results, we assume that all of them actually measure homophobia.

4 Results

Diagrams 4, 5 and 6 provide an overview of the mean and median values of the three dependent variables. Table 5 summarizes the mean values of the three dependent variables in the examined countries. Since the mean values can be affected by any single value being too high or too low compared with the rest of the sample, we also show the median values of our dependent variables by countries.²⁷ The median is defined as the numeric value separating the higher half of a sample from the lower half, and better suited to discern the central tendency for skewed distributions since it is much more robust than the mean. Thus it can provide a much better indication of central tendency if the distribution of the given variable is not a normal distribution in some of the examined countries. For example, on Diagram 4 there are eleven countries (Turkey, Romania, Cyprus, Russia, Estonia, Latvia, Croatia, Bulgaria, Poland and Hungary) with a median value of one, while the mean ranges from 1.48 to 3.26 for those countries.

In order to check whether the examined 27 European countries have reached significantly similar order in the three measures (variables) we have used Kendall's tau test, a nonparametric measure of association based on the number of concordances and discordances in paired observations²⁸ (Bolboaca and Jantschi 2006). We found that there is a significant concordance among countries on all three measurements.²⁹

Diagram 7, illustrating the relationship between the "justification" of homosexuality (EVS) and the acceptance of gay men and lesbian women (ESS) variables, presents Turkey, Ukraine, Russia, Romania, Croatia, Lithuania and Estonia in the most homophobic corner, while Denmark, the Netherlands, Sweden and Norway are in the least homophobic one. Table 6 provides an overview of those European countries where same-sex partnerships became institutionalised between 1989 and 2013 either in the form of marriage or registered partnership, and where adoption by same-sex couples is a legal option either in the form of second-parent adoption or joint adoption. It can be observed that the countries in the homophobic corner of Diagram 7 do not have any same-sex partnership or parenting legislation in place, and the lack of these legal institutions can be interpreted as symptoms of institutionalised homophobia characterising these countries.

Diagrams 8 and 9 illustrate the relationship between the two general acceptance variables ("justification" of homosexuality and the social acceptance of gays and lesbians) and the individual level variable measuring gender (in)equality in the examined societies: these results show that the most homophobic countries – such as Turkey, Ukraine, Russia, Romania – are also characterised by the most traditional views on


27 Since the non-preference for homosexual neighbours is a dummy variable, median values are provided only in the case of the first two independent variables.

28 The formula for Kendall's tau-b is
$$\tau = \frac{\sum_{i < j} (\text{sgn}(x_i - x_j) \text{sgn}(y_i - y_j))}{\sqrt{(T_0 - T_1)(T_0 - T_2)}}$$

29 The applied significance level is $p < 0,05$


gender relations, and the least homophobic ones – including the Nordic countries and the Netherlands – by the least traditional views on gender relations. Diagrams 10 and 11 illustrate the relationship between the two general acceptance variables and the variable measuring the level of satisfaction with democracy: here we can observe overlaps between homophobia and lower levels of satisfaction with democracy not only in Ukraine, Russia, Romania but also in Bulgaria, Hungary, Croatia and Lithuania, while in the other corner of the diagram we can find not only the Nordic countries and the Netherlands but also Switzerland.

Diagram 4.
“Justification” of homosexuality in 27 European countries:
Mean and median values
 (1 = ‘homosexuality can never be justified’;
 10 = ‘homosexuality can always be justified’)




Source: EVS 2008

Diagram 5.
Social acceptance of gay men and lesbian women in 27 European countries:
Mean and median values
 (1 = strong disagreement; 5 = strong agreement with the statement that *gay men and lesbians should be free to live their own life as they wish*)




Source: ESS 2008

Diagram 6.
Non-preference for homosexual neighbours in 27 European countries:
Mean values
(Percentage of those who have not indicated that they would not like to have homosexual neighbours)




Source: EVS 2008

Diagram 7.
Relationship between the variables "justification" of homosexuality (EVS)
and social acceptance of gay men and lesbian women (ESS)
in 27 European countries




Source: EVS 2008, ESS 2008 own calculation

Diagram 8.
"Justification" of homosexuality and gender inequality
in 27 European countries




Source: EVS 2008

Diagram 9.
Social acceptance of gay men and lesbians and gender (in)equality
in 27 European countries




Source: ESS 2008

Diagram 10.
"Justification" of homosexuality and satisfaction with democracy
in 27 European countries



Source: EVS 2008

Diagram 11.
Social acceptance of gay men and lesbians and satisfaction with democracy
in 27 European countries



Source: ESS 2008

Examination of the Pearson correlation coefficients showed that there are very strong correlations among all of the homosexuality-related variables of the EVS and the ESS (see Table 2). The strongest correlation can be found between the *non-preference for homosexual neighbours* and the *Gay men and lesbians should be free to live their own life as they wish* variables. The weakest (but still very strong) correlation can be found between *non-preference for homosexual neighbours* and the *Homosexual couples should be able to adopt children* variable. As for adoption by same-sex couples it seems to be less related to the homophobia than the other three variables or it is measured in other dimensions of homophobia than the other three variables.

Besides the correlation it is also important to determine whether there is an internal consistency among the examined variables within countries.³⁰ Regarding the Cronbach's Alpha – a widely used objective measure of reliability, indicating the internal consistency within the variables by showing a generally increasing value as the inter-correlations among test items increase – we found that its value is 0.72, which

30. The motivation for using Cronbach's Alpha is to measure a single latent trait or construct. Since we suppose that the different variables measure the same latent variable (homophobia or genderphobia) within countries we use it with aggregate data.

can indicate the presence of a single one-dimensional latent construct (which we can perhaps call *genderphobia*) behind the examined variables.

Table 2.
Pearson correlation coefficients among homosexuality-related variables

	Gay men and lesbians should be free to live their own life as they wish. (ESS)	"Justification" of homosexuality (EVS)	Non-preference for homosexual neighbours. (EVS)	Homosexual couples should be able to adopt children. (EVS)
Gay men and lesbians should be free to live their own life as they wish. (ESS)	1	0,921***	-0,932***	0,760***
"Justification" of homosexuality (EVS)	0,921***	1	-0,910***	0,825***
Non-preference for homosexual neighbours. (EVS)	-0,932***	-0,910***	1	-0,674***
Homosexual couples should be able to adopt children. (EVS)	0,760***	0,825***	-0,674***	1

Source: EVS 2008, ESS 2008 own calculation

Regarding the results of our regression analyses, after running our empty models in order to check whether the between-country variance levels are sufficient for examining the effects of country-level outcome variables at all, we have found that in the case of the *Gay men and lesbians should be free to live their own life as they wish* (ESS) variable 21%, in the case of the "*justification*" of homosexuality (EVS) variable 33% and in the case of the *non-preference for homosexuals neighbours* (EVS) variable 34% of the total variation in the dependent variables derived from between-country variance. These between-country variance levels are sufficient for applying multilevel analysis (Bickel 2007).

Table 3 and Table 4 provide an overview of the findings deriving from the application of two different types of regression models constructed around our three dependent variables.³¹ Both the Democracy and the Gender models included two country-level variables: the **A, B, C** Democracy models contained variables measuring the institutionalisation levels of same-sex partnerships and the satisfaction with democracy, while the **A, B, C** Gender models included variables measuring

31. As we work with quite large sample sizes we are aware of the fact that it is more likely to reach statistically significant results than in the case of smaller sized samples, thus we rigorously indicate the significance levels of each item in our the regression models.

the acceptance levels of traditional gender roles and the institutionalisation levels of same-sex partnerships.

Table 3.³²
Estimates of multilevel linear regressions – ESS 2008

		A) Dependent variable: Gay men and lesbians should be free to live their own life as they wish	
Explanatory and control variables		A) Democracy model	A) Gender model
PARTNERSHIP INSTITUTIONALIZED		0,58***	0,45**
SATISFACTION WITH DEMOCRACY		0,15**	-
GII (GENDER INEQUALITY INDEX)			-2,33***
Gender: Female		0,19***	0,14***
Age		-0,01***	-0,01***
Settlement type	Big city	Ref.	Ref.
	Suburbs	-0,03	-0,02
	Town	-0,07***	-0,05***
	Village	-0,11***	-0,08***
	Farm	-0,15***	-0,13***
Education level	Lower than secondary education	-0,1***	-0,06***
	Secondary education	Ref	Ref
	Tertiary education	0,1***	0,07***
Denomination	Roman Catholic	Ref	Ref
	Protestant	-0,01	-0,02
	Eastern Orthodox	-0,1***	-0,09**
	Islamic	-0,6***	-0,53***
	Others	-0,34***	-0,34***
	Not belonging to any	0,12***	0,1***
Attendance at religious services	More than once a week	Ref.	Ref.
	Once a week	0,17***	0,16***
	Once a month	0,51***	0,39***
	Only on special holy days	0,54***	0,47***
	Never	0,59***	0,51***
Men should have more rights...	Agree strongly		Ref.
	Agree		0,13***
	Neither agree nor disagree		0,17***
	Disagree		0,31***
	Disagree strongly		0,55***

32. The three country-level variables are capitalized in both Table 3 and Table 4.

Satisfactions with democracy	0,003	
Political view	-0,003	-0,03
Country's cultural life undermined or enriched by immigrants	0,06***	0,05***
Number of observations	48966	48966
Variance between countries	0,08	0,06
Variance within countries	1,165	1,14
Log Likelihood	-73293	-71790
Wald Chi2	5821***	6876***

Note: * $p < 0,05$; ** $p < 0,01$; *** $p < 0,001$

Source: European Social Survey 2008, own calculations

Table 4.
Estimates of multilevel linear and logistic regressions – EVS 2008

		B) Dependent variable: "Justification" of homosexuality		C) Dependent variable: Non-preference for homosexual neighbours	
Explanatory and control variables		B) Democracy model	B) Gender model	C) Democracy model	C) Gender model
PARTNERSHIP INSTITUTIONALIZED		2,04***	1,55*	1,43***	0,55
SATISFACTION WITH DEMOCRACY		2,06**		-1,03	
GII (GENDER INEQUALITY INDEX)			-7,23***		-8,83***
Gender: Female		0,69***	0,65***	0,34***	0,31***
Age		-0,03***	-0,03***	-0,01***	-0,01***
Settlement type	Under 2000	Ref.	Ref.	Ref.	Ref.
	2000-5000	0,22***	0,20***	0,18***	0,18***
	5000 -10000	0,14*	0,13*	0,21***	0,21***
	10000- 20000	0,29***	0,26***	0,47***	0,46***
	20000- 50000	0,26***	0,24***	0,36***	0,35***
	50000-100000	0,37***	0,36***	0,35***	0,37***
	100000-500000	0,53***	0,51***	0,39***	0,38***
	More than 500000	0,65***	0,65***	0,54***	0,52***
Education level	Lower than secondary education	-0,51***	-0,49***	-0,29***	-0,25***
	Secondary education	Ref.	Ref.	Ref.	Ref.
	Tertiary education	0,57***	0,54***	0,26***	0,24***
Denomination	Roman Catholic	Ref.	Ref.	Ref.	Ref.
	Protestant	0,22***	0,22***	0,11	0,1
	Eastern Orthodox	-0,16*	-0,19**	-0,21**	-0,21**
	Muslim	-1,83***	-1,8***	-0,72***	-0,63***
	Others	-0,64***	-0,67***	-0,06	-0,06
	Not belonging to any	0,21***	0,18***	0,01	0,01

Attendance at religious services	More than once a week	Ref.	Ref.	Ref.	Ref.
	Once a week	0,06	0,11	0,12	0,11
	Once a month	0,51***	0,57***	0,34***	0,32***
	Only on special holy days	0,81***	0,82***	0,38***	0,36***
	Once a year	0,86***	0,89***	0,5***	0,47***
	Never	1,16***	1,21***	0,53***	0,50***
Satisfactions with democracy	Very satisfied	Ref.		Ref.	
	Rather satisfied	-0,02		-0,01	
	Not very satisfied	-0,07		-0,11	
	Not at all satisfied	-0,16*		-0,24**	
Men should have more rights...	Agree strongly		Ref.		Ref.
	Agree		0,09		0,42***
	Disagree		0,6***		0,19***
Political view		-0,09***	-0,08***	-0,04***	-0,04***
Country's cultural life undermined or enriched by immigrants		0,15***	0,15***	0,09***	0,08***
Number of observations		36663	36663	37326	37326
Variance between countries		1,14	1,135	3,286	3,286
Variance within countries		6,67	6,62	0,73	0,39
Log Likelihood		-86874	-86741	-17700	-17626
Wald Chi2		7502***	7823***	1570***	1742***

Note: * $p < 0,05$; ** $p < 0,01$; *** $p < 0,001$

Source: European Values Study 2008, own calculations

Table 5.
Mean values of the dependent variables

	Social acceptance of gays and lesbians ¹ (ESS 2008)	Justification of homosexuality ² (EVS 2008)	Non-preference for ho- mosexual neighbours ³ (EVS 2008)
Belgium	4,2	5,8	6,7%
Bulgaria	3,2	2,8	54,9%
Croatia	2,9	2,5	51,8%
Cyprus	3,3	2,2	40,5%
Czech Republic	3,8	4,9	23,3%
Denmark	4,4	7,3	5,7%
Estonia	3,0	2,3	48,7%
Finland	3,8	6,7	11,9%
France	4,4	5,6	5,7%
Germany	4,0	5,7	16,5%
Greece	3,4	3,7	31,3%
Hungary	3,2	3,2	29,5%
Latvia	2,9	2,4	43,3%
Norway	4,0	7,2	5,6%
Netherlands	4,4	7,5	10,7%
Poland	3,2	2,9	52,7%
Portugal	3,6	3,7	27,7%
Romania	2,7	2,1	59,3%
Russia	2,6	2,2	62,3%
Slovakia	3,1	4,8	34,1%
Slovenia	3,4	3,9	34,4%
Spain	4,1	6,0	5,4%
Sweden	4,2	7,8	6,3%
Switzerland	4,1	6,4	7,5%
Turkey	2,6	1,5	90,5%
Ukraine	2,6	1,6	60,2%
United Kingdom	4,0	5,4	10,8%

Source: ESS 2008, EVS 2008

1. 1 = strong disagreement; 5 = strong agreement with the statement that gay men and lesbians should be free to live their own life as they wish
2. 1 = 'homosexuality can never be justified'; 10 = 'homosexuality can always be justified'
3. Percentage of those who have not indicated that they would not like to have homosexual neighbours

Table 6.
Introduction of same-sex marriage, registered partnership and adoption
by same-sex couples in 17 European countries (1989–2013)

Countries	Same-sex marriage	Registered partnership	Adoption by same-sex couples
Austria	-	2010	2013 ¹
Belgium	2003	2000	2006
Czech Republic	-	2006	-
Denmark	2012	1989	2007/2009 ²
Finland	-	2002	2009 ³
France	2013	1999 (PACS)	-
Germany	-	2001	2004 ⁴
Hungary	-	2009 ⁵	-
Iceland	2010	1996	2006
Ireland	-	2010/2011 ⁶	-
Luxembourg	-	2004	-
The Netherlands	2001	1998	2001
Norway	2008/2009 ⁷	1993	2009
Portugal	2010	-	(2013) ⁸
Slovenia	-	2005	2011 ⁹
Spain	2005	-	2005
Sweden	2009	1994	2003
Switzerland	-	2004	-
United Kingdom ¹⁰	-	2005	2002/2008 ¹¹

1. Only second-parent (or step-parent) adoption, i.e. adoption of the biological child(ren) of one's partner.
2. First only second-parent adoption was introduced, followed by the introduction of joint adoption rights for same-sex couples.
3. Only second-parent (or step-parent) adoption, i.e. adoption of the biological child(ren) of one's partner.
4. Only second-parent (or step-parent) adoption, i.e. adoption of the biological child(ren) of one's partner.
5. In Hungary the legal institution of registered partnership for same-sex and different-sex couples was introduced already in 2007, but only same-sex registered partnership came into operation in July 2009.
6. In the Republic of Ireland the legal institution of same-sex registered partnership was introduced in 2010 (Civil Partnership and Certain Rights and Obligations of Cohabitants Act), being in effect from January 2011.
7. The Norwegian Parliament enacted a gender neutral marriage law in June 2008, which came into operation on January 2009.
8. On May 17, 2013 the Portuguese Parliament voted in favour of allowing second-parent adoption.
9. Only second-parent (or step-parent) adoption, i.e. adoption of the biological child(ren) of one's partner. It is a special case because there was no new legislation introduced, but in 2011 Slovenian legal experts successfully used the old adoption legislation (originally introduced in 1976 with no specific reference to the gender of adoptive parents) for showing that second-parent adoption is in fact legal.
10. As of 2013, the British and Scottish parliaments are each progressing laws about the extension of marriage to same-sex couples. See: Marriage (Same-sex Couples) Bill – http://www.publications.parliament.uk/pa/bills/cbill/2012-2013/0126/cbill_2012-20130126_en_2.htm#pt1-pb1-11g1
11. Adoption & Children Act – England & Wales 2002; Scotland 2008.

Beside the specific country-level outcome variables, there were several individual level variables included in both the **A, B, C** Democracy and the **A, B, C** Gender models, such as respondents' gender, age, education level, settlement type, religiosity, satisfaction with democracy, xenophobic views and traditional gender beliefs – almost all of which manifested significant effects on the level of homophobia in ways we expected. Women, younger people, those with higher levels of education and people living in larger, more urbanized settlements tended to manifest less homophobic views than others. Regarding religiosity, frequent attendance at religious services and belonging to certain denominations (such as the Muslim/Islamic and the Eastern Orthodox) tended to increase homophobic views, while very infrequent attendance at religious services and not belonging to any denomination seemed to have the opposite effect.³³ Xenophobic views and traditional gender beliefs also indicated higher levels of homophobia, while satisfaction with democracy was the only individual-level variable, which did not seem to indicate any significant effects in any of the models.

Regarding the country-level variables, gender inequality measured by the GII seemed to be the strongest indicator of homophobia in all of our regression models. Having same-sex marriage and/or registered partnership as a legal institution significantly corresponded with decreasing levels of homophobia in all of the models except the **C** Gender model (where the dependent variable was Non-preference for homosexual neighbours). While satisfaction with democracy also had some statistically significant effect in the **A** and **B** Democracy models, it did not have any in the **C** Democracy model. We can also add here that originally we examined only 26 countries, which did not include Turkey, and in that configuration satisfaction with democracy at the country-level still had a significant effect ($p < 0,01$) in the **C** Democracy model – however, after including Turkey into our sample, this significant relationship ceased to exist.

The likelihood ratio and the Wald tests are commonly used to evaluate the difference between nested models (Fox 1997). In this case we do not have two nested models, but we compare two similar models, which differ from each other only regarding two sets of variables: the Gender Inequality Index (GII) of the gender model and the Satisfaction with democracy of the democracy model country-level variables, and the “Men should have more rights...” variable measuring the acceptance of traditional gender roles at the individual level and the Satisfaction with democracy individual-level variable. By comparing the two types of models – on the basis of the Log Likelihood and the Wald χ^2 values – it can be seen that homophobia is more strongly linked with the gender inequality indicators (the GII country-level variable and the acceptance of traditional gender roles individual-level variable) than with satisfaction with democracy. This link can also explain the reason for the institutionalization of same-sex partnerships losing its significant effect once the GII is included into the **C** Gender model: most probably these two country-level indicators explain the same part of the dependent variable.

33. It should be noted that not belonging to any denomination did not have any significant effect in any of the **C** (Non-preference for homosexual neighbours) models.

In general we could also observe that findings of the models including each of the two EVS dependent variables (respectively) do not differ significantly from those of the model containing the ESS dependent variable. Within all of these three types of models the Gender models manifested stronger explanatory power than the Democracy models. On the basis of our findings we can probably assume that all the three indicators that we used as our dependent variables are indeed valid measurement instruments of homophobia.

5 Conclusion

In this article we have explored possibilities of empirically measuring homophobia in internationally comparable ways by testing whether different homosexuality-related variables of the ESS and the EVS can be considered valid measurement instruments of homophobia. According to our findings there is quite a high probability that the agreement level with the statement that *gay men and lesbians should be free to live their own life as they wish* and the – let's face it, not only *prima facie*, utterly meaningless – “*justification*” of homosexuality variables as well as the *non-preference for homosexual neighbours* indicator can be used for measuring homophobia, or indeed, genderphobia.

However, as we are quite frequent users of large-scale survey data we must admit that we keep dreaming about much more refined measurement instruments – with much more (gender- and otherwise) sensitive wording – than those that are usually available. Nevertheless, we can observe the emergence of variables reflecting the acknowledgement of non-heteronormative partnership and family practices in large-scale international survey questionnaires (such as the question on same-sex adoption in the 2008 round of the EVS or more recently the questions about gender-specific same-sex parenting practices in the 2012 module of the ISSP) in parallel with the general decrease of homophobia in most – or at least in the happier – parts of Europe, shown also by the longitudinal results of both the EVS and the ESS.

Additionally we should also note that even though there might be a general longitudinal decrease of homophobia in Europe, certain (groups of) countries tend to lose their – historically speaking – “original” genderphobic character at a different pace than others. For example, EVS data on non-preference for homosexual neighbours between 1990 and 1999 reflected a more dynamic decrease of (the social distance aspect of) homophobia in the post-socialist countries than in the non-post-socialist countries – but to be fair, we have to add that the levels of non-preference for homosexual neighbours were much higher in post-socialist Europe around 1990 than in most of the Northern and Western European countries. However, in the first decade of the 21st century the positive trend that could previously be observed in the post-socialist countries has changed into a broad spectrum of stagnation, reflecting that the “contest for the title of the most homophobic country” is still an on-going event in the region...

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HETERONORMATIVITY IN SECONDARY SCHOOLS IN ZAGREB: YOUNG MEN WEARING MAKE-UP, KISSING AND WALKING PROUDLY

ABSTRACT: This paper analyses the presence and characteristics of heteronormativity in the context of the Croatian school system by focusing on secondary schools in the capital of Zagreb. We base our analysis on the results of a survey on opinions and attitudes regarding homosexuality conducted on a sample of 322 students and 117 teachers in nine secondary schools. The research reveals that stereotypes and prejudice towards lesbians and gays are omnipresent and widespread. Both students and teachers hold highly discriminatory attitudes concerning the visible/public expression of non-heteronormative gender and sexual identities. In addition, almost one-third of all students reported having resorted to verbal/physical violence against a person because of their alleged homosexual orientation. Moreover, we explore the research findings in relation to the (non)existence and (in)visibility of LGBT issues in school curricula and textbooks. In addition, we consider the recent (September 2012) introduction of a Health Education curriculum which for the first time introduces into Croatian schooling the topics of "acceptance of sexual diversity" and "stigmatisation and discrimination of sexual minorities". Finally, we outline public debates and reactions to this 'introduction of homosexuality to Croatian schools' coming from the Croatian Catholic Church and faith-based organisations.

KEY WORDS: secondary schools, Croatia, young people, homosexuality, sexuality education

Heteronormativnost v zagrebških srednjih šolah: Našminkami mladi fantje, ki se poljubljajo in s ponosom hodijo naokrog

IZVLEČEK: V članku se ukvarjava z analizo heteronormativnosti v kontekstu hrvaškega šolskega sistema, zlasti v zagrebških srednjih šolah. Analiza je zasnovana na podatkih iz raziskave stališč in mnenj o homoseksualnosti, ki je bila opravljena na vzorcu 322 dijakov in dijakinj ter 117 učiteljev in učiteljic iz devetih srednjih šol. Raziskava je

pokazala na vseprisotnost predsodkov in stereotipov o gejih in lezbijkah. Tako dijaki kot učitelji so izražali diskriminatorna stališča glede vidnih/javnih izrazov neheteronormativnih spolnih in seksualnih identitet. Skoraj tretjina vprašanih dijakov je poročala, da so že uporabili verbalno ali fizično nasilje proti osebi, za katero so domnevali, da je istospolno usmerjena. Zbrane rezultate analizirava v povezavi z (ne)obstojem in (ne)vidnostjo LGBT-vsebin v šolskem kurikulumu in učbenikih. Na koncu razpravlja še o nedavni (september 2012) vpeljavi zdravstvene vzgoje v kurikulum, ki je prvič v hrvaški šolski sistem vnesla vsebine, povezane s »sprejemanjem seksualne različnosti« ter »stigmatizacijo in diskriminacijo seksualnih manjšin«, ter o odzivih katoliške cerkve in drugih verskih organizacij na »vpeljavo homoseksualnosti v hrvaške šole«.

KLJUČNE BESEDE: srednje šole, Hrvaška, mladi, homoseksualnost, spolna vzgoja

1 Background

In Croatia homosexuality was decriminalized in 1977¹ and in 1998 the age of consent was equalized to the age of fourteen for both opposite and same-sex sexual activity². At the turn of the 21st century the growth and integration of Lesbian, Gay, Bisexual and Transgender/Transexual (LGBT) community and movement (mostly in the capital of Zagreb) was started with the development of Internet forums and the changes after the 2000s elections (Bosanac and Dobrović 2007; Jugović et al. 2007; Hodžić 2010). The right-wing war-time government was replaced by the coalition of centre-to-left parties, which significantly improved political liberties and the state of human rights. The year 2002 marks the increased public visibility and the beginning of more intense lobbying and advocacy for the protection of rights of *sexual and gender minorities* within the Croatian legal system. The same year, the first Croatian *Gay Pride* was held in Zagreb³, organized by gay and lesbian organizations *Iskorak* and *Kontra* from Zagreb, and the first national campaign for the promotion of lesbian and gay rights was implemented by LORI, a lesbian organization from Rijeka. This campaign included a TV clip *Ljubav je ljubav* (Love Is Love) which was banned by national television as “inappropriate”⁴.

In 2003, discrimination based on sexual orientation started being prohibited in many national laws. This was the result of intensive lobbying of civil society organizations

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1. In 1977, Yugoslav Criminal Code was transferred to the level of each federal unit and Croatia, Slovenia, Montenegro and Vojvodina removed homosexual sexual acts from the list of criminal activities.
 2. In the new Criminal Code from 2011 this age limit was raised to fifteen years for all.
 3. The first Zagreb Pride was held on June 29th, with around 300 participants marching through the city centre heavily guarded by the police. That did not stop numerous insults coming from both *ordinary* citizens and organized groups of young neo-fascists and skinheads who managed to throw tear gas at the march and beat up around 30 Pride participants. While 27 people were arrested, no one was ever charged with assault or discrimination.
 4. Interestingly, also in 2002, the first mainstream Croatian film dealing with same-sex (lesbian) relationship, *Fine mrtve djevojke* (Nice Dead Girls) was released, and selected as the Croatian nominee for the Best Foreign Language Film Oscar Academy Award.

(CSOs) as well as the state's response to the requirements of the accession processes to European institutions and associations. However, the Same-Sex Civil Unions Act adopted in 2003 grants to cohabitating unregistered partners only the rights to legal regulation of property and financial support and only after the dissolution of the union. In 2006, a proposal for the Registered Partnership Bill was rejected by the majority of the Croatian parliament⁵. On the other hand, that same year, hate crime legislation covering sexual orientation was introduced to the national Criminal Code. The first person charged according to this law, for attempting to throw petrol bombs on Zagreb Pride March in 2007, was found guilty and sentenced to fourteen months in prison. The Anti-Discrimination Act passed in 2008, which besides sexual orientation, also recognizes gender identity and gender expression as anti-discrimination bases, is the most recent and the most comprehensive of a dozen of legal acts relating to LGBT rights in Croatia.

Although significant improvements have been made in the area of legal protection of LGBT individuals and public gatherings in Croatia in the last decade, the legislation remains irrelevant until it is actually implemented⁶. Realization of many provisions has been impaired by discriminatory statements and actions by various state actors, as well as by their lack of commitment to protect LGBT rights and to prevent discrimination and violence based on sexual orientation and gender identity and expression. Lacking confidence in state institutions and the legal and law enforcement systems, and fearing disclosure of their sexual orientation, many victims still do not report violent incidents to the police (Amnesty International 2012; Lesbian group Kontra). In addition, the significant influence of Catholic values on private, social and political life also plays an important role in upholding the high-level of homophobia and transphobia in Croatian society (Labus 2005). Research from 2005, exploring violence against lesbians, gays and bisexuals in Zagreb, Rijeka and Osijek, has shown that every other respondent (N=202) experienced some form of violence since 2002, and 15% were victims of physical violence. More than half of the reported cases occurred in public (Pikić and Jugović 2006). In 2009, Zagreb Pride started the virtual gay-bashing map of Zagreb, marking the places where over 60 reported violent attacks on LGBT people have occurred over the past 11 years (Zagreb Pride 2009).

At the moment, in the Spring of 2013, there are more than 10 active organizations and initiatives, exclusively based in Zagreb, Split and Rijeka, the only cities with the critical mass of LGBT people that would produce a sense of a visible community. Besides regular Zagreb Pride marches and Queer Zagreb festivals (2003-2012), the capital has several clubs, gay saunas and cruising bars, and a dozen of LGBT-friendly

5. During parliamentary and Commissions' discussions about the proposal, discriminatory statements were voiced by members of the Croatian Democratic Union, the ruling party at that time. One of the comments, "The entire Universe is heterosexual, from an atom and a tiniest particle, from a fly to an elephant", was later printed on a Queer Zagreb T-shirt.

6. According to the latest edition of the ILGA-Europe Rainbow Map, which includes the scale reflecting the national legal human rights situation of LGBTI people, Croatia is ranked at 13th place out of forty-nine European countries (ILGA-Europe 2012).

bars and cultural venues hosting various LGBT and queer gatherings, as well as its own annual editions of Zagreb City Gay Guide.

This constitutes a part of the social milieu in which the growth and development of Croatian young men and women takes place, and in which they also learn and modify their attitudes and opinions about non-heteronormative identities and practices. With an aim to detect the level and nature of prejudices and stereotypes about homosexuality present among secondary school students in Zagreb, the authors of this article have carried out a quantitative research, as a part of a Queer Zagreb project. Besides research activities, an educational program and a manual dealing with homophobia and violence in schools have also been designed by the authors (Hodžić and Bijelić 2012).

2 Research on Opinions and Attitudes towards Homosexuality in Secondary Schools in Zagreb

The research was conducted on the sample of 322 students and 117 teachers in nine secondary schools in the city of Zagreb in order to explore attitudes and opinions on homosexuality. Two grammar schools, three craft schools and four technical schools participated in the research. A self-administered questionnaire was used, one for students and the other for teachers. Both questionnaires targeted information on the level of knowledge and information on LGBT issues, social distance and attitudes towards gays and lesbians, and (in)visibility of homosexuality in the school context.

2.1 Students

Survey has been conducted in the period from October 2011 until January 2012. The research participants were only those young people whose parents provided a signed consent for their participation. Parents' consent was a precondition set by the Education and Teacher Training Agency (ETTA) in their official approval of the research. Although we have argued that parents' consent can lead towards biased results that would undermine the homonegativity among student population, the ETTA did not change its decision. Their opinion was based on State Pedagogical Standard for Secondary Schools which sets a precondition of parents' consent for any research involving students, despite a coexisting Ethical Codex on Research on Children ruling that children over 14 years of age can independently of their parents give consent for participation in the research.

The sample was envisaged as stratified random sample but due to difficulties experienced during the fieldwork it turned out as a convenient sample for both students and teachers. Obstacles were related to some schools' reluctance to take part in such a research⁷ and the other was the outcome of parents' consent condition. 62% of all parents/guardians, included in the first selection round, refused to provide a signed

7. The reasons schools provided included not having time for conducting a research, their own policy of not conducting a research in the school, or being overburdened with the curriculum. The explanation of one headmaster was particularly figurative stating: "I don't want to pull the devil by its tail".

consent for their children to participate in the anonymous and voluntary survey⁸. After variables were prepared for statistical processing, data was analyzed using PASW Statistics 18. We utilized univariate analysis determining frequencies and percentages of answers and bivariate analysis determining statistically significant difference using chi-square test, t-test and analysis of variance.

The student sample (N=322) consisted of 64% young women and of 36% young men. Most students were 17 and 18 years of age, i.e. students finishing secondary school. The average age of respondents was 17 years. Around half of the respondents (52%) attend technical schools, 26% grammar schools and 22% attend craft schools in the city of Zagreb. 11% of young people consider themselves to be not religious while the rest, 89% of them, report practicing religious ceremonies (ranging from “almost daily” to “once every few years”).

Majority of students, 81% report receiving no information on homosexuality throughout school curriculum. At the same time, 11% of the whole sample estimate that curriculum offers mostly negative information on homosexuality, whereas 6% think that it offers positive information.

The use of a social distance scale was aimed to establishing the degree to which young people are willing to accept and associate with gays and lesbians. Scale consisted of nine degrees of acceptance, from *lower* to *higher* (“to live outside Croatia”, “to be living in the same country as I am”, “to be my neighbor”, “to be my teacher at school”, “to be my schoolmates”, “to be my classmates”, “to sit with me in the classroom”, “to be my friends”, “to be my brother/sister or other family member”). Each respondent had to indicate the highest degree that he/she is willing to accept. The scale distinguishes lesbians from gays.

Table 1 Social Distance.

DEGREES OF ACCEPTANCE	LESBIANS (%)	GAYS (%)
To live outside Croatia	11.7	20.5
To be living in the same country as I am	7	8.1
To be my neighbor	4.7	2
To be my teacher at school	2	1.3
To be my schoolmates	5	3.4
To be my classmates	4.7	2
To sit with me in the classroom	4	4
To be my friends	27.4	25.3
To be my brother/sister or other family member	33.4	33.3

Around third of young people, 33% expressed the highest degree of acceptance, i.e. are willing to accept gays and lesbians as family members. Around fourth of them

8. Contact persons in schools informed us that some students were embarrassed to show consent form to the parents; some parents did not want to read the form or discuss it and some even tore it apart.

are willing to accept gays and lesbians as friends. Around 24% of students are willing to accept them as neighbors, teachers or schoolmates. 20% of students expressed the lowest degree of acceptance, stating that they are willing to accept gays only when living outside Croatia, while 12% feel the same about lesbians.

On the basis of the degrees of acceptance a new variable *social distance* was constructed for gays and for lesbians. Each degree of acceptance was numerically marked with value 1 attributed to the category “to live outside Croatia”, and value 9 to the category “to be my brother/sister or other family member”. Accordingly, the higher numerical value indicated the higher level of acceptance. The following analysis includes this new variable. Analysis of variance established that there is a statistically significant difference between the level of acceptance of gay people and respondents’ sex ($F(1,295)=73.2, p<0.05$). Young women are more likely to display a higher degree of acceptance of gays (mean, 7.14) than young men (mean, 4.07). At the same time, there is no significant difference between respondents’ sex and acceptance of lesbians. It is also established that there is a difference between the type of school that young people attend and the level of acceptance of gays ($F(2,294)=20.2, p<0.05$) and lesbians ($F(2,296)=9.4, p<0.05$). Grammar school’s students are more likely to show a higher degree of acceptance of lesbians (mean, 7.67) and gays (mean, 7.75). Results on the social distance scale suggest that there is a difference in perception and acceptance of gays versus lesbians, as more students think that gays should live outside Croatia (21%) compared to their attitude toward lesbians (12%).

Knowing a gay person positively affects the level of acceptance of gays and lesbians. Analysis of variance established significant difference in both cases: for the acceptance of gays ($F(1,295)=4.1, p<0.05$) and lesbians ($F(1,297)=7.9, p<0.05$). The respondents that know a gay person are more likely to show a higher degree of acceptance of gays (mean, 6.57) and lesbians (mean, 7.10).

Religious affiliation is also associated with the level of acceptance of gay people. T-test established that there is a significant difference between believers and non-believers in relation to the level of acceptance ($t=5.37, df=47, p<0.05$). Non-believers are more likely to show a higher degree of acceptance of gays (mean, 7.81) and lesbians (mean, 8.38) compared to believers (mean, 5.90 for the acceptance of gays; mean, 6.27 for lesbians).

Students’ attitudes toward homosexuality and gender roles were measured using the Likert scale. Respondents had to express the level of agreement with each statement. Non-normative gender expression appeared to be unacceptable to the majority of students as 78% do not accept that boys could wear make-up. Public display of homosexuality, exemplified by two young men kissing in public place, is unacceptable for the majority of students (64%). One of the most controversial issues was child adoption by lesbians and gays. 58% of students think that gays and lesbians should not be allowed to adopt children, while third of them would allow it. On the other hand, around half of respondents consider gay people to be capable of working with children (52%) and raising children (46%) whilst one third of respondents disagree. Although majority, 71%, disagree with the statement that gay people should be excommunicated

to a desert island, around fifth of them (20%) agree. A strong disapproval of another form of public display of non-heteronormative identities, a Pride March, is also visible in respondents' attitudes. Majority of them (60%) do not see the reason of public display for lesbian and gay identities because "heterosexuals do not do such a thing", thus not being aware of everyday heteronormativity and failing to notice a political dimension of a Pride March. This item, together with attitudes towards boys wearing make-up and same-sex male kiss in public are three statements that caused the biggest disapproval. Variable *homophobia* was constructed using 20 statements/attitudes. Attitudes assembled into a variable *homophobia* represent sum of recoded answers to all 20 items so the scale was 20-100 with a higher score representing a higher level of homophobia. This new variable was used in the following analysis. T-test established that young men display the higher level of homophobia than young women ($t=5.8$, $df=230$, $p<0.05$). On the scale from 20-100 boys' score was higher (mean, 63.40) than girls' (mean, 52.50). Analysis of variance established association between type of school and the level of homophobia. There is a significant difference in regards to the type of school that young people attend ($F(2,319)=31.53$, $p<0.05$). Grammar school's students display a lower degree of homophobia (mean, 44.91) than students from technical (mean, 60.46) and craft schools (mean, 60.42).

