

DRUŽBOSLOVNE RAZPRAVE

DRUŽBOSLOVNE RAZPRAVE

letnik **XXXV**

številka **91**

september **2019**

DRUŽBOSLOVNE RAZPRAVE

ISSN 0352-3608 UDK 3

SLOVENSKO SOCIOLOŠKO DRUŠTVO
Fakulteta za družbene vede Univerze v Ljubljani

**Revija izdajata Slovensko sociološko društvo in Fakulteta za družbene vede Univerze v Ljubljani. /
Published by the Slovenian Sociological Association and the Faculty of Social Sciences at the University of Ljubljana.**

Glavni urednik / Main editor:

Marjan Hočevar, Fakulteta za družbene vede, Univerza v Ljubljani

Uredniški odbor / Editorial board:

Andreja Vezovnik, Fakulteta za družbene vede, Univerza v Ljubljani

Aleksandra Kanjuo Mrčela, Fakulteta za družbene vede, Univerza v Ljubljani

Alenka Krašovec, Fakulteta za družbene vede, Univerza v Ljubljani

Alenka Švab, Fakulteta za družbene vede, Univerza v Ljubljani

Ana Tominc, Queen Margaret University Edinburgh

Angelina Lucento, National Research University,

Higher School of Economics, Moscow

Anja Zalta, Filozofska fakulteta, Univerza v Ljubljani

Anđelina Svirčić Gotovac, Institut za društvena istraživanja (IDIZ), Zagreb

Blaž Lenarčič, Znanstveno-raziskovalno središče, Univerza na Primorskem

Blaž Križnik, Graduate School of Urban Studies, Hanyang University

Branislava Vičar, Filozofska fakulteta, Univerza v Ljubljani

Chiara Bertone, University of East Piedmont

David Paternotte, Université libre de Bruxelles

Dejan Jontes, Fakulteta za družbene vede, Univerza v Ljubljani

Gal Kirn, Humboldt University of Berlin

Herman Cuevas Valenzuela, Universidad Diego Portales

Jana Javornik Skrbinšek, University of Leeds

José Ignacio Pichardo Galán, Universidad Complutense de Madrid

Judit Takács, Institute of Sociology, Hungarian Academy of Sciences

Karmen Šterk, Fakulteta za družbene vede, Univerza v Ljubljani

Karolina Thel, Academy of Fine Arts, Varšava, Poljska

Katarina Prpić, Institute of Social Research in Zagreb

Ladislav Cabada, University of West Bohemia, Pilsen

Lilijana Burcar, Filozofska fakulteta, Univerza v Ljubljani

Lilijana Šarić, University of Oslo

Mojda Pahor, Zdravstvena fakulteta, Univerza v Ljubljani

Mateja Sedmak, Znanstveno-raziskovalno središče, Univerza na Primorskem

Matic Kavčič, Zdravstvena fakulteta in Fakulteta za družbene vede,

Univerza v Ljubljani

Marina, Lukšič Hacin Inštitut za slovensko izseljenstvo in migracije, ZRC SAZU

Matijaž Uršič, Fakulteta za družbene vede, Univerza v Ljubljani

Milica Antić Gaber, Filozofska fakulteta, Univerza v Ljubljani

Mina Petrović, Univerza v Beogradu

Miran Lavrič, Filozofska fakulteta, Univerza v Mariboru

Miroslav Stanojević, Fakulteta za družbene vede, Univerza v Ljubljani

Mojca Pajnik, Fakulteta za družbene vede, Univerza v Ljubljani in Mirovni inštitut

Moreno Zago, Università degli Studi di Trieste

Nina Bandelj, University of California, Irvine

Nükhet Sirman, Bo aziçi University, Istanbul

Oliver Vodeb, Swinburne University of Technology, Melbourne

Raffaella Ferrero Cornoletto, Department of Cultures, Politics and
Sexuality (DCPS), University of Turin

Roman Kuhar, Filozofska fakulteta, Univerza v Ljubljani in Mirovni inštitut

Sabina Mihelj, Loughborough University

Sabrina P. Ramet, Norwegian University of Science and Technology,

Department of Sociology and Political Science

Sonja Drobnič, University of Bremen

Tanja Kamin, Fakulteta za družbene vede, Univerza v Ljubljani

Tanja Oblak Črnič, Fakulteta za družbene vede, Univerza v Ljubljani

Tanja Renar, Fakulteta za družbene vede, Univerza v Ljubljani

Thomas Luckmann, University of Konstanz †

Tjaša Žakelj, Univerza na Primorskem

Valentina Hlebec, Fakulteta za družbene vede, Univerza v Ljubljani

Vesna Leskošek, Fakulteta za socialno delo, Univerza v Ljubljani

Zala Volčič, Pomona College, Claremont

Zdenka Šadl, Fakulteta za družbene vede, Univerza v Ljubljani

Zlatica Skrbiš, Australian Catholic University

Tehnična urednica / Technical editor:

Natalija Majsova, natalija.majsova@fdv.uni-lj.si

Urednica recenzij knjig / Reviews editor:

Nina Perger, nina.perger@fdv.uni-lj.si

Jezikovno svetovanje / Language editors:

Nataša Hribar, Tina Verovnik, Murray Bales

Bibliografska obdelava /

Bibliographical classification of articles: Janez Jug

Oblikovanje / Design: Tina Cotič

Prelom / Text design and Typeset: Polanca Mesec Kurdija

Task / Print: Biografika BORI, Ljubljana

Naklada / Number of copies printed: 320

Naslov uredništva / Editors' postal address:

Revija Družboslovne razprave

Marjan Hočevar

Fakulteta za družbene vede, Kardeljeva pl. 5, SI-1000 Ljubljana

Tel. /Phone: (+386) 1 5805 367

Elektronska pošta / e-mail: marjan.hocevar@fdv.uni-lj.si

Spletna stran / Internet: www.druzboslovne-razprave.org

Revijo sofinancira / The Journal is sponsored by:

Izid publikacije je finančno podprla Agencija za raziskovalno dejavnost Republike Slovenije iz naslova razpisa za sofinanciranje domačih in znanstvenih periodičnih publikacij / Slovenian Book Agency.

Letna naročnina (3 številke) / Annual subscription (3 issues):

individualna naročnina / individual rate: 25 EUR; za organizacije / institutional rate: 50 EUR; za študente in brezposelne / students and unemployed discount rate: 16 EUR; cena posameznega izvoda / single issue rate: 16 EUR. Za člane Slovenskega sociološkega društva je naročnina vključena v društveno članarino. / The annual Slovenian Sociological Association membership fee includes the journal's annual subscription rate. Družboslovne razprave je mogoče naročiti na naslovu uredništva ali na spletni strani revije. / Subscription requests can be sent to the editors' postal address. Če želite prekiniti naročniško razmerje, nam to sporočite najkasneje do 15. decembra. / If you decide to cancel the subscription, please write to editors' postal address by 15th of December.

Družboslovne razprave so abstrahirane ali indeksirane v / Družboslovne razprave is abstracted or indexed in:

CEEOL (Central and Eastern European Online Library), COBIB.SI, CSA (Cambridge Scientific Abstracts): • CSA Worldwide Political Science Abstracts • CSA Social Services Abstracts • Sociological Abstracts (Online), EBSCOhost • Current Abstracts • Political Science Complete • SocINDEX • SocINDEX with Full Text • TOC Premier, OCLC • Scopus • Sociological Abstracts (Online) • DOAJ (Directory of Open Access Journals) • Ulrich's Web • De Gruyter • dlib

Uredniška politika: Družboslovne razprave so revija, ki objavlja kolegialno recenzirane znanstvene članke in recenzije knjig. V recenzijski postopke sprejema članke v slovensščini in angleščini s področja sociologije, komunikologije, politologije in kulturalologije ter tem raziskovalnim področjem bližnjih družboslovnih disciplin. Pri izboru člankov za objavo se upoštevata njihova raziskovalna inovativnost ter aktualnost glede na trende v znanstveni skupnosti, v kateri je revija zasidrana. V teoretskem in metodološkem pogledu je revija pluralistično naravnana, posebno skrb pa posveča utrjevanju slovenske družboslovne terminologije.

Editorial policy: Družboslovne razprave is a peer reviewed journal which publishes papers and book reviews. Contributions are invited in fields of sociology, media studies, political science, cultural studies and other studies which are close to these fields. The published contributions should display high level of research originality and address the themes which seem relevant to the scientific communities in which the journal is grounded. Both in theoretical and methodological respects the journal stands for pluralism.

KAZALO

TABLE OF CONTENTS

ČLANKI ARTICLES

- SLOVENIAN SOCIAL SUPPORT NETWORKS
IN A LONG-TERM PERSPECTIVE, 1987–2018 /
Slovenska oporna omrežja v dolgoročni
perspektivi, 1987–2018**
Hajdeja Iglič 7
- UPRAVLJANJE STRESNIH EMOCIJ NA DELOVNEM MESTU /
Management of Stress Emotions in the Workplace**
Jerca Pavlič, Zdenka Šadl 29
- LAND AS AN INDICATOR FOR NATIONAL RESOURCE
BASED POLICY ISSUES: THE CASE OF SPATIAL RESOURCE
DISTRIBUTIONS IN ISRAEL / Zemljišče kot kazalnik
nacionalnih politik do (naravnih) virov:
primer distribucije prostorskih virov v Izraelu**
Shulamith Gertel Groome, Marjan Hočevar 47
- IMAGES OF MUSLIMS ON LEMONDE.FR DURING
THE PERIOD OF TERRORIST ATTACKS IN EUROPE
IN 2015–2016 / Podobe Muslimanov na spletni strani
lemonade.fr v času terorističnih napadov v Evropi
med letoma 2015 in 2016**
Polina Shevchenko 73

RECENZIJE KNJIG BOOK REVIEWS

- Roman Kuhar in David Paternotte (ur.): Anti-Gender Campaigns in Europe: Mobilizing against Equality. Rowman & Littlefield International, Ltd., Lanham, Maryland in London, 2017 (trda vezava)/2018 (mehka vezava).
Jasmina Šepetavc 95

- Charles Wright Mills: Sociološka imaginacija.
Ljubljana: Fakulteta za družbene vede, 2018.
Marko Ribač 98
- Ana Tominc: The Discursive Construction of Class and Lifestyle:
Celebrity chef cookbooks in post-socialist Slovenia. Amsterdam,
Philadelphia: John Benjamins Publishing Company, 2017.
Polona Sitar 101
- Mary Douglas: Kako mislijo institucije.
Ljubljana: Pedagoška fakulteta, 2018.
Sara Pistotnik 105



ČLANKI
ARTICLES



Hajdeja Igljč

SLOVENIAN SOCIAL SUPPORT NETWORKS IN A LONG-TERM PERSPECTIVE, 1987–2018

ABSTRACT

This article examines the effects of macro-level processes – economic recession, growth of the service economy, and deindustrialisation – on the social support networks of residents of Slovenia in the period between 1987 and 2018. Before the transition, Slovenia enjoyed highly functional social support networks. The economic downturns of the early 1990s and late 2000s increased the probability of insufficient social support. The growth of the service economy saw the importance grow of formal sources of support. Socio-demographic changes captured by the notion of the post-industrialisation of society brought various effects: the increased educational level and diminished size of households impacted the growing presence of formal sources and mixed social ties in support networks, while the ageing population contributed to the increased presence of networks with insufficient social support. We conclude that Slovenian social support networks have experienced a distinct transformation over the last three decades.