There is association between homophobia and knowing a gay person ($t=3.7$, $df=239$, $p<0.05$). Young people that do not have experience of knowing a gay person show a higher level of homophobia (mean, 59.12) from those who know gay people (mean, 51.93). Homophobia was also associated with the religious affiliation. T-test established that there is a significant difference between these two variables. Believers display a higher degree of homophobia (mean, 57.86) from non-believers (mean, 43.63). Experience of knowing a gay person is related to acceptance and tolerance while religious affiliation contributes to a higher level of homophobia and non-acceptance.

A set of questions was related to the violence against gay and lesbians and the ones that are being perceived as gays and lesbian. The questions were related to the violent behavior towards persons for their alleged homosexuality, including verbal and physical violence, passive bystanders and helping the victim.

Table 2 Violence.

BEHAVIOURS	YES (%)	NO (%)
Abusive behavior because of someone's alleged homosexuality	26.1	73.9
Physical assault because of someone's alleged homosexuality	5.9	94.1
Passive by standing when witnessing violence against a person because of their alleged homosexuality	20.2	79.8
Offering help to the victim in violent situation because of someone's alleged homosexuality	15	85

Table 2 shows that 26% of students were verbally abusive towards a person because of their alleged homosexuality and 6% were physically violent in a similar situation. 20% were the passive bystanders that witnessed violence against a person because of

their alleged homosexuality, while 15% offered help to the victim of violence. T-test established that there is a significant difference between the perpetration of violence and respondents' sex ($t=5.43$, $df=159$, $p<0.05$), where young men (mean, 0.57) are more likely to be the perpetrators of violence than young women (mean, 0.17)⁹.

2.2. Teachers

Teachers from selected schools were also asked to voluntarily and anonymously fill out the questionnaire, which mostly resembled the student one, with the added section about the inclusion of LGBT themes in school curricula. 117 teachers from nine secondary schools completed the questionnaire. 26% of teachers work in grammar schools, 21% in craft schools and 53% in technical schools. Majority of them (83%) work as subject teachers, while the rest are expert assistants (13%) and school directors (3%). Roughly half of them (55%) were older than 40 years of age. The sample predominantly consisted of women (78%), persons who live in Zagreb (85%), and persons who identify as religious (77%).

When it comes to teachers' attitudes, at first it seems that the majority is affirmative towards gays and lesbians, as around two-thirds of them nominally and "politically correctly" approves of equal rights (64%) and anti-discrimination legislative (66%), and considers lesbians and gays as "suitable" and "qualified" to raise children (58%) and to work in kindergartens and schools (80%). However, around 60% of teachers hold negative attitudes about visible and public non-heteronormative sexual and gender identities and expressions. It is interesting that they showed the highest proportions of disagreement with the same three issues as students did: boys wearing make-up (58%), young men kissing in public place (59%) and holding a Pride March (64%).

Moreover, the analysis using a new, compiled variable *homophobia* (constructed in the same way as for students) confirmed that there is a statistically significant relation between a level of homophobia and personal acquaintance with a gay person ($t=3.7$, $df=81$, $p<0.05$), as well as between homophobia and religious affiliation ($t=6.0$, $df=46$, $p<0.05$). Teachers who do not personally know a lesbian or a gay man (mean, 51.93) express higher level of homophobia compared to ones who have gays and lesbians as acquaintances or friends (mean, 42.87). Likewise, teachers who identify as religious display a higher degree of homophobia (mean, 49.50) than those who identify as non-believers (mean, 35.34).

Research results support the need to include education about LGBT rights in school curricula, as around half of the teachers themselves (52%) think that such content should be integrated in curriculum, and 41% of them feel that they would need additional training and skills to tackle this subject in schooling. However, a little bit less than a third of the sample said that there is no need for such education (27%) and that they would not like to teach about it (28%). Here the analysis revealed that teachers who

9. Item related to the use of verbal violence and item related to the use of physical violence were combined and recoded into single variable *violence* that scales from 0 (negative answer to both items) to 2 (positive answer to both items).

identify as religious are significantly more likely to have negative attitudes to teachings about sexual diversity ($\chi^2=6.76$, $df=2$, $p<0.05$). Results also show that the issue of homosexuality is mostly non-existent and invisible as a theme in school education process, and that teachers are quite uninformed about it. Around third of them reported that they do not know if homosexuality issues are present in school curricula (39%) or as a theme in education process (36%) regardless of the official curriculum. Likewise, around third of them affirms that there are no LGBT themes in curriculum (37%) and that such issues never appear in teaching context (24%).

2.3. Discussion

The key research findings ought to be viewed in relation to the required parents' consent, which, one can argue, have influenced the sample characteristics and resulted in the underestimation of the homophobia level in the population of secondary schools' students. In addition, the research was implemented in Zagreb exclusively. We can assume that if more comprehensive, nation-wide sample was carried out, the results would have tendency to more negative opinions and attitudes towards gays and lesbians. However, even in Zagreb, there is a significant number of both students and teachers who do not approve of the public display of transgressive gender expressions and homoerotic desires. The images of young men wearing make-up, as well as a same-sex kiss, and the holding of a Pride March, were three items which have caused the highest percentage of disagreement in both students' and teachers' sample. These represent the most visible disruptions of heteronormative formulas and, as such, often lie behind violent behavior towards persons perceived as gay or towards someone who is gender transgressive (CARE and ICRW 2009; Jakovljević and Arsenov 2012; Radoman 2011). The right to free expression and respect of one's sexual and gender identity should be one of the building blocks for any educational strategy aiming to diminish homophobia and transphobia among youth.

In relation to the expression of affirmative attitudes towards homosexuality and the acceptance of gay people, our results point to several characteristics, which are associated with such opinions. To summarize these insights, we can portrait an ideal-type of a gay-friendly person as a young woman who attends gymnasium, who is not religious, and who knows someone who is gay. These last two characteristics have been found relevant for the teachers' sample as well. A couple of other results only confirmed certain trends seen in previous international research. Namely, that there is a correlation between knowing a gay person (as an acquaintance, a friend, or a family member) and having a more affirmative and accepting attitudes towards gays and lesbians (Herek 2009). Likewise, they showed that lesbians are more accepted than gays (Herek 2000). Male homosexuality appeared to be more unacceptable, above all in the views of boys, as it endangers dominant hetero-masculinity and violates the norms and power relations of heteronormative system more than a lesbian identity.

In the context of school curricula and educational process, our respondents, both students and teachers, reported that homosexuality issues are mostly non-existent, which relates to a recent analysis of representations of homosexuality in textbooks that reve-

aled that the theme of homosexuality was either invisible or stigmatized, and only in a couple of cases it was presented neutrally, though very briefly (Bijelić and Cesar 2010). Our findings suggest that relevant educational programs for the youth should focus on the following themes: gender identities and expressions; gender stereotypes and discrimination, the concept of sexuality and sexual orientation and identity; homophobia and violence; and LGBT rights. In addition, there is a strong need to revise textbooks and remove negative and stigmatizing stereotypes about gay persons. Moreover, education for students should be accompanied by the adequate teachers' training, but also with development of school policies against homophobic and transphobic harassment and violence. In the next section we trace the recent history of negotiation processes over sexuality and health education programs in Croatian public schools.

3 Sexuality Topics in Croatian Schools

3.1. Sexuality and Health Education Programs (2004 – 2008)

During the last two decades, certain elements of sexuality education, mostly information on anatomy and reproductive sexuality, have been a part of the biology curriculum for elementary and secondary schools. In addition, psychology, sociology and ethics curricula in secondary schools offer a couple of lessons that cover adolescence, love, sexuality, marriage and family. However, a course that dedicates the highest number of school hours to the issues of sexual upbringing is the elective Catholic instruction, attended by 90% of primary and nearly 75% of secondary schoolchildren¹⁰ (Zrinščak 2004). Through 28 hours, allocated to the 7th and 8th grades in elementary school and to the 3rd grade in secondary school, this course includes discussion of sexuality firmly positioned within the context of heterosexual marriage (Ministarstvo prosvjete i športa 2003; Hrvatska biskupska konferencija 2009).

When in early 2004 media reported about the screening of an explicit American anti-choice documentary during a Catholic instruction class in one secondary school, the outburst of public reactions stirred the interest in teachings about sexuality in schools (Bijelić 2008). At that time, Croatian students have had access to two very different extra-curricular sex education programs – *MemoAIDS*, a peer-led HIV prevention program, and *TeenSTAR*, an abstinence-based sex education program. *TeenSTAR* came under strong public criticism by LGBT and feminist organizations, and Ombudspersons for gender equality and for children when it was revealed that it provides biased information on the topics of homosexuality, masturbation, contraception and gender. For example, masturbation was identified as a form of severe moral disorder and same-sex intimacy was equated with sexual harassment (Pravobraniteljica za djecu 2004; Pravobraniteljica za ravnopravnost spolova 2005).

10. This huge percentage is the consequence of not having structural alternatives of other religious or non-religious instructions in elementary schools, as well as the result of social pressure to confirm to dominant Catholic worldview.

In response to this increasing public pressure, at the beginning of 2005 the Ministry of Sport, Education and Science (MSES) established a Commission to assess the existing school-based sex education programs and to recommend a nationwide program. The Commission's final advice was, since they found none of the reviewed programs to be adequate, to submerge sexuality education contents within the broader health education program, which would be selected on the basis of a public call for proposals. After a long procedure, two programs were finally selected in the late 2006. Besides the program of *Forum for Freedom in Education*, a CSO working on improving the educational standards in Croatian schools, the other program chosen to be piloted was the one by *Parents' Voice for Children* (GROZD), a CSO formed by leading figures of *TeenSTAR* program. A majority of the Commission's members argued that the GROZD program, just like *TeenSTAR*, ignores and misrepresents a number of scientific facts about masturbation, contraception, and adolescent sexual activity, and includes biased and discriminatory information about homosexuality (Hodžić et al. 2012). Notwithstanding, the MSES decided to pilot both programs in selected number of primary and secondary schools.

As a response to this announcement, the civic coalition opposed to the GROZD sex education program was founded. Consisting of 130 CSOs and 350 individuals, the Coalition *Stop high-risk sex education* has used various advocacy strategies to block the introduction of the GROZD program in order to abolish the "reactive, irresponsible, inefficient, and non-transparent" government policy. The Coalition's efforts to exert international pressure culminated with the submission of a collective complaint with the European Committee of Social Rights (ECSR) against the Republic of Croatia in 2007. The complaint, filed via the International Center for the Legal Protection of Human Rights from London, was concerned with the state's failure to provide mandatory and comprehensive school-based sex education, while supporting scientifically inaccurate, biased, and discriminatory programs.

In its final decision in 2009, the ECSR opined that the number of hours and the information taught in the existing national curricula are limited, but did not deem them as "sufficiently deficient", arguing that pregnancy and STI rates among Croatian adolescents are generally not worse than in other European countries. However, the Committee did find that Croatia's limited sex education curriculum discriminated on the basis of sexual orientation, citing the use of a biology textbook which contained homophobic statements. In response, the MSES immediately pulled and replaced the textbook in question (European Committee of Social Rights 2009).

In the meantime, at the end of 2008, the MSES decided to abandon plans to introduce Health Education into the national curriculum, based on their interpretation of the results from a commissioned evaluation study, which reported no significant difference in health-related knowledge between students taking experimental sex education classes, and those in the standard program (Buljan Culej et al. 2008). They also argued that sex education is already present in schools through a so-called "integrative educational model", or as an MSES official stated, "Health Education is no less present in Croatian schools than in the EU" (Lučin and Dukić 2008).

3.2. Recent Developments (2012 – 2013)

After an unsuccessful attempt to introduce sexuality education five years ago, in September 2012, the current government¹¹ exercised more political will and decided to include teachings about sexuality in school curricula as one of four educational modules of a new Health Education (HE) curriculum (Agencija za odgoj i obrazovanje 2012). For the first time in the history of Croatian schooling LGBT issues became a part of official curricula for elementary and secondary schools. The 4th module of the HE curriculum, entitled *Sex/Gender Equality and Responsible Sexual Behavior*, contains three school-hours dedicated to the issues of sexual and gender diversity. In the 7th grade of elementary school (ages 13-14) one hour is allocated to the topic *Acceptance of Sexual Diversity* which sets following learning outcomes: to recognize similarities and differences between people in relation to sexuality; to discuss the notion of sexual minorities and their position throughout the history; to recognize stigmatization and discrimination; and to recognize the importance of accepting differences. The other two hours are directed to the topic *Stigmatization and Discrimination of Sexual Minorities* and are implemented in the 3rd grade of secondary school (ages 17-18). The learning outcomes for this session include: to analyze different approaches (scientific, religious and activist) to human homosexuality; to know the difference between the terms transsexual and transgender; to recognize different forms of violent behavior and discrimination towards sexual minorities; and to build up values of acceptance and tolerance of sexual diversity. In addition, the list of recommended literature to assist teachers in the implementation of HE includes the published report of the research discussed in this article and the accompanying educational program and manual¹², as well as an another manual on sex, gender and sexuality by the same authors (Bijelić and Hodžić 2012; Hodžić and Bijelić 2012; Hodžić et al. 2003).

This overt placement of LGBT topics in the official school programming immediately provoked a fierce anti-government campaign against the HE curriculum, i.e. its 4th module, led by GROZD and its affiliated cluster of faith-based CSOs. Their main complaints were related to discussions on homosexuality, masturbation, pornography, differentiation between sex and gender, and gender identities and roles. They argued that HE introduces “homosexual propaganda into schools” and that “gender ideology is contrary to scientific facts and it destroys a sexual identity of adolescents” (HINA 2012). The Church and its satellite CSOs framed their campaign within parents’ rights to decide on the upbringing of their children and in reference to the proposed sexual education module as being an attack on traditional Croatian values. In that way, they used the same tactics of confining sexuality issues to the private sphere and within a traditional (hetero-cultural) national context as they did in 2004-2008 debates (Hodžić

11. Almost the same coalition of centre-to-left parties that won 2000 elections received the majority of seats again in 2011 parliamentary elections.

12. Program of 14 school-hours includes 7 thematic sessions: Sex and gender; Sexual identities, behaviors and orientations; Prejudices and stereotypes; Coming out; Discrimination, homophobia and violence; Visibility; Human rights.

et al. 2012). In their actions, they strived to mobilize parents to sign petitions against HE and to advise them to withdraw their children from sex education classes. In addition, these faith-based CSOs initiated a web site *zdravstveniodgoj.com* where they publish their critiques towards HE, the authors of the program and CSOs supporting it, mostly built upon arguments *ad hominem*.

The Catholic Church itself has also explicitly railed against the sexual education module. Josip Bozanić, the archbishop of Zagreb, stated that the implementation of such HE would undermine the beliefs of religious parents and the Catholic Church in Croatia. He pointed out that HE is “dangerous” because teaching gender equality “destroys the essence of what it is to be human” (Barilar and Sever Šeni 2012). Another prominent theologian said that “lesbians and fags will destroy Croatia” and that HE is “a global conspiracy of homosexuals and other people of deviant sexual behavior wanting to impose their sexual moral and destroy our society” (Laušić 2013). During Christmas holidays in 2012, Croatian Bishops’ Conference published a special leaflet about the HE program. The goal was to alert parents and to mobilize church-goers to stand up and protest against the proposed program. In the leaflet they ask parents if they agree that “a child will learn that homosexual act is as natural and as equal as the heterosexual one” and that “a child will become indoctrinated with gender ideology” (Hrvatska biskupska konferencija 2012). This leaflet was distributed utilizing two biggest national retail chains *Konzum* and *Tisak*, thus exposing close relations between religious institutions and the politics of private capital.

In reaction to these strong accusations, the Ministry of Education, Science and Sport and the Education and the Education and Teacher Training Agency issued public statements on several occasions (Ministarstvo znanosti, obrazovanja i sporta 2012a; 2012b; Agencija za odgoj i obrazovanje 2013a). In the letters, they denounced the Church’s statements as “untruths, misinformation and malicious data”, displayed scientific facts about controversial educational topics and developmental messages, and emphasized the compulsory character of HE. Their arguments were framed within the human rights discourse, UN declaration, the Convention on the Rights of the Child and “fundamental EU values of nonviolence, gender equality and tolerance towards diversity”. Support to HE was also voiced by Ombudspersons for children and for gender equality who, in their assessments, emphasized legal foundations for such a school program in both national and international documents, stressing that all children have equal rights to information independently of their parents’ consent¹³ (Pravobraniteljica za djecu 2012; Pravobraniteljica za ravnopravnost spolova 2013).

Likewise, around 20 CSOs (the core of them was actively involved in 2007 initiative against GROZD program) produced a website *www.zdravstveniodgoj.hr* to support a more quality HE implementation, however, this time strategically staying away from

13. For their arguments they utilized articles from the Croatian Constitution, Gender Equality Law and Education Law, as well as the Convention on the Rights of the Child and relevant international documents by UNESCO, WHO, UNAIDS, Council of Europe and European Court of Human Rights.

a direct confrontation with faith-based CSOs. In addition, an *ad-hoc* initiative, the *Co-ordination for secular Croatia*, organized a couple of public rallies entitled *Gathering of Reason* to support the government in their implementation of the HE curriculum. Moreover, Zagreb Pride organized a public protest called *Love Thy Neighbor* in the front of Zagreb Cathedral, as a reaction of LGBT community to hate speech coming from representatives of the Catholic Church in Croatia.

The faith-based organizations promptly reacted and their campaign reached its peak at the end of January 2013 with the visit of Judith Reisman, accompanied by a great media attention. She was invited to Croatia by the *Vigilare* association and the Croatian Centre for the Renewal of Culture to give lectures and to participate in public discussions. Reisman, a controversial U.S. writer who advocates abstinence-only sex education, came to defame the HE curriculum as a product of a “criminal homosexual-pedophilic work of Alfred Kinsey” (Pavičić 2013). She, as anti-Kinsey crusader, also put forward allegations against reputable Croatian sociologist, university professor and one of the authors of the HE curriculum Aleksandar Štulhofer as being the promoter of Kinsey’s ideas in Croatia due to his professional connections with the Institute. Reisman accused him of trying to implement pornography and pedophilia as positive values into the HE curriculum. Moreover, Štulhofer has been accused of “his cooperation with pedophiles” and, without any evidence, his colleagues with whom he co-authored several publications, sexologists Teo Sandfort, Vern Bullough and Erwin Haeberle, were defamed as pedophiles (HINA 2013).

The Catholic Church continued advocating against HE and in certain parishes, during Sunday masses, new leaflets started to circulate, criticizing authors and supporters of the HE curriculum by claiming that “these people who do not have children will teach you how to raise yours” and trying to discredit them on a personal level (Lucić 2013). However, this strong Church’s campaign failed to significantly mobilize public opinion against HE. Results from a January 2013 national public opinion research show that 41.5% of the respondents support the introduction of HE and that more than half of them (56.2%) oppose Church’s meddling (HRT 2013).

At the time of concluding this article, in March 2013, the Education and Teacher Training Agency published online the list of workshops to assist teachers in the implementation of the HE curriculum, and started a two-weeks long online public discussion about the proposed educational tools (Agencija za odgoj i obrazovanje 2013b; 2013c). At the same time, the Ministry of Education, Science and Sport announced that they would start with revision of textbooks especially targeting parts that are discriminating on the basis of sexual orientation and gender, and that are mostly to be found in some Biology, Sociology, Psychology and Catholic instruction textbooks (Penić 2013).

Judging by the recent steps undertaken by the educational authorities, it seems that the Ministry of Education, Science and Sport has taken a firm stand on the issue of HE and is determined to implement the curriculum. Continuing with the implementation of HE, despite the Church’s opposition, indicates that there is a political will to base educational system on scientific facts and principles of non-discrimination rather than traditional and religious misconceptions and myths.

4 Closing Remarks

Despite the fact that over the last decade significant improvements have been made in the field of anti-discrimination legislative relating to LGBT persons in Croatia (excluding rights pertaining to same-sex unions/families), until recently there were no institutional efforts stemming from educational sector to diminish homophobia and transphobia among young people in schools. Research findings presented in this article suggest a strong need for systematic approaches in Croatian schooling system to reduce stigmatization and harassment of non-heterosexual youth. The recent educational authorities' decision to include, in the new Health Education curriculum, three school-hours dedicated to discussions about sexual diversity and stigmatization and discrimination of LGBT people, represents an important step towards making school environments less homophobic. Another significant move is the reported revision of textbooks aimed to eradicate present stereotypes, prejudices and discriminatory statements concerning sexual orientation/gender identity.

In addition, an active role that several LGBT organizations have been taking in developing educational programs and policies should also be noted. In the last two years, Queer Zagreb produced an educational program against homophobia and violence in schools with an accompanying manual, and has trained ten young people to implement it through peer-educational activities. LORI, a lesbian organization from Rijeka, has organized workshops for psychologists in several local schools and has recently issued two manuals, one for teachers and one for students, as well as a set of comprehensive directions and recommendations to decrease homophobia, transphobia and peer-violence in schools.

On the other hand, a strong opposition to these pioneering attempts to include issues about non-normative sexualities into schools' programming, coming from the Catholic Church and faith-based organizations, demonstrates how in Croatia, the discourse of Catholic morality, conflated with national culture and traditional/parental values, is being used to uphold heteronormativity.

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"FOR ME IT'S JUST NORMAL" – STRATEGIES OF CHILDREN AND YOUNG PEOPLE FROM RAINBOW FAMILIES AGAINST DE-NORMALISATION. THE CASE OF SLOVENIA AND GERMANY.

ABSTRACT: The paper presents some findings from an international study called "School is out – Experiences of children from rainbow families in school" which explored how children and young people from rainbow families anticipate, experience and deal with schools as heteronormative spaces. In the research, the term de-normalisation was developed to describe the processes by which children with LGBT-identified parents are perceived and constructed as not normal, as classified beyond the 'hetero-normative normality', which is expressed through 'othering' by others, for example in interaction. To avoid, prevent or reduce the impacts of de-normalisation processes, the interviewed children and youth have developed different strategies which we present in two frames: one involving disclosure and concealment and the other involving verbalisations and justifications. Based on these insights and findings, the article also outlines ideas on the resilience factors against de-normalisation and emphasises the importance of children and youth not standing alone against it.

KEY WORDS: Rainbow families, children in rainbow families, de-normalisation, heteronormativity, school, normality, homophobia, resilience

"Zame je to normalno" - strategije otrok in mladih iz mavričnih družin v spopadanju z de-normalizacijo. Primer Slovenije in Nemčije.

IZVLEČEK: V prispevku avtorici predstavita nekatere ugotovitve mednarodne raziskave School is out – Experiences of children from rainbow families in school, ki je ugotavljala, kako otroci in mladi iz mavričnih družin pričakujejo, doživljajo in ravnaajo s šolo kot heteronormativnim okoljem. V raziskovanju smo razvili pojem denormalizacije, ki opisuje procese, v okviru katerih so otroci, katerih starši so (označeni kot) homosek-

sualni, biseksualni ali transseksualni, prepoznani in konstruirani kot »ne-normalni«, kot izven heteronormativne »normalnosti«, kar se izraža npr. v interakciji. Da bi preprečevali ali zmanjšali učinke procesov denormalizacije, so intervjuvani otroci in mladi razvili različne strategije, ki so predstavljene v dveh okvirih: v enem gre za uravnavanje razkritja in prikrivanja, v drugem za verbalizacijo in pojasnjevanja. Temelječ na vpogledih in ugotovitvah raziskave, prispevek oriše tudi ideje o dejavnikih odpornosti pred denormalizacijo in poudari, da se mladi in otroci z njo ne smejo soočati sami.

KLJUČNE BESEDE: mavrične družine, otroci iz mavričnih družin, denormalizacija, heteronormativnost, šola, normalnost, homofobija, odpornost

*“For me now actually I don’t notice it so much anymore, who, yes when one so often now, that’s for me normal. I do not actually notice that often, when one doesn’t speak about it, that I, that we, are a rainbow family, so, that can one just say, like that, yes. And, when they have sometimes asked me, then it actually again came into my mind, because it’s not so often that one comes to this point, I believe, so, yes it doesn’t often come up in life to this point.” (Joyce, 10)*¹

*“Actually, just normal. Just that there are two women instead of a woman and a man. Completely normal! You could say two parents with children. But I wouldn’t qualify it, like “now we’re in a same-sex family”, it’s just a family. Just, there’s my mom, and B., and my sister.” (Lara, 17)*²

*“It is different, but it is not negative it is not abnormal, it is simply just different from other families and it is not bad, and it is completely normal as it is” (Cristina, 13)*³

1 Normal lives, normal families

This article will focus on experiences of children growing up with parents who identify themselves as gay, lesbian, bisexual or transgender⁴ in school. Especially it

1. In German: “*mir ist jetzt eigentlich gar nicht mehr aufgefallen[...] das ist ja für mich normal. Mir fällt das eigentlich oft gar nicht auf, wenn man gar nicht darüber redet, dass ich, dass wir ‘ne Regenbogenfamilie sind also, das kann man ja auch so sagen. Und wenn die mich dann [...] manchmal so gefragt haben, dann ist es mir erst eigentlich wieder eingefallen, weil’s eigentlich gar nicht so oft zur Sache kommt, find’ ich, also es kommt ja nicht so oft im Leben zur Sache*“
2. In Slovenian: “*V bistvu čisto normalna. Samo da sta pač dve ženski, namesto ženska in moški. Čisto normalno, ne? Lahko bi rekla dva starša z otrokoma. Ne bi pa kvalificirala “zdaj smo pa v istospolni družini,” pač družina. V njej je pač mami pa B. pa moja sestra*”
3. In German: “*es ist anders, aber es ist nicht negativ es ist nicht unnormal, es ist einfach halt anders als andere Familien und es ist nicht schlimm, und es ist ganz normal so*”
4. In this paper, when referring to rainbow families, we will refer principally to father-father-child(ren) and mother-mother-child(ren) families, as these were the families that the research sample consisted of. Moreover, additional and / or different attention needs to be given to the experiences of children in families where parents are bisexual or transgender – because these (can) more often pass as ‘normal’ families: it is the particular combination of the

will be discussed how children and youth deal with possible homophobic prejudices and which kind of strategies they develop and use to avoid experiences of exclusion and de-normalisation.

The above quotations convey a message that was expressed in the numerous interviews we did with children and youth from rainbow families. With this often clearly and precisely formulated message the children and young people we interviewed might attempt to claim normality, talking about their families that in the eyes of the society don’t fit the standard (heteronormative) model. The fact that we encountered these messages in almost every interview – sometimes already at the beginning, before the proper interview had even begun, sometimes it was introduced later on in the interview – lead us to the idea to further investigate how children and young people from rainbow families negotiate normality. We wanted to find out what it means for them to be ‘simply normal’ and how these meanings influence their desires to belong to it. The interviews were part of a study *School is out – Experiences of children from rainbow families in school*⁵; in this paper we will refer to the findings from two countries involved in the study (Germany and Slovenia). The trajectory of this research was to explore how children and young people from rainbow families anticipate, experience and deal with schools as heteronormative spaces. Rather than asking explicitly about homophobia, we opted to ask more openly about different experiences and strategies in the context of school. With this approach we offered the respondents to decide what they want to share and show what they perceive as unpleasant, threatening or violent, as well as take a de-victimising perspective, which focuses on the participants’ agency. For this project, we had a qualitative and comparative approach in order to explore how schools conceptualise families and if there are reasons to expect that children and young people with rainbow families risk discrimination and violence. We relied on queer-feminist critique of the idea of a normative heterosexual family. The comparative view allows us to further investigate the normative workings and resistances toward these norms in both larger and local contexts (Hemmings 2007).

same gender and homosexuality as visible to the environment that we discuss in relation to experiences in this paper (the focus is not the nature of the parents’ sexuality or gender identification, but actually the responses to those in their environment).

5. The study, *School is out – Experiences of children from rainbow families in school* was conducted by the Humboldt-University in Berlin, the University of Ljubljana/ Faculty for Social Work and the University of Lund in 2009-2011 funded by the EU programme Daphne. The authors of this paper were the co-authors of the research (along with five other authors). The qualitative study consists of 124 interviews with children and youth growing up with LGBT-parents, with LGBT identified parents and with pedagogical experts. Altogether 22 children, youngsters, and young adults between 8 and 20 years who grow up in a rainbow family were interviewed in Germany. In Slovenia, four young persons were interviewed, aged 16 to 23. The respondents were invited through social networks (publication of the invitation on internet places) and via personal networks, with the help of snowball methods. With children and youth that were underage, permission of the parents was obtained first. Cf. Streib, Quadflieg 2011 and Zaviršek, Sobočan 2012.

Despite the fact that these are countries with different socio-economic traditions and legal situations⁶, the interviews with kids in general expressed that they question the sometimes predominant idea about a certain single normality and are able to develop many understandings of normality / what is normal. As we will explain below, we see this as a competence, as it requires the ability of taking a perspective of another (also empathy), being aware of different conceptions of the world and life models and being aware of one's own emotions. Nevertheless, we recognize that this competence comes at the cost of being de-normalised. We use the term de-normalisation to describe the effects of not complying to (hetero) norms, where persons are seen as abnormal through processes or acts of exclusion that mark them as the 'deviant other' (Hark 1999). In this paper we will discuss how the interviewed children and youth describe their understandings of normality and the different ways of how children and youth from rainbow families deal with de-normalisation. The youth's responses to these processes are different kinds of strategies, which testify of the agency of youth in both resisting exclusion and rewriting the norm.

The above quotations from the interviews with youth demonstrate representatively for our research sample how the young respondents negotiate normality with respect to their families which differ from heteronormative models.

As demonstrated also in the quotations above, the young respondents have, albeit to different degrees and in different ways, narrated about their views on normality and difference in relation to the experiences related to their family realities.

Joyce, a ten year-old Afro-German girl lives together with her younger sister Kaya, her mother Anne and her mother's female partner Leonie in a town in Central Germany. Joyce and her sister Kaya have from time to time contact with their father who has lived in France since his divorce from the girls' mother. As she is a black girl living with two white mothers, it happens often in encounters with other people that they suppose the two sisters are adopted. The family has a very critical view on racist discrimination; the parents discuss this issue with the children and support them in dealing with discrimination. However, the fact of being a rainbow family has been lived in a more hidden way, rather than openly shown to neighbours, teachers, classmates, and relatives. Joyce seems to wonder how this could be changed in the future.

6. In Germany, the partnership of same sex persons has been legally recognized since 2001, second-parent adoption has been legally possible since 2005, in 2013 the possibility of second parent adoption was extended and now allows the adoptive parent to share custody with his/her partner so she/he now can be legally recognized as a parent, nevertheless, joint adoption is still not possible for same-sex-couples; but many gay and lesbian families function as foster families to children and youth; the Federal Constitutional Court ruled in June 2013 to end the financial disadvantage of rainbow families and same-sex partnerships. In Slovenia, the legislation is more evasive – in the cases of the few children who currently have two legal parents of the same-sex, this is the case of some kind of legal 'loopholes' and not targeted legal provisions; same-sex couples have been able to register their partnerships since 2006, but have substantially fewer rights than different-sex couples.

Joyce’s statement demonstrates that she recognizes that there are different understandings of what is the norm and what is perceived and labelled as normal. She differentiates between her own, subjective views – “for me it’s normal” – which correspond to her lived experience of her own family reality, and others’ views of what is or can be named ‘family’. Joyce expresses her belief, that if people did not talk about rainbow families at all, they would not actually express the differences and hierarchies between normal and non-normal families: she only ‘realizes’ that she comes from a ‘different’ family, when others bring her attention to that. Joyce’s experience is “*when one doesn’t speak about it*”, there is nothing special about it – nor to feel nor to explain. But “*when they have sometimes asked me*” she adds, “*then it actually again came into my mind*”. For example, when her classmates ask why her father doesn’t live with the family or whether Leonie is her aunt and she has to think of answers and explanations, she is reminded of being different. This assumption might be connected with the fear, that she is perceived as not belonging to the ‘normality’. The formulation “*that I, that we, are a rainbow family, yes one can say so*” we read as a signifier of this fear, but also as an expression of her responsibility and protectiveness towards her family, which might be related to her parents’ cautiousness in regard to revealing their family constellation to the outside world. At the same time, while speaking her mind Joyce seems to become more assertive about using the term ‘rainbow family’ as a suitable expression representing her family and as a ‘conceptual standard’. Finally, her conclusion “*it’s not so often that one comes to this point (in German: “zur Sache kommen”)*, I believe, so, yes it doesn’t often come up” (in German: “zur Sprache kommen”) can be read as a wish not to get into situations in which she feels the need to speak about her family. On the other hand, this phrase might also convey a wish to talk without fear, openly about her family: her two mothers, her sister and her cat. In that sense “*one comes to this point*” (“zur Sache kommen”) could be read as “one shows true colours” (in German: “Farbe bekennen”).

Lara is a seventeen year old young teenager living with her mother, her younger sister and her mother’s female partner in central Slovenia. She was born in a heterosexual relationship as was also her sister. Her mother has fallen in love with B., a woman, and started living with her a few years ago. Lara emphasizes the parental identification over gender and outlines that everything is actually the same as in an ordinary family (except that there are two women). She speaks as an ‘expert’: she has experience from both a family with a mother and father, as well as with a family with two mothers. Still, despite this certainty that everything is the same, she is cautious about labeling: she would not say “*now we’re in a same-sex family*”, but she insists on naming her family simply ‘family’. With this she underlines that verbalizing a difference (‘same-sex family’) implies also that the family will be perceived as inferior or ‘not-proper’ if it’s gender structure will be exposed or emphasised. At the same time she of course admits to a difference – “*Just, there’s my mom, and B., and my sister.*” – but she wants to eradicate the negative effects of the general perception of this difference by de-emphasising the gendered structure of the family and by normalizing it – “*just family*”.

Cristina is a thirteen year old girl, living with her two mothers and her two year older brother Micha in a town in South Germany. Micha and Christina were both conceived by donor insemination. Similarly to Lara, Cristina chooses a reflective approach in explaining her thoughts about her family *“it’s not ‘abnormal’ it’s simply just different, it is not bad, it is completely normal”*. In both phrases she uses double negations which show that she knows about others’ biased opinions and devaluations with respect to LGBT identified people and to families in which lesbian mothers chose anonymous donors. She knows very well from her own experience, that others hold these biased opinions and negative attitudes (that they think them and express them) and for her, it is impossible not to contradict them: her narrative in the interview testifies that she is very decisive in opposing and combating prejudices. In her statement *“it is completely normal like it is”* she emphasizes especially the last three words and with this she underlines that to her, it is her family that is the relevant, concrete, and “normal” basis to grow up and where she feels at ease and comfortable.

Nevertheless, moving back and forth between the different understandings of normality - the one within and the other beyond/outside - might indicate a feeling of tension: on the one hand they see their parents as those, who take care of them, by whom they feel loved, protected, understood and as well as sometimes not understood, irritated, and overstrained. On the other hand they are aware that to the outside world their parents’ identification has been labelled as something special, something which needs to be explained and justified.

All in all, these three young people, regardless of their age difference, their family history, their different nationalities, cultural backgrounds, even skin color, have very clear conceptions of how difference is constructed and how difference always brings about meanings of inferiority, otherness and non-normality.

2 De-normalisation

With the term de-normalisation, we describe the processes by which the children with LGBT identified parents are perceived and constructed as not normal, as classified beyond the hetero-normative normality, which is expressed through the ‘othering’ by others, for example in interactions (as we present with the experiences of the interviewed youth in our research sample). The term exposes and emphasises, that the acts of exclusion and labelling others as different not only construct the image of a particular person, but also re-construct the ideas about the perceived normality. Following the concept of normalisation we suggest the term de-normalisation to emphasise the effects of normalisation. Describing those who do not comply with (hetero) norms as abnormal through processes or acts of exclusion marks them as ‘deviant other’ (Hark 1999). De-normalisation also works to reaffirm existing norms and perceptions of normality (Butler 2009). We use the term de-normalisation to emphasise the regulative power effects of heteronormativity in the context of negotiations of social power, questions of hierarchy and status among peers, and in respect to interpersonal and structural levels in school (teachers and school curriculum) dealing with non-normative formations

such as non-heteronormative families (cf. Streib-Brzič, Quadflieg 2011: 19). In our research we operated with a definition of violence emphasising forms of social aggression expressed not mainly physically, but by verbal and non-verbal attacks on dignity and self-esteem. Such violence included acts of exclusion, insults, and devaluation, as well as evoking feelings of invisibility and of not being symbolically represented, which could be seen as intentional, as well as unintentional forms of discrimination with homophobic connotations. The violence was experienced especially through the social practices of de-normalising within a matrix of heteronormativity⁷

Practices of de-normalisation work precisely through assumptions of certain behaviours, which can silence and make experiences that do not match these assumptions invisible (cf. Streib-Brzič, Quadflieg 2011: 19). In the study, we identified four forms of the de-normalisation processes: a) experience of physical and verbal violence, b) anticipation of violence, c) being asked questions, d) being silenced.⁸

a) Experiences of physical or verbal violence as processes of de-normalisation

None of the children interviewed in our study, neither in Germany, neither in Slovenia, had experienced physical violence which could be related to the fact that they are living in a rainbow family. In Germany three out of 22 children report having experienced verbal violence from other children which they assign to the fact that they are growing up with LGBT parents. Luisa (15) describes a situation of being teased by a girl to whom she had disclosed that her mother loves a woman. This supposedly trustworthy friend went around and spread the news and moreover, she used the information to provoke Luisa, “she made fun of me a bit” as Luisa says. Janne (16) remembers a situation of being picked on by a classmate. Not sure whether her mothers’ being lesbian led to the fact that the girl had bullied her, Janne concluded, that nothing but this could have been the reason. This can be read as a sign how fundamentally the knowledge of de-normalisation has been experienced and is hence anticipated. The third interviewee who reported a harmful incident was Lisa, 12. She described an ongoing situation of being constantly asked by another child in school to answer questions about her mothers who had, exactly at that time, split up.

7. In partial reference to Butler’s (1990) ‘heterosexual matrix’, we use the term ‘matrix of heteronormativity’ as a wider term, taking the focus off sexuality and applying it to a framework including an even more extensive array of practices, as well as relating to the ‘family’ as a heteronormative construct.

8. All these processes with discriminatory effects might also be categorised as homophobic or transphobic violence. The terms homophobia and transphobia describe negative attitudes against people who identify themselves or are seen as lesbian, gay, bisexual or transgender. However, as Herek (2004) states, homophobic attitudes have been – from a deep psychological perspective - conceptualised as an unconscious fear and thus tend to individualise and pathologise the implied processes of devaluation and exclusion. In such conceptualisations, the aspects of hierarchisation and power relations remain largely neglected. The term ‘homophobia’ is widely understood and has been used for initiating alliances and measures against this discriminatory behaviour and effects, but in this paper we introduce a new term in order to elucidate other perspectives of experiencing discrimination.

In all three cases reported in Germany the children described the incidents as situations which could be solved with support and intervention of their parents. It was obvious how important sensitive support is, encouragement as well as clear statements and interventions by parents and how these help the children to deal with the difficult situations: these are undoubtedly significant resilience factors.

In Slovenia, the four interviewed young people formulated the experienced events of violent behaviour in the form of hate speech (derogatory and pejorative statements, but these mostly came from people who were not personally close to the respondents) and explicit 'othering'⁹. The 'othering' was experienced in many forms: they were pitied by their peers (the peers were presupposing that kids growing up without parents of both genders or with parents of the same gender were 'suffering' because of that), their behaviour was sometimes interpreted as a consequence of their family form (when peers wanted to present certain behaviours as unacceptable, weird etc.), or they were generally treated and perceived as different and with that also as 'bad'. The sources of discrimination were not only peers, but also adults in the children's lives (such as also grandparents). We studied the school environments especially close-up and also found examples of harassment by teachers. For example, one of the children had to change school because two teachers treated her badly (interrogated her about the absent father, discriminated her with regard to marking etc.) which led to health problems and problems with school performance.

In general, these results confirm former research. Rupp (2009) as well as Golombok (2004), Gartrell (2005), Gartrell, Boss (2010) and others found that just a few children report incidents of being bullied, picked on, excluded or even beaten up by peers because of having LGBT identified parents. Such results show on the one hand that children from rainbow families are well integrated; usually they have good contacts to peers, make friends and teachers appreciate having them in class. The fact that some experience violence, verbally, psychologically, or physically leads to the necessity to analyse how bullying functions: a group/majority identifies mostly one single person within the group who – in the eyes of the majority – doesn't match because of certain features. These features are actually arbitrarily selected – it depends on the group's attitudes. What needs to be noted here is that it has been recognised in several studies (Kosciew, Diaz, 2008, Klocke 2012, Magić, Janjevak 2013) that teachers have a key role as possible multipliers of prejudices (for example, by ignoring or not reacting to homophobic remarks or by showing their own homophobic attitude with certain statements) – or as multipliers of an understanding of diversity.

b) Anticipation of violence as experiences of de-normalisation

Almost every interviewed child reported having been affected by the phenomenon of de-normalisation – the anticipation of violence. Many children in both countries confessed often or in certain situations to having fear of being teased, excluded, black-mailed, beaten up or threatened. In Germany the intensity of these fears were connected

9. The process of perceiving or portraying someone or something as fundamentally *different* or *alien*; a hierarchisation is involved in this process.

to the atmosphere in school and obvious forms of psychological violence: most of the participants described experiences of bullying in school, rarely as victims, but often as spectators or even as indirect participants. Their fear was thus induced by their previous experiences or experiences of others that they know about, including their parents’ experiences of homophobia. The anticipation of violence is expressed also in the selective choices of whom to tell about the family structure without too great a risk of rejection. The anticipation of rejection, exclusion, name calling or bullying is especially harmful, because it creates a sense of constant threat – which forces children to be continuously aware of the divide between the outside world and the intimacy of their family life.

The fact, that children with whom we conducted interviews in Slovenia had hardly any contacts with peers who live in similar family formations obviously leads to an increasing feeling of insecurity. The scarce sharing of experiences and strategies might have been caused by the lack of disclosure of the LGBT parents / rainbow families, which can now be observed as growing (the younger generations of children have more contact with kids from similar backgrounds). The expectations of negative reactions and violence is such, that some young people would not speak about their family even to their closest friends: one of the respondents in Slovenia shared her story of how long it took her to tell her best friend that she is living with two female carers – only to find out that her best friend also has two mothers and has never talked about that to anyone either. In Slovenia, additionally, out of fourteen interviewed mothers, four also expressed that they fear losing child custody: they expected that if the father would use their sexuality as an argument against the mothers’ full custody, he would probably win his case¹⁰. Also from this perspective (fear of losing custody) the children are coerced into carefully choosing whom they tell – including their own biological parents. Moreover, our study also disclosed an anticipation of negative reactions among school teachers, who would avoid talking about rainbow families (and homosexuality) because they fear being condemned by parents and colleagues as ‘promoters’ of homosexuality (similar results for Slovenia can also be found in: Magić *et al.* 2011, Magić 2012, Kuhar *et al.* 2012).

Such experienced or anticipated violence is not limited to dimensions of physical violence (Neidhardt 1986), or defined only as an intentional act of power with the effect of physical harm (Popitz 1992); we understand it as referring to concepts with a broader definition (see, for example, Popp 2002). This concept includes psychological violence such as relational violence (where harm is caused to one’s relationships or social status). This is a mostly hidden, not an overt, form of violence that can be performed verbally or non-verbally through exclusion, humiliation, damage of reputation (spreading rumours) (Ittel, Salisch 2005), as well as through bullying, which is defined as the systematic mistreating of a person by a single perpetrator or a smaller group over a longer period of time (Schäfer, Herpell 2010).

10. As far as we know, there have been no cases of lost child custody due to a parent’s sexuality in Slovenia –there seem to be no cases of parents filing a claim on that basis. Nevertheless, the interviewed parents’ beliefs about the risks rest on the perceived general attitudes towards homosexuality and the perceived attitudes of social workers, who make the decisions in cases of child custody.

c) Being asked questions

De-normalisation works precisely through assumptions of certain behaviours, which can silence and make invisible experiences that do not match these assumptions. One example of how such assumptions can work is the seemingly innocent strategy of 'just asking' which marks the difference by maintaining a normative position: "*The capacity of ignorance to appear innocent and passive may well be an operation of its power, while the appearance itself of innocence and passivity may be one of its effects.*" (Sullivan 2004: 169). Speech practices are especially frequent and apparent in maintaining this normative position, and as education researcher Kevin K. Kumashiro argues: "*Oppression originates in discourse, and, in particular, in the citing of particular discourses, which frame how people think, feel, act, and interact. In other words, oppression is the citing of harmful discourses and there petition of harmful histories.*" (Kumashiro 2000: 40). With various speech acts, such as name-calling, asking questions, positioning, insulting, pitying, othering etc. de-normalisation is enacted in interaction and what is 'normal' or 'correct' is reinforced.

Those, growing up in rainbow families seem to be constantly reminded of the uncommonness of their daily reality. One of the ways in which children and youth realise and are again and again faced with the message that they are different is by having to answer questions that are not posed to children from heteronormative families: Do you really have two fathers; how is it possible to have two mums, how does that 'work'; who/where is your father then, etc. Children and youth reported being continuously and without any real interest being asked about their family, were having their biological and social family conditions discredited, were being identified with the sexual orientation of their parents etc. These questions not only involve questioning the authenticity and 'acceptability' of their family reality, but are sometimes or often experienced also as questioning their own personal authenticity, integrity and veracity of their statements. Mona (8), one of the young respondents in Germany, expresses a similar thought. When the interviewers asked her why she thought she is asked the same questions several times, she replied, that the others just cannot believe her answers, "*maybe they think I once would have another answer*" (Mona).

In contrast to adults who sometimes find it surprising that others, such as teachers, show so little interest in their family reality¹¹, the interviewed youth and children feel that they are often being asked repetitive and sometimes senseless and disinterested questions, which can quickly turn into interrogation and insults and forces them into providing (self-)justifications. Children and youth are happy to answer questions, as long as they express real interest, and as long as they feel they are in control of the

11. The fact of not being asked about their family was described by almost all interviewed parents in both countries. They feel the neighbours and other parents hesitate to ask details about their family constellation (who is the sperm donor, how do they explain their family constellation to their child) and about organizing their everyday family life (who is responsible for housework chores, do both work part time). The missing questions are mostly considered as a lack of interest and less frequently considered as an idea that people are simply uncertain of what and how to ask.

situation and can decide themselves how much and what kind of information they will share, or end the discussion. Some youth, like Vid (17) from Slovenia, also experienced being pitied by others: the message Vid got from some of his peers was that he obviously suffers because he has two mothers and that the others feel sorry for him, for this ‘terrible’ situation (Zaviršek, Bercht 2012).

d) Being silenced

Often simultaneously with the ‘just asking’ scenarios, children and youth from rainbow families experience also being silenced, and their family reality remaining invisible in social contexts (for example in school – discussions in the classroom, schoolbooks, at family-events or celebrations such as ‘mothers-day’). Especially in Slovenia, the children and youth reported rainbow families, even homosexuality as completely absent in the school curricula (or at least never framed in the context of family life, love, care etc.), which can be seen as systematic structural silencing, contributing to de-normalisation of rainbow families. Youth said they would feel more supported and included if they would be able to see and hear about various kinds of family realities in school, including those, similar to their own. Not that children and youth would want to become or be exposed themselves, but they felt that debates and images of the diversity would also serve as an affirmation of the ‘normality’ of their own lives and raise acceptance among their peers. At the same time, also at the interpersonal level, some would experience silencing as a hurtful way of their reality being devalued and marginalized.

Najda (21) from Slovenia talked about how all her peers and the community knew that her father was gay, but no one ever talked about it with her: except derogatory remarks, no space was opened for her to talk about her reality, to share her experience and feelings with others (cf. Zaviršek 2012). This ignorance and silencing functioned as a devaluation of a specific, lived reality and contributed to de-normalisation. Amelie in the German study reports, that even the teacher who was informed about her family (her two mothers had introduced themselves to all of the teachers as Amelie’s parents) asked her when she painted a family picture, why she wrote on the painting that there are two mums. Amelie explained that this is because she has two moms. “Then”, says Amelie “she remembered that I am the one” (in German: “fiel ihr ein, dass ich das ja bin”). Such situations of ‘having forgotten’ bring the children into a position to repeat and remind others about their family (if they do not want to consent to silencing). In any case such situations evoke the impression of not being seen and recognised. Similar experiences have been reported by other children and youth.

3 Strategies for dealing with de-normalisation

To avoid, prevent, or reduce the impacts of de-normalisation processes the children and youth developed different strategies, which we categorize into two groups: one involving disclosure and concealment and one involving verbalisations and justifications. The strategies we have identified in our study through the analysis of the respondents’ narratives in the interviews can be seen as confident acts of self-positioning and agency. This perspective is based on the systemic view and stresses the idea that social inter-

actions and relationships are not fixed but dynamic. Social relations and the therein existing hierarchies are seen as processes which involve continuous negotiations and depend on the interactions between the different actors (Watzlawick *et al.*, 1969). The strategies we identified can be categorised as (1) firstly efforts with which the children show that they fit into the normality, (2) secondly variants of reactions and constructive delineation when a child or youth encounters devaluation and (3) thirdly attempts to rewrite and redefine the attribution of 'being different' coming from the outside world.

3.1. "I don't rub it in everyone's nose" (Janne, 16) – Strategies of disclosure and concealment

How to speak about their family and explicitly about their parents' LGBT identification in their environment, with peers and friends in school seem to be for the majority of our young respondents in both countries one of the most emotionally charged topics. As discussed above they are well aware of homophobic attitudes and have experiences of de-normalisation in society, and so they think very carefully about processes of disclosure. They consider and with caution check whom they can trust among their classmates, friends, or teachers. They usually spend a considerable amount of time to find out who of these would with great probability accept the information with real interest and respect and – also very importantly – how could one at the same time be sure that those who possibly would devalue their family would not get to know it. Jean-Marie, an eight-year-old boy in the German study describes this balancing act as follows: *"so, one can tell it, but one doesn't need to, so, one can say, for example, when you were on holidays, you don't need to hide it. Except when there is a mean one in class, please don't tell them, because then – you will be picked on or so. And not to the friends of the mean one, because they then tell it to the mean one (laughs)"*.

The dilemma of how to choose the right moment, the right situation, the right content and suitable words is expressed also by Mona (8): *"just to tell everything right away is actually not so good"* she says. With stressing "everything" she refers to the fact that she was conceived by donor-insemination. She states clearly that this is an intimate detail of her life which needs to be protected against any disrespectful comments. Leander (11) concludes: *"later one can tell it just to everybody"*. When Leander says "later" it means that it remains an undetermined and vague point in the future. This can be read as a sign of on the one hand the wanting to be sure that the openness doesn't bring along any risks and on the other hand the wish *"one could just tell"* and how he adds even *"everybody"*.

Most children and youth decided only to talk about their special family constellation when they were directly asked. Amelie (11) summarises her strategy in the following way: *"I tell, when someone asks me about it"*. Similar statements we found among Slovenian respondents – Vid (17) for example said: *"It is true that it's not the first thing I say when it comes up. If I don't have to tell [them], I don't [tell them]. If it happens to come up, or if someone asks, then of course I tell [them], I don't hide it. [...] Yeah, if someone asks me directly if I have two moms, I'll say yeah, I have two moms. But otherwise I won't."* (quoted also in Zaviršek, Bercht 2012). Children and youth balance on the one side the authenticity and veracity about their family life, while also selectively share

information in order to protect their family and themselves against homophobia. The consent to silencing is actually cautiousness which functions as a coping strategy, and it was most present among very young children and young adults. Among the former possibly because of how developed their self-conceptualisations already are and because of how confident they feel in social interactions, and among the latter possibly because of factors such as how their family was constructed (often, these generations also have a recognized biological father or were even conceived in a heterosexual relationship), how ‘out’ their parents are to the outside world and how supported they are in disclosing their family reality. In Slovenia, Nadja was remembering how she dealt with disclosure when she was younger, less confident in herself and without support from her parents or other adults. *“I invented a story for myself: ‘if you tell [them], they’ll be mean’, something like that. So that was that fear, and shame. Constantly hiding something wasn’t easy, no.”* Notably, Nadja minimizes her fear (cf. also Zaviřšek, Bercht 2012) and her ‘right to be cautious and insecure’ by presenting it as ‘invented’.

Children – mostly teenagers – that feel equipped to address uncertainty about dealing with disclosure, have demonstrated that they approach it head on. They were explaining that they feel better being always direct and clear *“right open, making no secret at all out of it”* as Cristina, a 13 year old girl from Germany states. Those who developed and applied such an active strategy, report that they are convinced that the normality they experience inside the family should be identically expressed to the outside. If they would hesitate to talk freely about their parents’ being lesbian, gay, bisexual or queer, they conclude, they would support and agree to the de-normalisation processes. Moreover, they formulate that they feel even stronger to take an active initiative role by speaking and telling before others ask instead of waiting for being confronted with questions. In Slovenia, in the recent times, parents are taking such an active role and choose to disclose their family reality immediately (in kindergarten, school and elsewhere): thus it can be expected that in the following years or decade, some of their children might take on the same strategy and discourse, as they will have models to look to, that have not yet really existed until now.

It may seem that only such an active role addresses also structural inequalities on the societal (not only interpersonal) level. Nevertheless, it can be claimed that also the strategy characterised by caution should be recognised and appreciated as an active approach which mirrors the attempt / the desire to protect one’s own family. A family in which one feels wanted, loved and supported presents an experience which one does not want to put at risk of being questioned and devalued.

3.2. “How does this work, two mothers?” – Strategies of verbalization and justification

All of the interviewed children report that as soon as they disclose their family background (or as soon as someone else discloses it) they are confronted with a lot of questions. Often, they feel that these questions do not express real interest, and that the one asking is actually using / abusing his or her questions as an *“instrument of power”* to use Cristina’s word. This happens when the same questions are asked several

times by the same person, when the person doesn't 'understand' or doesn't 'remember' etc. Such interrogations are usually experienced as being questioned as a person (for example, one's 'normality', credibility, etc.) and/or in the familial relationship to their parents and siblings being questioned (for example, one's 'true' relatedness to one's brothers or sisters or one actually having two mothers or two fathers).

The strategies some children and youth have developed and employ for such situations consist of firstly the ability to evaluate whether the person who asks questions actually shows any real interest with his or her questions or uses them as teasing or even humiliating; secondly, a smart, humorous, ironical, or any kind of sharp-tongued reaction which surprises and silences the other person and thirdly, the (inner) permission and courage to end a conversation which ignored/disregarded their boundaries.

Cristina, reports that the most offending and annoying question for her was: "*how were you actually created, how can that be, where is your father?*". She says that if someone is really interested in that, then of course she likes to talk about it and also to explain how she was conceived by insemination and born to her mothers, but doesn't know her donor. The latter does not matter to her, but causes a lot of questions: "*I tell it to everyone, but [...] well, if they actually have no interest at all in it [...] then I don't say anything about it, then I say, I am there, I am here and it actually doesn't matter now*". Mona reports that when she talks about her two mothers others might comment "*that's not even possible*" to have two mothers but no father. She explains that she has developed a short but effective answer to it. She just replies: "*that works very well*". Usually, she reports, this phrase ended the discussion.

Obviously the effectiveness of these strategies (as described in 3.1 and 3.2) depends substantially on the children's attitude, their standing, and self-conception. As the resilience research shows this attitude can to a great extent be influenced and strengthened by parents, relatives, or other attachment figures (Welter-Enderlin, Hildenbrand, 2006; Bos, van Balen, 2008).

Janne describes by whom she feels inspired to deal with difficult situations: "*so somehow I have it from my mum, always I've learned a cool saying and so, because she is herself always like this, she can always say something immediately, and I am always quick to say something [...] and then it is alright*." Again, this statement shows how important it is also for older teenagers to have parents standing behind them and supporting them – and also offering examples or figuring as experts in developing suitable (re)actions.

As the Slovenian research findings show, it is especially difficult for those children and youth, whose parents have decided to silence the issue of sexuality and partnership even inside the family. Nadja's (19) mother, for example, never spoke about the homosexuality of her father or attempted to explain to the children what is actually happening; some of the parents reported that they did not tell the children anything yet. Nevertheless, all stories of 'coming out' of parents to the children were 'successful' ones: children were happy to receive 'explanations' of relationships and behaviours and this would equip them to verbalize and position themselves when confronted with questions. The role and impact of parental input is seen also in Lara's (17) statement:

“We live by the principle that it’s okay, if someone finds out, they should find out, we don’t care about their opinion. Okay, if they’re cool with it, if they’re not cool with it that’s their problem. You could say that everybody whom we would like to know already knows, so we don’t need to have special talks about whom to tell. Except if there’s a kind of problem [...] We told them to tell the person to stop it or something like that” (Lara, 17) (quoted also in Zaviršek, Bercht 2012). Lara’s example shows that own positioning and justifications are based primarily on the family as a collective that is foremost depend on the parents. The children quite often adopt the narrative of the family / parents, which defines the disclosure strategies and verbalisation strategies (‘we live by the principle’), as is as well the ‘shield’ against negative reactions and homophobia (‘we tell them to stop’).

Lara refers to the collective when talking ‘in general’ and demonstrates the importance of parental messages and resilience to develop one’s own in social interactions. She also presents the reiteration of normality in her own ‘peer community’: *“I was with my friends at a store and we were complaining about our parents, how they’re always bugging us and typical teenager stuff, and then my friend said, “you know, I’ve got a totally crazy situation, way more totally crazy than you!” And I said, yeah, what could be that crazy? Yeah, my mom has a girlfriend. And I said: “Aha, ok, mine has a girlfriend, too!” And then I looked at the third friend, and she says, “are you serious?” “Yeah, I’m serious!” She was a little afraid of what I was going to say.” (Lara).* Among her peers – friends, the normal is actually ‘crazy’: the more crazy it is, the more ‘normal’ it actually is. Hence, her friend, who also has two mothers describes her family situation as ‘crazy’: this makes it ‘normal’ and ‘real’. Even more importantly, the ‘coming out’ discussion is positioned among the ‘normal’ issues – ‘complaining about parents’. This is, all and all, much more relevant for all children and youth: not the sexuality of their parents, but actually the relationships with their parents, the reality of their family as a unit of people who care for each other, have conflicts and love each other.

4 Conclusions

Research we conducted in Germany and Slovenia with children and youth from rainbow families shows how children and youth are on the one hand – even though none of our respondents reported experiencing physical violence – exposed to de-normalisation processes (for example: being questioned about their family constellation, kinship to their non-biological parent, silencing or devaluing of LGBT identities), but also how they competently deal with it and develop strategies that equip them to do so. As long as there are conflicting views about homosexuality, bi-sexual and transgender identities we can also expect conflicting judgements about rainbow families.¹² Nevertheless, more importantly than that, this research demonstrates that the interviewed children and youth

12. Because we don’t talk about the experiences of families with trans parents in this paper, we also don’t discuss the trans identities in the framework of rainbow families, but refer to what is socially most visible – clear messages of the parents’ homosexual relationship.

are resilient to the processes of de-normalisation (as to other forms of ‘othering’). As children and youth have an active part in social interactions they are not simply passive recipients of negative or positive responses, inputs or discourses. As agents in social interaction, they are also tied to other agents: and how they are able to develop their resilience and competence is influenced also by others. One important result is that parents play a decisive role in strengthening resilience: when the children experience their family as a safe, caring space and feel their parents standing behind them and providing them with expertise to address de-normalisation not only younger but also older children experience that as relief and support. Secondly, other important adults in their school-lives have an influence on to which extent the children are exposed to de-normalisation: teachers in school, who are vital in the sense of either introducing the images of diverse family life, of responding to homophobia in school and creating school as a safe, inclusive space, or either in ignoring violence and discrimination (and allowing it) and supporting silencing and ‘othering’ of certain realities. Most of the respondents (both parents and youth) emphasise the importance of giving greater attention to diverse family forms and LGBT identities in the school curriculum. The comparison of the proposed recommendations of the interviewed children and youth, as well as the parents show that there was great consistency in assessing that schools should be more engaged and prepared for the issues concerning rainbow families and their different experiences. This also means that school books and pedagogical materials should include the realities of diverse family formations and sexual identities. Thirdly, peers should not be viewed as only potential threats or dangers (as they are often represented by opponents of rainbow families), but also as a strong source of support and affirmation. An especially important element for feeling supported and secure in their environment for children growing up in rainbow families is when their classmates and friends know other LGBT identified adults or children with same-sex parents. This fundamental finding can be used for developing measures in counteracting prejudices and de-normalisation practices. All in all, children and youth are not as much threatened or vulnerable to de-normalisation; they are vulnerable only if they stand completely alone against it.

In their dealing with de-normalisation, children and youth from rainbow families do not simply ‘protect’ their own family or defend their own personal rights and authenticity, but are also active agents of social change. In their interactions with others they are actively contributing to a broadening of the conceptualizations of family life that we generally hold and finally contribute to a democratization of our society.

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SILENCE OR CONDEMNATION: THE ORTHODOX CHURCH ON HOMOSEXUALITY IN SERBIA¹

ABSTRACT: The article deals with the representation of the gay population in the discourse of the Serbian Orthodox Church. The declarations of Church bodies and officials, as well as unofficial public statements of prominent believers regarding gay persons are analysed. There is an ambivalent attitude towards gay people that is usually expressed in the 'hate the sin, love the sinner' formula. There is also a different kind of ambivalence: the Serbian Orthodox Church as well as its faithful either stick to the 'policy of silence' regarding LGBT(Q) issues, or they resort to a very strong moralistic judgment and condemnation. This was particularly noticeable around the time of the gay parade taking place in Belgrade in 2010, as well as during the public discussion before the passing of the anti-discrimination law in the national assembly in 2009. The inclusion of philosophical and medical concepts in theological discourse can also be ascertained. As a result, besides the expected 'sin', the categories of 'unnatural/contrary to nature' and '(mental) illness' are often mentioned in the Church discourse, which is usually saturated with accentuated anti-Westernism.

KEY WORDS: gay population, Serbian Orthodox Church, ambivalent attitude, moralistic condemnation

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Tišina ali obsodba: pravoslavna cerkev o homoseksualnosti v Srbiji

IZVLEČEK: Članek se ukvarja z reprezentacijami gejevske populacije v diskurzu Srbske pravoslavne cerkve. Analizirane so izjave cerkvenih organov in uradnikov ter neuradne javne izjave uglednih vernikov o homoseksualnih osebah. Opazen je ambivalenten odnos do istospolno usmerjenih ljudi, ki je običajno izražen s formulo »Sovraži greh, ljubi grešnika«. Obstaja tudi drugačna oblika ambivalentnosti: Srbska pravoslavna cerkev se, enako kot njeni verniki, drži bodisi »politike tišine« v zvezi z vprašanji LGBT(Q) bodisi se zateka k zelo močnim moralističnim obsodbam. To je bilo zlasti opazno med gejevsko parado, ki je potekala v Beogradu leta 2010, kot tudi v javni razpravi pred sprejemom protidiskriminacijske zakonodaje v državnem zboru leta 2009. Članek izpostavlja vključitev filozofskih in medicinskih pojmov v teološki diskurz. Kot rezultat tega se poleg pričakovane kategorije »greha« v cerkvenem diskurzu pojavljata še kategoriji »nenaravno/v nasprotju z naravo« in »(duševna) bolezen«, oboje pa je postavljeno v kontekst protizahodnih idej.

KLJUČNE BESEDE: gejevska populacija, Srbska pravoslavna Cerkev, ambivalenten odnos, moralna obsodba

1 Introduction

In contemporary Serbia, both religion and sexual diversity have gained great public importance. Before the 1980s, religion was almost totally absent from the public space in the former Yugoslavia. With the “national revival”, which peaked in the armed conflict in the 1990s, the region witnessed the “comeback” of Orthodoxy, Catholicism and Islam in Serbia, Croatia and Bosnia, respectively (Perica 2002). Although traces of desecularization of Serbian society can be seen in the past few years, the Church remains among the most trusted institutions (Blagojević 2008; 2011; 2012; Gallup Balkan Monitor 2010) and religion appears as an unquestionable identification marker.

Less than a year after the fall of the Milošević regime, the first attempt to organize a Pride Parade in the Serbian capital on 30 June 2001 failed. The main reason for this was a violent attack on Pride participants in the centre of Belgrade. Both LGBT and any “suspiciously” looking people were severely beaten. Thugs, mainly football fans but also students of theology and “other Orthodox youth”, were led by the priest Žarko Gavrilović (Milosavljević 2001). Two initiatives to organize the Parade, in 2004 and 2009, were called off for security reasons. On 10 October 2010, the first, and so far the only successful Pride Parade took place, and this “was seen as a watershed in the history of LGBT rights in Serbia” (Mikuš 2011: 841), bringing to light the deep divide between traditionalist and modernist social forces.

Since the Church occupies an important position in society, it greatly affects the attitudes of the people. Therefore, an insight into this religious institution’s positions

on homosexuality may prove useful in understanding the general public's negative opinion and prejudices² against same-sex love.

This paper deals with the representations of the gay and lesbian³ population in the discourse of the Serbian Orthodox Church. The press releases of the Church authorities, public announcements by bishops, priests, monks and nuns, as well as statements by prominent believers⁴ regarding homosexuality are analysed. The research (content analysis) was conducted on the material which consisted of: a) monographs on Orthodoxy and an Encyclopedia of Orthodoxy written by Serbian theologians (3 items); b) columns from *Pravoslavlje (Orthodoxy) - The Newspaper of the Serbian Patriarchate*⁵ from 2001 to 2012 (13 items); c) texts from *NIN (Nedeljne informativne novine - Weekly informational newspaper)*⁶ from 2001 to 2012 that addressed the relation between religion and homosexuality in Serbia (6 items); d) articles containing illustrative statements by Church members from the Serbian daily newspapers *Politika*, *Večernje novosti*, *Blic* and *Alo!* (4 items); and e) communiqués from the internet portal of the Serbian Orthodox Church (www.spc.rs) (6 items).

2 Church's frameworks for dealing with homosexuality

Our analysis shows that the contemporary Serbian Orthodox Church deals with homosexuality in three ways: homosexuality is either not addressed at all (policy of silence), it is dealt with in an ambivalent manner (hate the sin, love the sinner) or it is interpreted as a provocation coming from the West. However, when the Church feels provoked, silence and ambiguity give way to overt hostility, manifested in interpretations of homosexuality either as a deviation from the laws of nature or as an attack on the Serbian nation and its morals.

2.1. Awkward silence

The announcement and the very event of Belgrade's Gay Pride in October 2010 have triggered a massive reaction on the side of both the Serbian Orthodox Church officials

2. On homophobia in Serbia see: Gay Straight Alliance & CeSID 2010.

3. Although there are references to both gays and lesbians, statements concerning male homosexuals are much more prominent.

4. Public figures, such as artists, scientists, philosophers, and others, who openly declare as Orthodox Christians and advocate church agenda. The attitudes and acts of the far right or clerical-fascist organisations (such as *Obraz*) will not be discussed in this paper. This also applies to the writings of the Orthodox "moral crusaders": Žarko Gavrilović, who published the book *Stampede Satanista (Stampede of the Satanists)* in 2010, or Ratibor Đurđević, the author of the booklet *Pederska Brigada (Queer Brigade)*, 1997).

5. The Church's bi-monthly journal intended for the general public, first time published in 1967.

6. A magazine with esteemed reputation that deals with political, social and cultural issues in Serbia, first time published in 1935. During January-March 2011, a six-part feuilleton »Serbian Orthodox Church in the New Century« was published in *NIN*, with one part dedicated to the Church's sexual ethics.

and their prominent believers, who otherwise tend to stick to the “policy of silence”⁷ regarding homosexuality, or ignore it, as advised by the Patriarch Irinej in his official address regarding the announcement of the Gay Pride in 2011: “In this particular case we hold that it is most suitable to treat the participants of the pride with total disregard. That could sober them up”⁸ (Irinej 2011). In his statement given to the Serbian tabloid paper *Alo!*, the Patriarch used somewhat harsher language: “This ‘pride’ should by all means be ignored, and I invite people not to be on the streets during the event and in that way, through disregard, to react to this *stupidity*”⁹ (Papović, Petrović & Dakić 2011, emphasis M. J.).

The above mentioned policy of silence is best illustrated with the following finding: homosexuality is not cited in any of the encyclopaedic or monograph publications that deal with Orthodoxy, whose authors are monks, priests or theologians from Serbia. Thus the three-volume *Enciklopedija pravoslavlja (Encyclopaedia of Orthodoxy)*, an ambitiously comprehensive work published in Belgrade in 2002 with Dimitrije Kalezić as its editor-in-chief, makes no direct references to concepts of sexuality, let alone “homosexuality”, in two thousand pages and among 14,000 discussed notions. It can be noted as a comparison that *The Oxford Dictionary of The Christian Church* contains this exact entry (see: Cross 1997: 786). Neither does *The Orthodox Church in 21st Century* by the late Radovan Bigović (2009) discuss the issue. Same-sex affection is, however, mentioned in the translated monographs by two foreign authors: in *The Orthodox Church (Pravoslavna crkva)* by Timothy Ware (Ver 2001) and in the identically titled monograph by Olivier Clément (Kleman 2001), although “homosexuality” is mentioned only in passing in the latter.

In a quite different manner, again as a comparison, *The Orthodox Church: An Introduction to its History, Doctrine, and Spiritual Culture*, by John Anthony McGuckin (which has not been translated into Serbian yet), contains comparatively more references to the issue of sexual nonconformity with a compassionate tone, and use of terms such as: “consolation”, “grace”, “affection”, “support” and “encouragement” (see: McGuckin 2008: 423-424). There is not only an absence of silence in McGuckin’s account, but a detailed and understanding elaboration of the subject, which goes to show that this kind of treatment is possible inside the Orthodox milieu. This, further, tells us that the belittling attitude towards homosexuality is not in itself a necessary or unavoidable

7. “Orthodoxy does not debate this issue (homosexuality - M. J.), nor does it feel the necessity to pronounce it, taking the position that silence is better than condemnation” (Brown and Anatolios 2009: 132). “Orthodoxy attempts to stifle discussion of gay issues in the WCC (World Council of Churches - M. J.)” (Newlands 2006: 97 n3). On sexuality being a non-issue for the Orthodox see: World Council of Churches 1999.

8. Statements provided in the main text are author’s translations into English, except when noted otherwise. Their original Serbian versions can be found in the respective sources in the list of references at the end of the paper.

9. Translated by Zorica Mršević.

feature of Orthodox theology¹⁰, but, perhaps, of theologians coming from the specific social and cultural backgrounds ridden with homophobic affectations.

2.2 Ambivalent attitudes

The ambivalence towards the phenomenon of homosexuality, on the other hand, is evident in various comments and statements (Bogosavljević 2005; Cvetković *et al.* 2010; Čalija 2010a, 2010b; Đorđević and Sokić 2002; Irinej 2010). It can be observed that the attitude of the believers oscillates between the strict moralistic condemnation and compassionate evangelical love, and it is best formulated in the phrase: “hate the sin, love the sinner”. The attitude’s tone, intensity and its ideological saturation clearly position it within the frame of traditionalist¹¹ forces in present-day Serbia that strongly oppose the processes of modernisation, postulating conservatism as a response to social crisis, uncertainty and devastating consequences of an ongoing transition.

2.3 Provocations and obtrusions from the modern West

Mainstream religion in Serbia regards the issues related to LGBT community to be the topic which is imposed from abroad (Western Europe and America) and “essentially trivial” (Irinej 2010: 5). Drawing attention to issues pertaining to discrimination of gays and lesbians is perceived by some as “promotion” or “advertising” of homosexuality and forceful westernisation of Eastern Orthodox societies and cultures. Bringing up this topic is considered as “imposed by the ‘decadent West’” (Tucić 2011: 45)¹². This is also in line with the ever growing¹³ attitude present in Serbia regarding the European Union and the West as having “dubious and ludicrous moral standards” and being “a true danger to tradition” (Spencer-Dohner 2008). It is worth stressing that quite similar attitudes are present in the Romanian Orthodox Church (Stan 2010: 42), as well as other Eastern Christian Churches, as a renowned Greek sociologist of religion notes: anti-Westernism is a widespread phenomenon in the Orthodox world today, particularly

10. “The source of Orthodox intolerance is not to be found in the New Testament” (Ramet 2006b: 172).

11. Compared to Western Christian denominations, Orthodoxy appears to be a religious system more bound to tradition and the past (see: Makrides 2012; Ramet 2006b).

12. Illustrative of this is the reaction of Patriarch Irinej to the exhibition of photographs *Ecce homo* by Elisabeth Ohlson Wallin in Belgrade in October 2012: “This is a shame, this is terrible, this is a scandal!” (S. S. & J. R. 2012: 23). The Patriarch wrote a letter to the Prime Minister seeking prohibition of this “deeply insulting” event (Irinej 2012). The controversial exhibition consisted of 12 photographs of New Testament scenes, in modern surroundings, portraying Jesus among homosexuals, trans people, leather people and people with AIDS. Ohlson Wallin “proceeds from the fact that Jesus accepted the rejected and helped them, so she, as a believer, asks how it is that today a war in his name is waged against the LGBT population” (S. S. & J. R. *ibid.*).

13. *Balkan Monitor* polls show a steady decrease of EU support in Serbia in the 2006-2010 period (Gallup Balkan Monitor - 2010 Summary of Findings: 16), and the recent polls show that the support of the Serbian public for the EU accession process is the lowest in the past 10 years (Pekušić 2013).

in Eastern and South-Eastern Europe, expressed by numerous actors, manifested at various levels and operating in different contexts, religious and otherwise (Makrides 2009).