KEYWORDS: social support networks, Slovenia

Slovenska oporna omrežja v dolgoročni perspektivi, 1987–2018

IZVLEČEK

Članek obravnava vpliv makro družbenih procesov – ekonomske recesije, rasti storitvene ekonomije in deindustrializacije – na oporna omrežja prebivalcev Slovenije v obdobju od 1987 do 2018. Pred tranzicijo so imeli prebivalci Slovenije visokofunkcionalna oporna omrežja. Ekonomski recesiji v zgodnjih 1990-ih in poznih 2000-ih sta povečali tveganje nezadostne socialne opore. Rast storitvene ekonomije je pripeljala do povečanega pomena formalnih virov

opore. Družbene spremembe, ki spremljajo deindustrializacijo družbe, so imele različne učinke: povečevanje izobrazbene ravni prebivalstva in zmanjševanje velikosti gospodinjestev sta vplivala na povečano prisotnost formalnih virov in večjo raznolikost neformalnih virov v opornih omrežjih, medtem ko je staranje prebivalstva prispevalo k povečevanju deleža prebivalstva brez zadostne opore. Zaključujemo z ugotovitvijo, da so slovenska oporna omrežja v zadnjih treh desetletjih doživela večjo transformacijo.

KLJUČNE BESEDE: oporna omrežja, Slovenija

1 Introduction

The paper examines the effects of the macro-level processes on Slovenian social support networks. The study comprises the period from 1987 to 2018. This is the time marked in Slovenia by the political transition to democracy and economic transition to the market economy followed by the rapid development of the service sector and institutional changes in the provision of welfare towards the increased role of the market. In this same period the country went through two economic recessions, namely the economic shock that took place in the first half of the 1990s, immediately after the foundation of the new state, and the economic recession starting in the 2008 after the collapse of the Lehman Brothers bank in New York. The Slovenian society also experienced significant socio-demographic changes usually captured with the term post-industrial society that included ageing of the population, declining size of the households, and increasing level of education.

The empirical analysis foregrounds the following research questions: What was the impact of the growth of the service economy, economic recessions, and deindustrialization of society on the availability of social support and restructuring of the sources of social support? The article thus aims to explore whether access to social support has decreased or increased due to the aforementioned social and economic processes, and whether they caused the re-orientation from one source of social support to another and to which.

Socio-demographic change like the increasing level of education is expected to have transformed social support networks according to the middle-class sociability. The increased importance of the service economy presumably opened up access to market sources of support and in turn, diminished dependence on the informal sources of help offered by the networks of kin, friends, neighbours and other personal ties in which social support stem from the notion of solidarity, independent of the cash nexus or citizenship status. We believe these two changes combined have resulted in the increased use of formal sources and more

diversified support network, along with a reduced significance of kin ties. However, it is likely that this trend was slowed down by the instances of two economic downturns. In both cases, the aggravation of macro economic situation (increased unemployment, lower incomes, increased poverty) is expected to have led to an increased share of those who had insufficient social support since economic crisis had double effect: it increased the need for more demanding forms of support and at the same time decreased the ability of usual support providers to offer such help. The insufficient social support has probably increased also as a result of the ageing of the population and declining size of the households.

The long-term changes in the Slovenian social support networks are examined using data from the *Stratification and Level of Living in Yugoslavia* (Stratifikacija in kvaliteta življenja) study in 1987 (Boh et al. 1987), and two waves of the International Social Survey Programme: *Social Relations and Support Systems* (ISSP 2001) and *Social Networks and Social Resources* (ISSP 2017). The surveys are representative of the Slovenian population. The social support network instrument used in all three surveys asked about to whom the respondents would turn in the case they needed to obtain various kinds of minor and major help.

2 Theoretical framework

The theoretical chapter is divided into three sections. The first section briefly presents the concept of social support networks, emphasises their relative stability and highlights the most important differences between countries. The second section addresses the concept of middle-class sociability and its relations to social support. The third section discusses how the deterioration of the individual's material wellbeing due to the economic downturn affects the support networks.

2.1 Social support networks

The term social support network denotes a web of personal relationships that are expected to or actually provide social support, with which they influence the individuals' health and wellbeing, as well as their chances of finding a job and being 'successful in life' (among others: Litwak and Szelenyi 1969; Berkman and Syme 1979; House, Umberson and Landis 1988; van Vaux 1988; Welman and Wortley 1990; Thoits 1992; van der Poel 1993; Kogovšek et al. 2003; Alonso 2012). When offering social support, people put their resources (such as time, money, skills, information) at the disposal of others within a framework of ongoing social exchange. In this economy of personal gifts and favors, it is essential that people be connected to others who possess the required resources and are willing to share them.

While numerous studies have examined the adaptability of support networks in providing help during individuals' personal crises and changed life situations, only rare studies have analyzed the change in support networks that emerges over a longer period and as the result of macro-level social processes. Thus, a significant part of the literature that we draw upon includes comparative studies conducted on the representative samples of countries and regions in which a small number of the selected forms of social support is observed. One of them is the 1987 ISSP survey carried out in seven countries, among which are also Slovenia's neighbouring countries (the USA, GB, Denmark, Australia, Austria, Italy, and Hungary). The results of the analysis of this data set have been reported by Hollinger and Haller (1990). The authors find a high rate of similarity in support networks between developed countries despite the fact that they have different historical trajectories and political and socio-cultural traditions. The most important source of help for adults is their partner, followed by friends, mother, and adult children. The latter are typically mainly a source of instrumental rather than emotional assistance. Instrumental support is in the function of geographical distance; the larger the distance, the more the kin ties are replaced by non-kin ties and formal sources of support. Emotional support is more difficult to find than instrumental support.

However, the lack of mention of the father as well as the role of partner as the source of social support reflect the degree of patriarchalism within the family relations and represent one of the dimensions of variability between the countries. Although in the Anglo-Saxon and Western European countries geographical distance to the relatives is larger than in Southern and Eastern European ones, this does not reduce the share of their emotional support, which even increases, mainly in relationships between the partners and between the father and his children. Countries also show differences in the presence of friendship and other non-kin ties. In some countries friends are substitute for kin, in others they supplement kin ties, while in still others they are almost non-existent, even when people lack access to social support within kinship network. Although the authors do not discuss this issue further, the inclusion of friends in support networks does seem to be related to the distinction between the instrumental and emotional support. Friends tend to be perceived as potential source of instrumental support in societies where formal sources are absent, in this case they complement already strong and supportive kin network, while in societies where kin networks have weakened and formal sources of support are abundant they to a certain extent substitute kin ties, especially with respect to emotional support.

The second comparative analysis, which uses data similar to our study, focuses on two Asian cities: Beijing and Hong Kong (Lee et al. 2005). The study offers

the opportunity to observe the differences in support networks within the same cultural tradition, but in contexts that differ in terms of the economic development and strength of the service economy. Here again, the authors find a high similarity of support networks, with differences only occurring in the presence of formal sources of help, especially with respect to financial support. Formal sources are used to a higher degree in Hong Kong than in Beijing. The temporal analysis (comparing Beijing in two time points) shows that with the decline of the role of the work place as provider of social support in the everyday life of Chinese, their social support networks acquired characteristics that made them similar to support networks in countries included in the abovementioned ISSP surveys.

2.2 Middle-class sociability

In the second half of the 20th century, social networks experienced significant changes. Sociological studies of personal networks conducted during the 1970s and early 1980s in the developed countries have shown that middle-class personal communities are not 'lost' as would follow from the classical sociological works and analyses of early industrialisation, but are being transformed towards the "liberated" community. The expression comes from Wellman's (1979; see also Drouhot 2016) naming of one of the three hypothetical forms of personal networks, which would typically have a sparsely knit, spatially dispersed and socially diverse network structure. In the same period, Fisher (1982) who analysed the differences between personal networks in rural and urban communities concluded that urban personal networks allowed for the individual's choice of their significant partners, based on the quality of the relationship, while the influence of social roles in the structuring of personal networks has been decreasing. Comparing friendship networks in different social classes, Allan (1989) showed that middle-class friendship relations stand out in terms of decontextualisation and the inclusion of selected friends in the private sphere, where relationships are less constrained with normative expectations than in the public sphere. Finally, Paine (1969) argued that the main feature of middle-class sociability was that the boundaries of the relationships were defined contextually and discursively.

There are several interpretations as to which characteristics of the middle-class social position have brought about the development of the new form of sociability that evolved around the notions of autonomy and choice. Some principally link the turn to the social ties outside the family and relatives with the crumbling away of these ties due to increased spatial mobility (Pahl and Prevalin 2005). This is a structural approach that connects new forms of sociability with the new opportunities for establishing and maintaining social contacts. The decreased opportunities for maintaining the familiarity of kin ties that comes from everyday

closeness increases the opportunity to achieve familiarity in non-kin, mainly friendship ties.

A different interpretation claims that the change of sociability style occurs in the conditions in which interpersonal relationships are losing their productive function in the provision of economic well-being. Namely, strong normative element in interpersonal relationships which is traditionally found in kinship networks helps maintain loyalty, predictability and stability (Silver 1990). This is a functionalist argument according to which the opening up of corporative family units to non-kin ties should be attributed to their decreased significance for the individual's material well-being in the conditions of heightened social mobility and generous systems of social security.

Regardless of the differences in the above arguments, they both claim that the transition from the 'networks of loyalty' to 'networks of choice' is linked to macro social changes taking place in the developed societies in the period of economic expansion after the Second World War.

2.3 Networks in the conditions of economic scarcity and insecurity

During the past three decades, however, the discourse on personal networks began to be dominated by more pessimistic tones. The studies of the patterns of sociability and participation within the research programme on social capital, which were encouraged primarily by Putnam's work (2000), call attention to the decreased informal sociability and civic participation and increased loneliness. Also, a renowned article (McPherson, Smith-Lovin and Brashears 2006) that compares the personal networks in the US between 1987 and 2004 finds that these have become smaller and more kin-oriented and that the number of people without a significant discussant partner has increased. Despite some alarming conclusions, empirical studies showed that these trends differ from country to country and that the change is less profound than first assumed (Clark 2015).