In his address regarding the announcement of the forthcoming Gay Pride event in 2011, the Serbian Patriarch Irinej stated that “[w]e have had enough of humiliation and meeting external expectations. This unnatural freedom offered to us by ‘the gay pride’ is strange to our history, tradition and culture” (Irinej 2011). The Metropolitan of Montenegro and the Littoral Amfilohije Radović explicitly links homosexuality with modern civilisation, defining it as “something imposed by modernity”, and in that way invoking “the myth about a Western conspiracy against Serbia” (Stakić 2011: 56).

3 The resolute response of the traditional East

When feeling provoked, the Serbian Orthodox Church ceases the “silent treatment” of homosexuality, and indifference gives way to overt hostility and often insulting denunciation – a (common) feature of the post-socialist condition. During the days of socialist regimes

antireligious state policies have managed to tone down the moral zeal of most Orthodox Churches in Eastern Europe, which had to recognise that a tough stance on sexual behaviour and family issues could alienate a population that was already drawn away from the church by secularisation, modernisation, urbanisation, and the policies of an atheistic state. (Stan 2010: 42)

After the demise of socialism, Churches returned “with a vengeance” and re-entered the public space with vocal demands for restoring traditional morality and practices. Such moralistic fashion is ascertained by the Greek Metropolitan John Zizioulas (Ζηζιούλας). According to him, the main feature of this trend is giving primacy to adherence to moral laws over other elements present in the Church and an emphasis on social activism and Puritan piety “with almost exclusive emphasis on sexual morality” (Zizioulas *s.a.*). The rhetoric of “brimstone and fire” is used in condemning gay people, prominently utilised by the Metropolitan Amfilohije, who writes about the Gay Pride in Belgrade held in 2010, in this vigorous manner:

Something terrible happened yesterday in Belgrade. Never had something that terrible happened before in Belgrade. (...) It is terrible, as the event that took place today poisons; and it is dictated by today’s strongmen of the world. That is something that destroys not only the body itself but also the spiritual organism, the spirit of the folk, denies human life, and desecrates the holiness of the human body, human spirit, community, and leads to nothingness and self-destruction. (Amfilohije 2010b: 17)

In the second article published in the same issue of *Pravoslavljje*¹⁴, the Metropoli-

14. It was issue 1046 from October 15 2010, with the following headline on the cover page: “Obraz Beograda mora da bude svetao!” (“The Honour of Belgrade has to be Bright!”) - which are the words of major Dragutin Gavrilović from the speech delivered to Serbian troops who were defending Belgrade from the invading German and Austrian armies in 1915). An article with the identical title did not discuss the Gay Pride directly, and one could get the impression that the editorial board of the magazine pretended to be ignorant of the recent events - the fact that the Pride had been held five days before and that it was marked by an outburst of violence caused

tan labels the Gay Pride as “a parade of shame and embarrassment”. A year earlier, in 2009, he labelled the event as “a parade of Sodom and Gomorrah” (Milićević *et al.* 2010: 52), by making use of the Old Testament’s symbolism of Sodom and Gomorrah, this time adding the New Testament metaphor of “the tree that does not bear fruit” (and is to be cut down, destroyed and cast into the fire; see: Matthew 3:10, 7:19; Luke 13:6-9) – which, according to Stakić (2011: 56) “represents a rather explicit call for violent intervention”. Similarly, professor Žarko Trebješanin, a psychologist, claims that the Metropolitan Amfilohije encouraged violent right-wingers “to crush the sinning, and by repeated mentioning of Sodom and Gomorrah, he practically called them to violence” (Mršević 2013: 66). For male homosexuality (“muželoštvo”¹⁵) Amfilohije stated that it represents: “a) desecration and abuse of human nature and its God-given potentials, b) violence against the moral order of things, c) observed more closely, it is a conscious or unconscious human impulse for self-destruction” (Amfilohije 2010a: 6-7). An apocalyptical motif is also present in his (hate) speech as he sees the Gay Pride as the announcement of no less than the “twilight” of the Western civilisation and the “fall” of Christian peoples (Amfilohije 2010a: 8). It is also worth noting that he puts the entire blame on the violence escalating around the Gay Pride in Belgrade on the organisers, “these godless perverse people” (Amfilohije 2010b: 16). He continued with moral(istic) crusading in his Christmas Epistle from 2013 where, after reusing the barren tree metaphor, spoke of “unnatural, mindless and futile inflaming of male for male and female for female”, while positioning “homosexuality”¹⁶ in the context of the “new totalitarianism of mindless drives” that, as he believes, leads man to chaos,

by the far right-wing groups (at the forefront of which was *Obratz*). Still, by using the given title and relying on its allegorical meaning, the magazine obviously sided with “the defenders of the purity of the Serbian nation”. Additionally, this issue of the magazine contained a number of articles dealing with homosexuality - the statement of the Holy Assembly of Bishops regarding the announcement of the gay parade in Belgrade, the interview with Amfilohije “Kolo smrti na ulicama Beograda” (“The Circle of Death on the Streets of Belgrade”), “Jedan pastirski osvrt na homoseksualnost” (“A Shephard’s View on Homosexuality”) by Thomas Hopko, the plea of priests from Niš “Homoseksualnost je neprirodna i grešna” (“Homosexuality is Unnatural and Sinful”), Miodrag Popović’s Prayer from the Saint Sava Temple “Sve mi je dozvoljeno...” (“I am allowed everything...”), Amfilohije’s speech “Nasilje obezboženih ljudi stvara drugo nasilje” (“The violence of Infidels Prompts more Violence”), as well as the interview with Zorica Kuburović “Moje ‘ne’ promociji duševne bolesti” (“A ‘No’ to the Promotion of Mental Illness on my Behalf”) - so one could safely claim that № 1046 of the magazine *Pravoslavlje* focused on the issue of homosexuality.

15. *Muželoštvo* is the Church Slavonic translation of the Greek term *arsenokoîtai* (ἀρσενικοῖται) which is used by St. Paul in 1 Cor 6:9. The word most probably comes from the Corinthian slang of that time. Old Latin translation is *masculorum concubitores* – “male bedfellows”. “Muž” is “man” or “male” in Church Slavonic, and “lož” refers to “sleeping” or “lying down”, therefore *muželožnik* is “the man who lies with men”.
16. The term *homosexuality* is incorrect, because it does not aim at denoting a doctrine, movement or an artistic style, but one of the varieties of sexuality, thus: *homosexuality*. Besides, if *homosexuality* was the right term, we would speak of *homosexualists*, not *homosexuals*.

death and nothingness, renders consecrated sanctity of marriage pointless, destroys family, abolishes monogamy, and in the name of individual sexual satisfaction transforms a mother's womb from the workshop of life to the workshop of death, legalises all sexual depravities making them into a business worth billions (Amfilohije 2013). Similarly, Žarko Vidović, an "orthodox philosopher" sees the Pride as a "declaration of war", and even as a "genocide" to which he responds "with the defence of the family as a true Church"¹⁷, while recommending harsh punishment of excommunication from the Church community for gay people, whom he also labels "pathetic", for "[t] here is no remorse for those who want to subject to ridicule what God created such as the power of humans to give birth to children" (S. T.L. 2010: 11).

The prioress of the monastery Sokolice in Kosovo, Mother Makarija Obradović labels homosexuality as:

"a severe disease of human personality", and a homosexual person as "an abomination before God", a person with diminished physical and human qualities, a potentially sick person, if otherwise such a person has not already been "awarded with incurable AIDS". "The Serbian Orthodox Church has methods to deal with this phenomenon if such cases appear within the ranks of priests and monks, but such examples *do not exist among us*", the Mother asserts confidently, by adding that *such cases might exist in other religions*. (Nikoletić 2011a: 37, emphasis M. J.)

The surprisingly belligerent tone used by the cloistress and reference to "methods of dealing with this phenomenon" (unusually reminiscent of *Die Endlösung*), bear witness to the intensity of condemnation. The firm non-acceptance of the existence of homosexuals among the clergy¹⁸ recalls the anecdotal remark by the Serbian Prince Miloš from the 19th century in which he denies the existence of homosexuals in Serbia.¹⁹ These are textbook examples of the tendency for which Abraham Roback coined the term *ethnophaulism* – a practice of groups to attribute the origin of social failings to other ethnicities/peoples. "In the case of homosexual behaviour, ethnophaulism is not only a type of group slander, but it also reflects a curiosity to trace the custom to its purported source" (Dynes 1990: 368), which takes a rather simple form: homosexuality

17. On 12 September 2009 a "Family walk" took place in Belgrade, organized by the "patriotic" organization Srpski sabor Dveri (now a political party) with the blessings of the Serbian Orthodox Church, as a sort of a counter-parade to the gay-pride (which was scheduled for September 20, but did not take place). The "Family walk" was presented as an "expression of the belief in the world of traditional values and communities, family life and morality" (Obradović 2009: 5).

18. "Despite the fact that the Church sees homosexuality as a perversion, those attracted to the same sex could be found among the ranks of monks, bishops, priests and theology students" (Nikoletić 2011b: 43).

19. "Our society could never pride itself on even a remotely humane attitude towards gays and lesbians. Only until recently this 'highly moral' society refused (even) to accept the existence of the same-sex orientated women and men. This 'blindness' for homosexuality is reflected in the best manner in an anecdote according to which, while writing the criminal code for the (newly-)independent state of Serbia, the advisers asked Prince Miloš whether to include male homosexuality into criminal offences or not, to what he responded: 'God forbid, so someone may think that such a thing exists here!'" (Nebrigić 2009: 97).

is a form of corruption introduced from abroad and most definitely not indigenous to our healthy country (or church).

3.1 Betrayal of the nation

The Serbian Patriarch interpreted the announcement of the Gay Pride in 2011 as a treacherous diversion aimed at drawing public attention away from the alarming situation in the southern Serbian province of Kosovo and Metohija, where ethnic Albanians, after the armed conflict and NATO intervention in 1999, seceded from Serbia. In 2008 the Republic of Kosovo declared independence, increasing the already high level of political instability of the region, which in its turn plays a major role in shaping opinions towards non-normative groups and behaviours, like homosexuals. Furthermore, Kosovo has a special significance for the Church and for the Serbian nation. It is the area where the “Kosovski boj” (“The Battle of Kosovo”) between the Serbian army and the invading army of the Ottoman Empire took place in 1389. The battle acquired an almost timeless dimension, regarded by Serbs as a defining moment in their history and identity. Numerous medieval monasteries and churches are situated in Kosovo, which is often referred to as “the spiritual cradle of the Serbian nation”. A strong mythical significance of Kosovo constitutes the core point of this specific form of religious nationalism²⁰.

Patriarch Irinej made a direct link between the situation in Kosovo and the gay parade: “Bearing in mind the announced parade in Belgrade, we come to the conclusion that one wants to cover up and obscure the tragic position of Serbian people in mournful Kosovo and Metohija” (Irinej 2011). Ivan Vučković, an actor²¹, made a similar statement, labelling the gay parade as a “hypocritical whim and a dictated abnormal requirement” in the moment when lives and rights of “our brothers” from Kosovo and Metohija are “really threatened” (Lazić 2010: 21).

3.2 Deviation of human nature

The Orthodox official theology unambiguously interprets homosexuality as a sin, illness, disorder, a form of zeal and addiction (similar to drug abuse), as well as something unnatural, sacrilegious and destructive:

Suffice it to say that the official position of the Orthodox Churches towards homosexuality has remained conservative, similar to the stance adopted by the Roman Catholic Church, and more intolerant than the Orthodox pronouncements and practices towards abortion and contraception. Orthodox Canon Law condemns homosexuality in the harshest terms. (Stan 2010: 39; see also: Hopko 1987, 2010; Popović 2006, 2010; *s.n.* 1984)

The Church’s discourse on homosexuality incorporates the ancient Greek philosophical notion of *non-natural* or *unnatural* (*παρά φύσιν*), where the *nature* is not only postulated as a criterion of a proper sexual behaviour, but as a power that “itself

20. For more on the gradual shift from “instrumental pious nationalism” to “religious nationalism” in Serbia see: Drezgić 2010 and Vrcan 1995.

21. Who, ironically enough, played a part of the priest in the popular TV series “Selo gori, a baba se češlja” (“The village is on fire, but grandma is combing her hair”).

condemns the perverted practice” (Primoratz 1999: 51.). Conflating of the concepts of *natural* and *moral*, and making “the distinction between the natural and the unnatural seems to give the condemnatory moral use of the term a particular force, as well as a certain veneer of objectivity and, in certain contexts, of almost scientific authority” (Primoratz *ibid.*).

The Church also adopts the pathological model and “borrows” the concepts such as *disease*²² and *disorder* from the medical discourse, although, when it comes to same-sex attraction, these notions are considered to be outdated²³. However, the passage from the Nativity Encyclical of His Holiness Patriarch Irinej and all the Hierarchs of the Serbian Orthodox Church from 2011 demonstrates the aforementioned:

What is AIDS, that horrible disease and calamity of our time, if not, in most cases, a consequence of the desecration of the sacredness of marriage and the misuse of sexuality and physical love, and often a consequence of their *unnatural* use? As the misuse of God-given psychophysical powers causes many *diseases*, likewise the *misuse of nature and the natural resources* around us, man’s insatiability and greed are *damaging nature* (...) The disdain of the *healthy, God-given laws of human nature*, transfigured by Christ’s Birth into the unlimited “measure of the stature of the fullness of Christ”, and the *idolizing of unnatural fornication and adultery* cannot but, *according to the very nature and moral order of things*, end up in the demonization and annihilation of humanity in its very essence.²⁴ (Irinej *et al.* 2011: 2-3, emphasis M. J.)

4 Embracing the fallen

Despite the general reject of homosexuality, there are certain writings and statements among the officials of the Serbian Orthodox Church that assess homosexuality and the gay parade in a more collected manner, in line with the thinking of John Zizioulas expressed in an interview from 2000 where he states that

If homosexuality is perceived as a sin, then again, it is the Church that has to accept such a sinner in the same manner as it accepts the heterosexual one. For there is no difference between these two: if the first one is a sinner, then that is the case also with the second. Otherwise, it would be a form of racism – to consider a certain sin as unacceptable and the other as acceptable. (Marković 2000)

The statement issued by the Holy Assembly of Bishops of the Serbian Orthodox Church regarding the announcement of the Gay Pride in Belgrade in 2010 was also,

22. Patriarch Irinej in an interview from 2012: “I do not judge those people but feel deeply sorry for them. It is probably something stronger than them. It is a deviation of the human nature which is not seen anywhere else in nature. I think it is a disease, and that these people need help to overcome this unnatural anomaly” (Spaić & Popović 2012: 18).

23. Contemporary medicine no longer considers homosexuality to be a disorder: the World Health Organisation removed it from the registry of illnesses and disorders (International Statistical Classification of Diseases and Related Health Problems - ICD) on May 17 1990, and since then it has been regarded as a variation of human sexuality. In 2008, the Ethical Committee of the Serbian Medical Association publically expressed the view that homosexuality is not a disorder.

24. Translated by *Path of Orthodoxy*.

for the most of its part, a call for refraining from violence²⁵ against the participants of the “noisy, distasteful, utterly provocative and sacrilegious parade”, since “[i]nstead of diminishing and conquering evil, violence only multiplies it”. (Irinej 2010: 5).

Davor Džalto, an artist and art historian, writes that “[h]ating the sinner because there is hate for the sin equals suicide for the Christians” (Džalto 2011: 53). In the appeal issued by 29 priests from Niš regarding the Belgrade Pride Parade in 2010, “forgiveness” and “love” figure prominently (Cvetković et al. 2010: 10-11). Hieromonk Nikodim stresses that the Church condemns the sin, but “keeps its doors wide open for all those who by the gift of God’s providence become aware of their sinfulness, and to those who sense the desire within hearts to clean their polluted souls with the tears of repentance” (Bogosavljević 2005: 18). The priest Dr Srboljub Bulić, a clinical psychologist at the Orthodox Pastoral Advisory in Belgrade, despite considering homosexuality as “somehow contrary to the divine laws”, stated the following:

It is still not wrong for me to see homosexuals as my Christian brothers, who have problems. I do not look at gays and lesbians with anger. If a gay person comes to me, I would not try to convert or judge him/her, I would rather simply try to hear, offer my guidance and be a friend to such a person. (Đorđević and Sokić 2002)

5 Our religious freedom and the human rights of the Others

As religious denominations engage with homosexuality – a “torn in the flesh” for the churches – the struggle shifts to the sphere of human rights. The members of the LGBT population are facing opposition by those who invoke freedom of religion and belief against the legal ban of discrimination based on sexual orientation (Endše 2010: 214-245; Ghanea *et al.* 2007; Hunt 2010; Loughlin 2004; Nathan 2009; Newlands 2006; van der Ven 2010; van der Ven *et al.* 2004).

A similar conflict was present in Serbia during the public debate regarding the draft and passing of the Law on Prohibition of Discrimination. Seven “traditional”²⁶

25. “On the very day the Gay Pride was held, the SOC declared, with the blessing of its leader - Patriarch Irinej, that the *moleban* (prayer) in the Temple of Saint Sava against the *prelest* * of homosexuality, drug-abuse and other forms of zeal and addiction, scheduled for that day, was cancelled. This was followed by the statement for the media by Atanasije, the Bishop of Hvostan and the Vicar of the Patriarch Irinej, in which he pointed out that anyone who objected to the law enforcement services does not have the approval of the Serbian Church for such an act. Živica Tucić, an analyst of religious developments, perceives this statement as the most important among the statements that could be heard from the Church orders: this was so both due to the fact the statement was given with the blessing of the Patriarch and the fact that it clearly expressed the views of the Church that there would not be any blessing for those that inflict violence” (Čalija 2010b: 9).

* The term *prelest* in Orthodox theology relates to the condition of spiritual deception, to an act of wounding of human nature by falsehood; etymologically, the word is derived from the term *lest* (deception, lie, delusion) in Church Slavonic. The theologians maintain that because of the Original sin all people are in such a state.

26. Labelled so by Article 10 of the Law on Churches and Religious Communities: “Traditional Churches are those which have had a historical continuity within Serbia for many centuries

religious organisations exerted considerable pressure on the authorities to withdraw the draft, which previously reached the deputies in the Assembly and went through all relevant parliamentary bodies. The main targets of critique were the implementations of transsexuality and homosexuality as specific grounds for discrimination, with the request by the “traditional” religious organisations for the adjustment of Article 18²⁷ of this law to make reference to religious beliefs, as well as the removal of Article 21²⁸, which prohibits discrimination based on sexual orientation (Mršević 2013: 69)²⁹. They jointly stated that the law “could lead to collision among certain rights stated in the draft and the right to practice, express and teach religious beliefs freely (...), and the protection of the moral values” (Irinej *et al.* 2009a).

NGO Gay Straight Alliance regarded this “a serious attack on the constitutional order of Serbia”, adding that “the churches justified their actions by homophobic attitudes” (Milićević *et al.* 2009: 71). Irinej, the Bishop of Bačka, responded that introducing such rights “insult public morality, religious beliefs and the basic social values as well as the right to personal dignity and respect for privacy and family life guaranteed by the international regulations, the Constitution and the official laws of Serbia” (Irinej *et al.* 2009b).³⁰

and which have acquired the status of a legal person in accordance with particular acts, that is: the Serbian Orthodox Church, the Roman Catholic Church, the Slovak Evangelical Church (a.c.), the Christian Reformed Church and the Evangelical Christian Church (a.c.). Traditional religious communities are those which had a historical continuity within Serbia for many centuries and which have acquired the status of a legal person in accordance with particular acts, that is: the Islamic Religious Community and the Jewish Religious Community.”

27. Compared to the draft of the proposed Law on Prohibition of Discrimination, Article 18 was amended in the first paragraph and the second paragraph was added, so in the adopted version of the Law it reads as: “Discrimination shall be considered to occur in the case of conduct contrary to the principle of free expression of faith or beliefs or if an individual or a group of persons is denied the right to acquire, maintain, express and change faith or beliefs, or the right to express, be it privately or publicly, or act in accordance with his/her beliefs. The conduct of priests, that is to say, religious officials, which is in keeping with a religious doctrine, beliefs or the objectives of churches and religious communities entered in the register of religious communities, in accordance with the law regulating the freedom of religion and the status of churches and religious communities, shall not be considered to constitute discrimination.” (Unofficial translation solicited by *UNDP Serbia*)
28. A part of Article 21 referring to discrimination based on gender identity was deleted, while the provisions banning discrimination based on sexual orientation remained in the adopted Law: “Sexual orientation shall be a private matter, and no one may be called to publicly declare his/her sexual orientation. Everyone shall have the right to declare his/her sexual orientation, and discriminatory treatment on account of such a declaration shall be forbidden.” (Unofficial translation solicited by *UNDP Serbia*)
29. Gordana Živković, senior research associate at the Institute of European Studies from Belgrade, asks of the Serbian “liberals”: “Who gives them the right to ‘tolerate’ and respect the rights of the so-called marginal groups, and at the same time treat rights of the ‘majority’ (which includes the believers of the SOC) in a totalitarian and fascistic manner?” (Živković 2007: 22).
30. If a “social credo” of Orthodox Churches could be composed, its first point, according to Ramet, would read: “God’s law is above the positive laws, and therefore the Orthodox Church has the

Bishop Irinej's advert to rights guaranteed by various legal acts might seem a bit odd when one of the rudimentary legal principles is recalled, that of equality before the law. In the analysis of the Law on Prohibition of Discrimination made by Zorica Mršević, a Professor of Law, she explains that according to paragraph 2 of Article 18 religious leaders are put above legal provisions and therefore cannot be legally sanctioned for discrimination (Mršević 2013: 70).

6 Conclusion

It does not seem likely that a more liberal attitude on the part of the Serbian Orthodox Church towards the homosexual population will come quickly. The Church's "social credo", as conceived by Ramet (2006a: 144), is not inclined towards tolerance for anything that deviates from the Church guidelines, with sexual tolerance being "the worst type of tolerance" and "all alternatives to heterosexuality" being "anathemas". Tolerance of homosexuality, ecumenism and European orientation are "organically interrelated" and "embody a threat" to the "purity" which "must be defended" (Ramet 2006b: 167). What further solidifies the Serbian traditionalist opposition to the "spectres" of (post) modernity is a portion of intense nationalism on the part of the Church. The resulting discourse constructs homosexuals as "constitutive outside" of the nation, as the nation's Other³¹. A nationalist rhetoric centred on homosexuality promises to deliver to the nation what is most elusive: identity" (Dudink 2011: 263). Therefore, one can expect the Church to remain the strongest pillar of heteronormativity in Serbian society.

However, what can also be expected are increasingly vocal demands for mollification of the "brimstone and fire" rhetoric, and emphasis on the evangelical love for LGBT persons, be they believers or not, who understand their lifestyle as the only possible choice (therefore, not a choice at all), despite the fact that the Church regards it as a sin.

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right and duty to judge which laws and bills are sinful and to fight for the applicable laws to reflect the celestial law (as understood by the Orthodox Church)" (Ramet 2006a: 143-144).

31. "The homosexual is, for the contemporary Orthodox Church, what the Jew was in bygone days" (Ramet 2006b: 171).

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ČLANKI / ARTICLES

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»GOVERNANCE«: VLADANJE, UPRAVLJANJE, VLADAVINA ALI VLADOVANJE?

IZVLEČEK: Članek podaja izhodišče za terminologizacijo pojma *governance* v slovenski politološki in komunikološki vedi. Ponuja družbeno-politično kontekstualizacijo izoblikovanja pojma *governance*, njegovo pojmovno razčlenbo v razmerju do pojmov *vladanje*, *upravljanje* in *vladavina*, ki jo podpira z analizo korpusnih podatkov, in jezikoslovni poimenovalnoteoretski premislek o (ne)ustreznosti poimenovalnih različic, ki za ta pojem trenutno soobstajajo v slovenskih družboslovnih vedah. Avtorice ugotavljajo, da tako na pojmovni kot na izrazni ravni obstaja – trenutno neizpolnjena – potreba po doslednem razločevanju med pojmom *governance* kot vodenjem in koordinacijo vseh akterjev v javno-političnem procesu, *vladanjem* kot vodenjem in implementacijo javne politike, ki ju izvaja institucionalno definiran subjekt, ter *upravljanjem*, ki se nanaša zgolj na implementacijo določene politike. V prispevku je kot potencialno primerna poimenovalna rešitev za pojem *governance* predlagan izraz *vladovanje*, pri čemer avtorice kot ključni argument za terminologizacijo navajajo dosedanje pomensko neobremenjenost izraza, obenem pa opozarjajo tudi na njegove poimenovalne pomanjkljivosti.

KLJUČNE BESEDE: *governance*, *vladovanje*, *vladanje*, *upravljanje*, terminologija

Governance: Government, governing, management or a new term »vladovanje«?

ABSTRACT: This article provides a short contextualisation of use of the term *governance* at the international level and its uptake in Slovenian political and communication sciences. The authors then focus upon the lack of a clear consensus regarding the translation and definition of the term in Slovenian literature. They provide an analysis of Gigafida, the main corpus of the Slovenian language, concerning how the term *governance* is translated and used in the Slovenian language. The authors critically juxtapose the concepts of *governance* with the main current translations: *government*, *governing* and *public administration and management*. Finally, the authors propose that *governance* should be conceptualised as part of a newly coined term "vladovanje"

1. Imena avtoric so zapisana po abecednem redu.

(Splichal 2008) since the absence of such a completely new term reduces the accuracy of Slovenian terminology.

KEYWORDS: *governance, government, governing, public administration, public management*

1 Uvod

Izraz *governance* se je v politološki in komunikološki vedi uveljavil za poimenovanje spremenjenih procesov vladanja in upravljanja, za katere je v splošnem značilno brisanje mej na dveh področjih: (a) med civilno družbo in državo (Splichal 2011) ter (b) med procesom oblikovanja javnih politik in procesom njihove implementacije (Bevir 2007). V terminologiji slovenske politološke in komunikološke vede se za koncept *governance* trenutno še ni izoblikovala in ustalila ena sama poimenovalna rešitev.

Analiza rabe izraza *governance* in njegovih slovenskih prevodnih različic v referencialnem korpusu Gigafida in specializiranem vzporednem korpusu Evrokorpus, ki je podrobno predstavljena v prispevku, potrjuje, da se za prevajanje termina *governance* večinoma uporabljajo izrazi, ki so v politološki in komunikološki vedi že pomensko obremenjeni oziroma terminologizirani: *vladanje, upravljanje in vladavina*. Raba pomensko že obremenjenih izrazov za poimenovanje novega koncepta *governance* je, kot kažemo v prispevku, odraz ne le z njim povezanih izraznih, temveč tudi pojmovnih nejasnosti v omenjenih vedah. Prizadevanja za razrešitev terminološke zmede zato ne morejo biti omejena zgolj na nadaljnje iskanje jezikovnosistemsko čim primernejšega leksema, temveč zahtevajo tudi ponovni premislek samega razumevanja koncepta *governance* ter njegovega mesta v pojmovnem sistemu politološke in komunikološke vede, ob upoštevanju podobnosti in razlik z drugimi vedami, ki prav tako uporabljajo omenjeni izraz in/ali pojem.

V prispevku pretresamo in argumentiramo možnost terminološkega dogovora, ki bi – izključno za potrebe politološke in komunikološke vede – za poimenovanje spremenjenih procesov vladanja in upravljanja oziroma kot prevod izraza *governance* potrdil za zdaj še izredno redko rabljen izraz *vladovanje* (Splichal 2008). Obenem pa že uvodoma poudarjamo, da ključni namen prispevka ni ponuditi dokončno terminološko rešitev za nakazani problem, temveč predvsem usmeriti in spodbuditi razpravo o obeh njegovih sicer ločljivih, vendar organsko prepletenih plateh; (a) o *governance* kot konceptu v okviru pojmovnega sistema politološke in komunikološke vede – in posebej o njegovem razmerju do pojmov *vladanje, upravljanje in vladavina*, ter (b) o poimenovanjih za omenjeni pojem, torej o pomenski in jezikovnosistemski ustreznosti trenutnih slovenskih prevodnih različic ter seveda o tem, kako z oblikovanjem novega slovenskega izraza ali prevzemanjem poiskati čim bolj funkcionalno rešitev za zapolnitev nastale leksikalne praznine.

Članek je sestavljen iz štirih delov. V prvem na kratko predstavljamo uveljavitev in razumevanje pojma *governance*. V drugem so predstavljeni rezultati korpusne analize rabe izraza *governance* in izrazov, ki se uporabljajo tudi kot njegove prevodne različice.

V tretjem delu se prispevek osredotoča na argumentacijo (ne)primernosti rabe izrazov *vladanje*, *vladavina* in *upravljanje* kot prevodov za izraz *governance* ter argumentira potencialno ustreznost terminologizacije izraza *vladovanje*. Prispevek zaključujemo s kritičnim razmislekom o omejitvah in pomanjkljivostih interpretacije spremenjenih procesov vladanja ter upravljanja v okviru koncepta *governance*. Poleg tega pa ponovno opozarjamo, da se angleški izraz *governance* v različnih družboslovnih vedah po vsem svetu uporablja za poimenovanje zelo heterogenih in ponekod medsebojno povsem nezdržljivih pojmov, zaradi česar bi bilo po našem mnenju rabo termina *vladovanje* – da bi zagotovili njegovo zadostno pomensko natančnost – smiselno omejiti zgolj na njegovo politološko-komunikološko konceptualizacijo, ki je predstavljena v tem prispevku. Za poimenovanja bistveno drugačnih pojmov, ki imajo v angleškem izvirniku prav tako izraz *governance* – na primer ekonomskega koncepta *corporate governance* – pa bi bilo najverjetneje smiselno iskati tudi izrazno povsem drugačne slovenske prevode.

2 Governance

Pojem *governance* so v družboslovne vede po Splichalu (2011, 207) prvi vpeljali raziskovalci mednarodnih odnosov, hitro pa so ga povzele skoraj vse discipline in je v zadnjem času bistveno aktualnejši ter bolj uporabljan od pojma *vladanje* (*government*). Vzpon termina *governance* povezujemo predvsem z diskurzom o globalizaciji, reformah javnega sektorja ter spremembah razmerij med državo in civilno družbo. Politična dimenzija globalizacije se vse bolj enačila s pojmom *global governance*, saj na mednarodni ravni ni bilo oblasti in akterjev, katerih delovanja bi lahko opredelili v okviru pojmov, ustaljenih v nacionalnih okvirih (predvsem *vladanje* in *upravljanje*).

Leta 1992 je OZN ustanovila *Commission on Global Governance*, ki je tri leta kasneje objavila poročilo *Naša globalna sosesčina* (*Our Global Neighborhood*), v katerem *global governance* opredeljuje kot »vsoto številnih ukrepov, s katerimi posamezniki ter javne in zasebne institucije urejajo skupne zadeve« (Report of the Commission on Global Governance 1995: 1). Poročilo ob bok nacionalnim državam v proces globalnega *governance* postavlja še nevladne organizacije, državljanska gibanja, multinacionalne korporacije in globalni trg. Izraz *governance* je postal del besednjaka mednarodnih organizacij; z njim opisujejo svoje delovanje in ga uporabljajo predvsem s pozitivno konotacijo, npr. v okviru idej Svetovne banke in Mednarodnega sklada o *good governance* (Nanda 2006) ter idejah Evropske komisije o *governance* v Evropski uniji (Höreth 2002).

V splošnem je izraz *governance* razumljen kot skupek procesov, v katerih raznoliki, javni in zasebni akterji poskušajo regulirati javne zadeve (npr. Rosenau in Cziempel 1992/1998). Osrednji značilnosti tega procesa sta tako hkratna potreba po regulaciji transnacionalnih zadev in odsotnost avtoritete, ki bi jo lahko primerjali z legitimeteto, močjo in zmožnostjo regulacije suverene oblasti. Po Splichalu (2011: 208) se *governance* nanaša predvsem na erozijo tradicionalnih osnov politične moči ter spreminjajočo se mejo med državo in civilno družbo.

Governance izhaja iz reforme javnega sektorja, ki je potekala v 80. letih (Bevir 2007). Ta reforma je zajemala vključevanje deležnikov in delničarjev v politične procese in strukture ter odpiranje zasebnemu sektorju. S tem je povzročila vdor delničarjev v javni sektor, in to do točke, ko so formalne državne avtoritete začele nadomeščati neformalne avtoritete trga in omrežij. Posledično se je spremenilo razumevanje državne avtoritete in njenega odnosa z državljani. Prvi val reforme javne uprave je bil vpeljevanje paradigme novega javnega menedžmenta, njegova posledica pa je bila tudi izrazita fragmentacija in privatizacija javnih ter kvazijavnih služb (institucij, agencij, zavodov ...). Velika disperzija teh institucij je kasneje privedla do drugega vala reforme z namenom koordinacije teh institucij. Koncept *governance* je najtesneje povezan prav z vlogo koordinacije vpletenih institucij in je po načelu dežnika zajel vse akterje, povezane z določeno problematiko (Rhodes 2007). Pa vendar oba vala reforme nista učinkovala na iste oblastne strukture. Prvi val je vplival na delovanje izvrševalcev, drugi pa na delovanje odločevalcev. Posledica obeh valov je po Bevirju (2007) brisanje meje med procesom oblikovanja javnih politik in procesom implementacije javnih politik.

Na nacionalni ravni je *governance* – v nasprotju z monopolističnim, hierarhičnim in tehnokratskim vladanjem – omrežje različnih subjektov (javnih, zasebnih, prostovoljnih), ki so medsebojno povezani, tako da se lahko pogajajo ter vključujejo v oblikovanje javnih politik in njihovo uresničevanje (Brezovšek in Bačlija 2010). Goss (2001: 11) z besedo *governance* opisuje nastajajoče nove oblike kolektivnega odločanja, ki vodijo k razvoju različnih odnosov, ne samo med institucijami, pač pa tudi med državljani in institucijami. Ali kot to opiše Evans (2004): »/T/ermin *governance* se uporablja v normativnem smislu za opisovanje spremembe, ko oblastne institucije v javnopolitičnem procesu stopijo v dialog z akterji iz civilne družbe.«

3 Različni pojmi in poimenovalna zmeda: analiza korpusnih podatkov

Rabo besede *governance* in njenih trenutnih prevodov (*vladanje, upravljanje, vladavina, vladovanje*) raziskujemo v trenutno najobsežnejšem korpusu slovenščine – referenčnem enojezičnem pisnem korpusu Gigafida, ki obsega več kot milijardo besed. Odločitev za ta vir jezikovnih podatkov terminološkemu raziskovanju postavlja določene omejitve. Referenčni korpusi namreč nastajajo z namenom metonimične predstavitve realne podobe določenega jezika kot celote (Gorjanc in drugi 2005; Stabej 2010). Skladno z recepcijskim merilom njihove gradnje je zastopanost strokovnih oziroma znanstvenih besedil v njih precej omejena.² Na podlagi analize podatkov iz Gigafide torej ne moremo pričakovati merodajne podobe o rabi izbranih izrazov v slovenskih strokovnih in znanstvenih družboslovnih besedilih, saj bi za kaj takega potrebovali specializiran korpus. Je pa korpus Gigafida zaradi svojega obsega in zvr-

2. V korpus pa ni zajeta nobena revija, ki bi bila posebej posvečena področju politologije oziroma komunikologije, ki nas v tem prispevku najbolj zanimata. Pregled rabe teh izrazov v strokovni in znanstveni rabi smo, ker trenutno specializiran korpus slovenskih politoloških in komunikoloških besedil ne obstaja, opravili z ročnim pregledovanjem omenjene literature.

stnosti besedil, ki jih vsebuje, odličen vir za raziskovanje razširjenosti in pomenov omenjenih izrazov v splošnejši, predvsem publicistični rabi. Drugi za našo raziskavo zanimiv vir je Evrokorpus, zbirka vzporednih dvojezičnih korpusnih prevodov,³ ki so nastali v Sektorju za prevajanje Službe Vlade Republike Slovenije za evropske zadeve z namenom »zagotoviti čim bolj poenoteno rabo terminologije pri pripravi slovenske različice pravnih aktov EU, prevodih slovenskih predpisov ter v drugih dokumentih in prevodih«. Gre torej za specializiran korpus strokovnih besedil s pravno-administrativno vsebino.

V Gigafidi so poleg podatka o številu zadetkov oziroma pogostnosti pojavljanja izbrane besede v korpusu za našo raziskavo pomembni še naslednji podatki iz kolofona korpusnih dokumentov: informacija o zastopanosti izbranih besed v določeni besedilni vrsti, ki je posredovana v filtru *Vrsta besedila*, podrobnejša informacija o najobsežnejših virih pojavitev izbranih besed, podana v filtru *Vir*, ter informacija o naraščanju oziroma upadanju rabe določene besede, na katero lahko – seveda ob upoštevanju količinske zastopanosti gradiva, zajetega za posamezno leto – sklepamo iz filtra *Leto*. Evrokorpus pa je zanimiv predvsem zato, ker omogoča vpogled v prevajalske odločitve pri prevajanju izbranih izrazov v slovensko-angleškem oziroma angleško-slovenskem vzporednem korpusu strokovnih besedil.

Število zadetkov za vse izbrane besede, razen za besedo *vladovanje*, v korpusih presega količino, ki jo je smiselno pregledovati ročno. Rabo in pomenske variante besed – razen v primeru izraza *vladovanje* – smo zato, kolikor je bilo mogoče, analizirali z opazovanjem njihove sobesedilne okolice oziroma najpogostejših kolokatorjev. Pri analizi podatkov iz Evrokoprusa pa smo kombinirali ročno pregledovanje zadetkov z avtomatsko posredovanimi podatki o najpogostejših/priporočenih prevodih.

3.1 Governance

Za iskalni niz *governance* v Gigafidi dobimo 291 zadetkov, pretežno iz novinarskih besedil, pa tudi iz stvarnih (strokovnih) besedil in besedil, objavljenih na spletnih straneh uradnih ustanov. Zadetki so glede na čas objave besedil, v katerih je bila beseda rabljena – upoštevajoč količino gradiva, zajetega za posamezno leto – razmeroma enakomerno razporejeni v obdobju od 2003 do 2010; nekoliko izstopa le leto 2009 z 90 zadetki. Zelo redke pojavitve izraza *governance* pred letom 2000 je po eni strani mogoče pojasniti z manjšo količino korpusnega gradiva za to obdobje, po drugi strani pa je verjetno tudi, da se je sam pojem v splošni rabi izrazil šele s procesi priprave Slovenije na vstop v EU. Treba pa je opozoriti, da se izraz *governance* v veliki večini dobljenih konkordančnih nizov pojavlja kot del naslova institucionalnih dejavnosti in/ali dokumentov v angleškem jeziku, na katere se mediji ali ustanove sklicujejo. Izraz *governance* v splošni, neterminološki rabi torej ni polno zaživel, ampak je omejen predvsem na pojavljanje v omenjenih lastnih imenih v angleškem jeziku. To potrjuje tudi pregled besedilne okolice; v frekvenčnem seznamu besed, ki se naj-

3. V slovenskem, angleškem, francoskem, italijanskem in španskem jeziku. Za predstavitev obsega in deleža besed po taksonomiji glej Logar Bergine idr. (2012: 32).

pogostejše pojavljajo tri mesta pred ali za besedo *governance*, so med prvimi desetimi same angleške besede,⁴ najpogostejši levi kolokatorji besede so prilastki *educational*, *good in corporate*, ki z izrazom *governance* tvorijo (terminološke) večbesedne enote.

Izredno zanimiv je vpogled v rabo in prevajanje izraza *governance* v Evrokorpusu; v slovenskih besedilih vzporednega slovensko-angleškega korpusa zadetkov za *governance* ne najdemo. Ta podatek smiselno nadgrajuje ugotovitev, da je več kot 90 % od 218 pojavitev izraza *governance* v angleškem delu vzporednega korpusa v slovenščino prevedenih bodisi kot *upravljanje* bodisi kot *uprava*. Pri tem je treba opozoriti, da gre v večini teh primerov za prevajanje zveze *corporate governance* iz besedil, klasificiranih pod področno oznako *Gospodarstvo*, z zvezo *korporativno upravljanje*. Za sicer bistveno redkeje zastopano zvezo *good governance* so v Evrokoprusu prisotni naslednji prevodi: v besedilih s področja gospodarstva *dobro upravljske prakse*, *dobro upravljanje* in *odgovorno vodenje*, v besedilih s področno oznako *Uprava EU* pa poleg *odgovornega vodenja* tudi *dobro vodenje* in *odgovorna politika svetovnega reda*. Samo v enem primeru – v besedilu z oznako *Drugo* – je izraz *governance* preveden kot *vladanje*.⁵

3.2 Vladanje, vladavina, upravljanje

Povsem drugačna je v referenčnem korpusu slika rabe izrazov *vladanje*, *vladavina* in *upravljanje*. Tako število zadetkov (9221 za izraz *vladanje*, 16.448 za izraz *vladavina* in 80.859 za izraz *upravljanje*) kot tudi njihova enakomerna zastopanost v vseh letih izhajanja besedil, ki so zajeta v korpus Gigafida, pričajo, da gre za dodobra uveljavljene izraze. Njihova raba v referenčnem korpusu, predvideno, ne izkazuje enega samega, specializiranega oziroma terminologiziranega pomena.

Samo na podlagi opazovanja najpogostejših kolokatorjev izrazov *vladanje* in *vladavina* njunih pomenov ni mogoče natančno razločevati, kar potrjuje tudi definicija v SSKJ, ki v drugi točki gesla *vladavina* njuna pomena izenačuje.⁶ Najpogostejši kolokatorji izrazov *vladanje* in *vladavina* so po eni strani pridevniki in drugi izrazi, ki ta dva pojma konkretizirajo tako, da ju časovno umeščajo oziroma zamejujejo (desetleten, dolgotrajen, obdobje, čas, konec, prekiniti) oziroma tako, da ju povezujejo z njunimi akterji (dinastija, kralj, ljudstvo, LDS, HDZ, Slobodan, Janez). V tretji sklop najpogostejših kolokatorjev bi lahko uvrstili tiste, ki *vladanje* oz. *vladavino* opredeljujejo glede na tip (komunističen, liberalen, ideološki, monarhija, demokracija ipd.). V primerjavi z izrazom *vladanje* pri izrazu *vladavina* izstopa zgolj desni prilastek *prava*, s katerim se *vladavina* očitno povezuje v stalno besedno zvezo. Tudi v Evrokorpusu so

4. To so: *corporate*, *education*, *Higher*, *Europe*, *Corporate*, *across*, *higher*, *and*, *in*.

5. The development of the Internet has allowed for many claims about the future of democracy and governance. → Razvoj interneta je spodbudil mnoge trditve o prihodnosti demokracije in vladanja.

6. **vladavína** -e ž (i) **1.** navadno s prilastkom *politična ureditev*: ustavna vladavina je zamenjala absolutizem; parlamentarna vladavina; oblika vladavine **2.** *vladanje*: predsednik je po petnajstih letih vladavine odstopil / zakonitost pomeni zahtevo po vladavini pravice ● knjiž. ni priznal nobene vladavine *oblasti*

prevodne različice za ta dva pojma precej raznorodne. Poleg najpogostejšega prevoda *government* se tako v angleškem vzporednem korpusu pojavljajo še izrazi *rule*, *reign*, *power*, pa tudi formulacije, ki se omejujejo zgolj na časovno opredelitev omenjenih pojmov: *during the period of* ipd. Dosledno prevajanje zveze *vladavina prava* kot *rule of law* pa potrjuje zgornjo ugotovitev o ustaljenosti te besedne zveze.

Daleč najbolj raznolike pomene izkazuje izraz *upravljanje*. Že samo dejstvo, da se med njegovimi najpogostejšimi levimi kolokatorji v Gigafidi na četrtem mestu pojavlja pridevnik *daljinski*, do dvajsetega mesta pa se zvrstijo še *strošek*, *ribški*, *enostaven* ipd., pa kaže na to, da splošna raba tega pojma zajema z zelo različnih specializiranih oziroma strokovnih področij, zaradi česar so podatki o rabi tega izraza v referenčnem korpusu za terminološki razmislek, ki je predmet tega prispevka, praktično neuporabni. V Evrokoprusu dobimo za izraz *upravljanje* 13.082 zadetkov; poleg že omenjenega dejstva, da se izraz uporablja kot prevod besede *governance*, predvsem v zvezi s prislaskom *corporate governance*, podatki kažejo še, da se z izrazom *upravljanje* prevajata tudi izraza *management* in *administration*. Na podlagi področne klasifikacije besedil v Evrokoprusu na besedila iz gospodarstva, financ, dela in sociale, upravljanja EU itd. ni mogoče trditi, da bi bila raba katerega od teh dveh izrazov (*management* ali *administration*) značilnejša za določeno področje, zanimivo pa je tudi, da se v angleških besedilih oba izraza pogosto pojavljata skupaj, v zvezi *management and administration*, v slovenščino pa sta nato prevedena zgolj kot *upravljanje*.

3.3 Vladovanje

Beseda *vladovanje* se v korpusu Gigafida pojavi zgolj 33-krat, torej še 10-krat redkeje od prevzetega angleškega izraza *governance*. Zaradi nizkega števila zadetkov smo analizo rabe lahko opravili z ročnim pregledovanjem zadetkov. Med 33 zadetki jih je več kot 80 % (28) iz publicističnih besedil,⁷ objavljenih leta 2008 ali kasneje, torej v času od izida v Delu objavljenega članka *Deregulacija, denacionalizacija, depolitizacija*, v katerem je Splichal besedo *vladovanje* utemeljil kot termin s pomenom, ki ga podrobno opredeljujemo tudi v tem prispevku. Ti primeri so torej potencialni kandidati publicistične rabe besede *vladovanje* v pomenu, ki je vsaj približno skladen z v tem članku podano opredelitvijo pojma. Ob pregledu konkordančnih nizov se izkaže, da taki rabi ustreza 21 zadetkov, vendar je treba takoj dodati, da vsi zadetki pripadajo prav omenjenemu članku ter še enemu isto leto v Delu objavljenemu Splichalovemu besedilu; so torej rezultat rabe zgolj enega tvorca, konkretneje predlagatelja novega termina.

V vseh ostalih primerih v korpus zajete rabe je iz sobesedila mogoče razbrati, da je beseda *vladovanje* uporabljena kot sopomenka izraza *vladanje* oziroma v dveh primerih *vladavina*.⁸ Vsaj v štirih primerih rabe se na podlagi sobesedila ponuja tudi

7. Viri so: Delo, Finance, Novi glas, Demokracija in revija Šport.

8. Na primer: »Med vladovanjem cesarja Jožefa II. se je v letih 1785–86 porodila ideja o sistematični preureditvi grajskih prostorov v kaznilnico« (**vrsta besedila**: Stvarna besedila, **naslov**: Zgodba o Ljubljanskem gradu, **avtor**: Vera Šenica Pavletič, leto: 2005); »vladovanja stresa« (**vir**: drugo, **leto**: 2008, **vrsta besedila**: Revije, **naslov**: Revija Šport, **avtor**: neznani avtor); »vladovanje kapitala v korist vseh državljanov« (**vir**: drugo,

interpretacija, da vladanje določenega subjekta avtor prek rabe izraza *vladovanje* ocenjuje z negativno vrednostno sodbo in da je torej beseda *vladovanje* v teh primerih uporabljena kot slabšalen izraz.⁹

Tako na podlagi izrazito nizkega števila zadetkov kot tudi na podlagi dejstva, da dve tretjini vse v korpus zajete rabe izraza *vladovanje* izhaja iz dveh besedil in jo je mogoče pripisati enemu samemu tvorcu, lahko ugotovimo, da izraz *vladovanje* v slovensko publicistiko in splošno rabo (še) ni prodrlo. Enako je mogoče trditi tudi za strokovna besedila, saj v Evrokorpusu zadetkov za izraz *vladovanje* sploh ni.

4 Pojemovno razlikovanje: governance in sorodni pojmi

Ugotovitve korpusne raziskave o prevajanju angleškega termina *governance* oziroma o izbirah poimenovanj za ta pojav¹⁰ potrjuje tudi – sicer ne povsem izčrpen in metodološko dodelan – pregled slovenskih politoloških in komunikoloških znanstvenih besedil. Omejili smo se zgolj na tiste primere, pri katerih je iz opredelitve poimenovanega jasno razvidno, da tvorci referirajo na nov tip političnih odnosov, ki jih opredeljujemo v tem prispevku, oziroma na tiste izraze, kjer so avtorji jasno označili (bodisi v opombi ali pa v oklepaju poleg izraza), da skušajo z njimi nadomestiti angleški izraz *governance*. Za prevod se tako uporabljajo *vladanje* (Tomšič in Vehovar 2006; Kajnc 2008), *upravljanje* (Rizman 2006; Kovač 2005; Rus 2001), *vladavina* (Knep in Fink Hafner 2011; Kustec Lipicer 2006) in *vladovanje* (Splichal 2008, 2011).

Terminologija vsake vede naj bi z namenom zagotavljanja optimalne sporazumevalne učinkovitosti težila k stanju, ko je razmerje med pojmi, ki tvorijo njeno specializirano védenje, in poimenovanji zanje ena proti ena, kar pomeni, da termin poimenuje zgolj en pojem oz. – ožje – pomen; obenem pa se pri standardizacijskem ali terminografskem naporu z normiranjem (npr. z oznakami za pogovorno, žargonsko, starinsko ipd. ali pa z *glej*, *puščico* itd.) omeji tudi variantnost oz. sinonimnost ali dvojničnost poimenovanj istega (Korošec 1971: 9–11; Kalin 1991: 187; Korošec 1972: 266). V raziskavi ugotovljeno stanje je torej s terminološkega stališča mogoče interpretirati kot odstop od obeh omenjenih načel.

V naslednjem koraku se osvetlitve problematičnosti kršenja obeh načel najprej lotevamo na pojmovni ravni, s poskusom čim natančneje opredelitve pojma *governance*, njegove umestitve v pojmovno polje politološke in komunikološke vede ter definiranja razmerij z drugimi v večrazsežnostno mrežo tega polja povezanimi pojmi. Poleg splošnega dejstva, da je definiranje pojmov pravzaprav prvi korak terminološkega dela, saj

leto: 2008, **vrsta besedila:** Časopisi, **naslov:** Demokracija, **avtor:** neznani novinar).

9. Na primer: »ogorčena, da je kaj takega doživela v času njenega vladovanja« (**vir:** Gorenjski glas, **leto nastanka:** 2005, **vrsta besedila:** Časopisi, **naslov:** Gorenjski glas, **avtor:** /); »Sicer pa je Damijan Dolinar dejal, da je razočaran tudi nad triletnim obdobjem vladovanja LDS, saj meni, da v preteklih treh letih ni bilo zgrajenega praktično ničesar.« (**vir:** Dnevnik, **leto:** 1998, **vrsta besedila:** Časopisi **naslov:** Dnevnik, **avtor:** /); »Osedlali so ga med JJ-jevim vladovanjem.« (**vir:** Delo, **leto:** 2001, **vrsta besedila:** Časopisi, **avtor:** /).

10. Novih oblik odnosov med državo in različnimi deležniki oziroma odnosov v zasebnih družbah (*corporate governance*).

je jasna pojmovna strukturiranost nekega področja pogoj za poimenovalno učinkovitost njegove terminologije (Novak 1971: 5; Vintar 2008: 23–34), je ta korak tudi podlaga za argumentacijo našega nasprotovanja rabi izrazov *vladanje*, *upravljanje* in *vladavina* kot slovenskih poimenovanj za pojem *governance*.

4.1 Governance in vladanje

V razmerju do tradicionalne oblike vladanja je *governance* (McCarney, Halfani in Rodriguez 1995: 94) »širši in bolj inkluziven pojem /.../, ki se lahko aplicira tako na vladne strukture kot tudi na številne oblike nevladnih organizacij, civilnih iniciativ in društev«. Porio (2000: 88) ta pojem definira podobno. Meni, da »se konvencionalna definicija vlade (ali vladanja) nanaša na vladne strukture in institucionalizirane procese, *governance* pa je termin, ki zajema politične odnose med državo in različnimi deležniki«.

Tabela 1: Vladanje in governance

	Vladanje (government)	Governance
Število institucij	majhno	veliko
Birokratske strukture	hierarhična/konsolidirana	decentrirana/fragmentirana
Horizontalna omrežja	zaprta	ekstenzivna
Mednarodna omrežja	minimalna	ekstenzivna
Demokratske povezave	predstavniške	predstavniške + novi poskusi
Politike	rutinske	inovativno učenje

Vir: Prirejeno po John (2001: 17).

Iz tabele 1 je razvidno, da gre pri pojmu *governance* za bolj ekstenziven in odprt proces, ki poleg oblastnih vključuje tudi druge akterje. Besedi *vladanje* (*to govern*) ali *vlada* (*government*) sta vezani na strukturalno razumevanje vlade kot javno-pravnega subjekta, ki je del legitimne oblasti. Vladati v kontekstu moderne demokracije pomeni imeti podeljeno legitimiteto za implementacijo sprejetih javnih politik.

Grindle (2002) v svojem razumevanju učinkovitega delovanja vlade predstavlja elemente, značilne za *governance* (kot so participacija, pravičnost, odgovornost, transparentnost in ekonomičnost). Upoštevanje takega pristopa k opredeljevanju delovanja vlade je po vsej verjetnosti ključen pri razumevanju, zakaj se za izraz *governance* uporablja tudi prevod *vladanje*. V vsebinskem kontekstu je namreč mogoče tako razumeti transparentno, participativno, odprto in učinkovito delovanje vlade. Ključna razlika med obema pojmomoma je po našem mnenju, da je vlada javno-pravni subjekt, vladanje pa je funkcija vlade. *Governance* pa je proces (ne struktura), v katerem sodeluje *tudi* vlada. Pri tem gre še za dodatno terminološko težavo, saj bi bilo primerneje, če bi namesto besede *vlada* uporabljali besedo *oblast*. Zgolj *vlada* kot prevod za *government* namreč implicira organ, beseda *government* pa se večinoma nanaša na širše razumevanje oblasti.

4.2 Governance in upravljanje

Osrednji cilj v procesu *governance* je sprejeti javno politiko (ali drugo odločitev), ki je sprejemljiva za vse akterje, udeležene v procesu. V tem kontekstu je *governance* dejavnost, ki sodi v sfero oblikovanja javnih politik. Besedo *upravljanje* pa, ravno nasprotno, pogosto povezujemo z drugim delom javnopolitičnega procesa – implementacijo. Zakaj torej tako pogosto prevajanje besede *governance* v *upravljanje*? Odgovor je verjetno smiselno iskati v dejavnosti upravljanja in pristojnostih upravljavca. Za Pusića (1985) je upravljanje vsaka kontinuirana dejavnost povezovanja ljudi v akcijo za opravljanje družbenih zadev, zato mora potekati po pravilih ter ima vlogo posrednika med postavljenimi cilji in njihovo uresničitvijo. Vsakdo, ki upravlja, izvršuje splošnejše odločitve tistega, ki ga je pooblastil za odločanje. Ta proces se konča pri tistem, ki ima do upravljanja izvirne pravice. Upravljanja zato ne moremo postaviti kot antiteze izvrševanju. Upravljanje je izvrševanje odločitev nadrejenega (Haček in Bačlija 2007).¹¹

Pomemben vpliv na prevajanje besede *governance* z *upravljanje* ima razumevanje tega, kdo je upravljavalec. Ekonomska znanost ponuja razmeroma statično strukturalno definicijo upravljavca, ki izhaja iz uprave kot organa v podjetju. Uprava v podjetju je namreč organ, ki odloča o strateških usmeritvah podjetja, upravljanje pa je odločanje o lastnini (Rozman 1996). Že v okviru, vezanem pretežno na upravljanje podjetij, je prevajanje izraza *corporate governance* v *korporativno upravljanje* problematično, saj, kot opozarja Dayton (2001), *governance* ni upravljanje (*governance is not management*).¹² Dodatna težava nastane, ko poskušamo razumeti upravljanje in upravljavca v javnem sektorju. Upravni proces v javnem sektorju sicer poteka po načelih, ki so v bistvenih prvinah enaka upravnim procesom v zasebnem sektorju (Virant 2009). Družba mora najprej določiti svoje cilje oziroma potrebe, nato pa je treba te odločitve izvrševati tako, da se sprejemajo nove odločitve. Cilji in potrebe v družbi se izražajo kot javni interes v političnih odločitvah, ki jih v glavnem sprejemajo predstavniški organi (strateški akt pa je koalicijska pogodba ali predvolilni program). Če je uprava tisti organ, ki v javnem sektorju izvršuje odločitve, kdo je potem organ, ki upravi naroči izvrševanje? Virant (2009) meni, da lahko v procesu javnega upravljanja govorimo o institucionalnem (politično odločanje) in instrumentalnem delu (izvrševanje političnih odločitev). To v upravno znanost vnaša dodatno zmedo, saj implicira, da je politično odločanje tudi upravljanje – po vzoru iz ekonomije. Do nedorečenosti prihaja predvsem zaradi poimenovanja javne *uprave*, ki ima za logično posledico poimenovanje dejavnosti uprave kot *upravljanja*. Če bi potegnili vzporednico z ekonomijo, bi morali v javnem sektorju poiskati organ, ki opravlja funkcijo uprave. To bi bila vlada ali celo bolj normativno politični predstavniki na splošno ter še širše suvereno ljudstvo. To namreč odloča

11. Bistvo upravljanja je torej dejavnost izvrševanja, čeprav se aktivnost upravljavcev ne začne in konča zgolj v dejavnosti izvrševanja. Dihotomija uprava-politika je preživeta in samo po sebi se razume, da ima uprava v javnopolitičnem procesu pomembno vlogo že na začetku javnopolitičnega cikla.

12. O terminološki zmedbi pri prevajanju besede *management* v *upravljanje* nekoliko kasneje.

(z vsakokratnimi volitvami pa tudi z mehanizmi neposredne demokracije) strateške usmeritve družbe.

Dejavnost javne je izvajanje odločitev lastnika. Torej je poimenovanje dejavnosti uprave kot *upravljanje* nekoliko neustrezno (v angleščini se za javno upravo uporablja termin *public administration*; ta administrira, kar dopušča, da upravlja nekdo drug). V Parsonsovem (1960) kontekstu namreč govorimo o operativni ravni delovanja organizacije – menedžiranju. Rozman (1996) delo menedžerjev opiše kot *ravnanje*, saj naj bi menedžerji (ravnalci) usklajevali tehnično razdeljeno delo, posamezne segmente razdeljenega dela pa naj bi opravljali specialisti. Vsebina dela menedžmenta (ravnanja)¹³ je usklajevanje tehnično razdeljenega dela v celoto, usklajevanje ciljev in interesov zaposlenih, usklajevanje razmerij oziroma, na kratko: je usklajevanje, odločanje in delegiranje. Dodatna težava nastane, ko poskušamo po analogiji razumeti menedžment v javni upravi (javnem upravljanju). Tukaj menedžment pogosto razumemo le kot reformirano, napredno različico administriranja¹⁴ ali celo upravljanja. Kroukamp in Liezel (2000) pravita, da so menedžerske funkcije javnega sektorja pravzaprav le podaljšanje oziroma razširitev javne administracije za zagotavljanje javnih storitev v sodobni demokratični družbi.

Proces oblikovanja javnih politik je namenjen združevanju vseh institucij (akterjev) z namenom reševanja neke problematike, proces implementacije javne politike pa je namenjen koordinaciji vseh institucij (akterjev) z namenom implementiranja ali servisiranja državljanov. V tem smislu je oblikovanje javnih politik domena pojma *governance*, implementacija javne politike pa domena javnega menedžmenta. Dihotomija politika–uprava je sicer predpostavljena in razumljena, vendar koncept menedžiranja v javnem sektorju ne vključuje funkcije odločanja, ki je v domeni vladanja ali *governance*. Izvirni greh zbliževanja pojmov *menedžment* in *governance* je namreč v naravi samega pojma *governance*. *Governance* se od *vladanja* razlikuje predvsem po vključevanju deležnikov in delničarjev, decentraliziranosti, participativnosti in podobnem. Podobna načela so značilna tudi za novi javni menedžment, ki deluje bolj

13. Rozman (prav tam) za besedo *management* predlaga prevod ravnanje. Meni, da je pomemben razlog za uporabo besede *ravnanje* kot ustrezen prevod besede *menedžment* njena uporaba do konca druge svetovne vojne. V tistem času se je beseda *ravnatelj*, *ravnateljstvo* splošno uporabljala za pomembne organizacijske funkcije. Rozman pravi, da pri besedi *ravnanje* ne gre za neko »novotarijo«, ampak za naravno, v preteklosti veljavno besedo, ki je bila s spremembo družbenega sistema po nepotrebnem ukinjena, da bi z njo ukinili tudi »kapitalistično« ravnanje ravnateljev. V tem kontekstu menedžerje imenuje tudi ravnatelj.

14. Popačenko *administriranje* smo namenoma uporabili za nazornejši prikaz težavnosti pri prevajanju iz anglosaške literature. Tam je vsebinska razmejitev nekoliko jasnejša, saj poznamo dva termina, *administering* in *managing*. Oba implicirata upravljanje (v našem pomenu besede), vendar se med seboj distinktivno ločita. Prav to pa v slovenski prevod vnaša dodatno zmedo. Če je prevod za oba termina *upravljati*, kaj ju potem vsebinsko razlikuje oziroma kako termina prevesti v slovenski jezik? Neposrečena besedna igra (beseda *upravljanje* prevzema vedno več pomenov) vnaša v upravno znanost precej nedoslednosti in včasih celo nepravilnosti. Zmanjšuje se jasnost argumentov, kdo je kdo (lastnik – ravnalec – izvajalec) v javni upravi, s tem pa tudi odgovornost za izvajanje posameznih procesov in funkcij.

transparentno, je uporabnikom prijazen, pozna decentralizirano delovanje in podobno. To je po vsej verjetnosti tudi vzrok za prevajanje *governance* v *upravljanje*. Razlikovanje obeh konceptov pa je vseeno mogoče in potrebno, saj ima *governance* za sogovornika državljana (ali skupino državljanov ali specifično organizacijo), pri menedžmentu pa je sogovornik uporabnik.

Lahko sklenemo, da ima prevajanje besede *governance* z *upravljanje* več omejitev. Prvič, zaradi poimenovanja javne uprave (*public administration*) kot uprave (ne pa administracije, kar bi bilo ustreznejše) se implicira, da javna uprava upravlja. Poleg tega *governance* neposredno ne vključuje javne uprave, saj ta za dogovarjanje z različnimi akterji nima pooblastila. Tako nas izraz upravljanje lahko zavede, da o pojmu *governance* začnemo razmišljati kot o operacionalni dejavnosti, kar pa ta ni. *Governance* je dejavnost na strateški ravni organizacije. Drugič, upravljaivec v javnem sektorju je organ s popolnoma drugačnimi funkcijami kot upravljaivec v ekonomiji, kar v razpravljanje o pojmu *governance* v javnem in zasebnem sektorju vnaša dodatno zmedo. In tretjič, enačenje *governance* z upravljanjem bi bilo delno osmišljeno le, če bi od *upravljanja* s primernim prevodom dosledno ločevali glagol *managing*, saj *governance* ni menedžment (Dayton 2001). Če za oba termina uporabljamo isti prevod – *upravljanje* –, namreč nastane vsesplošna zmeda.

4.3 Governance in vladavina

Termin *vladavina* poimenuje družbeno ureditev, ki je navadno visoko strukturirana in hierarhično urejena. Implicira torej način vladanja, ki ga povezujemo z zaprtim, avtorskim, hierarhično strukturiranim vodenjem in odločanjem. Ne nazadnje s tem izrazom poimenujemo vodenja vladarjev. V tem kontekstu je *vladavina* vsebinsko ravno nasprotna pojmu *governance*. Najpogosteje namreč *governance* razumemo kot omrežja na določenem javno-političnem področju (Marsh in Rhodes 1992). Rhodes (2007) meni, da se je koncept *governance* pravzaprav razvil iz koncepta javnopolitičnih omrežij. Javnopolitična omrežja so formalne in neformalne institucionalne vezi med oblastnimi (vladnimi) strukturami ter ostalimi akterji, ki se organizirajo na določenem javnopolitičnem področju v fazi oblikovanja javne politike ali v fazi njene implementacije (Rhodes 2007). Je pa res, da so javnopolitična omrežja lahko razraščena in trdno vraščena v sferi odločanja na določenem javnopolitičnem področju. V teh primerih se zdi, da »nadvladujejo« področje, kar bi lahko tudi pojasnilo odločitve za govor o njihovi vladavini. Če bi torej izraz *governance* dosledno prevajali kot *vladavino omrežij*, in ne zgolj kot *vladavino*, bi to lahko bila delno sprejemljiva rešitev, s pridržkom, da je vladavino smiselno pripisovati zgolj trdnim, ne pa tudi za šibkim omrežjem.

4.4 Governance kot vladovanje

Izraz *vladovanje* je nastal z namenom oblikovanja ustrezne, natančne in nedvoumne poimenovalne rešitve za novi politološki pojem v sodelovanju med Tomom Korošcem in Slavkom Splichalom,¹⁵ ki je izraz tudi prvič uporabil v članku *Deregulacija, dena-*

15. Tako sodelovanje (prof. dr. Tomo Korošec je namreč jezikoslovec, prof. dr. Slavko Splichal

cionalizacija, depolitizacija leta 2008. Splichal termin *vladovanje* uporablja v skladu z razumevanjem koncepta *governance*, prikazanim v Tabeli 1.¹⁶ *Vladovanje* se tako po Splichalu (2008, 2011) nanaša na novo delitev oblasti in vpliva »ne le med državami, ampak tudi med akterji, ki so nad državami, pod državami in poleg držav« (Splichal 2008: 5). Po Splichalu (2011) je iskanje splošno sprejemljive definicije vladovanja nesmiselno, saj se z njim poimenuje razmeroma heterogene pojave. Splichal tako predlaga zgolj ohlapno definicijo, ki se nanaša na »prerazporejanje avtoritete navzgor, navzdol in vstran od držav«. »V nasprotju z *vladanjem* se *vladovanje* nanaša tako na državne kot tudi nedržavne oblike odločanja in vplivanja na odločitve, ki pomembno zadevajo populacijo posameznega kraja ali celotno svetovno skupnost« (Splichal 2011: 208; poudarki v izvirniku).

Obravnavane prevodne različice za izraz *governance*, ki se trenutno pojavljajo v slovenskih strokovnih in znanstvenih besedilih, kažejo, da se v slovenski politološki in komunikološki vedi očitno pojavlja težnja po slovenskem, ne zgolj prevzetem izrazu za pojem *governance*. Izhajajoč iz tega dejstva in upoštevajoč predstavljeno terminološko zmedo ter njene posledice, menimo, da bi bila odločitev za terminološki dogovor, ki bi uveljavil termin *vladovanje*, za politološko in komunikološko vedo bistveno manj škodljiva kot ohranjanje pluralizma bolj ali manj (ne)ustreznih prevodnih različic v čakanju na morebitno boljše rešitev.

Daleč najpomembnejši argument za standardizacijo rabe izraza *vladovanje*¹⁷ ni njegova posebna jezikovnosistemska primernost, temveč dejstvo, da je med omenjenimi prisotnimi prevodnimi različicami edini, ki v strokovnem besedišču ni že pomensko obremenjen¹⁸ in torej v terminologijo stroke ne vnaša nezaželene polisemije oziroma homonimije.¹⁹ Možen zadržek v tem pogledu je ugotovitev, da ima beseda *vladovanje* v neterminološki, splošni rabi lahko slabšalno konotacijo. Zato je morda smotrni pomislek, ali bi se taka recepcija izraza utegnila prenesti tudi na *vladovanje* kot termin, kar bi zmanjšalo njegovo primernost, saj je eden od pogojev terminološkosti prav čustvena nevtrálnost izraza.

Z jezikovnosistemskega stališča, skladno z njegovim nastankom, izraz v zadostni meri ustreza terminološkim zahtevam po knjižnosti, primerni dolžini in lahki izgo-

pa komunikolog) v terminologiji velja za ideal oblikovanja »ustreznejše, enotnejše in morda tudi bolj slovenske terminologije« (Vintar 2008: 56).

16. Pri tem pa je treba opozoriti na razliko v uporabi termina pri Splichalu (2008), ki termin analizira predvsem kot problematičen empiričen pojav, in Johnu (2001), ki, kot je razvidno iz Tabele 1, termin predstavlja predvsem v njegovi normativni formi.

17. »/K/ončno veljavnost daje terminom le kodifikacija, opravljena z dogovorom med zainteresiranimi in ob upoštevanju načel za oblikovanje terminov« (Korošec 1971: 9).

18. Edini pridržek bi lahko predstavljala pomenska zasedenost sestavljenk te besedne družine tipa *prevladovanje, obvladovanje, nadvladovanje* ipd., za katere pa lahko predvidimo, da se njihovi pomeni ne aktivirajo kot del pomenskega polja termina *vladovanje*.

19. Da terminološka poimenovanja pogosto zaostajajo za novo predmetnostjo oziroma novimi pojmi področja in da se poimenovanja za nove pojme pogosto delno prekrivajo s starimi, je sicer znan in pogost pojav, ki se mu v resničnosti strokovnih jezikov ni mogoče povsem izogniti (Vintar 2008: 37).

vorljivosti, nekoliko manj pa, kot podrobneje razčlenjujemo v nadaljevanju, po derivacijski sposobnosti in besedotvorni razvejanosti, ki omogočata nadaljnje pomenske in skladenjske izpeljanke ter torej širjenje besedne družine.²⁰ Dejstvo, da gre za glagolnik, se po eni strani zdi dodaten argument za terminologizacijo izraza *vladovanje*. V referenčnem korpusu Gigafida za iskalni pogoj *ovanje, torej pri iskanju besed, ki se končujejo na ta sklop črk, dobimo 1940 glagolnikov. Vsi poimenujejo procese, ki jih soustvarja večje število udeležencev, pri tem pa prav raba glagolnika omogoča, da se na te procese sklicujemo, ne da bi posebej imenovali oziroma poudarjali vlogo njihovih nosilcev. Glagolniki torej preusmerjajo pozornosti od dejanj nosilcev k procesu kot njihovemu kontinuiranemu rezultatu, kar je ključno tudi za pojem *governance*. Glagolnik *vladovanje* poleg tega – enako kot v angleški terminologiji – ohranja koren besedne družine (*gov-/vlad-*) in tako izrazno nakazuje pomenske povezave z ostalimi pojmi v tej družini, na primer *vladanjem* ipd. Tovrstno ohranjanje pomenske koordinacije med tujimi in domačimi termini je pomembno, če upoštevamo, da prizadevanje za enotno terminologijo ne more potekati samo v mejah enega jezika, temveč so predvsem strokovne in znanstvene terminologije mednarodno odvisne (Korošec 1971: 12).

Po drugi strani je pri oceni primernosti izraza *vladovanje* legitimen pomislek, da – v nasprotju z običajnim jezikovnim procesom nastajanja glagolnikov iz glagolov – glagolnik *vladovanje* ne izhaja iz glagola *vladovati*, ki je prav tako kot *vladovanje* (še) neuveljavljen oziroma zgolj hipotetičen.

Med obravnavanimi jezikovnosistemskimi lastnostmi termina tako nekatere zvišujejo, druge (predvsem odsotnost, zgolj hipotetičnost in posledično praznost njegove besedne družine) pa zmanjšujejo verjetnost, da bo termin med uporabniki sprejet, kar pa je ključni pogoj, da – ne glede na njegovo sistemsko primernost – termin tudi dejansko zaživi (Bokal 1998; Humar 2009: 79).

Predstavitev argumentov in zadržkov o primernosti izraza *vladovanje* nas tako vrne k izhodišču in povodu za nastanek tega prispevka; v slovenski politološki in komunikološki vedi očitno obstaja potreba po poimenovanju novega pojma, ki ga je v ta namen treba terminologizirati. Terminologizacija temelji na dogovoru, za dosego dogovora pa je nujen obsežen in konstruktiven dialog vpletenih, h kateremu želimo spodbuditi s tem prispevkom.

5 Zaključek: nekaj pomislekov ob uveljavljanju termina *vladovanje*

Kljub zavesti o potrebi po terminologizaciji pojma *governance* v slovenskih družboslovnih vedah se nam ob prizadevanjih v tej smeri odpira nekaj pomislekov. Na vsebinski ravni je ključen pomislek vpetost izvirnika *governance* v neoliberalni diskurz. Turnšek Hančič (2011) opozarja, da so ideje o vladovanju kot novih oblikah politične ureditve botrovale prenosu pojma deležnikov iz ekonomskega v politični

20. V strokovnih besedilih se doslej pojavljata predvsem glagolnik *vladovanje* in glagol *vladovati* v ednini, medtem ko se sistemsko sicer možno poimenovanje za akterje vladovanja – *vladovalci* ter pridevniške in prislovne izpeljanke (še) niso uveljavili.

diskurz. Bourdieu in Wacquant (2000/2003) sta opozorila na t. i. neoliberalni novorek, v katerem prepoznavata novo obliko kulturnega imperializma, s katerim se razširja ameriška neoliberalna ideologija. Turnšek Hančič (2011) k njunemu naboru besedišča tega neoliberalnega novoreka prišteva tudi pojem »deležnikov« (*stakeholders*), ki se uveljavlja kot nadomestek drugih konceptov demokratične vključenosti in po Turnšek Hančičevi vnaša zmedo in priložnosti za legitimizacijo akterjev, ki v okviru »starih« pojmov (npr. državljani/-ke, javnost, civilna družba) ne bi bili sami po sebi razumljeni kot legitimni udeleženci demokratičnega odločanja.

Z vse glasnejšo kritiko neoliberalne miselnosti je vladovanje postalo tarča kritik, ki opozarjajo, da je demokratični deficit inherenten vladovanju, saj velik delež akterjev vladovanja nima legitimnosti niti niso odgovorni tem, katerih življenja regulirajo (npr. Scholte 2005; Hay 2007; Gupta 2008). Po Splichalu (2011) lahko pri vladovanju govorimo o dveh podprocesih: depolitizaciji in denacionalizaciji. Denacionalizacija je proces prenosa regulativnih moči od nacionalne države na politične avtoritete izven nacionalne legitimite. Depolitizacija je proces prenosa regulativnih moči nacionalne države na ekonomske ali zasebne akterje izven arene nacionalne legitimite. Posledično politične moči, suverenost, demokracija in državljanstvo niso več omejeni na državni prostor. Globalno vladovanje tako ubeži tradicionalnim oblikam odgovornosti, vezanim na nacionalne države, nove oblike odgovornosti (glej npr. Benner in dr. 2004) pa niso dovolj učinkovite (Splichal 2009).