According to earlier interpretations, the reasons for changes in networks were assumed to lie in new technologies, changes in the working participation and the replacement of civic-minded generations born between 1910 and 1940 with less civic-minded and more individualised generations. However, recent studies point to strong compositional effects (socio-demographic changes such as a change in age, education and household structures of the population) and period effects (declining real incomes and growing economic inequality) (Costa and Kahn 2003; Uslaner 2002; Clark 2015). The worsening of individuals' economic situation that falls under the period effect, entails their decreased resources for socialising, participation and networking (Igljč, Rozer and Volker

2019). In the conditions of economic insecurity, individuals also have to redirect themselves from social to productive activities, which bring them extra income. And even if individuals keep maintaining extensive networks, these networks do not necessarily provide support, since they have been affected by the economic downturn as well (Letki and Mierina 2015).

3 Hypotheses

We continue by presenting hypotheses about the effects of macro-social processes in Slovenia during the past three decades on the change of support networks. The hypotheses are formulated separately for three sets of factors: the development of the service economy, economic downturn, and socio-demographic changes.

3.1 The development of the service economy in Slovenia

Support networks perform the function of the provision of goods and services, which the individual either cannot or does not wish to obtain in other ways. Therefore, with the growth and improvement of the quality of the service sector, the role of the so-called formal sources in Slovenian support networks is expected to have increased. The service sector has experienced intensive growth since the late 1980s. In 1971, the share of those employed in the tertiary sector totalled 31 %, which increased to 51 % in 1991 and reached 65 % in 2005 (Drozg 2007). By the early 2000s, the share of services in the GDP exceeded 50 %.

Particularly important for the support networks is the development of financial services. The liberalisation of the financial market, the development of new financial products, and easier access to them coupled with increased needs for financial assistance resulted in the higher indebtedness of the Slovenian population in the first decade following the transition. The burden of the population as the ratio between the size of bank loans and the income of the population increased between 1992 and 2000 from 0,39 to 3,50 (Ferk 2007). Besides the financial sector, growth also occurred in other services, such as in household help in the case of illness, help in the garden, help in the case of emotional problems and in the need for counselling. Most of these services can be bought on the market, while some are also accessible in the public sector or are at least partly co-funded from public resources.

The growth of the service economy throughout the post-transition period suggests the following hypothesis: the period after 1987 saw the growing significance of formal sources of help, in particular with regard to the need for financial resources. Accordingly, the significance of informal sources in the provision of welfare was declining. (H1)

3.2 Economic downturns

The first survey examining support networks was carried out in 1987 when Slovenia began a six-year period of negative economic growth. Throughout the 1980s, real wages declined compared to the decade before (Kordež 2018), and inflation reached 181,1 % (SURS). By 1989, it had increased to 2.762,7 % (SURS). Slovenia's independence and the interruption of the economic flows with the rest of the former Yugoslav republics resulted in unemployment that until then had been at an insignificant level. Between 1987 and 1993, the number of unemployed increased from 17,826 to 137,142 (ZRSZ). In 1993, for the first time since the transition had begun, Slovenia again recorded positive economic growth, and the number of the unemployed started to decline. However, it remained above 100,000 until 2001 (ZRSZ). Although Slovenia was among the transition countries that in the early 1990s were among the first to have overcome the transformation depression (Lorenčič 2012), it was only later, in the early 2000s, that the real income reached the levels from the mid-1980s and inflation dropped below 5 %.

The great global crisis of the late 2000s had similar dimensions. The number of unemployed rose until 2013, amounting to 124.015. It is expected to fall to the pre-crisis level only by 2021 (ZRSZ). The wage growth that slowed down during the crisis completely stopped in 2012 and 2013. With the exception of the minimum wage, which increased by 20 % in 2010, wages started to grow again only in 2017 (SURS).

Both cases of the economic downturn that marked Slovenia in the first three decades after the transition saw a large increase in the risk of unemployment and the decline of household income. They are expected to be reflected in support networks in terms of the increased share of individuals who have no one to turn to for help. (H2) This hypothesis builds on the idea that economic crisis leads to the contraction of networks since it reduces the resources for socialization and participation. Also, in economic crisis the need for social support increases but since it affects all partners in the network the overall capacity of network to offer support decreases. We expect that in the economic downturn the informal support networks contract with respect to both kin and non-kin ties. (H3)

3.3. Socio-demographic changes

Support networks vary with the size of household, education, age and gender. In the observed period from 1987 to 2018, the size of the household in Slovenia was diminishing, its average size being 3,06 in 1991 and 2,48 in 2011 (SURS). The main increase was observed in the number of one- and two-member

households in urban settlements. From the aspect of support networks, *the presence of informal support is expected to decrease and the presence of formal help increase with the diminishing household size.* (H4) In addition, decreasing size of the households is conceived as a structural cause for *an increase in insufficient social support (H5)* as well as *the mobilization of non-kin social ties and consequently more diverse networks (H6).*

The Slovenian population is ageing. In 1991, the average age was 35,9 years, and persons older than 65 years represented 11 % of the entire population (SURs). By 2011, the average age was 43,2 years, and the share of those older than 65 amounted to 19 % of the entire population (SURs). With the elderly's support networks in general offering less support (Hlebec 2003; Kavčič 2011), *the share of those who have no one to turn to for help is expected to rise.* (H7)

During the past three decades, the education of the population has changed significantly. In 1991, 47,2 % of the population had completed elementary school or less with this share dropping to 30 % by 2011 (SURs). In the period from 1991 to 2001, the share of the population that had completed high school increased from 43,1 % to 54 % (SURs). Throughout this period, the share of the population with tertiary education was also growing, increasing from 8,9 % in 1991 to 17,5 % in 2011 (SURs). Education is the most frequently used indicator of the changes in the style of sociability. With the increasing educational level, *the share of 'liberated' personal communities is expected to increase, which means that the networks had become more diverse (H8).*

4 Data

The analysis is based on three surveys that use the same approach to the study of personal support networks. Namely, the respondents were asked whom they would turn to for help in different situations of need or emergency. For each type of need or emergency, they list one or two sources of social support that they identify in terms of role relationship (for example, husband/wife/partner, mother, father, etc.).

Although they use the same general approach, the surveys differ with respect to a number of different situations for which they ask about the potential source of social support. In the three surveys from the mid 1980s (in the USA in the GSS 1985, in Slovenia in the YULOL 1987, and in Australia, the UK, Germany, Austria, Italy, Hungary in the ISSP 1986) the respondents were asked about the sources of social support in six different situations: (1) help in the household and garden; (2) help with shopping and around the home when having flu and having to stay in bed; (3) help when needing to borrow a large sum of money; (4)

advice when feeling upset and having a problem with one's husband, wife or partner; (5) advice when feeling a bit down or depressed; (6) advice regarding important changes in life, for example about the job or moving to another city. For each situation, they were asked to elicit two sources of support (so-called 1st and 2nd choice). The list of role relationships was long and very specific. It included: "Husband/wife/partner", "Mother", "Father", "Daughter", "Son", "Sister", "Brother", "Other relative including in-laws", "Closest friend", "Other friend", "Neighbour", "Co-worker", different formal sources of support, "Other", and "No one".

The second wave of the ISSS module on social support networks, titled *Social Relations and support systems*, was conducted in 2001. The number of situations in which the respondents turn to types of people for help was reduced to three: (1) help in case of illness; (2) advice when depressed or a bit down; and (3) borrowing a large sum of money. Respondents were again asked to whom they would turn first and second for help, and the list of available role relationships was longer than in the mid-1980s.

The third wave of ISSP on social support networks, *Social network and social resources*, was conducted recently. In Slovenia, the data were collected in 2018. The questions about potential sources of help refer to a long list of situations. The original questionnaire from 1986–1987 was complemented with additional questions asking about persons with whom people associate in their free time and those who offer them help with administrative problems or official paperwork, or look after them if they were seriously ill. The response categories were changed significantly again.

The described changes in the measurement instrument present a serious challenge for the analysis, which aims to focus on the changes over time. In order to cope with this problem, we compare all three time points simultaneously by observing the distribution of the types of social support networks. The network types are defined on the basis of the small number of response categories and for the small number of helping situations.

5 Analysis of trends

5.1 Sources of social support in 1987

Before we turn to the analysis of trends we offer a short presentation of the Slovenian social support networks before the transition, in 1987. Table 1 shows the share of respondents who would turn to different social ties if they needed a certain kind of help. The last column shows the average share of respondents turning to different social ties for six kinds of help together. Different social ties

were divided into three categories: “partner”, “kin”, and “non-kin”, with the addition of “formal” sources of help as well as the possibility to answer ‘no one’. Only the first choice was taken into account.

Table 1: Sources of social support, 1987: by different kinds of social support and overall (percentages).

	House-work	Illness	Family problems	Depression	Borrow money	Advice	Overall
Partner	50,1	47,2	14,1	45,8	16,1	54,3	40,1
Kin	39,0	44,8	47,3	22,1	60,1	30,9	39,9
Non-kin	9,9	5,6	23,1	29,3	12,5	0,1	14,1
Formal support	0,5	1,1	3,4	0,9	8,1	1,5	2,2
No one	0,7	1,2	12,1	1,9	3,4	4,6	3,7
N	285	284	281	282	281	283	281

Slovenian support networks in the period just before the transition show a significant role of partner and kin ties, which presented the source of support in 80 % of the situations. They are followed by non-kin ties, which are important especially with respect to help in case of emotional problems (family problems and depression) although they also offer financial support. Relying on sources is extremely low and the share of those who would not be able to turn to any source for one or another kind of difficulty is also observed to be low. The family and kinship networks with some help of friendship networks seemed to successfully perform the function of social support.

5.2 Changes in the 1987–2001 period

Table 2 shows changes in Slovenian social support networks in the first observed period, 1987–2001. As opposed to the previous table, only three kinds of help are considered here – help in case of illness, depression, and financial problems which is the reason why figures for overall support in 1987 in Table 2 differ from Table 1. The results are presented for the 1st choice only, and for the 1st and 2nd choice together. Individual cells show percentages that again tell how often a certain source of help was chosen among all the choices. Descriptive analysis shows an increased percentage of partnership ties and formal sources in 2001 compared to 1987. Other informal ties, both kin and non-kin, have lost their significance. The drop is especially strong when considering the role of kin ties among the 1st choice and non-kin ties among the 1st and 2nd choice together. The share of those who have nobody to turn to for help was significantly increased.

Table 2: Sources of social support, Slovenia 1987–2001: overall (column percentages).

	1. choice			1. & 2. choice		
	1987	2001		1987	2001	
Partner	35,9	41,2	**	20,0	23,6	***
Kin	43,7	34,7	***	49,9	46,8	**
Non-kin	15,4	12,3	**	21,6	14,5	***
Formal	3,1	7,1	***	3,6	7,5	***
No one	1,9	4,5	***	5,0	7,6	***
N	281	1077		281	1077	

* $p < 0,05$ ** $p < 0,01$ *** $p < 0,001$

The results suggest that the first period saw the contraction of informal support networks to close family members, whose help was complemented with newly emerging formal sources. These changes could be interpreted in terms of the rise of the service economy and they confirm Hypothesis 1. The increased share of the population without enough support also support Hypothesis 2 about the impact of the economic downturn. The support networks also exhibit contraction with respect to kin and non-kin ties, supporting Hypothesis 3. Obviously, the formal sources failed to replace the reduced role of informal ties which means that there were also other reasons for the contraction of the informal support networks than just their replacement with formal sources. We claim these reasons were related to the deteriorating economic situation of the population.

5.3 Changes in the 2001–2018 period

This section presents the analysis of support networks in the period 2001–2018. Due to the changes in the measuring instrument, adaptation in the analysis is needed again. This time the results are reported together for help in the cases of illness and depression, and separately for help in the case of financial shortage. The lack of information is marked as “n.a.” (information not available) in Table 3.

Table 3: Sources of social support, Slovenia 2001–2018: illness & depression, and borrow money (column percentages).

	Illness Depression			Borrow money		
	2001	2018		2001	2018	
Kin	83,2	79,5	**	n.a.	n.a.	
Non-kin	13,7	18,6	***	n.a.	n.a.	
No one	3,1	1,9	*	8,5	7,6	
Formal	n.a.	n.a.		19,2	28,2	***
Personal	n.a.	n.a.		72,2	63,9	***
N	1077	1047		1077	1047	

* $p < 0,05$ ** $p < 0,01$ *** $p < 0,001$

Situations of illness and depression show the decreasing presence of kin ties and the increased presence of non-kin ties. The share of situations in which individuals have nobody to turn to for help was slightly diminished and is on the border of statistical significance. For these two situations of help, we do not have any information regarding formal sources. However, there was a high increase in the percentage of financial help that respondents would ask for from formal sources. As many as 10 % more respondents than in the previous period would turn to formal sources, such as banks and savings institutions if they needed financial help. Accordingly, this would lower the percentage of those who would use informal sources. The percentage of those who, in this case, would not find help remains high and unchanged.

The 2001–2018 period can be seen as the continuation of the process of post-industrialisation of the economy, mainly with regard to financial needs, supporting Hypothesis 1. At the same time, the share of the situations of insufficient or absent support is not diminishing, which probably reflects the economic crisis of the 2008 as predicted by Hypothesis 2. However, the share of non-kin ties is on the rise in the case of small instrumental (illness) and emotional (depression) support, while kin ties decline, indicating the transition to the pattern of middle-class sociability. Of course, despite a decline, kinship ties still remain prevalent. But due to the nature of the 2018 measurement instrument, kin ties cannot be separated from partnership ties. So we do not know if the trend of the growing importance of partnership ties increased also into this period, and how strong was really a decline in the kin ties different from the partnership ties. The Hypothesis 3 thus does not hold for the period from 2001 on.

5.4 Trends in social support networks and socio-demographic variables

This section presents the analysis of both periods simultaneously, adding a larger number of respondents' socio-demographic characteristics. To this purpose, we again changed the analytical approach and first delineated different types of social support networks on the basis of very broadly defined categories of the sources of social support.

The following types of support networks were formed with the help of the classification analysis (we used the two-step cluster procedure in the SPPS): "kin-centred", "mixed", "formal" and "insufficient" (Table 4). As its name suggests, a "kin-centred" network mainly includes kinship ties (66,5 %) as a support source in case of illness and depression, financial support is expected from personal ties and social support is available in all cases. A "mixed" type network comprises an approximately equal share of different non-kin and kin ties (29,7 % and 36,1 %, respectively), financial support is again expected from informal sources and social support is in general widely available. A "formal" network type indicates a high presence of formal sources in case of financial needs, otherwise it is kin-centered. Finally, the "insufficient" type reveals a high absence of both formal and informal sources of help. In all types of support networks kinship ties are predominant source of support.

Table 4: Prevalence of network types by wave (row percentages) and their characteristics (column percentages).

	Type 1 Kin-centered support	Type 2 Formal support	Type 3 Insufficient support	Type 4 Mixed support	N
Wave					
Wave 1987	60,4	7,4	5,5	26,7	281
Wave 2001	51,9	17,5	11,3	19,3	1061
Wave 2018	43,2	27,0	7,8	22,0	1034
Network characteristics					
Kin	66,5	53,9	40,7	29,7	
Non-kin	0,0	12,2	8,9	36,1	
Personal	33,5	0,0	7,1	33,4	
Formal	0,0	33,8	3,3	0,0	
No one	0,0	0,0	38,7	0,0	
N	1179	489	243	465	
%	51,7	17,5	8,4	22,5	

Regardless of the year of the survey, the most common type is a "kin-centred" support network, with, however, its presence tending to diminish. Between 1987 and 2018, the presence of this type of network fell from 60,4 % to 51,9 % and further to 43,2 %. At the same time, the presence of a "formal" type of support network dramatically increased. Its presence first grew from 7,4 % to 17,5 %, and further on to 27 % in the following period. In the first transition period, the presence of a "mixed" network type fell from 26,7 % to 19,3 %, and was slightly increased in the second period, but did not reach the 1987 level. The presence of an "insufficient" network type mainly grew in the first period: from 5,5 % to 11,3 %; while declining in the next period, it still remained higher than in 1987.

Table 5 shows the results of multinomial logistic regression of four network types on socio-demographic variables and different time points (or waves of study). This analytical approach was used because the answers are mutually co-dependent (the respondents could only select one social role for each type of help; therefore, they only had one choice). The results are expressed in Exp (B), which means that the value lower than 1 indicates lower, and the value higher than 1 higher probability of the respondent having a certain type of support network compared to a "kin-centred" network, which was defined as the base category.

Table 5: Multinomial regression of network types on socio-demographic characteristics and wave.

		Model 1 Wave	Model 2 Sex	Model 3 House- hold	Model 4 Educa- tion	Model 5 Age	Model 6 Full model
		Exp (B)	Exp (B)	Exp (B)	Exp (B)	Exp (B)	Exp (B)
Type 2 (Formal support)	Wave 1 (1987)	base					base
	Wave 2 (2001)	2,751***					3,114***
	Wave 3 (2018)	5,087***					5,604***
	Female		base				base
	Male		1,321**				1,203+
	Household size			0,775**			0,790**
	Edu low/middle				0,749*		1,706
	Edu higher				base		base
	Edu interactions: low/middle * wave 2						/ 0,665
	higher * wave 2						base
	low/middle * wave 3						0,685
	higher * wave 3						base
	Age 15-24					0,366***	0,395***
	Age 24-64					base	base
Age over 65					0,745	0,528***	
Type 3 (Insufficient support)	Wave 1	base					base
	Wave 2	2,371***					2,684***
	Wave 3	1,960**					1,698**
	Female		base				base
	Male		1,073				1,237
	Household size			0,469***			0,555***
	Edu low/middle				1,347		0,585
	Edu higher				base		base
	Edu interactions: low/middle * wave 2						/ 3,801**
	higher * wave 2						base
	low/middle * wave 3						2,149*
	higher * wave 3						base
	Age 15-24					0,457**	0,530*
	Age 24-64					base	base
Age over 65					3,010***	1,920**	

Type 4 (Mixed support)	Wave 1	base					base
	Wave 2	0,838					1,253
	Wave 3	1,150					1,013
	Female		base				base
	Male		0,785**	,			0,809*
	Household size			0,719**			0,583***
	Edu low/middle				0,973		1,290
	Edu higher				base		base
	Edu interactions:						/
	low/middle * wave 2						0,901
	higher * wave 2						base
	low/middle * wave 3						0,526*
	higher * wave3						base
	Age 15-24					2,232***	2,607***
	Age 24-64					base	base
	Age over 65					0,770	0,514***
	R ² (Nagelkerke)		0,061	0,007	0,025	0,003	0,087
χ^2		164,525	19,137	64,562	8,888	236,473	472,932
d.f.		6	3	3	3	6	27
N		2376	2369	2361	2352	2349	2315

Note: Reference category is network Type 1 ("kin-centered" support network)

* $p < 0,05$ ** $p < 0,01$ *** $p < 0,001$ + borderline significance

The first column (Model 1) in the Table 5 shows the effects of three time points. The next four columns (Model 2 to Model 5) show bivariate effects of different socio-demographic variables (sex, household size, education and age), and the last column (Model 6) presents the multivariate effects of all variables simultaneously. Also, interaction effects between education and wave are included.

Multivariate analysis corroborates that the probability of respondents having a 'formal' type of support network is growing from one period to the other and that this trend is relatively independent of the demographic changes, supporting again the Hypothesis 1. With respect to socio-demographics, the probability of the use of "formal" support network compared to "kin-centred" network is indicated to be higher among men, respondents with higher education, those living in smaller households and middle-aged people. We thus find support for Hypothesis 4 that smaller households tend to rely more on formal sources of support than bigger households. The increase in the presence of smaller households in the Slovenian society should be regarded as one of the reasons for larger

reliance on formal sources. Education turn out insignificant in the multivariate analysis, and the ageing of the population works against the transition towards more "formal" support networks.

As was established in previous analyses, the probability for "insufficient" social support increased after 1987. It is slightly lower in the 2001–2018 period, but still statistically significantly higher than in 1987. These results are explained in terms of economic downturns that characterised both periods supporting Hypothesis 2. Socio-demographic changes also had a significant impact on the rise of "insufficient" type of networks. Again, size of household is important as smaller households are more likely than bigger ones to have "insufficient" compared to "kin-centered" support networks confirming Hypothesis 5. Ageing of the population brings about more of 'insufficient' type of support networks as proposed by Hypothesis 7. Education affects the probability of the respondent having "insufficient" support network only in the interaction with the wave: in the time of economic downturns lower and middle educational categories are significantly more likely to have "insufficient" support than higher educational category confirming that the increase in insufficient network type is related to the stress posed by the economic recession on networks of people with less economic resources.