Ideja globalnega vladovanja kot »omrežij deležnikov« (npr. Held in Koenig-Archibugi 2004) je kritizirana kot upravičevanje vstopa korporacij v odločevalske procese. Če so podjetja prej morala biti vsaj del združenj, da so lahko sodelovala v odločevalskih procesih, so kot deležniki v procesu globalnega vladovanja velika multinacionalna podjetja kar neposredni udeleženci forumov, kot je bil na primer Svetovni forum o informacijski družbi (Hintz 2007: 5). Vladovanje tako omogoča utrjevanje neoliberalnega pristopa k vprašanjem moči države, globalnega prostega trga in zasebne regulacije javnih zadev. Pri tem je kriterij učinkovitosti postal osrednji argument v prid javno-zasebnim partnerstvom regulacije transnacionalnih in globalnih zadev. Bäckstrandova (2006: 473) npr. predlaga, da učinkovitost regulacije javnih zadev v okviru globalnega vladovanja lahko odtehta pomanjkanje legitimnosti na osnovi demokratične vključenosti. Tovrstna negacija vprašanja demokratične vključenosti in poudarek zgolj na uspešnosti je v skladu z neoliberalnim pristopom h globalnemu vladovanju (Higgot in Erman 2008). Ta je po Higgotu in Ermanu (2008) značilen za tehnokratsko-vodstvene elite, ki jim mednarodne institucije predstavljajo predvsem instrument politik ublaževanja tveganj trgovanja na svetovni ravni.

Po drugi strani pa je med procesom vpeljave terminov *deležniki* in *vladovanje* v slovenski jezik pomembna razlika. Pojem *deležniki*, trdi Turnšek Hančič (2011), je bil v slovenski politični diskurz vpeljan z namenom prikazovanja večje demokratičnosti političnih odločitev; sama vsebina termina ni podvržena podrobnejšim kritikam. Slovenski izraz *vladovanje* pa je nasprotno nastal v okviru kritične misli o neoliberalizmu; Splichal (2009) ima tako večinoma kritičen odnos do *vladovanja*. S tem se prikaže hiba Bourdieujeve in Wacquantove (2000/2003) teze, ki jo povzame Turnšek Hančičeva

(2011), o obstoju neoliberalnega novoreka – da ga namreč vsi, ki uporabljajo besedišče tega novoreka, tudi zagovarjajo ter vsaj implicitno podpirajo njegov obstoj in s tem njegove posledice. Na tem mestu ugotavljamo, da tako kritiki neoliberalizma kot njegovi zagovorniki v slovenščini potrebujejo vpeljavo novega termina *vladovanje*, saj jim daje možnost poimenovanja aktualnih, pa čeprav tudi negativnih družbenih sprememb.

Drugi pomislek se nanaša na možnost posplošitve izraza *vladovanje* kot univerzalno ustrezne prevodne različice za izraz *governance*. Pojem *governance* zajema obširno skupino pojavnosti, kot so javnopolitična omrežja (Rhodes 1997), javni menedžment (Hood 1991), koordinacija ekonomskih sektorjev (Campbell in dr. 1991; Hollingsworth in dr. 1994), javno-zasebno partnerstvo (Pierre 1998) in *good governance* (Nanda 2006). Pierre in Peters (2000: 14) sta ga zato označila za *umbrella concept*, torej krovni koncept, ki združuje množico pojmov. Pojma, za katerega v tem prispevku predlagamo izraz *vladovanje*, praktično ni mogoče zadovoljivo zajeti v klasično definicijo z navedbo prvega nadrejenega pojma in značilnosti, ki ga ločijo od sorednih pojmov. Gre namreč za ohlapen, krovni pojem, ki združuje precej heterogene oblike odnosov med različnimi, tako javnimi kot zasebnimi akterji. Ta pojem je do določene mere sicer možno definirati z razlikovanjem od pojmov *vladanje*, *upravljanje* in *vladavina*, saj je bilo eden od povodov za njegovo izoblikovanje prav dejstvo, da novih oblik odnosov ni bilo več mogoče misliti v okviru nobenega od teh konceptov.

Po drugi strani pa pri uvedbi termina *vladovanje* obstaja nevarnost, na katero je implicitno že opozoril Splichal (2011: 207), ko je zapisal, da je pojem *vladovanje* v veliki meri zasenčil pojem *vladanje*. Utegnilo bi se namreč zgoditi, da bi *vladovanje* kot krovni pojem začelo zamenjevati poprej uveljavljene pojme, kot sta *vladanje* in *upravljanje*, tudi v primerih, ko so ti vsebinsko povsem ustrezni. Kot primer lahko podamo uporabo izraza *governance* v poimenovanju projekta Svetovne banke: *Worldwide Governance Indicators*. V projektu raziskovalci na 212 državah poskušajo meriti *governance* v okviru šestih dimenzij: odgovornost oblasti in možnosti soodločanja, politična stabilnost in odsotnost nasilja/terorizma, učinkovitost vlade, kvaliteta regulative, pravna država in nadzor korupcije (Kaufmann 2009). V tem primeru *governance* ne pomeni vladovanja, kot smo ga opredelili v tem prispevku, temveč najširši možni pojem za državno ureditev. V tovrstnih primerih, kjer je z *governance* mišljen krovni pojem, bi njegovo prevajanje v *vladovanje* prineslo dodatno terminološko zmedo, saj se *vladovanje*, kot ga predlagamo v tem prispevku, nanaša na specifične spremembe političnih moči v zadnjih desetletjih.

Nazadnje je treba razmisliti tudi o primernosti uporabe termina *vladovanje* v razmerju do drugih strok, ki se prav tako srečujejo z angleškim izvirnikom *governance*. Pomenljiva je že raznolikost prevajanja angleške besedne zveze *corporate governance* v slovenski ekonomski vedi. Bežen pregled naslovov slovenskih del, ki kot ključno besedo vključujejo *corporate governance*, pokaže, da se zveza prevaja kot *vladanje podjetju* (npr. Giacomelli 1998), *obvladovanje in vodenje družb* (npr. Zajc 1999), *upravljanje podjetij* (npr. Bratina 2004), največkrat pa jo ohranjajo kar v angleškem izvirniku. Če bi temu dodali še *vladovanje podjetju*, bi verjetno dosegli zgolj še večjo zmedo in se pomaknili korak bliže k temu, da *vladovanje* postane »omnibus«, koncept brez

specifične vsebine, ki je uporabljan v zelo raznorodnih, tudi neprimerljivih kontekstih. Odločitev o rabi termina *vladovanje* kot prevoda izraza *governance* bo torej morala zase opraviti vsaka veda, ki uporablja izraz *governance* in išče prevodno ustreznico zanj, posebej. Seveda bo vsaka veda v primeru odločitve za rabo izraza *vladovanje* morala tudi znova definirati in lastnim potrebam prilagoditi njegov pomen. Za politološko in komunikološko vedo pa po našem mnenju velja, da se izraz *vladovanje* lahko funkcionalno vključi v njuno terminologijo, če se njegova raba zavestno in strogo omeji na poimenovanje spremenjenih političnih procesov vladanja in upravljanja, kot jih opredeljujemo v tem prispevku.

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Summary

The aim of this article is to debate on and analyse the concept of governance which has become an important element of modern (Western) thought on current global and national developments yet has not been appropriately or sufficiently introduced in Slovene vocabulary and academic writings. The authors propose that the Slovene political and communication sciences should search for a new term that would diminish the ambiguity and extend the accuracy of Slovene terminology.

In the first section of the article the authors present a brief history of introduction of the terms good governance and global governance in Western academic writing and discourse of international organisations such as the United Nations Organisation, The International Monetary Fund and The World Bank. The authors here argue that globalisation has caused the change in the relation between the state and regulation of ever more transnational affairs. Governance has been juxtaposed to government because the concept of government was not applicable to regulation of international affairs since globally there is no international authority yet relations that transcend national borders still are regulated – the difference being the multipletthora of diverse, both public and private, actors that participate in the processes of global governance.

In the second section of the article the authors argue that there is a need for a terminological consensus in Slovene political and communication sciences on how to translate and conceptualise the term governance. They provide an analysis of Gigafida, the main referential corpus of Slovene language, as to how the term governance is translated and used in Slovene language. The results show that next to using the word in its original English form it is translated as (a) governing: “vladanje” and “vladavina”; (b) management: “upravljanje”; and (c) very recently with “vladovanje”.

The third section of the article critically analyses the translations of the term governance as “vladanje” (eg. Tomšič in Vehovar 2006; Kajnc 2008), “vladavina” (eg. Knep in Fink-Hafner 2011; Kustec-Lipicer 2006) and “upravljanje” (Rizman 2006; Kovač 2005; Rus 2001).

The authors juxtapose the concepts governance to government, governing and public administration and management. They conclude that strict division of all these concepts is generally accepted as difficult. Differentiation between government and governance is commonly understood on the presumption that governance is *more* than government (meaning it involves more actors) and that governance is not as structured as government. There are greater difficulties when differentiating between governance and public administration and management. Pierre and Peters (2000) believe that this overlapping of meanings stems from a specific governmental structures in United Kingdom where Prime Ministers Office has a dual role. Whatever the reason for such ambiguity, public administration/management and governance should be differentiated while at the same time recognising that they are in fact intervened. Public managers are players in the policy-making process (therefore governance) and dichotomy between public service and politics is long forgotten. The division between governance and public management is (and should be) blurry and vague, however that does not

mean it doesn't exist. Authors briefly comment on the also used term "vladavina" as a translation for governance, and criticize that normative implication of the term presents rigid structure, which is directly opposed to the meaning of governance. Finally, the authors propose that governance should be conceptualised as part of a newly coined term "vladovanje" (Splichal 2008) since the absence of such a completely new term diminishes the accuracy of Slovene terminology, makes it ambiguous, and consequently less functional.

The authors conclude the article with emphasizing several caveats with regards to the introductions of the new term "vladovanje" in Slovene language. The first is the problem on the conceptual level: the original term governance has been to a large extent embedded into neoliberal discourse. The question that arises here is to what extent does the term include this neoliberal character. The second set of problems identified by the authors refers to the terminological level. Here the authors discuss the problems of the term "vladovanje" becoming an umbrella concept and/or an omnibus concept used in different ways by various actors, and defined according to need and practice. The authors also warn that "vladovanje" is not a suitable translation of the term governance in all contexts and all disciplines, as an example they provide the question of how to translate the term "corporate governance".

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Simona Topolinjak

DEJAVNIKI IZVAJANJA MEHKE ZAKONODAJE EU NA PODROČJU ENAKOSTI SPOLOV – PRIMER URAVNOTEŽENE ZASTOPANOSTI ŽENSK IN MOŠKIH V PROCESIH ODLOČANJA

IZVLEČEK : V članku analiziramo raznovrstne dejavnike izvajanja mehkih politik Evropske unije na področju enakosti spolov v Sloveniji. Osredotočimo se na izvajanje načela uravnotežene zastopanosti žensk in moških v procesih odločanja na področju politike, znanosti in gospodarstva, kjer je delež žensk na najvišjih položajih še vedno nizek. Na podlagi analize EU- in slovenske zakonodaje ter družboslovnih intervjujev z relevantnimi vladnimi in nevladnimi akterji na EU- in nacionalni ravni je bilo ugotovljeno, da je zaradi sprejete mehke zakonodaje na tem področju najpomembnejši akter pri izvajanju nacionalna vlada, ki lahko izbere javnopolitične instrumente in jih prilagodi svojim aspiracijam. Pritisk na izvajanje s strani EU je tako močnejši v času pristopnih pogajanj o vstopu Slovenije v EU in ob močnem delovanju interesnih skupin.

KLJUČNE BESEDE: izvajanje javnih politik, mehka zakonodaja, EU, Slovenija, enakost spolov.

Implementation factors of soft EU legislation in the field of gender equality. An example of the balanced representation of women and men in decision-making processes.

ABSTRACT: This paper examines various implementation factors of the European Union's soft policy in the field of gender equality in Slovenia. We focus on implementation of the principle of the balanced representation of women and men in decision-making processes in the fields of politics, science and the economy, where the proportion of women in top positions remains low. Based on an analysis of EU and Slovenian legislation and interviews with relevant governmental and non-governmental actors at the EU and national levels, it was found that because of the adopted soft law in this area it is the national government, which can select public policy instruments and adapt them to its

own aspirations, that is the most important player when it comes to implementation. Pressure from the EU was stronger in the accession negotiations when Slovenia was joining the EU and also when interest groups work together.

KEY WORDS: *implementation of public policy, soft law, Slovenia, EU, gender equality*

1 Uvod

V članku se posvečamo analizi raznovrstnih dejavnikov, ki vplivajo na izvajanje politik Evropske unije (EU) na področju enakosti spolov v Sloveniji. Osredotočimo se na formalno izvajanje mehke zakonodaje EU, in sicer na izvajanje načela uravnotežene zastopanosti žensk in moških v procesih odločanja na treh področjih – v politiki, znanosti in gospodarstvu. Za analizo izvajanja načela uravnotežene zastopanosti žensk in moških v procesih odločanja smo se odločili, ker je to vprašanje izredno aktualno: v Sloveniji so ženske na mestih odločanja na teh treh področjih slabo zastopane, na različnih področjih pa prihaja do sprejemanja različnih dokumentov.

Za vsa tri področja tako velja, da bolj ko se vzpenjamo po družbeni lestvici, manj žensk najdemo. V Sloveniji je trenutno najboljše stanje v politiki, saj je bilo po izrednih volitvah leta 2011 v parlament izvoljenih 32 % žensk, kar pomeni, da je bila dosežena kritična meja zastopanosti, ki je običajno določena s 30 % (npr. Dahlerup 2006; Norris 1996). Ta visoki delež žensk v predstavniskem telesu pa se ne kaže pri sestavi vlade, saj je ministrsko mesto zasedla le ena ženska (tako se je delež ministric znižal za 18 odstotnih točk – prejšnja, Pahorjeva vlada je tako imela največji delež ministric v slovenski zgodovini, in sicer 26 %). V znanosti je delež senatorok na univerzah približno 25 %, pri čemer se delež senatorok na novih univerzah (Nova Gorica in Primorska) giblje nad tretjino, na starih univerzah (Ljubljana in Maribor) pa je pod 20 % (Topolinjak 2012: 252–253). Novembra 2010 je bilo v Sloveniji na položaju direktorjev in direktoric ter članov in članic uprav družb 27 % žensk, v upravah največjih družb pa je januarja 2012 sedelo le 15,3 % žensk (Evropska komisija 2012b, 50–51).

V analizi nas bo tako zanimalo, kateri dejavniki vplivajo na izvajanje načela uravnotežene zastopanosti žensk in moških v procesih odločanja na treh izbranih področjih. Mnogonivojska ureditev EU in s tem delitev moči med različnimi vladnimi ravni pripelje tudi do problemov v samem izvajanju javnih politik (Dimitrakopoulos in Richardson 2001: 336), saj gre za decentralizirano izvajalsko strukturo (Treib 2008: 5), pri čemer lahko ločimo formalno izvajanje (prenos evropske zakonodaje v nacionalno) in dejansko izvajanje (izvajanje sprejete evropske zakonodaje v praksi).

Za potrebe analize je uporabljen pristop študije izvajanja od spodaj navzgor, ki obravnava izvajanje javnih politik kot proces politične interakcije med različnimi javnopolitičnimi igralci, med katerimi prihaja do pogajanj in sklepanj kompromisov (Hogwood in Gunn 1984: 207; Ham in Hill 1984: 103), ter študije evropeizacije od zgoraj navzdol, ki obravnava pritisk EU na države članice (npr. Radaelli 2004). Ker pri izvajanju politik sodelujejo različni javnopolitični igralci na različnih ravneh (na ravni EU, nacionalni ravni), ki si informacije izmenjavajo na različne načine (od zgoraj

navzdol, od spodaj navzgor, vertikalno in horizontalno), je za razumevanje izvajalskega procesa uporabljena tudi kombinacija koncepta javnopolitičnih omrežij s konceptom mnogonivojske vladavine.

Dosedanje raziskovanje dejavnikov izvajanja skupnih evropskih politik je večinoma temeljilo na analizi izvajanja določenih direktiv. Z raziskovanjem mehkejših instrumentov se je ukvarjalo manj raziskovalcev – npr. Gerda Falkner s svojimi sodelavci (analiza izvajanja v direktivah zapisanih mehkejših instrumentov, kot so določena priporočila v posameznih direktivah), Fiona Beveridge in Samantha Velluti s sodelavkami (vprašanje spola pri odprti metodi koordinacije), Emanuela Lombardo in Maxime Forest s sodelavci (vprašanje evropeizacije politike enakosti spolov). Pri samem raziskovanju direktiv so raziskovalci ugotovili, da prihaja do prepočasnega prenosa same direktive v nacionalno zakonodajo, kar pa pomeni, da prihaja do zamika pri izvajanju. Že Pressman in Wildavsky (1984: 122) sta izpostavila, da je nejasno, ali je pravilno, a zamaknjeno izvajanje uspeh ali neuspeh. Prepočasna transpozicija (z zamikom tudi več let) lahko povzroči nove probleme (Mastenbroek 2003: 391) ter spodkopava legitimnost skupne politike in tako vpliva na širši evropski integracijski proces (Haverland in Romeijn 2007: 760).

V nadaljevanju bomo najprej na podlagi analize literature o izvajanju politik EU, predvsem politološke, klasificirali dejavnike izvajanja politik EU, nato pa bomo analizirali njihov vpliv na izvajanje (formalno izvajanje) načela uravnotežene zastopanosti žensk in moških v procesih odločanja. V sklepu bomo izpostavili tako pozitivne kot negativne dejavnike, ki vplivajo na izvajanje načela uravnotežene zastopanosti spolov v procesih odločanja na izbranih treh področjih. Vpliv dejavnikov na posameznih ravneh je bil analiziran na podlagi analize zakonodaje EU in slovenske zakonodaje ter družboslovnih intervjujev z relevantnimi vladnimi in nevladnimi akterji na EU- in nacionalni ravni (več Topolinjak 2012).¹

2 Klasifikacija dejavnikov izvajanja politik EU


Različni avtorji so prepoznavali različne dejavnike, ki vplivajo na izvajanje javnih politik EU. Lahko jih razdelimo v dva grozda dejavnikov: na eni strani so dejavniki, povezani z delovanjem oblikovalcev javnih politik tako na EU- kot na nacionalni ravni, na drugi strani pa so dejavniki, povezani z izvajalskimi strukturami oz. dejanskimi izvajalci (na EU-, nacionalni in organizacijski ravni), oboje pa je odvisno tudi od tipa javne politike (Topolinjak 2012: 51). Čeprav je bila večina kvalitativnih študij narejena v enem sektorju² in tako sektorjev med sabo ne moremo primerjati, imajo različni tipi javnih politik za posledico tudi različne konflikte in probleme ter tako povzročijo tudi različne tipe izvajalskega procesa.

1. Članek temelji na doktorski disertaciji, kjer so bili analizirani raznovrstni dejavniki na EU-, nacionalni in organizacijski ravni.
2. Kot pravi Treib (2008: 16), je bilo največ raziskav narejenih na področju okoljske politike (npr. Haverland 2000; Börzel 2003), zakonodaje o delovnem razmerju in enakosti spolov (npr. Caporaso in Jupille 2001; Falkner in dr. 2005a, 2005b) in politike notranjega trga (npr. Knill in Lehmkuhl 2000).

Večina prvih raziskav izvajanja javnih politik v EU je bila narejena na podlagi pristopa od zgoraj navzdol. Tako je bilo izvajanje zakonodaje EU v posameznih državah prikazano kot apolitični proces, katerega uspeh je odvisen od jasno zapisanih določil, uspešne administrativne organizacije in poenostavljenih zakonodajnih postopkov na nacionalni ravni (npr. Siedentopf in Ziller 1988). Šele skozi čas so se raziskovalci zavedeli, da je izvajanje politični proces in da je izvrševanje javne politike pogosto ovirano zaradi odpora nacionalnih političnih akterjev (Pülzl in Treib 2006: 98). Najbolj znan argument temelji na zgodovinsko-institucionalnem predvidevanju, t. i. stopnji (ne) skladnosti, ki izpostavlja nacionalne akterje kot vratarje statusa quo in kot zaščitnike nacionalnih zakonodajno-administrativnih tradicij (npr. Duina 1997; Börzel 2003).

V začetku 21. stoletja so se raziskovalci začeli zavedati, da je pri analizi izvajanja treba dati pozornost številnim omrežjem nacionalnih akterjev. Tako je proces izvajanja odvisen ne le od skladnosti obstoječe nacionalne zakonodaje z zakonodajo EU, ampak tudi z dejavniki, kot so število veto igralcev, prisotnost/odsotnost konsenzno orientirane kulture oblikovanja odločitev, (ne)podpora interesnih skupin (Green Cowles in dr. 2001; Heritier in dr. 2001).

Grafikon 1:
Razdelitev literature o izvajanju javnih politik v EU na grozde dejavnikov



Literatura izvajanja javnih politik v EU je tako v grafikonu 1 razdeljena na podlagi javnopolitičnih akterjev, s katerimi so povezani posamezni dejavniki. Ker pa so

nekateri dejavniki lahko povezani tako z oblikovalci javnih politik kot z njihovimi izvajalci, bomo v nadaljevanju posamezne dejavnike analizirali na podlagi ravni, kjer se pojavljajo. Tako bomo na ravni EU analizirali vpliv vrste zakonodaje, postopkov odločanja, nadzora, neposrednega pritiska s strani institucij EU in finančnih resursov na izvajanje politike enakosti spolov, na nacionalni ravni pa vpliv skladnosti slovenske zakonodaje z zakonodajo EU, vpliv ekonomskih stroškov, političnih preferenc, organiziranosti transpozicijskega prostora in vpliv interesnih skupin na samo izvajanje politike enakosti spolov, predvsem na področju uravnotežene zastopanosti žensk in moških.

3 Analiza dejavnikov izvajanja politik EU na področju enakosti spolov

Vprašanje enakosti spolov je v EU prisotno že od ustanovitve Evropske gospodarske skupnosti (EGS) leta 1957, saj je bilo v Pogodbo o ustanovitvi EGS vključeno tudi načelo enakega plačila za enako opravljeno delo za moške in ženske. Od takrat naprej je vprašanje stalno prisotno na dnevnem redu EU. Leta 1997 je z Amsterdamsko pogodbo vzpodbujanje enakosti spolov postalo tudi eden od ciljev EU, hkrati pa je bil uveden tudi nov pristop – integracija načela enakosti spolov (politiko enakosti spolov je treba integrirati v vse politike na vseh ravneh in v vseh fazah) (Walby 2005: 456). Poleg strategije integracije načela enakosti spolov se uporabljata še dve strategiji oz. pristopa: enako obravnavanje (vsi morajo imeti enake možnosti na vseh področjih) in pozitivna akcija (gre za specifično pomoč ženskam, ki so v patriarhalni družbi v neenakem izhodiščnem položaju, npr. spolne kvote) (Verloo 2001: 3–4).

EU je sprejela sedemnajst direktiv (trenutno jih je v veljavi šest³), ki se osredotočajo na enakost spolov. Poleg te t. i. trde zakonodaje pa so njene institucije (Evropski parlament, Svet, Evropska komisija) sprejele tudi veliko mehke zakonodaje⁴ v obliki

3. Trenutno so veljavne naslednje direktive: Direktiva 79/7/EGS z dne 19. decembra 1978 o postopnem izvrševanju načela enakega obravnavanja moških in žensk v zadevah socialne varnosti; Direktiva 2007/30/ES Evropskega parlamenta in Sveta z dne 20. junija 2007, ki je spremenila direktivo Sveta 92/85/EGS z dne 19. oktobra o uvedbi ukrepov za spodbujanje izboljšav na področju varnosti in zdravja pri delu nosečih delavk in delavk, ki so pred kratkim rodile ali dojijo; Direktiva Sveta 2004/113/ES z dne 13. decembra 2004 o izvajanju načela enakega obravnavanja moških in žensk pri dostopu do blaga in storitev ter oskrbi z njimi; Direktiva 2006/54/ES Evropskega parlamenta in Sveta z dne 5. julija 2006 o uresničevanju načela enakih možnosti ter enakega obravnavanja moških in žensk pri zaposlovanju in poklicnem delu; Direktiva Sveta 2010/18/EU z dne 8. marca 2010 o izvajanju revidiranega okvirnega sporazuma o starševskem dopustu sklenjenega med BUSINESSEUROPE, UEAPME, CEEP in ETUC; Direktiva 2010/41/EU Evropskega parlamenta in Sveta z dne 7. julija 2010 o uporabi načela enakega obravnavanja moških in žensk, ki opravljajo samostojno dejavnost.
4. Poleg uravnotežene zastopanosti žensk in moških v procesih odločanja je bilo sprejeto veliko mehke zakonodaje tudi na drugih področjih – npr. o nasilju nad ženskami (npr. Krizsan in Popa 2011).

priporočil, resolucij, akcijskih načrtov itd. Definiramo jo lahko kot pravila upravljanja, ki v osnovi nimajo zakonsko obvezujoče moči, vendar imajo kljub temu praktične učinke (Snyder v Cini 2000: 4). Fiona Beveridge (2008) tako poudarja, da se je razvoj *acquis communautaire* vedno razvijal vzporedno z nekimi mehkejšimi iniciativami. Komisija je tako v obdobju, ko Svet ni imel politične volje za sprejetje novih določil o politiki enakosti spolov, nadaljevala delo z mehkejšimi metodami (Mazey 1995). Tako so velikokrat postavili temelje za prihodnje, bolj obvezujoče mehanizme.

Politiko enakosti spolov je težko izvajati, ker jo države članice opredeljujejo kot del socialne politike, se pravi področja, kjer so države članice zelo zaščitniške. Vsaka politika se tako mora prebiti skozi tri šivankina ušesa, in sicer na nadnacionalni ravni znotraj Komisije, ki pripravi neko zakonodajo, na mednarodni ravni v Svetu in Evropskem parlamentu, ki zakonodajo sprejmeta, ter nazadnje v državi članici, ki to politiko sprejme in izvaja (Pollack in Hafner-Burton 2000: 437–438). Problemi nastajajo tudi zaradi različnih sistemov v posamezni državi, saj lahko vsaka država na svoj način definira sam problem (Eveline in Bacchi 2005: 503).⁵

V nadaljevanju se bomo osredotočili na izvajanje načela uravnotežene zastopanosti žensk in moških v procesih odločanja, ki je bilo na ravni EU opredeljeno v mehkejši zakonodaji. Zanimalo nas bo, kateri identificirani dejavniki iz analizirane literature imajo vpliv na izvajanje načela uravnotežene zastopanosti žensk in moških v procesih odločanja v Sloveniji. Osredotočili smo se na obdobje od začetka leta 1991 do konca marca 2012.

3.1 Vpliv dejavnikov na ravni EU

Na kakšen način je neka politika definirana, je še posebej pomembno v kontekstu EU na področju enakosti spolov, saj zaradi kompleksnosti oblikovanja politik in razširjenosti določenih konceptov in idej prihaja do različnih pomenov v različnih jezikih in nacionalnih kontekstih (Eveline in Bacchi 2005). Zaradi tega je izredno pomembno, na kakšen način je določena politika sprejeta, se pravi v kakšnem dokumentu, kakšne finančne spodbude prinaša in na kakšen način je zagotovljen nadzor nad samim izvajanjem.

V EU je bilo na področju uravnotežene zastopanosti žensk in moških v procesih odločanja na treh izbranih področjih sprejetih kar nekaj dokumentov. Gre za resolucije s strani Evropskega parlamenta in Sveta, ki se osredotočajo na vprašanje uravnotežene zastopanosti obeh spolov na mestih odločanja,⁶ priporočilo s strani Sveta (1996), ki

5. Tako npr. prihaja do različnih definicij in praks strategije integracije načela enakosti spolov v politiko (Walby 2005: 455; Eveline in Bacchi 2005: 497).

6. Resoluciji Evropskega parlamenta o ženskah v odločevalskih telesih (1994) in o ženskah v odločanju (2000), Resolucija Sveta o uravnoteženi zastopanosti žensk in moških v procesih odločanja (1995). V nekaterih drugih resolucijah je bilo uravnotežena zastopnost žensk in moških v procesih odločanja le omenjena – npr. v resolucijah Evropskega parlamenta o enakosti žensk in moških v EU za posamezno leto, o vidikih enakosti spolov pri gospodarskem nazadovanju in finančni krizi (2010), o ženskah v znanosti (2008), o vlogi žensk v industriji (2008), o ženskah in vodenju podjetij (2011), v Resoluciji Sveta o ženskah in znanosti (1999) in resolucijah o znanosti in družbi ter ženskah v znanosti (2001).

spodbujajo države članice, da sprejmejo potrebne ukrepe za povečanje števila žensk na vodstvenih položajih, načrte Komisije za enakost med moškimi in ženskami⁷ ter zavezo držav članic v obliki Evropskega pakta (2006 in 2011). Sprejeta je bila v treh strjenih obdobjih – trije dokumenti med letoma 1994 in 1996, štirje dokumenti med 1999 in 2002 ter v zadnjih petih letih porast mehke zakonodaje, predvsem na področju uravnotežene zastopanosti obeh spolov na položajih odločanja v gospodarstvu.

V *postopku odločanja*⁸ oz. pri sprejemanju odločitev na področju enakosti spolov v EU sodelujejo Evropski svet, Evropski parlament, Svet EU, Evropska komisija in Sodišče ES. Zakonodajne pobude za sprejetje direktiv večinoma pripravlja Komisija, mnenje k predlogu podajo tudi druge evropske institucije (Evropski parlament, Ekonomsko-socialni svet (EESO), Odbor regij), odločitev pa v postopku soodločanja sprejmeta Svet in Evropski parlament.⁹ Mehko zakonodajo (npr. resolucije) večinoma sprejemata Evropski parlament in Svet samostojno, pri Priporočilih Sveta o uravnoteženi zastopanosti žensk in moških v procesih odločanja (1996) pa so sodelovale vse institucije. V zadnjih petih letih je tako bilo sprejete veliko mehke zakonodaje o izboljšanju vloge žensk na mestih odločanja, iz česar lahko sklepamo, da se je v zadnjem času v EU povečal pomen načela uravnotežene zastopanosti obeh spolov v procesih odločanja, saj so vse tri institucije – Evropski parlament (različne resolucije), Svet (Evropski pakt 2006 in 2011) in Komisija (delovni dokumenti, načrti) – sprejele neke dokumente. To lahko po eni strani pripišemo veliki širitvi EU leta 2004 in prihodu novih držav članic, kjer so ženske slabše zastopane v predstavniških telesih, po drugi strani pa spremembi dnevnega reda EU in v povezavi z njim aktivnosti glede uravnotežene zastopanosti žensk in moških v procesih odločanja v gospodarstvu.¹⁰

Kljub dejstvu, da EU daje velik poudarek uravnoteženi zastopanosti žensk in moških v procesih odločanja, pa se je do sedaj na tem področju sprejemala le mehka

7. Strategija za enakost med ženskami in moškimi (2010–2015) (2010), Načrt za enakost med moškimi in ženskami (2006–2010) (2006) ...

8. Mastenbroek (2003: 375) meni, da različni postopki odločanja lahko vplivajo na hitrost sprejetja določene direktive. Na eni strani Fearon (1998) zagovarja teorijo pogajalske moči in poudarja, da je pogajanje med različnimi akterji na EU-ravni najpomembnejši dejavnik za razumevanje izvajanja, po drugi strani pa Heather Mbaye (2001: 274) in Katerina Linos (2004: 19) zagovarjata teorijo strateške izbire, saj sta ugotovili, da nacionalno glasovanje za ali določeno direktivo proti njej nima posebne teže pri samem (ne)izvajanju; na tej podlagi sklepata, da se lahko država odloči, ali bo določeno politiko izvajala ali ne.

9. Do Maastrichtske pogodbe je imel ključno vlogo pri odločanju o zakonodajnih pobudah Svet. Evropski parlament je imel najprej le posvetovalno funkcijo, nato pa se je njegova vloga krepila – z Enotnim evropskim aktom je Evropski parlament dobil pravico sodelovanja, po Maastrichtski pogodbi pa je postal enakopraven zakonodajni organ (postopek soodločanja) (Dovžan 2009).

10. Na najvišji dnevni red EU (Svet) je bilo to vprašanje postavljeno leta 2010 s sprejetjem Poročila o enakosti spolov v EU (Uradnica Evropske komisije 2010).

zakonodaja. Gre za mehko *vrsto dokumentov*¹¹ (resolucije, priporočila itd.), ki so v nasprotju z direktivami neobvezni, nimajo določenega transpozicijskega časa in tudi jezik je mehkejši. V direktivah je npr. navedeno, da je treba nacionalno zakonodajo uskladiti z vsebino direktive, medtem ko se v resolucijah države članice samo poziva in spodbuja, da okrepijo delovanje na področju enakosti spolov v procesih odločanja (pri tem pa npr. tudi izpostavijo primere dobre prakse v posameznih državah članicah). Čeprav je mehka zakonodaja sprejeta s soglasjem držav članic, se uporaba mehke zakonodaje včasih razume kot simbolno dejanje, ki je močno v obljubah in šibko v zavezah (Lange 1992). Vendar je mehka zakonodaja lahko prav tako učinkovita, če jo je država članica pripravljena izvajati (Jacobsson 2004: 89).

Poleg mehke zakonodaje se v določenih primerih določene institucije ali posamezniki obrnejo neposredno na države članice in jih pozivajo k sprejetju določene politike. Govorimo o *neposrednem pritisku s strani institucij EU*. Tako je na področju politike Evropski parlament nacionalne parlamente držav pristopnic pozval, da sprejmejo ukrepe za bolj uravnoteženo zastopanost žensk in moških v nacionalnih delegacijah v Evropskem parlamentu in kasneje za volitve v Evropski parlament (npr. Resolucije o enakosti moških in žensk v EU v posameznih letih). V zadnjem času je aktivna evropska komisarka za pravosodje Viviane Reding, ki je 1. marca 2011 pozvala gospodarske družbe, naj do marca 2012 podpišejo izjavo o večji zastopanosti žensk in moških v upravah podjetij (gre za samoregulacijo s strani podjetij). Kljub močni podpori s strani Evropskega parlamenta (sprejem resolucije, kjer predlagajo tudi uvedbo spolnih kvot), nekaterih držav članic (ki so sprejele zavezujoče mehanizme – npr. Francija, Nizozemska) ter tudi evropskih državljanov¹² je izjavo podpisalo le 24 podjetij, zato je marca 2012 komisarka pozvala zainteresirane skupine, da se vključijo v javno posvetovanje o možnih ukrepih na ravni EU in napovedala sprejetje ukrepov do konca leta 2012 (Evropa 2011, Evropska komisija 2012a).

11. Vrsto dokumenta lahko analiziramo na podlagi različnih elementov: stopnja obveznosti – manj je mednarodni predpis legalno obvezen, manj se države prilagajajo (Börzel in dr. 2003: 17); stopnja preciznosti – nekateri (npr. Börzel in dr. 2003: 17–18) pravijo, da je izvajanje slabše v primeru, ko je predpis nejasen in nenatančen, nasprotno pa Keating (2007: 20) ugotavlja, da bolj specificirana direktiva zavleče izvajalski proces; kompleksnost določenega akta – nekateri raziskovalci (npr. Mastenbroek 2003: 376; Keating 2007: 20) menijo, da bo direktiva sprejeta hitreje, če gre samo za tehnični popravek, in počasneje, če gre za dokument s povsem novo vsebino; drugi (npr. Haverland in Romeijn 2007: 769) pa opozarjajo, da lahko tudi pri sprejemanju in izvajanju amandmajev prihaja do resnega zamujanja, kar lahko povežemo s krajšim transpozicijskim rokom, večjim poudarkom držav članic pri sprejemanju novih direktiv in v določenih primerih z velikimi spremembami, ki jih povzroči sprejetje amandmajev; stopnja pooblaščenosti, ki jo dajo države tretjim akterjem, da interpretirajo in sprejmejo predpise (Börzel in dr. 2003: 18); transpozicijski čas (rok za sprejetje zakonodaje v državi članici) – gre za pritisk EU na državo članico, saj mora določeno zakonodajo sprejeti v določenem roku (npr. Toshkov 2007).

12. Po podatkih Eurobarometra se je 75 % vprašanih opredelilo za uvedbo zakonodaje o uravnoteženi zastopanosti spolov v upravah podjetij, pri čemer jih je 49 % navedlo, da bi bile najprimernejši mehanizem za uveljavitev denarne kazni (Evropska komisija 2011).