The results for the impact of time on "mixed" type of support networks are statistically insignificant. The economic processes and the development of the service economy did not affect the structure of support networks in terms of kin and non-kin ties as much as they did affect the emergence of formal sources of support and the increase in insufficient support. The dynamics of the changes in the likelihood of 'mixed' network type depends solely on socio-demographic factors. They are more probable among men than women and among those living in smaller households confirming Hypothesis 6 that the increasing distance between kin ties presents the opportunity for non-kin ties to take over the function of providing social support. The increasing education, especially in the second post-transition period (after 2001) which saw an increase of graduates at the tertiary level working in the service sector, brought about more mixed "network type", which can be explained in terms of middle-class sociability and confirms Hypothesis 8. But as ageing of the population contributes negatively to the likelihood of "mixed" type of support networks, the overall picture of Slovenian networks in terms of the kin/non-kin ties structure is not significantly different from 1987.

6 Conclusion

This article examines social support networks of the residents of Slovenia in the period between 1987 and 2018. Although network microstructures usually exhibit high levels of stability, they nevertheless change in response to the large-scale processes. In the article we focused on the impact of processes such as the growth of the service economy, economic downturn and socio-demographic changes.

The analysis started with the analysis of the Slovenian support networks in 1987. The results show that the former were relatively diverse and functional despite the insufficiently developed formal sources of support. The percentage of respondents with insufficient support was small.

In the two post-transition periods, 1987–2001 and 2001–2018, the kin-centered character of support networks diminished and networks became more diverse in terms of sources of social support. The role of formal sources increased, but due to the economic downturns the needs for social support increased more than the access to formal sources, resulting in the increased proportion of the population with “insufficient” type of networks. The economic recession in the first post-transition period affected in particular those with lower and middle levels of education who experienced a contraction in support networks with respect to both kin and non-kin social ties.

In the second post-transition period we see a sign of the spread of the middle-class sociability as a result of the larger number of graduates with tertiary education whose jobs are more dependant on the service economy than in the previous periods, and the changing size of the households which are becoming smaller. Both trends contributed to the “mixed” type of support networks which are more diverse, with kin ties co-existing with non-kin ties. However, they have been countered with the ageing of the population.

The picture of the Slovenian support networks that derives from the analysis is that after the transition sources of support have become more diverse. In particular, people rely more on formal sources. But support is at the same also more insufficient than before. This is partly due to the economic distress experienced by the families and households during the two recessions, and partly due to socio-demographic changes, especially ageing of the population and smaller size of the households. Although we can expect that the impact of both – smaller household size and older population – will be in the future partly ameliorated by the increasing education, it nevertheless represents a challenge for the social policy.

References

- Allan, Graham (1989): *Friendship: Developing a sociological perspective*. London: Harvester/Wheatsheaf.
- Alonso, Mercedes F. (2012): Social support networks in Spain: The factors that determine models of choice. *International Sociology*, 27 (3): 384–402.
- Berkman, Lisa F., and Syme, Leonard S. (1979): Social networks, host resistance, and mortality: a nine-year follow-up study of Alameda County residents. *American Journal of Epidemiology*, 109 (2): 1186–2014.
- Clark, April K. (2015): Rethinking the decline in social capital. *American Politics Research*, 43 (4): 569–601.
- Costa, Dora L. and Kahn, Matthew E. (2003): Understanding the American decline in social capital, 1952–1998. *Kyklos*, 56 (1): 17–46.
- Drouhot, Lucas G. (2006): Reconsidering 'community liberated': How class and the national context shape personal support networks. *Social Networks*, 48 (January): 57–77.
- Drozg, Vladimir (2007): Prispevek h gospodarski geografiji Slovenije. *Revija za geografijo*, 2 (1): 67–88.
- Ferk, Barbara (2007): Zadolževanje in prezadolženost prebivalstva. *UMAR: Delovni zvezki*, 16. Kraj: Založba.
- Fisher, Clau S. (1982): *To dwell among friends*. Chicago: University of Chicago Press.
- Hlebec, Valentina (2003): Omrežja starostnikov v Sloveniji. *Družboslovne razprave*, 43 (19): 171–182.
- Hollinger, Franz, and Haller, Max (1990): Kinship and social networks in modern societies: a cross-cultural comparison among seven nations. *European Sociological Review*, 6 (2): 103–123.
- House, James S., Umberson, Debra, and Landis, Karl R. (1988): Structures and processes of social support. *Annual Review of Sociology*, 14: 293–318.
- Iglíč, Hajdeja, Rözer, Jesper, and Volker, Beate (2019): Economic crisis and social capital: The role of politics in understanding short-term changes in social capital. Unpublished manuscript.
- Kavčič, Matic (2011): *Družbena in individualna tveganja starejših - vloga omrežij socialne opore*. Ljubljana: Fakulteta za družbene vede, UL: Doctoral dissertation.
- Kogovšek, Tina, Hlebec, Valentina, Dremelj, Polona, and Ferligoj, Anuška (2003): Omrežja socialne opore Ljubljančanov. *Družboslovne razprave*, XIX (43): 183–204.
- Kordež, Bine (2018): Od česa je odvisna višina naše pokojnine. Available from: <https://damijan.org/2018/09/22/od-cesa-je-odvisna-visina-nase-pokojnine/>. (Accessed 30.09.2019).
- Lee, Rance P.L., Ruan, Danching, and Lai, Gina (2005): Social structure and support networks in Beijing and Hong Kong. *Social Networks*, 27 (3): 249–274.
- Letki, Natalia and Mierina, Inta (2015): Getting support in polarized societies: Income, social networks, and socio-economic context. *Social Science Research*, 49 (January): 217–233.

- Litwak, Eugene, and Szelenyi, Ivan (1969): Primary Group Structures and Their Functions: Kin, Neighbors, and Friends. *American Sociological Review*, 34 (4): 465–481.
- Lorenčič, Aleksander (2012): Prelom s starim in začetek novega. Tranzicija slovenskega gospodarstva iz socializma v kapitalizem (1990-2004). Ljubljana: Inštitut za novejšo zgodovino.
- McPherson, Miller, Smith-Lovin, Lynn, and Brashears, Matthew E. (2006): Social isolation in America: Changes in core discussion networks over two decades. *American Sociological Review*, 71 (3): 353–375.
- Pahl, Ray, and Prevalin, David J. (2005): Between family and friends: a longitudinal study of friendship choices. *The British Journal of Sociology*, 56 (1): 433–450.
- Paine, Robert (1969). In search of friendship: An exploratory analysis in 'middle-class' culture. *Man*, 4 (4): 505–524.
- Putnam, Robert (2000): *Bowling alone: The collapse and revival of American community*. New York: Simon & Schuster.
- Silver, Allan (1990): Friendship in Commercial Society: Eighteenth-Century Social Theory and Modern Sociology. *American Journal of Sociology*, 95 (6): 1474–1504.
- SURS. Statistični urad Republike Slovenije (Statistical Office of the Republic of Slovenia). Available from: <https://www.stat.si/StatWeb/en> (Accessed 30.09.2019).
- Thoits, Peggy A. (1992): Stress, Coping, and Social Support Processes: Where Are We? What Next? *Journal of Health and Social Behavior*, 35 (Extra issue): 53–79.
- Uslaner, Eric M. (2002): *The moral foundations of trust*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
- van der Poel, Matt G.M. (1993): Delineating personal support networks. *Social Networks*, 15 (1): 49–70.
- van Vaux, Alan (1988): *Social support: theory, research, and intervention*. New York: Praeger Publishers.
- Wellman, Barry (1979): The community question. *American Journal of Sociology*, 84 (5): 1201–1231.
- Welman, Barry, and Wortley, Scott (1990): Different strokes from different folks: Community ties and social support. *American Journal of Sociology*, 96 (3): 6558–6588.
- ZRSZ. Zavod Republike Slovenije za zaposlovanje (Employment Office of the Republic of Slovenia). Available from: <http://english.ess.gov.si> (Accessed 30.09.2019).

Authors' data:

Assoc. Prof. Dr. Hajdeja Igljč
 Faculty of Social Sciences, UL
 e-mail: hajdeja.iglic@fdv.uni-lj.si
 tel.: 051 316111

Jerca Pavlič, Zdenka Šadl

UPRAVLJANJE STRESNIH EMOCIJ NA DELOVNEM MESTU

IZVLEČEK

Članek obravnava stres na delovnem mestu, ki ga v sodobnem poslovnem svetu doživlja vedno več zaposlenih. V članku je kritično izpostavljen diskurz individualizacije stresa, ki zaposlenim narekuje, da konstruirajo sebe kot individue in oblikujejo lastno realnost zunaj okvirov širše kolektivitete. Avtorici model upravljanja stresnih emocij umeščata na skupinsko raven in obravnavata koncept skupinske emocionalne kulture, ki lahko zaposlenim pomaga pri uspešnejšem in učinkovitejšem spoprijemanju s stresom s pomočjo skupinskih emocionalnih norm, strategij, ritualov in rutin ter kulturnih artefaktov. Članek izpostavlja problematiko naraščanja poklicnega stresa, ki bi jo morale delovne organizacije v sodelovanju z zaposlenimi reševati na organizacijski ravni ter uvesti ustrezne primarne, sekundarne in terciarne ukrepe.

KLJUČNE BESEDE: poklicni stres, stresne emocije, diskurz individualizacije stresa, skupinsko upravljanje stresnih emocij, skupinska emocionalna kultura

Management of Stress Emotions in the Workplace

ABSTRACT

The article deals with work-related stress that ever more employees experience in the modern business world. The article criticises the discourse of the individualisation of stress, which states that employees must construct themselves as individuals and shape their own reality beyond the scope of broader collectivism. The authors set the model of managing stress emotions at a group level and deal with the concept of a group emotional culture, which enables employees to be more successful and effective in coping with stress by using group emotional norms, strategies, rituals and routines and cultural artefacts. The article focuses on the problems of growing work-related stress, which ought to be characteri-

sed as an organisational problem and dealt with on a primary, secondary and tertiary level.

KEY WORDS: work-related stress, stress emotions, discourse of the individualisation of stress, group management of stress emotions, group emotional culture

1 Uvod

Čeprav je stres na delovnem mestu pogosta tema poljudnih člankov in raziskav v sodobni znanosti, je prevladujoči diskurz zaznamovan z astrukturalizmom in individualizacijo, ki sporočata, da je stres individualen problem, za reševanje katerega so odgovorni zaposleni individui sami – običajno zunaj delovnega mesta, v prostem času in osebnem življenju. V zgodovinski perspektivi lahko diskurz individualizacije pripišemo razvoju individualizirane poznomoderne družbe, v kateri so individui odvisni le od svojih kompetenc in iznajdljivosti, saj trend individualnosti slabi osrednji položaj kolektivnih identitet, ki izgubljajo svoje značilne lastnosti tako v smislu samozavedanja kot v odnosu do drugih skupin (Beck in Beck-Gernsheim 1996, 2002). Po Baumanu (2002: 13) v »naši zindividualizirani, sprivatizirani različici moderne« breme in odgovornost za neuspeh »padeta predvsem na ramena individua«. Ugotovitev avtoric Ule in Kuhar (2003: 27), da individui »v kriznih in stresnih situacijah prej doživljajo stres individualizacije kot pa njene osvobajajoče obete« je še posebej relevantna v povezavi s stresom na delovnem mestu. Beck in Beck-Gernsheim (1996: 819) ugotavljata, da proces individualizacije zaposlenim narekuje, da konstruirajo sebe kot individue in oblikujejo lastno realnost zunaj okvirov širše kolektivitete. Organizacije prek menedžerskih diskurzov individualizacije odgovornost za reševanje poklicnega stresa prelagajo na zaposlene (kot individue), pri čemer jih spodbujajo s prepričanjem, da morajo svoje težave reševati sami. V takšnih diskurzivnih pogojih upravljanje stresnih emocij »ne deluje kot sredstvo za krepitev moči zaposlenih, temveč kot orodje za ustvarjanje ozke individualistične interpretacije delovnega življenja s tem, da se vsa odgovornost prelaga na zaposlene« (Thunman 2015: 136) kot (nepovezane) individue. Neadekvatno razumevanje kompleksnega problema stresa na delovnem mestu in (ne)premišljeno prelaganje odgovornosti za reševanje problemov s stresom na ramena zaposlenih s strani organizacijskih akterjev še dodatno intenzificira raven stresa zaposlenih (Meyerson 1998; Styhre in dr. 2002; Thunman 2015).

Diskurzivna preusmeritev na zaposlene je problematična, če upoštevamo empirična in teoretska spoznanja, ki ključne dejavnike stresa umeščajo na organizacijsko in širšo societalno raven. Številne raziskave in razprave namreč kažejo, da poslovni imperativi visoke produktivnosti vodijo v hitro naraščajoč

delež zaposlenih, ki se na delovnem mestu srečujejo s poklicnim stresom. Vse več poklicnega stresa, ki ga zaposleni občutijo, kadar »zahteve delovnega okolja presegajo njihove zmožnosti, da bi se z njimi spoprijeli ali jih nadzorovali« (Šprah in Zorjan 2016: 9), se pojavlja zaradi novih vrst delovnih mest, novih oblik zaposlovanja in prekarnih zaposlitev, visoke intenzivnosti dela in delovne preobremenitve, velikih emocionalnih obremenitev pri delu, slabih medosebnih odnosov, slabe organizacije in vodenja dela (Kralj in dr. 2011; Eurofound 2015; Šprah in Zorjan 2016; Zorjan in dr. 2016).

Vodstveni delavci na evropski in nacionalni ravni se zavedajo, da se raven doživljanja stresa med zaposlenimi na delovnem mestu vseskozi povečuje – 79 % anketirancev je leta 2009 v Prvi evropski raziskavi v podjetjih o novih in nastajajočih tveganjih ESENER-1 (*European Survey of Enterprises on New and Emerging Risks*) izrazilo skrb glede povečanega stresa na delovnem mestu (EU-OSHA 2015), a je kljub temu le 26 % evropskih organizacij in manj kot 20 % slovenskih organizacij uvedlo postopke za spoprijemanje s stresom na delovnem mestu (Mrčela in Ignjatović 2012). V večini slovenskih organizacij se obvladovanju psihosocialnih dejavnikov tveganja in upravljanju poklicnega stresa posveča premalo pozornosti, zaposlenim tudi primanjkuje ustreznih informacij o prepoznavanju in preprečevanju negativnih posledic stresa na delovnem mestu. Kralj in kolegi (2011) ugotavljajo, da se več kot polovica zaposlenih o problemih na delovnem mestu ne pogovarja s svojimi nadrejenimi, ker so v preteklosti že naleteli na nerazumevanje s strani vodstva ali ker menijo, da pogovor z njimi ne bo rešil njihovih težav s stresom na delovnem mestu. Prav tako so prepričani, da večino podjetij zanima le doseganje dobrih poslovnih rezultatov, medtem ko jih dobro počutje in zadovoljstvo zaposlenih na delovnem mestu ne zanima. Zaposleni se spoprijemanja s stresom na delovnem mestu še vedno lotevajo individualno, tako da nasvete in pomoč največkrat poiščejo v neformalnih okoljih oz. se obrnejo na družinske člane in prijatelje – kljub temu da večina zaposlenih ve, kje lahko dobijo strokovno pomoč, ki pa je sicer v večji meri namenjena le obravnavi individuov, in ne širšemu družbenemu kontekstu skupine (Kralj in dr. 2011).

Namen članka je obravnavati stres na delovnem mestu ter polja diskurzivnih pogojev in možnosti, ki uveljavljajo specifične načine pojmovanja stresa in prakse v povezavi z njim. Kritično bomo presojali prevladujoč diskurz individualizacije stresa ter ocenjevali diskurzivne pogoje in možnosti, povezane (1) z idejami o ukrepih, s katerimi naj bi delovne organizacije prispevale k izboljševanju delovnih pogojev in zmanjševanju stresa zaposlenih na delovnem mestu, in (2) s povezovanjem zaposlenih v delovne skupine/skupnosti, ki vzpostavljajo kolektivno refleksijo ter občutenje in izražanje (stresnih) emocij. V članku naj-

prej opozarjamo na naraščanje poklicnega stresa v postindustrijskih zahodnih družbah, predstavimo njegove opredelitve in diskurz individualizacije stresa. V nadaljevanju orišemo predloge za uvajanje posebnih ukrepov, ki so usmerjeni na identificirane dejavnike stresa oz. vodijo celovito politiko v zvezi s stresom na delovnem mestu. Posebej pa nas bo zanimala konceptualizacija upravljanja stresnih emocij na skupinski ravni, ki lahko potencialno vodi do novih oblik vednosti in izkustev, povečuje možnosti sodelovanja in solidarnosti med zaposlenimi ter vzpostavlja situacije, ki – za razliko od upravljanja stresa in stresnih emocij na individualni ravni, kjer vsak_a zaposleni_a opravlja svojo nalogo sam(otno), ali formaliziranega nadzora organizacij – lahko vsebujejo organizacijsko- ali družbenotransformativni potencial.

2 Trend naraščanja poklicnega stresa in diskurza individualizacije stresa

V primerjavi z obdobjem pred desetimi leti beležimo trend hitrega povečevanja stresa in izgorelosti na delovnem mestu, saj delavci stres postavljajo že na prvo mesto tveganj za njihovo varnost in zdravje pri delu (Podjed 2014b: 13). Tudi primerjalni podatki Evropske agencije za varnost in zdravje pri delu (EU-OSHA) med letoma 2002 in 2019 kažejo trend povečevanja stresa na delovnem mestu, saj je pred sedemnajstimi leti v Evropski uniji zaradi stresa trpel vsak četrti delavec, medtem ko danes že približno polovica evropskih delavcev ocenjuje, da pogosto doživljajo stres na delovnem mestu (EU-OSHA 2019). Po podatkih raziskave Eurostat je doživljanje stresa na delovnem mestu najpogostejša težava, s katero se sooča 27 % zaposlenih v Evropski uniji, poleg tega kar 53 % zaposlenih meni, da stres na delovnem mestu pomeni največje tveganje za njihovo zdravje in varnost (Evropska komisija 2014). V Sloveniji smo glede dojetanja stresa na delovnem mestu pri vrhu Evropske unije, saj kar 45,6 % zaposlenih meni, da je njihovo zdravje ogroženo zaradi dela (primerjalni podatki z Evropo so 28,6 %). Slovenski delavci kot najpogostejši razlog za ogrožanje njihovega zdravja s 37,7 % navajajo stres, kar nas uvršča na drugo mesto v Evropi, takoj za Grčijo (Podjed 2014b: 13). Posebni modul Pete evropske raziskave o delovnih razmerah za Slovenijo iz leta 2010 je pokazal, da 78,9 % slovenskih delavcev doživlja stres na delovnem mestu, več kot 40 % pa jih občuti splošno utrujenost. Rezultati kažejo, da kar tretjina anketirancev poroča, da imajo več dela, kot ga zmorejo opraviti (Mrčela in Ignjatović 2012: 17-23). Po kazalcih intenzivnosti dela smo Slovenci na tretjem mestu v Evropi, saj skoraj 80 % zaposlenih doživlja stres na delovnem mestu, ker imajo več dela, kot ga zmorejo opraviti, in ker delajo pod velikimi pritiski (Mrčela 2010; Podjed

2014b). Leta 2012 je v Sloveniji potekala raziskava med odraslimi CINDI (od 25 do 64 let), v kateri je približno 26 % vprašanih odgovorilo, da zelo pogosto oz. vsakodnevno doživljajo stres. Najpogostejši razlogi za doživljanje stresa so po mnenju anketirancev delovna preobremenitev, slabi odnosi s sodelavci in neustrezno delovno okolje. Težave z obvladovanjem stresa ima po podatkih raziskave 4 % vprašanih, približno 26 % jih zelo pogosto doživlja stres in ima hkrati težave z njegovim obvladovanjem (Jeriček Klanšček in Bajt 2015: 30).

V okviru teorije stresa je stres opredeljen kot neskladje med ocenjevanjem visokih zahtev na eni strani in ocenjevanjem sposobnosti za obvladovanje teh zahtev na drugi strani (Lazarus 1976). Razmerje med enim in drugim vpliva na raven stresa, hkrati pa sproža tudi različne fiziološke, emocionalne in vedenjske odzive (Dernovšek in dr. 2006). V literaturi obstaja veliko različnih definicij stresa, saj »nekateri s pojmom stres označujejo eksterne faktorje, ki delujejo na strukturo in/ali funkcioniranje organizma, drugim stres pomeni odziv živega organizma na omenjene dražljaje, spet drugi kot stres označujejo samo posledice oziroma učinke škodljivih dražljajev« (Kralj in dr. 2011: 10). Osnovna predpostavka teorij stresa je, da »individui reagira na neko hitro nastalo spremembo v okolju, ki pomeni porušenje dotedanjšega ravnotežja, kar vodi do posebne 'stresne reakcije individua' (npr. razburjenje, odpor, izčrpanost)« (Ule 1993: 129). Prevalenca definicij stresa bazira na individualističnih predpostavkah, da je stres »individualno doživetje oz. da ima vsaka oseba svoje psihične in fizične stresorje, na katere se kvalitativno in kvantitativno odziva« (Kralj in dr. 2011: 10). Stres je torej generalno definiran le na individualni ravni kot »fiziološki, psihološki in vedenjski odgovor individua, ki se poskuša prilagoditi in privaditi notranjim in zunanjim dražljajem (stresorjem), ter popolnoma naraven telesni odziv, ki se pojavi, kadar individui oceni, da je ogrožen« (Bajt in dr. 2015: 16).