Za uspešno izvajanje politik je eden ključnih dejavnikov tudi *nadzor* nad samim izvajanjem. Znotraj javnopolitičnega omrežja obstajajo različni tipi nadzora, in sicer administrativni, finančni in politični nadzor na vseh ravneh (Laffan 1983: 402). Nadzor nad izvajanjem je največkrat s strani Evropske komisije, ki pa ima omejene možnosti za odkrivanje kršitev izvajanja; gre torej za nepopoln nadzor nad samim izvajanjem (Dimitrakopoulos in Richardson 2001: 345). Funkcija nadzora se še zmanjša pri izvajanju mehke zakonodaje; govorimo lahko le o spremljanju (monitoringu). Nadzor se tako na neki način izvaja prek letnih poročil o enakosti med ženskami in moškimi, ki jih pripravlja Komisija in kjer sta »moralna nagrada« in »kazen« lahko izpostavitel države kot primera dobre oz. slabe prakse.¹³ Letna poročila so predstavljena na spomladanskem zasedanju Sveta; ta jih tudi formalno potrdi. To je zelo pomembno, saj lahko s tem poročilom pride na dnevni red Sveta novo ključno vprašanje (tako je bilo npr. v poročilu o enakosti žensk in moških, 2010, ki je bilo predstavljeno na spomladanskem zasedanju Sveta leta 2010 in ki ga je ta potrdil, prvič izpostavljeno tudi vprašanje žensk kot vodij in članic najvišjih odločevalskih teles v podjetjih) (Uradnica Evropske komisije 2010). Za spremljanje napredka držav članic na področju uravnotežene zastopanosti žensk in moških v procesih odločanja je Komisija leta 2004 (s pomočjo Evropske mreže strokovnjakov za zastopanost žensk pri političnem odločanju) na svoji spletni strani vzpostavila tudi podatkovno zbirko primerljivih podatkov o ženskah na odločevalskih mestih. Za potrebe spremljanja izvajanja pekinške akcijske platforme glede žensk v odločanju pa je leta 1999 Svet pod predsedovanjem Finske sprejel set devetih indikatorjev (kvantitativnih in kvalitativnih) za spremljanje situacije žensk na mestih odločanja v politiki,¹⁴ čez štiri leta pa je Svet pod italijanskim predsedovanjem sprejel še drugi set devetih indikatorjev glede uravnotežene zastopanosti žensk in moških na ekonomskih odločevalskih mestih.¹⁵ Junija 2008 je Evropska komisija

13. Tako je bila Slovenija v zadnjem Poročilu Evropske komisije o napredku na področju enakosti spolov za leto 2011 (Evropska komisija 2012b) predstavljena po eni strani kot primer dobre prakse, saj se je s pomočjo spolnih kvot in izvolitvijo novih političnih strank po izrednih volitvah leta 2011 podvojil delež žensk v parlamentu (s 16 na 32 %) in kot primer slabe prakse, saj ima v vladi manj kot 10 % žensk.

14. Delež žensk v spodnjem domu nacionalnih/federalnih parlamentov DČ in v EP, delež žensk v regionalnem predstavniškem telesu DČ, delež žensk v lokalnih predstavniških telesih DČ, politike krepitev uravnotežene zastopanosti obeh spolov na volitvah, delež članic nacionalnih/federalnih vlad in delež članic Evropske komisije, delež ministric po različnih področjih nacionalnih/federalnih vlad, delež najvišje rangiranih javnih uslužbenk, razdelitev najvišje rangiranih javnih uslužbenk po področjih, delež žensk na vrhovnih sodiščih DČ ter delež žensk na Sodišču ES in na Sodišču prve stopnje ES.

15. Delež žensk med guvernerji Centralnih bank, delež žensk med člani odločevalskih teles centralnih bank, delež žensk med ministri na ekonomskem področju, delež žensk med predsedniki največjih podjetij v posamezni DČ, delež žensk med člani v najvišjih organih odločanja v največjih podjetjih v posamezni DČ, delež žensk med predsedniki sindikatov na ravni EU, delež žensk med člani upravnega telesa sindikatov (na ravni EU), delež žensk med predsedniki delodajalskih organizacij (na ravni EU), delež žensk med člani upravega telesa delodajalskih organizacij (na ravni EU).

v skladu s Načrtom za enakost med moškimi in ženskami 2006–2010 ustanovila tudi evropsko mrežo žensk za odločanje v politiki in gospodarstvu, ki je evropska platforma za razprave, izmenjavo informacij in dobrih praks ter prepoznavanje najboljših strategij na tem področju.

Na področju znanosti je vprašanje o ženskah¹⁶ prišlo na dnevni red leta 1999 s sprejetjem akcijskega načrta za ženske in znanost,¹⁷ ki sta ga podprla tako Evropski parlament kot Svet, izredno vlogo pa je odigrala tudi Helsinška skupina za ženske in znanost (sestavljena iz nacionalnih predstavnikov in predstavnic), ki je bila ustanovljena z namenom izmenjave izkušenj in podpore Komisiji pri promociji enakosti spolov v znanosti. Znotraj nje je bila ustanovljena tudi skupina statističnih strokovnjakov in strokovnjakinj, ki je začela zbirati statistične podatke o ženskah v znanosti in jih objavljati v publikaciji »She figures« (prva je izšla 2003). Pri samem nadzoru oz. spremljanju izvajanja enakosti spolov v znanosti pa so pomembne tudi razne delovne oz. ekspertne skupine, ki jih je ustanovila Evropska komisija, ki so pripravile poročila o ženskah v znanosti (npr. strokovna skupina ETAN, ENWISE), pri čemer se je strokovna skupina WIRDEM (Women in research decision making) ukvarjala z vprašanjem žensk na vodilnih mestih v znanosti in ugotovila, da je ključni dejavnik za neravnovesje spolov v odločanju prevladujoča kultura (Evropska komisija 2008).

Pri spremljanju izvajanja politik enakosti spolov pa imajo velik pomen tudi različne interesne skupine, ki opozarjajo na neizvajanje (Börzel in dr. 2003: 4). Tako je na ravni EU najpomembnejši Evropski ženski lobi (EWL), ki predstavlja nacionalne ženske organizacije držav članic in je tudi večinsko financiran s strani EU, deluje pa v smeri uresničitve dveh ključnih ciljev – vzpostavitev enakosti med ženskami in moškimi ter vzpostavitev paritetne demokracije na vseh nivojih (EWL 2012). Na področju znanosti je Evropska komisija leta 2005 financirala ustanovitev Evropske mreže znanstvenic (EPWS), ki je njen pomemben sogovornik pri spremljanju izvajanja politik o ženskah v znanosti. Pri obeh se postavlja vprašanje neodvisnosti, saj oba večinsko financira EU.

Pri podpori institucijam EU in državam članicam pri njihovih prizadevanjih spodbujati enakost spolov ima oz. bo imel veliko vlogo Evropski inštitut za enakost spolov (EIGE), ki je bil uradno odprt junija 2010 v Vilni. Naloga EIGE je zagotoviti objektivne, zanesljive, primerljive informacije in podatke o enakosti med ženskami in moškimi ter na podlagi njihove analize pomagati institucijam EU in državam članicam pri sprejemanju odločitev – trenutno se posvečajo a) izvajanju pekinških izhodišč, b)

16. Evropska komisija je leto dni prej (leta 1998) z državami članicami ustanovila strokovno skupino za vprašanje žensk v znanosti ETAN (European Technology Assessment Network), ki je pripravila poročilo »Znanstvene politike v EU – spodbujanje odličnosti z uveljavljanjem enakosti spolov«, ki se osredotoča na položaj znanstvenic v zahodnih državah. Leta 2002 je bila tako pri EK ustanovljena še skupina ENWISE (Enlarge Women In Science To East) s članicami iz držav srednje in vzhodne Evrope ter balkanskih držav, ki je pripravila poročilo »Zapravljeni talenti: izza domačih štirih sten pred javnost«, ki govori o položaju žensk v državah ENWISE.

17. V njem je kot cilj naveden 25 % delež žensk na vodilnih položajih v znanosti.

vzpostaviti EU-indeksa enakosti spolov ter c) integraciji načela enakosti spolov (EIGE 2012). Tako lahko govorimo še o *informacijski in raziskovalni podpori*, saj lahko različne institucije pridobljene informacije uporabijo pri sprejemanju, izvajanju, spremljanju in nadzoru politike, raziskovalke in raziskovalci pa jih lahko uporabijo v raziskovalne namene (raziskovanje poteka tako na EIGE kot tudi po različnih raziskovalnih institucijah) (Topolinjak 2012: 119–120).

Finančni reursi lahko povečajo legitimiteto mednarodnih institucij, vendar lahko različni mehanizmi povzročijo različne učinek – če se npr. država želi prilagoditi določenim predpisom, a nima kapacitet za to, bodo sankcije najverjetneje povzročile prej poglobitev problema kot njegovo rešitev, nasprotno pa bi finančna pomoč vzpodbudila prilagajanje (Börzel in dr. 2003: 27). Ker v naši analizi obravnavamo mehko zakonodajo, finančni resursi v samih dokumentih niso omenjeni. Tako neizvajanje politike enakosti spolov ni finančno sankcionirano. Financiranje politike enakosti spolov je zagotovljeno z akcijskimi programi za enakost spolov; trenutno potekajo štirje pomembnejši viri financiranja s strani EU na področju enakosti spolov: Evropski socialni sklad, Evropski sklad za regionalni razvoj, PROGRESS (2007–2013) in 7. okvirni program za znanost.

3.2 Vpliv dejavnikov na (sub)nacionalni ravni

Politika na področju enakosti spolov je s strani EU v nekaterih primerih obvezujoča (predvsem na področju zaposlovanja, kjer so bile sprejete direktive), v drugih primerih pa je le priporočilna (npr. za uravnoteženo zastopanost obeh spolov v procesih odločanja). Zaradi tega je izredno pomembno delovanje nacionalnih javnopolitičnih igralcev v procesu izvajanja – tako vladnih kot nevladnih, na katere pa vplivajo tudi zunanji in notranji dejavniki. Preverili bomo skladnost slovenske zakonodaje z zakonodajo EU, vpliv ekonomskih stroškov, političnih preferenc, organiziranosti transpozicijskega prostora in vpliv interesnih skupin na samo izvajanje politike enakosti spolov, predvsem na področju uravnotežene zastopanosti žensk in moških v procesih odločanja. V nekaterih primerih ni mogoče ločiti izvajanja načela uravnotežene zastopanosti žensk in moških v procesih odločanja od izvajanja politike enakosti spolov, zato sta obravnavana skupaj (predvsem sprejetje krovnih zakonov na tem področju).

V pristopnem obdobju je bila *skladnost nacionalne zakonodaje z zakonodajo EU*¹⁸ na področju enakosti spolov opredeljena v Pogajalskih izhodiščih Slovenije za področje 13 – socialna politika in zaposlovanje. Del zakonodaje EU na področju enakosti spolov je tako že bil vključen v slovensko zakonodajo (predvsem v poglavju

18. Veliko raziskovalcev (npr. Duina 1997, Knill in Lenschow 1998) se je osredotočilo na stopnjo skladnosti med nacionalno in EU-zakonodajo. Če sta zakonodaji skladni, je adaptacijski pritisk majhen, izvajanje pa pravočasno in neproblematično; v primeru neskladnosti pa bo pri izvajanju prišlo do težav in zamujanja. Če se direktiva EU zelo razlikuje od zakonodaje v državi članici, bo transpozicija lahko bolj zapletena zaradi različnih javnopolitičnih igralcev, ki se jih določena politika dotika (Börzel 2003), vendar že obstoječa zakonodaja ne pomeni tudi uspešnega in pravočasnega prenosa direktive (Falkner in dr. 2005a: 4–6; Keating 2007: 23).

o človekovih pravicah in temeljnih svoboščinah v Ustavi RS), drugo zakonodajo pa je Slovenija vključila s sprejemom zakona o delovnih razmerjih (zagotovljeno enako plačilo za ženske in moške za enako delo ...), zakona o starševstvu in družinskih prejemkih (postopno zagotovljena individualna pravica obeh staršev do najmanj treh mesecev starševskega dopusta) ter krovnega zakona za enake možnosti obeh spolov – zakona o enakih možnostih žensk in moških – ZEMŽM (zagotovitev enake obravnave moških in žensk na vseh področjih) (Pogajalska izhodišča, 13. poglavje). ZEMŽM¹⁹ je bil sprejet 21. junija 2002 (mesec dni po vložitvi zakona s strani vlade) po hitrem postopku, v razpravi so sodelovali le trije poslanci in ena poslanka (magnetogram 17. redne seje DZ, 21. 6. 2002). Dve leti kasneje je bil sprejet tudi Zakon o uresničevanju načela enakega obravnavanja – ZUNEO (temeljni zakon za enake možnosti ne glede na osebno okoliščino), ki so ga poslanci morali sprejeti po nujnem postopku, saj ga je bilo treba sprejeti še pred vstopom v EU, da ne bi bilo kakšnih posledic za državo. V razpravo je bilo vključenih šest poslancev, od tega dve poslanki (magnetogram seje DZ, 22. april 2004).

Če se osredotočimo na vprašanje uravnotežene zastopanosti žensk in moških v procesih odločanja, lahko ugotovimo, da je bilo sprejetje ZEMŽM izredno pomembno, saj je (1) bila opredeljena uravnotežena zastopanost obeh spolov, ki jo je treba v največji meri upoštevati tudi pri a) sestavi delovnih teles in delegacij državnega zbora (ZEMŽM, 10. čl.), b) sestavi delovnih teles in delegacij vlade (ZEMŽM, 14. čl.), c) imenovanju ali predlaganju predstavnic in predstavnikov vlade v javnih podjetjih (ZEMŽM, 14. čl.) in d) sestavi strokovnih svetov ministrstva (ZEMŽM, 14. čl.) ter (2) političnim strankam bilo naloženo sprejetje štiriletnih načrtov o vprašanju uravnotežene zastopanosti obeh spolov na kandidatnih listah in v organih stranke (ZEMŽM, 31. čl.). Na podlagi 14. člena je bila tako sprejeta vladna uredba o kriterijih za upoštevanje načela uravnotežene zastopanosti spolov ter na Javni agenciji za raziskovalno dejavnost RS (ARRS) Pravilnik o delovanju stalnih in občasnih strokovnih teles za področje raziskovalne dejavnosti (2006). Pri sprejetju slednjega in dveh resolucijah za obdobje 2006–2010 (ReNRRP) in 2011–2020 (ReRIS), ki sta skladni z raziskovalno politiko EU in zagotavljanjem enakih možnosti v znanosti, je imela veliko vlogo tudi Komisija za uveljavitev žensk v znanosti.²⁰ Komisija za uveljavitev vloge žensk v znanosti je strokovno telo ministrstva za znanost,²¹ ki pomaga pri oblikovanju znanstvene politike v Sloveniji. Ustanovljena je bila po zgledu Helsinške skupine in je zelo dejavna v informiranju o ženskah v znanosti

19. Vsebina zakona je bila med drugim usklajena z Amsterdamsko pogodbo, Priporočili Sveta o uravnoteženi zastopanosti žensk in moških pri odločanju (1996) in Resolucijo Evropskega parlamenta o uravnoteženi zastopanosti žensk in moških pri odločanju (2000) (Izjava o skladnosti: Predlog ZEMŽM).

20. Ustanovljena je bila maja 2001 v okviru MŠZŠ in v sodelovanju s Slovensko nacionalno komisijo za UNESCO. Komisija je sestavljena iz predstavnikov oz. predstavnic različnih znanstvenih ved, različnih akademskih in raziskovalnih institucij ter institucij, pomembnih za delo na področju spodbujanja žensk v znanosti (SURS, Urad za UNESCO, ARRS). Več na spletni strani Komisije.

21. Področje znanosti je spadalo v različna ministrstva, največkrat v povezavi z visokim šolstvom.

ter pri zbiranju in objavljanju podatkov o neenakosti med spoloma v znanosti.

Največji korak naprej je bil narejen v politiki. V devetdesetih letih 20. stoletja je bilo namreč v Sloveniji več poskusov uzakonitve načela uravnotežene zastopanosti obeh spolov v političnem odločanju, vendar je bil vsak predlog zavržen z argumentom, da imajo ženske in moški po ustavi enake možnosti (glej npr. Antić 1998; Antić in sodelavke 2003). Na enaki podlagi je potekala tudi razprava glede uzakonitve spolnih kvot v Zakonu o volitvah predstavnikov v Evropski parlament – ZVPEP-A, Zakonu o lokalnih volitvah – ZLV-E in Zakonu o volitvah v Državni zbor – ZVDZ-B (magnetogrami sej DZ).

Pred samim sprejetjem zakonodaje je v Sloveniji že obstajal Urad za enake možnosti (UEM)²² oz. prej Urad za žensko politiko (deloval od 1992 naprej), ki izvaja in spremlja politiko enakosti spolov. Program dela za obdobje 2005–2013 je opredeljen tudi v Resoluciji o nacionalnem programu za enake možnosti žensk in moških – ReNPEMŽM ter v dvoletnih periodičnih načrtih za izvajanje nacionalnega programa. UEM deluje na vseh področjih. Tako se tudi zavzema za bolj uravnoteženo zastopnost obeh spolov v političnem odločanju ter v procesih odločanja v znanosti in na družbeno-ekonomskem področju.

V okviru sprejemanja zakonov in resolucij na področju uravnotežene zastopanosti spolov v procesih odločanja ni prišlo do večjih *ekonomskih stroškov*. Izvajalske institucije so bile vzpostavljene že prej (UEM).²³ V okviru sprejetja zakonov o volitvah je Volilna komisija dobila le še eno nalogo več – spremljanje skladnosti kandidatnih list z določbo o spolni zastopanosti. Pri tem niso bili potrebni nobeni novi kadri ali finančna sredstva. Tudi nacionalni programi za znanost ne predvidevajo nobenega novega organa; vsi ukrepi so del preostalega izvajanja znanstvene politike.

*Administrativna učinkovitost*²⁴ izvajanja načela uravnotežene zastopanosti žensk in moških v procesih odločanja je odvisna od števila izvajalskih struktur in nadzora. Na področju uravnotežene zastopanosti žensk in moških v procesih odločanja na vseh treh področjih v izvajalskem ciklusu sodelujejo (1) vlada pri oblikovanju in sprejemanju zakonodaje ter pri imenovanju bolj spolno uravnoteženih strokovnih teles in delegacij,

22. Sedanja vlada je v sklopu varčevalnih ukrepov UEM ukinila, njegove naloge pa je s 1. aprilom 2012 prenesla na Ministrstvo za delo, družino in socialne zadeve. Ukinitvi so nasprotovala nekatere interesne organizacije, in politične stranke, ki so javno pozivale, naj vlada predlog umakne.

23. Po sprejetju ZEMŽM in ZUNEO se je v UEM povečal obseg dela, zato so morali zaposliti še dva nova sodelavca (skupaj 10), od tega je eden opravljal delo zagovornika oz. zagovornice enakih možnosti (Vlada RS 2006).

24. Na splošno velja, da države z bolj učinkovito in transparentno birokracijo direktive hitreje implementirajo (Linos 2004: 12–13), države z manjšo javno upravo, neučinkovito birokracijo in sistemsko korupcijo pa imajo višjo stopnjo neprilagoditve (Mbaye 2001: 261; Keding 2007: 23). Države članice, ki imajo uvedeno močno spremljanje izvajanja (npr. Danska, Nizozemska), imajo manj kršitev kot tiste, ki imajo šibko administrativno in znanstveno infrastrukturo (npr. Grčija, Španija) (Börzel in dr. 2003: 5). Zakonodajno telo namreč potrebuje učinkovite administracijske, znanstvene in zakonodajne vire za izdajo pravil in predpisov ter za spremljanje njihovih uveljavitev (Vogel in Kessler 2000: 21).

(2) Državni zbor pri sprejemanju zakonodaje ter pri imenovanju bolj spolno uravnoteženih strokovnih teles in delegacij, (3) UEM pri predlaganju zakonodaje, nadzoru in spremljanju različnih kazalcev na posameznih področjih, (4) različne interesne skupine, ki spremljajo izvajanje, (5) v politiki pa še a) politične stranke pri formuliranju političnega programa glede enakih možnosti za ženske in moške, sestavljanju vodstva politične stranke ter kandidiranju kandidat in kandidatov za posamezne volitve ter b) volilna komisija pri nadzorovanju kandidacijskih postopkov, (6) v znanosti a) ARRS s sprejetjem pravilnika, b) Komisija za uveljavitev vloge žensk v znanosti s sodelovanjem pri pripravi zakonodaje in spremljanju izvajanja ter c) univerze in raziskovalni instituti kot organizacije, kjer bi se to moralo izvajati, (7) v gospodarstvu podjetja kot izvajalska organizacije (Topolinjak 2012: 130–131). Izvajanje sprejete zakonodaje in načela enake zastopanosti obeh spolov v procesih odločanja spremlja UEM; o pravem nadzoru ne moremo govoriti. Gre za poročila o stanju na posameznih področjih ter o organiziranju konferenc in okroglih miz na posamezno temo.

Vpliv *nacionalnih preferenc*²⁵ na sprejetje zakonodaje na področju enakosti spolov se kaže predvsem v hitrem sprejetju zakonov v pristopnem obdobju. Pred pogajanjem za članstvo v EU je bil v Sloveniji sprejet samo Zakon o političnih strankah – ZPolS, ki pa je imel načelo enakih možnosti zelo ohlapno zapisano. V času pogajanj za članstvo in po podpisu pristopne pogodbe sta bila sprejeta dva temeljna zakona na področju enakih možnosti (ZUNEO le teden dni pred vstopom v EU) ter prvi izmed volilnih zakonov – ZVPEP, ki je uzakonil spolne kvote. Se pravi, da je v tem primeru šlo za pritisk od zunaj, s strani EU, oz. da je Slovenija zakone sprejela zaradi prestiža. To lahko trdimo tudi na podlagi tipa zakonodajnega postopka, saj sta bila oba zakona sprejeta po hitrem oz. nujnem postopku. Zakonodajo so sprejemale tako leve kot desne vlade, ne glede na čas pred volitvami ali po njih, javna podpora EU pa je bila ves čas dobra (Topolinjak 2012: 125).

Največji *veto igravec*²⁶ pri sprejemanju načela enakih možnosti za ženske in moške

25. Vpliv *nacionalnih preferenc* je viden že pri transpoziciji določene politike EU v nacionalno politiko, saj država članica ne bo podpisala dogovora, ki je v nasprotju z njenimi preferencami (Toshkov 2007: 336). Preference lahko operacionaliziramo na različne načine. Strankarska (vladna) ideološka pozicija (pozicija levo – desno in liberalno – tradicionalno) – Toshkov (2007: 345) ugotovi, da ni statistično pomembna oz. nima nobenega vpliva na sprejetje direktiv. Pomembne so tudi preferenze glede evropske integracije – v kontekstu razširitev enega pogajanja lahko močna podpora vlade članstvu v EU zasenči druge vladne preference in tako vlada določeno politiko sprejme kljub drugačnim preferencam (Toshkov 2007: 338). Ko je javno mnenje proti politiki, je vlada ne bo izvajala. Lampinen in Uusikylä (1998: 239) tako pravita, da je lažje izvajati zakonodajo EU v državah, kjer je visoka stopnja podpore za članstvo v integraciji. Nasprotno pa je Mbaye (2001: 276) ugotovila, da je v državah članicah, kjer je večja podpora članstvu v EU, več kršitev. To pojasnjuje na primeru Italije in Grčije, kjer neučinkovita birokracija, korupcija in drugi dejavniki, ki naredijo vlado nepopularno, povzročajo neizvajanje in zaradi tega se poveča zaupanje ljudi v EU, ki jo vidijo kot tisto, ki bo povzročila spremembe v državi.

26. Teorijo *veto igrancev* je razvil Tsebelis (1995), ki pravi, da reformna kapaciteta političnega sistema pada, čim večje je število akterjev, ki želijo sprejeti reformo. Veto točke (npr.

je bila pred vstopom v EU vlada (Antić 1998: 215–218; Antić in dr. 2003, 47–56), v vseh primerih leva vlada. ZEMŽM, ZUNEO in ReNPENŽM je pripravil UEM v sodelovanju z vladnimi institucijami, nevladnimi organizacijami in sindikati ter poslankami in strokovnjakinjami za področje enakosti spolov. Ne gre pa samo za koordiniranje in usklajevanje med različnimi koalicijskimi strankami, ampak tudi med različnimi ministrstvi. Pri pripravi zakonodaje namreč sodeluje večje število ministrstev, saj so enake možnosti pomembne za vsa področja. V naših analiziranih dokumentih je bilo največ sodelujočih pri pripravi ReNPENŽM, kjer so sodelovala vsa ministrstva ter še ostala vladna in nevladna telesa. Pri volilni zakonodaji je imel najpomembnejšo vlogo MNZ in kasneje tudi MJU. Ker sta bila tako ZEMŽM kot ZUNEO sprejeta v času pristopnih pogajanj, sta bila oba sprejeta po hitrem oz. nujnem postopku, razprava je bila kratka. Daljša razprava se je razvijala ob sprejemanju spolnih kvot za posamezne volitve. ZVPEP-A in ZLV sta bila sprejeta po skrajšanem postopku, ZVDZ-B pa po rednem postopku. Resolucije so bile sprejete po enofaznem postopku.

*Interesne skupine*²⁷ imajo pomembno vlogo pri oblikovanju in izvajanju javnih politik. V devetdesetih letih 20. stoletja je v Sloveniji delovalo okrog 50 nevladnih ženskih skupin (UEM 1999: 17). Na področju žensk v politiki je bila najbolj aktivna majhna feministična skupina Ženske za politiko, ki je bila ustanovljena leta 1990 v Ljubljani in je zahtevala večjo prisotnost žensk v politiki in ustanovitev posebnega vladnega telesa za ženska vprašanja; z drugimi skupinami je uspešno sodelovala tudi v kampanji za ohranitev ustavne pravice o svobodnem odločanju o rojstvu otrok, nato pa po uspešni kampanji zamrla (Antić 2003: 273). Politiki so vprašanju enake zastopanosti obeh spolov v političnem odločanju začeli posvečati več pozornosti, ko so se v razprave o ustavnih spremembah, na podlagi katerih bi lahko vpeljali pravno zavezujoče posebne ukrepe, vključili strokovnjaki in civilna družba, združeni v Koaliciji za uravnoteženo zastopnost žensk in moških v javnem življenju. Cilj Koalicije je bil in še vedno je, da spodbudi in uveljavi uravnoteženo zastopnost žensk in moških v javnem življenju.

parlament) vplivajo na čas in kakovost izvajanja ne glede na različne vrzeli v skladnosti med evropskimi zahtevami in nacionalnimi tradicijami. Veliko število veto igralcev tako povzroči nižjo kvaliteto in počasnejše izvajanje (Haverland 2000; Börzel in dr. 2003: 21–22). Danica Fink Hafner in Damjan Lajh (2005) sta tako ugotovila, da v Sloveniji na sam proces evropeizacije vplivajo tri ključne institucionalne veto točke, in sicer 1. načelo zaporednosti pri odločanju o zakonodajnih predlogih; 2. državni svet, ki lahko da odločilni veto na sprejeto zakonodajo, in 3. možnost razpisa referendumov. Vlada, ki mora zadovoljiti veliko koalicijskih partnerjev in drugih veto igralcev, se ne bo vedla tako odločno ali učinkovito (Mbaye 2001: 263), saj je z večjim številom strank v vladi večja možnost za nesoglasja in s tem se tudi podaljša čas za sprejem določene politike EU (Toshkov 2007: 339, 346). Če je za sprejem in izvajanje določene zakonodaje zadolženih več ministrstev, je potrebna koordinacija med ministrstvi (Mastenbroek 2003: 378). Večje je število ministrstev, več je točk odločanja in večja je možnost zavlačevanja izvajanja določene politike (Pressman in Wildavsky 1984; Haverland in Romeijn 2007).

27. Duina (1997) poudarja, da je transpozicijski čas direktiv odvisen od skladnosti med direktivo in organizacijo interesnih skupin. Mednarodne sankcije so tako učinkovitejše, če se hkrati vrši tudi pritisk od spodaj (Börzel in dr. 2003: 27).

Tako je z aktivnim delovanjem (lobiranje, pisanje političnim strankam in vladi, organiziranje okroglih miz in spodbujanje medijske obravnave vprašanja uravnotežene zastopanosti žensk in moških) prišlo do spremembe Ustave in spremembe volilne zakonodaje (uvedba spolnih kvot) (Flander 2004: 232). Ženski lobi Slovenije (ŽLS) je bil ustanovljen leta 2007 in je od takrat zelo aktiven. Aktivno se je vključil v kampanje za evropske volitve (kampanja 50/50, izdaja Delove priloge Odločajmo skupaj, okrogle mize), lokalne (okrogle mize) in državnoborke volitve (pred izrednimi volitvami v Državni zbor so analizirali kandidatne liste političnih strank in list za predčasne volitve v DZ z vidika možnosti izvolitve več žensk za poslanke ter skupaj z UEM organizirali novinarsko konferenco) (ŽLS 2011). V znanosti se ob pomoči Komisije za uveljavljanje žensk v znanosti postopoma vzpostavlja mreža znanstvenic, ki se ukvarja z vprašanjem neenakosti spolov. V gospodarstvu je pomembna Sekcija managerk (deluje v okviru Združenja Manager), katerih glavni cilj je spodbujanje vodilnih delavk, da uveljavljajo svoje sposobnosti in ustvarjajo najboljše možnosti za doseganje dobrih poslovnih rezultatov. Sekcija organizira srečanja in konference menedžerk, podeljuje priznanji »ženskam prijazno podjetje« in »managerkam prijazno podjetje«, pripravila je dokument za spodbujanje uravnotežene zastopanosti obeh spolov v vodstvu podjetij: »Vključi. Vse. Smernice za spodbujanje enakosti« ter marca 2012 napovedala, da bo vladi predlagala sprejetje spolnih kvot v gospodarstvu (Blatnik 2011).

4 Zaključek

EU je vprašanje uravnotežene zastopanosti obeh spolov v procesih odločanja na vseh treh področjih izpostavila v mehki zakonodaji, ki je neobvezna, nadzor nad izvajanjem (oz. spremljanje izvajanja) pa je omejen le na poročila, kar pomeni, da tudi ni nobenih sankcij ob neizvajanju, kar lahko negativno vpliva na izvajanje. Kljub temu bi lahko rekli, da ima mehka zakonodaja po drugi strani tudi pozitiven učinek, saj lahko na dnevni red postavi novo temo, lahko pomaga nacionalnim interesnim skupinam, da lažje pritiskajo na vlado. Do razlike med področji prihaja pri neposrednem vplivu evropskih institucij na nacionalne institucije, ki pozitivno vplivajo na izvajanje v politiki; za gospodarstvo zaenkrat tega še ne moremo oceniti.

Na izvajanje politik enakosti spolov, predvsem načela enake zastopanosti žensk in moških v procesih odločanja, tako najbolj vplivajo dejavniki na nacionalni ravni, saj je izvajanje mehke zakonodaje prepuščeno državam članicam, ki tako politiko sprejmejo in izvajajo ali pa ne. Vlada je tako tista, ki lahko izbere javnopolitične instrumente (npr. vzpostavitev spolnih kvot z določitvijo najnižje meje zastopanosti) in tako politiko prilagodi svojim aspiracijam. Obvezna določila, ki imajo ob neizvajanju tudi opredeljene sankcije²⁸ (npr. neveljavnost kandidatnih list, ki ne upoštevajo spolnih kvot), so zagotovilo, da bo izvajanje učinkovito.

28. V ZEMŽM je bilo npr. določeno, da morajo politične stranke pripravljati štiriletne načrte glede zastopanosti obeh spolov v organih stranke in pri kandidiranju, vendar je večina političnih strank to ignorirala, saj ni bilo sankcij ob neizvajanju (Uradnica UEM 2012).

Če pogledamo glede na teorijo izpostavljene dejavnike, ki naj bi vplivali na izvajanje politik, lahko rečemo: glede na to, da imamo v večini primerov na ravni EU sprejeto mehkejšo zakonodajo, so za izvajanje v Sloveniji pomembni trije dejavniki, ostali imajo v našem primeru manjši vpliv ali pa ga sploh nimajo. Tako bi lahko rekli, da je najpomembnejši dejavnik *vstop Slovenije v EU* in s tem zvezi sprejetje zakonodaje EU. Kot pravi Van Vleuten (2005), gre za politično ceno sprejete politike (v našem primeru vstop v EU). Pomembno vlogo pa imata tudi *neposredni pritisk s strani institucij EU* in *pritisk nacionalnih interesnih skupin*, ki s svojo aktivnostjo (na eni strani povezave z oblikovalci javnih politik, na drugi strani informiranje javnosti) pomembno vplivajo na sprejetje politik enakosti spolov. Predvsem sta bili uspešni Koalicija pri spreminjanju volilne zakonodaje in obveščanju javnosti ter ŽLS z aktivno udeležbo v predvolilni kampanji od leta 2007 naprej. Z oblikovanjem smernic za enake možnosti v podjetjih pa se bo morala tudi Sekcija managerk aktivneje vključiti v proces izvajanja ter pridobiti vladno podporo, da se bo tudi na tem področju začel pozitiven premik v smer boljše zastopanosti žensk v vodstvih podjetij.

Čeprav je bilo na ravni EU narejeno veliko, da se načelo uravnotežene zastopanosti žensk in moških vključi v procese odločanja, predvsem s sprejemanjem mehke zakonodaje, pa je treba deklarativno zavezo držav članic tudi dejansko udejanjiti v posamezni državi članici.

Tako lahko sklenemo, da sta bila pri neobvezujoči zakonodaji EU o uravnoteženi zastopanosti žensk in moških v procesih odločanja prenos in izvajanje zakonodaje v Sloveniji odvisna od politične volje v državi članici ter od aktivnosti evropskih institucij in interesnih skupin, ki lahko vlado držijo v primežu, dokler se politika oz. zakonodaja ne začne izvajati.

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Summary

The article is based on an analysis of the impact of a wide variety of factors on the implementation of the policies of the European Union (EU) in the field of gender equality in Slovenia. We focus on the formal implementation of EU soft law, especially implementation of the principle of balanced representation of women and men in decision-making processes in three areas - in politics, science and economy. That is a current issue in Slovenia because women in decision-making in all three areas are under-represented. Currently it is the best situation in the state politics - on extraordinary elections in 2011 there were elected 32% of women, that means that the women representation in parliament achieved a critical limit, which is usually set at 30 % (e.g. Dahlerup 2006, Norris 1996). But this high proportion of women in the representative body is not reflected in the composition of the government, where the ministerial position was occupied by only one woman (the proportion of women ministers dropped for 18 percentage points, former Pahor's government had 26 % of women which is the highest proportion of women ministers in Slovenian history). In science, the proportion of women senators at Universities is around 25 %, while the share of women senators in the new universities (Nova Gorica and Primorska) move above one third, but in the old universities (Ljubljana and Maribor) is still below 20% (Topolinjak 2012: 252–253). In November 2010, among directors and members of the boards of Slovenian companies there were 27 %, but in January 2012 in the boards of the largest Slovenian companies sat only 15,3 % of women (European Commission 2012b, 50–51).

On the basis of implementation literature the classification of the implementation factors is made. The factors are divided into two clusters – the factors connected with designers of public policies (e.g. the type of legislation, the control system) and the factors relating to implementation structures of public policies (e.g. the influence of interest groups, administrative efficiency). The impact of factors is analyzed on two key points of the implementation of EU policies: the adoption of legislation at EU level (the decision-making process, the nature of the document, monitoring, financial resources) and transposition of EU's legislation in Slovenia (conformity of national legislation with the EU, economic costs, administrative efficiency, national preferences, organization of transposition space and influence of stakeholders).

Research findings show that in the implementation chain a lot of factors are identified which affect the implementation of EU policies in the field of gender equality. The most important factor at the EU level is the type of the document, which has an impact on all other factors. EU documents about a balanced representation of women and men in decision-making processes are mainly accepted as soft law, which does not reflect the statutory duties (Woodward, 2001), but it is more recommendatory in nature, so it is depending on Member State whether it will be accepted or not. While hard legislation is usually transferred to Member States immediately, particularly to the new Member State (Falkner and other 2008), a soft law could be ignored or accepted in Member States, it depends on political decision-makers. On the other hand the soft law also has had a positive impact because the new topic has been put on the agenda and stakeholders have got opportunities to press on the national government. So, the empirical analysis has shown that the transfer of soft law in the field of gender equality in Slovenia is good when at the same time pressure from the EU institutions and from national interests groups occurs (e.g. the adoption of gender quotas in the Slovenian electoral law). It could be said that the most important implementation factor was Slovenian's accession to the EU and adoption of EU legislation. Although the Government and the National Assembly adopted the EU legislation and thereby successfully establish a formal implementation, this does not mean that there is an effective implementation. National policy makers have had the opportunity to set a) policy mechanisms, which may be mandatory (e.g. statutory gender quotas for candidacy in elections) or recommended (e.g. general definition of balanced representation of women and men in decision-making positions), b) implementation control (e.g. Electoral Commission, Office for equal opportunities) and c) penalties in the implementation failure (e.g. the invalid candidate list which do not take into account gender quotas). In the case that the control is bad and that there are no sanctions, implementation is inefficient.

To conclude, although a lot has been made on EU level that the principle of balanced representation of women and men become a part of decision-making processes (particularly with adoption of soft law), member states should actually put declarative commitments into practice.

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RECENZIJE KNJIG / BOOK REVIEWS

Sašo Slaček Brlek

Zgroženi ekonomisti: Manifest; 20 let slepote. Ljubljana: *cf., 2012.
170 strani (ISBN 978-961-257-044-6), 18 EUR

Sodobno praznoverje ima drugačno vsebino in utrjuje svojo prevlado na drugačne načine kot praznoverje, proti kateremu so peresa dvigovali Voltaire, Diderot in Rousseau, vendar njegova bistvena vloga ostaja enaka: prikrivanje resnične narave družbenih pojavov in procesov, da bi se skozi te procese lahko reproducirali in utrjevali odnosi izkoriščanja. Preroki sodobnega praznoverja ne bivajo v baročnih palačah, temveč svoje sporočilo širijo izza zidov tehnokratskih utrd – ekonomskih oddelkov univerz, Evropske centralne banke, Mednarodnega denarnega sklada in Evropske komisije. Njihov misticizem je misticizem nadvse sofisticiranih matematičnih formul in izpopolnjenih ekonomskih modelov, strojev, ki ne glede na vhodne podatke venomer bruhamo enako sporočilo: trgi imajo vedno prav. Prav imajo, ko sejejo razdejanje v Grčiji, Španiji, na Portugalskem, Irskem, v Italiji in Sloveniji. Prav imajo, ko zahtevajo žrtvovanje javnih storitev in delavskih pravic. Prav imajo, ko si podrejšajo izvoljene predstavnike ljudstva. Prav imajo, ko zahtevajo, da plačamo njihove izgube.

Proti temu sodobnemu praznoverju so peresa dvignili Zgroženi ekonomisti in se namenili razgaliti ključne zmote vladajoče ekonomske ortodoksije, ki so podlaga ukrepom za spopadanje s krizo v evroobmočju. Svojo kritiko podajajo v poljudni obliki, razumljivi v mistično govorico ekonomije neposvečeni širši javnosti. V Manifestu, ki ga je podpisalo 630 francoskih neortodoksnih ekonomistov in kritičnih mislecev, se spopadejo predvsem s razumevanjem delovanja finančnih trgov ter problemom javnega dolga. Dokazujejo, da finančni trgi niso učinkovit mehanizem za alokacijo kapitala (med drugim izpostavijo njihovo težnjo k pozitivnim povratnim zankam, ko rast cen ne zmanjšuje, temveč povečuje spekulativno povpraševanje in s tem še pospešuje rast cen) in so neučinkoviti pri ocenjevanju solventnosti držav. Kritizirajo institucionalno zasnovo evroobmočja, ki države članice peha v odvisnost od finančnih trgov in jih sili v razgrajevanje socialne države. Njihovi predlogi za alternativne ekonomske politike so reformističnega značaja in zahtevajo zmanjšanje odvisnosti tako podjetij kot držav od finančnih trgov, na ravni podjetij recimo z javno kreditno politiko, ki bi omogočala kreditiranje po nižji obrestni meri za dejavnosti s področja socialne varnosti in okolja, na ravni držav pa z večjo vlogo Evropske centralne banke pri financiranju držav, s čimer bi jih razbremenila pritiska finančnih trgov. Predlagajo tudi poglobljanje evrointegracij z ukrepi za harmonizacijo tudi na socialnem področju ter zmanjševanje nevzdržnih razlik v konkurenčnosti in zunanjetrgovinski bilanci ter z redistributivnimi politikami tako znotraj posamičnih držav (bolj progresivno obdavčenje najvišjih dohodkov, kapitalskih dohodkov in finančnih transakcij) kot med centrom in periferijo znotraj evroobmočja.

V drugem delu knjige, naslovljenem z *20 let slepote*, so kritike in predlagane alternative, ki so v Manifestu predstavljene zgolj shematično, podkrepjene s podrobnejšimi analizami. V prvem prispevku Henri Sterdyniak analizira temeljne napake v institucionalni zasnovi evroobmočja, ki so postale boleče očitne ob izbruhu velike recesije, a so že pred tem povzročale naraščajoč razkorak med centrom in periferijo, kjer so države centra z neomerkantilističnimi politikami uspele okrepiti svoj ekonomski položaj in ustvariti zunanjetrgovinske presežke v odnosu do držav periferije, medtem ko so bile slednje prisiljene gospodarsko rast vse bolj naslanjati na financializacijo, zadolževanje in nepremičninske balone. Sterdyniak ugotavlja, da evropske politike tega razkoraka ne odpravljajo, temveč ga z vsiljevanjem fiskalne discipline in prepuščanjem držav spekulativnim napadom še poglobljajo. Za reševanje predlaga paket desetih ukrepov, ki bi države v težavah iztrgali iz primeža finančnih trgov, pomagali izravnati nesorazmerja znotraj evroobmočja in zagнали nov cikel rasti z investicijami v ekološke dejavnosti.

Sledita dve študiji primerov, najprej Irske, ki jo Benjamin Coriat označi kot vzorčni primer, saj je pred krizo v neoliberalnih krogih veljala za model uspešnosti deregulacije finančnega sektorja. V analizi se posveti predvsem deregulaciji in neučinkovitemu izvajanju že tako ohlapne regulacije kot dejavnikoma za nastanek balonov, ki so po poku, ko se je država odločila reševati finančne institucije, povzročili krizo javnih financ. S tem želi ponazoriti, kako ukrepi zloglasne trojke (Evropska komisija, Evropska centralna banka in Mednarodni denarni sklad), ki se osredotočajo izključno na javni dolg, naslavlja zgolj simptom, ne pa tudi vzrokov krize.

Sledi študija primera Islandije, ki jo avtorja prispevka (Benjamin Coriat in Christopher Lantenais) razumeta kot model uspešnega spopadanja s krizo. Ugotavljata, da je Islandija prav tako kot Irska zašla v težko situacijo zaradi hipertrofirane finančnega sektorja, ki ga je kriza postavila na realna tla. Posnemanja vredno se jima zdi, da so se državljani Islandije uprli poskusom, da bi jim naprtili izgube finančnega sektorja, in so prisilili upnike propadlih bank, da sami prevzamejo velik del teh izgub.

Zadnji prispevek, izpod peresa Dominiqa Philona, naslavlja vprašanje restrukturiranja državnega dolga. Avtor ugotavlja, da varčevalni ukrepi, ki so bili vsiljeni evropski periferiji, niso zgolj socialno krivični, temveč tudi ekonomsko neučinkoviti, saj vodijo v recesijo, ki zmanjšuje državne prihodke in finančnim trgom pošilja signal, ki je vse prej kot spodbuden za investiranje v državne obveznice po znosnih obrestnih merah. Restrukturiranje dolga perifernih držav se mu zdi neizogibno, ključno vprašanje pa je, ali bodo pri restrukturiranju prevladali interesi finančne industrije ali interesi prebivalcev držav.

Poziv zgroženih ekonomistov, da ponovno premislimo temeljne aksiome, na katerih temeljita vladajoča ekonomska ortodoksija in vladajoča politika Evropske unije, je v času, ko politične in ekonomske elite skušajo na vse pretege zapirati prostor razprave, ključne odločitve umakniti kar se da daleč od demokratičnih institucij in državljane odpraviti z mantro, da alternative preprosto ni, vsekakor dobrodošel. Njihovo pisanje ni tehnično, temveč poljudno, ključne ekonomske procese poskušajo osvetliti kar se da razumljivo, kar jim nedvomno uspeva. S konkretnimi predlogi prav tako nazorno pokažejo, da so alternativni načini spopadanja s krizo vsekakor mogoči. Kot takšna je knjiga odličen prispevek k razpravi o ključnih problemih, s katerimi se trenutno spopada Evropska unija.

Če bi predlagane ukrepe razumeli kot izdelan program, in ne kot izhodišča za razpravo, bi jim morali očitati, da so utemeljeni predvsem negativno, z neuspešnostjo trenutnih ukrepov in najbolj očitnimi pomanjkljivostmi vladajoče ekonomske ortodoksije, precej manj pa pozitivno. Najbolj je ta pomanjkljivost očitna pri obravnavi islandskega odziva na krizo, kjer avtorji ne posvečajo dovolj pozornosti temni plati tega primera: čeprav je iz priloženih podatkov na straneh 134 in 135 mogoče razbrati, da je devalvacijo valute spremljalo močno znižanje realnih plač in posledično poslabšanje materialnega položaja gospodinjstev, avtorja študije primera temu v besedilu ne posvečata pozornosti. Če bi jo, bi se morala vprašati, v kolikšni meri so s stališča gospodinjstev izidi islandskega scenarija v resnici drugačni od irskega. Vendarle pa ima kljub tem pomanjkljivostim pisanje Zgroženih ekonomistov izjemno vrednost: ključne ekonomske probleme jim uspe prevesti v razumljivo govorico, uspe jim podati prepričljivo kritiko vladajoče ekonomske ortodoksije in ponuditi v razpravo številne alternativne ukrepe. Njihov največji prispevek je argumentirano odpiranje razprave, za katero si elite želijo, da se ne bi nikoli zgodila.

Franc Trček

**Gorazd Kocijančič (ur.) Fragmenti predsokratikov. Študentska založba (Knjižna zbirka Koda), Ljubljana, 2012.
2200 strani, (ISBN 978-961-242-561-6), 179 EUR**

Tudi razmeroma izkušena recenzerka ali recenzent družboslovne in humanistične literature se občasno znajde pred zagato, kako recenzirati nekaj, kar se recenziji izmika. Običajno, vsaj kar zadeva dela slovenskih avtorjev in avtoric, je ta nezmožnost posledica izostanka uredniških posegov ob sočasnem nezavedanju ustvarjalk in ustvarjalcev, da ne pišejo le za sebe, svojega (so)mentorja ali (so)mentorico ter ozki krog privržencev. Če temu dodamo še nekako sprejeto pravilo v domači akademski subkulturi, da je recenzentska kritika že po avtomatizmu žalitev, potem smo tam, kjer pač smo. Ne le v družboslovju in humanistiki. No, včasih pa se znajdemo tudi v položaju, ko določenega dela enostavno ni mogoče recenzirati; lahko ga kvečjemu nekoliko orišemo. Fragmenti predsokratikov, slovenski integralni prevod predsokratikov, je nedvomno eno od teh del. Gre za delo, ki ga je v treh letih opravila skupina desetih prevajalk in prevajalcev pod uredniškim nadzorom Gorazda Kocijančiča. Izid tega voluminoznega dela v treh knjigah v prazničnem decembru lanskega leta so večinoma označevali s superlativi.

Izhajajoč iz te dokaj enotne ocene, verjetno ni odveč, da potencialnim bralkam in bralcem najprej odgovorimo na vprašanje, zakaj je ta prevod tako epohalen. Vsaj tisti z nekaj zgodovinskega spomina ter kakšnim »starošolsko« resnim predavateljem ali predavateljico filozofije na gimnaziji, tudi v času ponesrečenega usmerjenega izobraževanja, si še živo priključimo v spomin svoja prva srečanja s predsokratiki. Večinoma v izboru njihove misli, ki jo je izbral in prevedel Anton Sovre. Sovretovi Predsokratiki so bili dolgoletna knjižna uspešnica Slovenske maticе, ki je doživela več kot štirideset izdaj. Iz tistih gimnazijskih časov, če te vednosti nismo pridobili po kateri od drugih poti do splošne razgledanosti, se nam je v spominu ohranila tudi beseda fragment, delec.

Seveda predsokratiki niso bili nekakšne fraktalne ali fragmentalne razcepljene osebnosti, ki so v svojih najboljših trenutkih izrekle kakšen fragment ali dva in se je potem ta ustno in pisno prenašal naprej. Gre za mislece, večinoma iz 6. in 5. stoletja pred našim štetjem, gre za čas prehoda iz oralne, ustne v pisno kulturo. Predsokratiki so lastne nauke praviloma pripovedovali svojim poslušalcem, kar je tudi razlog, da se njihova razmišljanja niso ohranila v obliki celovitih, izvirnih zapisanih del. Ohranili so se zgolj fragmenti, običajno posredovani skozi citate, sklicevanja na njih ter povzetki, ki so jih zapisali poznejši filozofi in zgodovinarji, začenši s Platonom. Ti rokopisi o predsokratikih so se ohranjali v knjižnicah. Večinoma je šlo za samostanske knjižnice na Bližnjem vzhodu.

Po padcu Konstantinopla so se rokopisi razpršili po Evropi in se z Gutenbergovo revolucijo začeli pojavljati v natisnjeni obliki. Šele v začetku dvajsetega stoletja je izšla obsežna Dielsova izdaja predsokratikov. Hermann Diels je zbral številne obstoječe navedbe o predsokratikih poznejših avtorjev in na njihovi osnovi rekonstruiral misel predsokratikov. To celoto je prvič izdala leta 1903 v obsežnem dvojezičnem starogrško-nemškem delu z naslovom Fragmenti predsokratikov. Eruditsko delo je z dopolnili in popravki izboljševal Diels sam, potem pa še njegov učenec Walther Kranz. Diels-Kranzovi Fragmenti predsokratikov so se tako vzpostavili kot kanon, institucija, ki je nujen za soočanje s predsokratiki. V zdajšnji informacijski dobi je dvojezična grško-nemška izdaja tudi javno dostopna na internetu.

Izbrane dele izdaje iz dvajsetih let je leta 1946 v slovenščino prevedel Anton Sovre. Izdaja iz leta 1952 pa je izhodišče slovenskega prevoda celotnih *Fragmentov predsokratikov*. Tako smo po triletnem delu dobili integralni prevod tega kanona v obliki starogrško-slovenske izdaje.

Do sedaj je bilo to epohalno delo v integralni obliki prevedeno zgolj v italijanščino. Tako je slovenščina šele drugi jezik, ki je dobil integralni prevod tega kanona.

Za razliko od Sovretovih *Predsokratikov* je integralna izdaja oblikovana z obsežno filološko-historično strukturo, ki jo je zasnoval Diels. Predstavitev predsokratikov, ki si sledijo v časovnem zaporedju, je sestavljena iz treh delov. Vsak mislec je najprej predstavljen v t. i. fragmentu A, ki vsebuje antična poročila o konkretnem predsokratiku in navedbe, parafraze njegovih del v poznejših delih antičnih filozofov. V fragmentu B so podani domnevno izvirni in tudi dvomljivi fragmenti konkretnega predsokratika. V zadnjem, fragmentu C, pa so zbrani posnemovalci oziroma posnemanja konkretnega misleca.

Ta tridelni filološki koncept, ki ga je uvedel Diels – in ga v izčrpni spremni besedi razloži, a tudi delno problematizira Kocijančič – je uvodoma za bralca, navajenega prebiranja misli predsokratikov v manj filološko-strukturalni obliki, nekoliko moteč. Vendar se lahko dokaj hitro navadimo nanj in s tem tudi na kakovost informacij, ki nam jih posreduje. Nekatere od njih vsebujejo tudi sociološko-zgodovinsko zanimive kuriozitet. Tako npr. izvemo, da so Efežani prosili recenzentu ljubega Heraklita, naj jim napiše zakone, a ta tega ni hotel storiti, ker je polis že obvladovala slaba ureditev. Umaknil se je v Artemidino svetišče in kockal z otroki. Na koncu pa je zasovražil ljudi in odšel v gore, kjer je jedel zelišča in trave.

To obsežno delo, ki ga imamo sedaj v starogrško-slovenski dvojezični izdaji, je razdeljeno na tri velike dele: *Začetki*, *Fragmenti filozofov 6. in 5. stoletja (in njihovih neposrednih naslednikov)* ter *Starejša sofistika*. Gre za kronološko predstavitev vsakega od predsokratikov, kjer imamo na levi ponatis Diels-Kranzove izdaje v grščini in na desni slovenski prevod.

Kaj torej vsebuje ta integralni prevod predsokratikov? Vsebuje in zajema vse, kar se je ohranilo v t. i. arhaiski dobi starogrške filozofije. V dobi od njenih začetkov pa vse do prihoda treh velikanov. Čeprav bi iz samega naslova lahko sklepali, da voluminozno delo vsebuje vse mislece pred Sokratom, so v delu prisotni tudi misleci, ki so bili časovno Sokratovi in celo Platonovi sodobniki, a so v vsebinskem smislu njuni predhodniki. Lahko rečemo, da je pred nami razgrnjena pisana mavrica protofilozofskega mišljenja. Če je, kot pravi že nekoliko »zlajnana« Withedova krilatica, vsa evropska filozofija le opomba k Platonu, kdo bi dodal še k Sokratu in Aristotelu, potem smo z integralnim prevodom predsokratikov dobili uverturo. Razumeti opombe brez branja uverture je, blago rečeno, nespoštljivo, če že ne nemogoče.

Če se za konec vprašamo, sledeč didaktiki recenzentskega postopka, komu je namenjeno to delo in kaj lahko kritiziramo, smo pred resno zagato. Seveda lahko na nekoliko starošolski način rečemo, da je namenjeno vsem uka in splošne razgledanosti željnim. Lahko pohvalimo tako kakovost spremne, uvodne besede Gorazda Kocijančiča kot tudi dodatek bibliografije o predsokratikih Bogoljuba Šijakovića.

Lahko kritiziramo določene tipkopijske napake in občasne težave z nabori pisav, kar je očitno posledica hitenja z (najavljeno) izdajo v prazničnem času. Ob tem lahko razumemo obsežnost tovrstnega projekta, a nas vseeno zbode zelo visoka cena za sicer tudi oblikovno lično izdajo. Cena, ki je že visokošolskim predavateljem (pre)visoka, študentom pa nedosegljiva. Ker sem si že iz prebiranj predsokratikov v Sovretovem prevodu zapomnil fragment »Najvažnejša je mera«, bi bil moj nasvet tako izdajatelju kot tudi resornem ministrstvu, da se poišče finance in se to epohalno delo objavi v prosto dostopni obliki na svetovnem spletu ter tudi v žepni, lahko zgolj slovenski izdaji, ki bo finančno dostopnejša predsokratikov že(lj)nim, saj gre navsezadnje za študentsko založbo.

Recenzent v nemogoči vlogi, ki je to voluminozno delo lahko le orisal, predsokratike iz te integralne Diels-Kranzove izdaje bere pred spanjem in zagotavlja, da so krepčilni.

Za konec pa še fragment za pokušino: »Harmonija je namreč zedinjenje mnogo-pomešanih (stvari) in somišljeništvo različno mislečih« (Filolaj iz Krotone, pitagorejec).

David Preželj

**Simon Hajdini: Na kratko o dolgčasu, lenobi in počitku.
Ljubljana: Društvo za teoretsko psihoanalizo, Zbirka Analecta, 2012.
244 strani (ISBN 978-961-6376-56-3), 24 EUR**

Lenoba in počitek sta tarči pregona v Evropski uniji. Leni narodi so živeli na račun varčnih, zdaj pa je prišel čas izstavljanja računov. V delu *Na kratko o dolgčasu, lenobi in počitku* knjižne zbirke Analecta avtor predstavi precej bolj kompleksno sliko razmerij med lenobo, dolgčasom in počitkom ter svetom produktivnosti in varčnosti kapitalizma.

Avtor poskuša pokazati, da še zdaleč ne gre za razmerje enostavne opozicije med lagodjem lenobe in varčno prizadevnostjo. Z epistemologijo lacanovske psihoanalize, kjer so protislovja produktivna, se sprehodi skozi zgodovinski razvoj pojmovnega sklopa, ki vsebuje lastnosti, vezane na lenobo, in izpeljuje presenetljiva dognanja, ki izpodbijajo zdravorazumske predstave, vezane na ta pojem. O dolgčasu avtor razmišlja ob Kierkegaardu, kjer po daljšem ekskurzu o filozofovem pojmovanju demonskega in časa omenjeni pojem naveže na brezvsebinskost. Za glavno teoretsko izhodišče razmišljanja o lenobi in dolgčasu avtor sega po lacanovski teoriji želje. Tista želja, ki je indiferentna do objekta, kajti zadostuje ji fantazma, ki ji služi kot opora, fantazma, ki je sočasno razlog nezadovoljenosti želje in privid zadovoljitve. Fantazma, ki je oprta na delček realnega, ki je videti kot zapreka do zadovoljitve, a hkrati nastopa tudi kot njen nujni pogoj.

Razdelek o počitku se prične s poglobljenim ekskurzom o simbolnem redu, ki je sicer zanimiv, a ga le stežka povežemo s počitkom. Nato pa avtor bralca le sooči s problemom počitka. Kdor namreč počiva, ne počne nič slabega in zato tudi ne greši. A v kapitalističnem univerzumu je počitek vseeno lahko grešen, saj počivajoči goljufa kapitalista, pri katerem je počitek le interval v delovnem procesu, ki je v stalnem teku. Kaj pa je pravzaprav tisto, za kar delavec ogoljufa kapitalista? Tu avtor ne eksplicira, poda pa nam namig, ko govori o družbeno koristnem počitku, kjer ne najdemo niti delčka uživanja, kar nas lahko napoti k še enemu velikemu motivu lacanovske psihoanalize – ekonomiji užitka pri dialektiki razmerja hlapca in gospodarja Heglove *Fenomenologije duha*. S tem motivom prvotne akumulacije avtor razmišlja o kraji užitka, ki so jo domnevno zagrešili evropski javni uslužbenci ali pa kar celi narodi, in postavi tezo, da brez te ideologije razsipnosti hlapcev Gospodar danes ne bi mogel akumulirati. Centralnost lacanovske teorije želje in ekonomija užitka, mišljena skozi dialektiko hlapca in gospodarja, umesti delo v teoretski sklop, ki ga tvorita monografija Mladena Dolarja *O skoposti* in spremna beseda istega avtorja z naslovom *Subjekt, ki se zanj predpostavlja, da uživa*, ki je bila napisana za delo Alaina Grosricharda, *Struktura seraja*. Tako lenoba kot skopost sodita na seznam smrtnih grehov, a specifičnost lenobe je, da ne dopušča identifikacije. Lenuh je vedno nekdo drug. Skopost lahko ustvarja družbeno kohezijo, če jo percipiramo kot nujno varčevanje in še posebej, če jo dojemamo kot nasprotje lenobe, ki ne nudi možnosti skupnostne identifikacije. Do lenuhov torej ne bomo solidarni, zato nas ne čudi, da se za označevanje tistih, ki so danes na različne načine razlaščeni, uporabljajo asociacije lenobnosti. Lenoba paradokсно proizvaja zadovoljitev ob sami izgubi zadovoljitve, do katere se pride prek ovinka dela. Izguba potrebe po delu proizvede možnost zadovoljitve, ki pa je grešna. Gre za greh, ki se na delovanje nanaša na v celoti negativen način, torej ne gre za greh, ki sestoji iz grešnega delovanja, pač pa iz opuščanja in nedelovanja. Lenoba se vzpostavlja v razmerju do dela na način, da potrebo po delu ohranja kot izgubljeno, nato pa svojo zadovoljitev črpa prav iz te odsotnosti. »Lenoba je fenomen zadovoljitve v sami njeni odsotnosti, zadovoljitev, ki se poraja iz same odsotnosti potrebe« (str. 31).

Avtorjeva subverzija zdravorazumske predstave, da je neizkušenost zgolj odsotnost veščin, je zanimiva v navezavi na t. i. družbo znanja. Avtor predlaga pojmovanje neizkušenosti kot posebne

veščine, ki nam omogoča vedno znova opustiti pridobljena znanja. Opuščanje pa je značilnost lenobe, ki jo fleksibilni trg delovne sile paradoksalno uporabi za stvarjenje nove figure lenuha, ki je produktiven za kapital. Lenuha, ki je stalno dejaven z opuščanjem priučenih veščin in ki mu delo pomeni zgolj lupino navade, ki jo zapolni poljubna vsebina. »Navada delati (to ali ono) zdaj sama postane forma dela, objekt navade v formi konkretnega dela se zreducira na navado samo kot objekt« (str. 235). Ob tej tezi se avtor marginalno dotakne tudi vprašanja univerze in ugotavlja, da je danes univerza vse manj kraj proizvodjanja ekspertov in specialistov. Proizvaja namreč posameznike, izučene v poznavanju tržnih razmer in zahtev trga dela. Morda gre tu teza predaleč, ko instituciji univerze pripisuje zmožnost prilagajanja tržnim razmeram. Preden se univerza preoblikuje z namenom prilagoditve trgu, se na trgu lahko oblikujejo popolnoma drugačni pogoji, kot so vladali na začetku procesov sprememb univerze.

Če bralec pričakuje vezavo tematike na aktualna dogajanja preganjanja lenuhov zaradi krize kapitalizma ali pa apologijo lenobe, je lahko malce razočaran, saj je delo na aktualne dogodke pripisuje le na začetku in koncu. Glavnino sestavlja analiza bogatega zgodovinskega in literarnega materiala, kjer s koncepti že omenjenih filozofov beremo zapise zgodnjih krščanskih asketov – Tomaža Akvinskega, Cervantesovega Don Kihota, Goetheja in Mozartovega Don Giovannija. Kljub temu pa je lahko delo zanimivo za študente, ki iščejo navezavo na aktualne dogodke prav zaradi izčrpane predstavitve lacanovske teorije želje. Želimo si lahko, da poglavje z imenom *Opomba k libidinalni metriki* preberejo ekonomisti, ki verjamejo postavkam neoklasične ekonomske teorije o subjektu, katerega želja ni problematična, čigar preference so primerljive in jih je mogoče hierarhično razvrščati. Tu avtorju uspe teoretsko in pedagoško produktivna primerjava evklidskega in libidinalnega prostora, s katero razloži nekaj osnovnih postavk lacanovske psihoanalize. Morda je tu delo najbolj dostopno študentom, ki bi se želeli poučiti o tej miselni tradiciji. V libidinalnem prostoru ničelna razdalja med dvema točkama ne pomeni tudi njune identitete. Identiteta objekta s samim seboj prinaša samorazliko. Užitek je opredeljen kot negativna razdalja, ki ukrivi libidinalni prostor in omogoča razdaljo objekta do samega sebe. Užitek je torej izključen iz evklidskega prostora, kjer se nahaja kartezijanski subjekt, ki ve, česa si želi, subjekt, ki ne potrebuje nikakršne zapreke do objekta želje, ki bi šele omogočila konzumiranje užitka. To poglavje pa se nahaja šele v drugi polovici dela, tako da se od bralca, ki prične na začetku, pričakuje nekaj predznanja ljubljanske lacanovske šole in Heglove filozofije.

Igor Vobič

**Nick Davies: Zgodbe s ploščate Zemlje: Laži, izkrivljanja in propaganda v globalnih medijih. Mengeš: Ciceron, 2011.
463 strani (ISBN 978-961-6627-24-5), 27,56 EUR**

V strokovni monografiji *Zgodbe s ploščate Zemlje: Laži, izkrivljanja in propaganda v globalnih medijih* Nick Davies, novinarski in uredniški veteran britanskega *Guardiana*, razgrinja oblastna razmerja in odločevalske dinamike sodobne industrije novic, pri čemer na številnih primerih manipulacij in laži, naivnosti in nespretnosti ter resnicoljubnosti in propagande očrta prepletanje simbioze in konflikta v odnosih med novinarstvom, gospodarstvom in politiko. »Začenja pa se ta zgodba z novinarji, ki vam bodo mirno zagotavljali, da je Zemlja ploščata, ker tudi v resnici mislijo, da bi lahko bila« (str. 36). Strokovno monografijo, ki je okrepljena s podatki, pridobljenimi z znanstvenoraziskovalnimi metodami, poleg prologa in epiloga tvorijo štirje povezani deli. V prvem delu Davies s primeri kritično opredeljuje osrednji pojem knjige

»zgodbe s ploščate Zemlje« ter razgrinja vzajemni odnos med množičnimi mediji in politično-ekonomsko močjo, ki se mu v naslednjih treh delih podrobneje posveti. V drugem delu se tako loteva industrializacije uredništev sodobnih medijskih hiš, tretji del namenja skupni logiki služb za odnose z javnostmi in množičnih medijev, v četrtem delu pa razpravo zaokrožuje z »internimi zgodbami« s Fleet Streeta, londonske ulice, na kateri imajo sedež najpomembnejši britanski časopisi. Davies v knjigi natančno popisuje mračno empirično realnost novinarstva in političnega življenja v tako imenovanih starih demokracijah, predvsem Veliki Britaniji, pri čemer pa ne dvomi o prevladujoči paradigmi novinarstva in medijev v teh državah. Normativne predispozicije novinarstva, ki izhajajo iz liberalnih idej demokracije in svobodnega trga, jemlje kot samoumevne.

V prvem delu Davies s primerom postopanja množičnih medijev v poročanju o »milenijskem hrošču« ali »Y2K virusu«, zaradi katerega naj bi prvega januarja 2000 »propadel svet« (str. 14), razgalja vzorce širše kulture novičarske proizvodnje, ki jo zaznamuje zanemarjanje temeljnih idej novinarstva – natančnosti, transparentnosti in odgovornosti. Pomemben del analize posveča razmerju med mediji in politično-ekonomsko elito, s posebnim poudarkom na Rupertu Murdochu in njegovem News Corporation: »Murdoch je izjemno uspešen poslovnež, povprečno sposoben novinar in brutalen, brezobziren nasilnež« (str. 22). Davies zavrača poenostavljene razlage »poraza medijev« (str. 19), kot sta uganjanje željam velikih oglaševalcev in podrejenost uredništva diktatom lastnikov. Prakse »novih korporacijskih lastnikov« namreč ločuje od njihovih »propagandističnih prednikov« (prav tam); ugotavlja, da oblast ne deluje linearno, neposredno in od zgoraj navzdol, temveč je vseprisotna in celo dopušča »prostitucijo« – novinarji tako lahko »celo poljubno izbirajo med različnimi ideološkimi usmeritvami, dokler te prinašajo dobiček« (str. 22). V tem kontekstu Davies s številnimi primeri implicitno opozarja na paradokse utelešenja »svobodnega tiska« v Severni Ameriki in Evropi v lastninski pravici njegovih lastnikov, in ne v osebni pravici do komuniciranja. Avtor ugotavlja, da novi korporacijski lastniki medijske hiše uporabljajo za sklepanje zavezništev s politiki, ti pa jim v zameno pomagajo pri njihovih drugih poslih – na primer s partikularnim vplivanjem na spremembe zakonodajnega okvira. Medijski lastniki se neposredno vmešajo v delovanje uredništva praviloma takrat, ko to s svojimi izdelki škoduje njihovim drugim poslovnim interesom.

V drugem delu avtor razkriva procese »tovarnovic« in dinamike »reciklažnega novinarstva« ter nakazuje njihove negativne posledice za vstopanje ljudi v družbeno življenje in participacijo v njem. Z osebnimi zgodbami novinarjev in prepoznavanjem sprememb strukturnih vzorcev Davies ugotavlja, da so večje medijske hiše zdesetkale uredništva in kot glavni imperativ postavile hitrost. Sodobni novinarji zato delajo več ur na dan kot pred nekaj leti/desetletji in so pod stalnim časovnim pritiskom: »Novinarji ne morejo opravljati preprostih, osnovnih nalog svojega poklica. Svojim bralcem preprosto ne morejo povedati resnice o področju, ki naj bi ga novinarsko obvladali« (str. 71). Davies z analizo vodilnih britanskih dnevnikov (*The Time*, *Guardian*, *Independent* in *Daily Telegraph*) ugotavlja, da je 60 odstotkov prispevkov v celoti ali večinoma prepisanih iz objav tiskovnih agencij in/ali iz piarovskih sporočil, 20 odstotkov vsebin vsebuje vsaj bistvene dele takšnih sporočil, ki jim nato v uredništvih dodajo aktivno pridobljene informacije ali podatke, pri osmih odstotkih prispevkov se vira ne da prepoznati. V preostalih 12 odstotkih prispevkov je raziskava, ki so jo opravili s programi za ugotavljanje izvirnosti avtorskih del, pokazala, da so jih novinarji napisali na podlagi informacij, ki so jih pridobili sami.

Kljub dolgoletnim novinarskim in uredniškim izkušnjam pri *Guardianu* ter številnih drugih medijih Davies gradiva ni zbiral sam, temveč je med drugim sodeloval z raziskovalno ekipo študentov novinarstva na cardiffski univerzi in tamkajšnjimi uglednimi raziskovalci, med katerimi je tudi profesor Bob Franklin, sicer urednik vodilnih znanstvenih revij na področju novinarskih študij. Z njihovo pomočjo in s sodelovanjem številnih novinarjev, ki so želeli ostati anonimni, Davies ugotavlja, da mediji kot tovarne novic niso strogo zbirokratizirana

okolja z jasno delitvijo dela in odgovornosti odločanja: »Marsikaj se dogaja, ko si novinarji iz rok v roke porivajo krhke delčke informacij, kadar so pod pritiskom vseh teh nasprotujočih si zahtev – delaj, kar delajo drugi, objavi ekskluzivno zgodbo, ukradi ekskluzivno zgodbo, prodaj časopis, prodaj že obrabljene novice, prihrani denar, ustvari dobiček, pridobi prijatelje, škoduj sovražnikom, pohiti, udari, popači, prilagajaj se fotografiji, prilagajaj se prostoru, udari na prvi strani, zakopli nekam na notranjih straneh. Ne, v tem ni zarote, to je zgolj velika zmešnjava« (str. 186).

V tretjem delu se Davies ukvarja s prepoznavanjem logike te »velike zmešnjave«; ugotavlja, da je celotna struktura nacionalnih in globalnih medijev ter tiskovnih agencij v svojem bistvu neodporna do lažnih in vsiljenih zgodb, ki jih agencije za odnose z javnostmi ustvarjajo v imenu komercialnih in/ali političnih interesov. Avtor z razgrinjanjem številnih primerov industrije odnosov z javnostmi prepozna metode ugotavljanja občutkov in prepričanj ciljnega občinstva ter zavestnega prirejanja sporočanja tako, da se sklada s temi občutki in prepričanju ter z logiko delovanja množičnomedijskega novinarstva. »Če so se odnosi z javnostmi v dvajsetih letih prejšnjega stoletja razvili v ZDA zato, da bi pomagali nadzorovati iracionalna čustva množic, danes ta industrija iracionalna čustva samo še podžiga. In to globalno« (str. 246). V zadnjem delu poglavja se Davies ukvarja z državno propagando in aktivnostmi enega »ključnih dobaviteljev« informacij britanskim in ameriškim novinarjem v času iraške vojne – sklenjeno mrežo obveščevalnih agencij, vojaških enot in vladnih uradov, ki od sebe dajejo »strateško komuniciranje« (str. 247). Posebno pozornost Davies namenja aktivnostim ameriške obveščevalne agencije CIA, pri čemer je »samo po sebi šokantno«, da je glede na dostopne podatke in pričevanja njena mreža razporejena po vseh najprestižnejših uredništvih v ZDA – samo *New York Times* je pod krinko v svojih vrstah gostil deset agentov (str. 274).

V četrtem delu, ki ga Davies naslovi *Interne zgodbe*, skozi študije primerov britanskih časopisov *Sunday Times*, *Observer* in *Daily Mail* bralca seznaja z »mračnimi silami« – praksami podkupovanja, korupcije in krajami zaupnih informacij, ki so jih normalizirale partikularne interesne mreže novinarjev, policistov in politikov. Davies je s temi primeri kar nekaj let pred »prisluškovalno afero«, zaradi katere je Murdochov tabloid *News of the World* zaprl svoje uredništvo in ustavil tiskarske stroje, opozarjal na podobne prakse nekaterih britanskih medijev, ki so prisluškovalne naprave nastavljali v razdelilne omarice blizu stanovanj nekaterih britanskih javnih osebnosti, tudi medijskih. Z natančnim razkrivanjem kulturnih vzorcev delovanja tabloidnih časopisov nakazuje, da senzacionalističnim poenostavljenjem in morbidno radovednostjo podstavljajo grožnjo demokraciji, spodbujajo cinizem in zmanjšujejo zanimanje za politiko, ker se izogibajo pravim političnim vprašanjem v prid površinskim političnim škandalom. Tovrstne usmeritve, ki se odmikajo od temeljnih postulatov novinarske etike, se v Daviesovih primerih sprevrtačajo v nekaj, kar z novinarstvom nima veliko skupnega.

Delo *Zgodbe s ploščate Zemlje: Laži, izkrivljanja in propaganda v globalnih medijih* ponuja osupljiv pogled v logiko sodobnega medijskega okolja, predvsem britanskega, katerega paradokse Davies razdela s subtilno analizo artikulacij med strukturo in delovanjem novinarjev. Knjiga zato ni le dobrodošlo branje za raziskovalce ter študente novinarstva in medijev, temveč tudi ali predvsem za novinarje in njihovo občinstvo, saj imajo nekateri trendi britanskega in ameriškega novinarstva transnacionalni značaj. Ob tem lahko Daviesu zamerimo le, da se ne ukvarja s paradigmatičnimi vprašanji »svobodnega tiska«, ki se skrivajo v normaliziranih razmerjih med koncepti oblasti, lastništva in participacije ter zaradi svojih normativnih predispozicij pomembno zaznamujejo temeljno načelo novinarstva – povezovanje državljanov s političnim življenjem. Nedvomno pa Daviesu uspeva – tudi s prefinjenim publicističnim stilom – bralcu prikazati strukturne težave sodobne medijske sfere in ga prepričati, da je imel Joseph Pulitzer, nekdanji urednik in novinar, vsaj v nečem prav: »Ciničen, pohlepen, demagoški in pokvarjen tisk bo sčasoma ustvaril ljudi po svoji podobi.«