Stres se kot »problem individua« še posebej izpostavlja v teorijah organizacijskega vedenja (ang. *organizational behavior theory*), ki poudarjajo, da morajo zaposleni na individualni ravni najti učinkovite načine oz. strategije spoprijemanja s stresom, ker naj bi bili izključno sami odgovorni za nadzorovanje, upravljanje ali izogibanje stresu (Meyerson 1998: 103–108). Takšen diskurz individualizacije stresa v foucaultovskem smislu proizvaja (oblastne) učinke, poleg vednosti, ki stres na delovnem mestu obravnava kot individualni problem, posreduje tudi določene tehnike, načine spopadanja oz. upravljanja z njim, prek katerih se zaposleni konstituirajo kot samonadzorujoča in poslušna telesa, ki služijo instrumentalnim ciljem organizacije – biti morajo aktivni, se sami dobro organizirati in se znati hitro prilagajati na spremembe, če se želijo uspešno spoprijemati s stresom na delovnem mestu (Beck in Beck-Gernsheim 1996, 2002; Bauman 2002). Po Baumanu (2002: 13) individui sčasoma internalizirajo stališča »individuali-

zirane, sprivatizirane različice tekoče moderne«, ki odgovornost za neuspeh pripisuje individuom, saj naj bi bili njihovi lastni »ravnodušnost in brezbržnost« krivi za nedoseganje zahtevanih rezultatov (prav tam: 50).¹ Koristnost takšnih diskurzivnih oblastnih učinkov se kaže v minimiziranju možnosti, da bi zaposleni, po Newtonu in dr. (1995: 72–73), kolektivno sprevideli, da prav delodajalci z vedno bolj zahtevnimi delovnimi pogoji ustvarjajo stresno okolje in zaposlene, ki doživljajo vedno več stresa na delovnem mestu. Individualizacija in konstrukcija stresa kot individualnega izkustva slabita potencial, ki bi ga prineslo povezovanje in združevanje zaposlenih v širše socialne enote, kajti družbena naravnost, emocionalna participacija in skupinsko upravljanje stresnihemocij bi lahko spodbudili kolektivno (kritično) refleksijo organizacijskih stresorjev (Ule 1993; Bajt in dr. 2015), kot so visoka pričakovanja, naraščajoče delovne zahteve, negotova zaposlitev in različni pritiski po doseganju čim boljših rezultatov. Rener (2007: 45) opozarja, da se »tveganja dojemajo individualno kot posamične krize in primanjkljaji«, zato individualizacija pomeni, da se »situacije, ki bi nekoč klicale po kolektivni in politični akciji, zdaj razlagajo kot nesrečne zgodbe tega ali onega, ki jih lahko reši le ta ali oni na individualni ravni z osebnim delovanjem«. Po Rener (2007: 40) individualizacija in osebne izbire vodijo do vse bolj obsesivnega ukvarjanja s samim seboj, kar minimizira »sodelovanje in solidarnost med ljudmi«. Tudi Bauman (2002: 45) opozarja, da ni veliko možnosti, da bi se lahko izognili individualizaciji in odklonili sodelovanje v igri individualiziranja ter da ima »druženje z drugimi trpečimi le to prednost, da vsakogar prepriča, da je samostojen boj s težavami nekaj, kar vsi drugi počnejo vsak dan« in da »od skupnosti dobimo le nasvet, kako preživeti v lastni brezupni osamljenosti« (prav tam: 47).

Delovne organizacije prek diskurza individualizacije stresa in omejevanja izražanja stresnihemocij določajo norme racionaliziranja, potlačevanja in prikrivanja stresnihemocij, konformnost z normami pa pri zaposlenih povzroči, da ne razvijejo skupne emocionalnosti oz. se je ne zavedajo in da ohranjajo profesionalnost na delovnem mestu (Newton in dr. 1995). Zaposlenim svetujejo, naj si poiščejo ustrezne individualne dejavnosti za upravljanje stresa, kot so svetovanje, joga in dihalne vaje (Styhre in dr. 2002: 88), vendar zaposleni sami

1. Bauman (2002: 88) poudarja, da individui krivijo lastno nezmožnost in nesposobnost uspešnega reševanja problemov, zato ob tem čutijo krivdo v smislu »saj že vem, da je odvisno od mene in samo od mene, da naredim (in še naprej delam) kar največ iz svojega življenja; in ker tudi vem, da lahko vse možne resurse, ki jih tako podjetje utegne zahtevati, iščem in najdem le v lastni spretnosti, pogumu in zagnanosti, moram vedeti, kako se tega lotevajo drugi ljudje, ki se spopadajo s podobnimi težavami«.

težko obvladajo negativne posledice stresa, saj »stresorji ne vplivajo neposredno na osebo, temveč na osebo, ki je v interakciji z drugimi osebami« (Ule 1993: 131). Na delovnem mestu je uspešno spoprijemanje s stresom zelo pomembno, saj neučinkovito obvladovanje stresa še poveča njegovo raven, zaposleni pa občutijo jezo, napetost, frustracijo, vznemirjenost, razdražljivost, tesnobo, strah, žalost, nezadovoljstvo, nemoč, obup, nemir in krivdo (Černigoj Sadar 2002; Fineman 2003; Bilban 2007; Gatchel in Kishino 2012; Bajt in dr. 2015; Šprah in Zorjan 2016; Dernovšek in dr. 2017).

3 Ukrepi organizacij za upravljanje poklicnega stresa

V ekonomskih in družbenih pogojih trenutne neoliberalne oblike kapitalizma številne delovne organizacije niso zainteresirane niti za odstranjevanje vzrokov stresa, kot so visoka intenzivnost dela, velike fizične, psihične in emocionalne obremenitve, negotove in prekarne zaposlitve, niti za iskanje učinkovitejših načinov za spopadanje s stresom na skupinski in družbeni ravni. Organizacije se izogibajo priznanju, da so odgovorne za naraščanje poklicnega stresa zaradi intenzifikacije delovnih procesov, dolgih delavnikov in nadur, slabe organizacije in vodenja dela ter pritiskov po zmanjševanju stroškov dela. Po drugi strani podatki kažejo, da stres na delovnem mestu slabo vpliva na produktivnost zaposlenih in poslabšuje splošno uspešnost organizacije, povečuje odsotnost z dela in prezentizem, povečuje število nezgod in poškodb pri delu, zvišuje fluktuacijo delavcev ter pomeni večje stroške za nacionalne zdravstvene sisteme in sisteme socialnega varstva (Eurofound 2010b; EU-OSHA 2015).

Te ugotovitve so sprožile pozive k obvladovanju psihosocialnih dejavnikov tveganja, upravljanju poklicnega stresa ter sodelovanju delodajalcev, zaposlenih in strokovnih delavcev na različnih ravneh delovanja. Evropska komisija (2004: 3–4) naslavlja delodajalce, da na primarni, sekundarni in terciarni ravni uvedejo posebne ukrepe, usmerjene na identificirane dejavnike stresa, ali pa vodijo celovito politiko v zvezi s stresom, ki vsebuje različne preventivne ukrepe ali ukrepe, usmerjene na že nastale posledice. Na primarni ravni lahko ukrepi vključujejo najboljše prakse organizacije, katerih glavni cilj je minimiziranje, modificiranje ali eliminiranje delovnih zahtev, ki negativno vplivajo na počutje in zadovoljstvo zaposlenih. Primarni preventivni pristopi tako zajemajo številne načine zmanjševanja nevarnosti pojava stresa pri delu, ki lahko vključujejo spreminjanje organizacijske kulture, kar pomeni ustvarjanje emocionalne kulture, ki spodbuja zaupanje, povezanost, sodelovanje, solidarnost ter emocionalno in socialno oporo, podpira zaposlene in prevzame aktivno vlogo pri obvladovanju poklicnega stresa ter izboljšuje dobro počutje in povečuje zadovoljstvo

zaposlenih na delovnem mestu. Na primarni ravni lahko delovne organizacije stremijo tudi k izboljšanju komunikacije in razvoju ustreznih komunikacijskih sistemov, tako da spodbujajo emocionalno konverzacijo med zaposlenimi in nadrejenimi, kajti boljša komunikacija poskrbi za večjo jasnost vloge zaposlenih, izboljša medosebne odnose in spodbuja sociabilnost med zaposlenimi (Leka in dr. 2003; Eurofound 2010b; Evropska komisija 2011; Kralj in dr. 2011; Bajt in dr. 2015; Šprah in Zorjan 2016). Na sekundarni ravni lahko delodajalci pomagajo zaposlenim pri spoprijemanju s stresom na delovnem mestu z ukrepi, ki so usmerjeni k zgodnjemu prepoznavanju psihosocialnih dejavnikov tveganja in simptomov stresa ter razvijanju veščin, sposobnosti in strategij zaposlenih za zmanjševanje, obvladovanje in upravljanje stresa. Med sekundarne preventivne pristope spadajo usposabljanje in izobraževanje zaposlenih o obvladovanju stresa, na katerih zaposleni pridobijo znanja in spretnosti, ki jim lahko pomagajo pri soočanju s psihosocialnimi dejavniki tveganja in poklicnim stresom (npr. razvijajo komunikacijske veščine, dajejo pobude, izkazujejo oporo sodelavcem) (Leka in dr. 2003; Evropska komisija 2011; Kralj in dr. 2011; Podjed 2014a; Bajt in dr. 2015; Direktorat za javno zdravje 2015; Šprah in Zorjan 2016). Tretja faza vključuje terciarne ukrepe ter vključuje skupne napore delodajalcev in zaposlenih pri odpravljanju fizičnih in mentalnih posledic psihosocialnih dejavnikov tveganja in poklicnega stresa. Neustrezno upravljanje s stresom ustvarja disfunkcionalno okolje in nefunkcionalne zaposlene, ki doživljajo velike stiske, zato je cilj terciarnih ukrepov zdravljenje in rehabilitacija zaposlenih, ki omogoča postopno vrnitev na delo z bolniškega dopusta, prilagajanje oz. reorganizacijo delovnega mesta in zagotavlja zaupno svetovanje za zaposlene (Evropska komisija 2011; Bajt in dr. 2015; Šprah in Zorjan 2016). V Sloveniji je področje obvladovanja psihosocialnih dejavnikov tveganja in upravljanja poklicnega stresa na delovnem mestu urejeno z Zakonom o varnosti in zdravju pri delu (ZVZD-1 2011), ki je prinesel številne novosti o promociji zdravja na delovnem mestu ter vključuje skupna prizadevanja za izboljšanje zdravja, dobrega počutja in večjega zadovoljstva zaposlenih s strani delodajalcev, delavcev in širše družbe, kljub temu pa v praksi ne prihaja do njegove implementacije (Direktorat za javno zdravje 2015). Bajt in kolegi (2015: 33) opozarjajo, da bi morali vodstveni delavci zaposlenim omogočiti, da izpostavijo težave, povezane s poklicnim stresom, jih spodbujati k izražanju mnenj in stališč o negativnih posledicah stresa na delovnem mestu ter jih vključiti v pripravo preventivnih ukrepov, da bi dobili nadzor nad rešitvami.

Orisani predlogi ukrepov se kažejo kot diskurzivna invencija, ki signalizira premike k spremenjenemu pojmovanju stresa in upravljanju (stresnih) emocij na delovnem mestu. Stres in stresne emocije niso več kot individualni problem izrinjeni iz organizacij (v sfero prostega časa in osebnega življenja), ampak

postajajo predmet zaskrbljenosti organizacij (prepoznavanje, imperativ obvladovanja, komuniciranje, sodelovanje, izobraževanje in usposabljanje, zaupno svetovanje, terapevtske tehnike). Ta premik ponuja možnosti za spoprijem z vzroki stresa (prepoznavanje ne le simptomov, ampak tudi psihosocialnih dejavnikov tveganja stresa, prilagajanje oz. reorganizacijo delovnega mesta), kar je pozitiven učinek, ki lahko vodi v ustvarjanje (bolj) znosnih pogojev dela, po drugi strani pa lahko – zlasti prek organiziranega svetovanja, usposabljanja, terapevtskega pristopa – vodi v nove modalitete (emocionalnega) nadzora – sedaj utemeljene na priznavanju in izražanju stresnih emocij – ter povečevanja korporativne kolonizacije (emocionalnih) subjektivitet zaposlenih. S Foucaultom (1995) se lahko vprašamo, ali predlagani ukrepi vsebujejo seme novih strategij in mehanizmov discipliniranja, ki zreducirajo zaposlene na krotka telesa, ki so politično impotentna, a ekonomsko produktivna.

4 Skupinsko upravljanje stresnih emocij

Oblikovanje skupin na delovnem mestu, ki kultivirajo skupinsko pripadnost, povezanost in sodelovanje, zaposlenim omogoča vzpostavljanje kakovostnejših odnosov, konstruktivno reševanje konfliktov in uspešnejše modificiranje nezaželenih učinkov stresnih emocij. Po Mengesu in Kilduffu (2015) delovne skupine zaradi poklicnega stresa kolektivno doživljajo skupinske stresne emocije, ki se manifestirajo kot posledica identifikacije članov s skupino, skupinskih emocionalnih norm in družbene interakcije. Prvič, bolj ko se člani identificirajo s skupino, ki ji pripadajo, bolj emocionalno se odzivajo v njenem imenu in bolj podobne emocije doživljajo (Barsade in Gibson 1998; Delvaux in dr. 2015). Drugič, skupinske emocije nastajajo tako, da člani omejuje svoje individualno emocionalno doživljanje ter dejanske emocije in njihovo izražanje podredijo skupinskim emocionalnim normam, saj članstvo v skupini narekuje določena pričakovanja glede primerne doživljanja in izražanja emocij (Barsade in Gibson 1998; Kelly in Barsade 2001). Tretjič, skupinske emocije se konstruirajo prek družbene interakcije med člani skupine, v kateri se emocije individua spreminjajo glede na odzive drugih (Barbalet 2011), zato je potrebna fizična ali virtualna prisotnost drugih članov skupine, ki v odnosu do stimulansa izzove poenotenje emocij (Menges in Kilduff 2015: 851). Skupinske emocije v stresnih situacijah pomagajo usklajevati kolektivna prizadevanja za doseganje skupnih ciljev in reševati morebitne težave, signalizirati stopnjo, do katere je določeno ravnanje zaželeno glede na prevladujoče skupinske emocionalne norme, ter opredeljevati vloge in odgovornosti članov v skupini in se o njih pogajati (Barsade in Gibson 1998; van Kleef in Fischer 2015).

Zaposleni vzpostavijo in razvijajo skupinsko emocionalno kulturo, ki spodbuja skupinsko pripadnost, zaupanje, povezanost, sodelovanje in solidarnost, zagotavlja občutek varnosti in socialne opore, omogoča medsebojno pomoč ter skupno reševanje konfliktov in problemov zaradi poklicnega stresa. Barsade in O'Neill (2016: 58) sta skupinsko emocionalno kulturo opredelili kot »niz emocionalnih vrednot, norm, artefaktov in pričakovanj, ki vplivajo na to, katere emocije zaposleni doživljajo in kako jih izražajo na delovnem mestu«. Avtorici dodajata, da močna skupinska emocionalna kultura na člane skupine vpliva tako, da skupinskim emocionalnim normam ter pravilom čustvovanja in izražanja sledijo predvsem zato, da so sprejeti s strani preostalih članov skupine. Delovne skupine lahko na podlagi skupinske emocionalne kulture upravljajo stresne emocije s pomočjo skupinskih emocionalnih norm, strategij, ritualov in rutin ter kulturnih artefaktov. Skupinske emocionalne norme služijo kot orientacija za člane skupine, kako naj interpretirajo svoje emocije in emocije drugih članov skupine ter kako naj omejujejo individualno emocionalno doživljanje članov skupine (Barsade in Gibson 1998; Kelly in Barsade 2001; Collins 2004; Tiedens in dr. 2004; Ashkanasy in Humphrey 2011; Menges in Kilduff 2015). Stresne emocije lahko delovne skupine upravljajo tudi s skupinskimi emocionalnimi strategijami, kot so pogovor o zasebnih in službenih stvareh, emocionalna in socialna opora, medsebojna pomoč, takojšnje reševanje problemov in konfliktov ter izogibanje konfliktom. V delovnih skupinah člani dobijo nasvete od sodelavcev, situacijo vidijo na drugačen način in se lažje soočajo z negativnimiemocijami na delovnem mestu. Člani hitro rešujejo probleme in konflikte, kadar želijo ohraniti dobre medosebne odnose, se bolje počutiti na delovnem mestu ter svoje delo opravljati učinkoviteje in bolj usklajeno (Gross in John 2003; Stets in Turner 2010). Skupine razvijejo in uporabljajo tudi skupinske rituale in rutine ter kulturne artefakte, s katerimi upravljajo stresne emocije. Med najpogostejše skupinske rituale spadajo specifični način pozdravljanja, skupno druženje, obedovanje, praznovanje posebnih dogodkov, pripovedovanje zgodb in šal, skupinsko vzklikanje, navijanje, petje in plesanje (Länsisalmi in dr. 2000; Rimé 2007; Menges in Kilduff 2015); najpogostejše skupinske rutine pa so skupni sestanki, odmori in malice ter druženje po službi. Pri upravljanju stresnih emocij lahko delovne skupine uporabljajo tudi različne kulturne artefakte, ki so zaznavni, neverbalni vidiki skupinske emocionalne kulture ter vključujejo fizične prostore in objekte, opremo, dekor, različna umetniška dela in oglasne table (Rimé 2007; Barsade in O'Neill 2014, 2016; Menges in Kilduff 2015).

Obstoj delovnih skupin, ki se usmerjajo glede na neformalne ter implicitne vedenjske in emocionalne standarde, kaže na možen odmik od formaliziranega nadzora organizacij. V okviru širše skupine postane stres skrb na ravni skupnosti.

Slednja nudi članom socialno in emocionalno oporo ter skupinske interpretacijske sheme za razumevanje vzrokov stresa in neprijetnih emocij, ki jih doživljajo. Namesto diskurza o stresu kot o problemu individua je stres rekonstruiran kot družbeno izkustvo (Meyerson 1998: 114), ki nosi političen potencial za spremembe delovnih razmer.

5 Sklep

V članku nas je zanimalo, na kakšen način diskurz individualizacije stresa znotraj delovnih organizacij vpliva na upravljanje stresa zaposlenih. Ugotovili smo, da je vpliv negativen, saj individui za neuspešno reševanje problemov krivijo sebe, zato se trudijo rešitev poiskati na individualni ravni z osebnim delovanjem. Čeprav ni mogoče v celoti ubežati dominantnemu diskurzu o stresu, pa je mogoč odpor v obliki rekonceptualizacije razumevanja stresa. Premike je mogoče zaznati v idejah, da se zaposleni na eni strani naučijo ustreznega čustvovanja in učinkovitega upravljanja stresnih emocij na delovnem mestu (Bajt in dr. 2015; Dernovšek in dr. 2017); na drugi strani pa naj bi delovne organizacije legitimirale emocionalnost znotraj delovnega konteksta z vzpostavljanjem organizacijske kulture, ki bi eksplicitno spodbujala svobodno izražanje emocij med zaposlenimi (ustvarjanje varnega okolja, ki spodbuja zaupanje in povezanost med sodelavci), ustvarjala primerne pogoje za vzpostavitev emocionalne in socialne opore (podporne skupine), spodbujala emocionalno konverzacijo ter zmanjševala konflikte in napetosti med zaposlenimi (Lazarus in Cohen-Charash 2001; Fineman 2003). Pomembne so tudi spodbude, da bi delovne organizacije na evropski in nacionalni ravni morale večjo pozornost namenjati različnim ukrepom za obvladovanje psihosocialnih dejavnikov tveganja in upravljanja poklicnega stresa, njihovi programi pa bi morali temeljiti predvsem na »preventivnih, sistematskih in participativnih intervencijah, saj je zmanjševanje psihosocialnih tveganj na delovnih mestih učinkovito zgolj v primeru združevanja individualne in organizacijske ravni« (Kralj in dr. 2011: 117). Predlagani ukrepi kažejo, da postaja vprašanje vzrokov poklicnega stresa legitimno. Ugotavljamo, da poklicni stres in upravljanje stresnih emocij niso (več) izmejeni – kot individualni problem – iz sfere instrumentalnega delovanja organizacij in umeščeni v osebno življenje zaposlenih. S tem ko postajajo predmet menedžiranja organizacij, pa postanejo (stresne) emocije po drugi strani vse bolj projekt, ki ga je treba razviti in upravljati.

Potencial odpora zoper dominanten diskurz se kaže tudi v delovnih skupinah znotraj organizacij, ki so v literaturi opredeljene kot prostori skupinskega upravljanja stresnih emocij. Zaposleni, povezani v širše skupine, v katerih se

prepletajo »medsebojna odvisnost, odvisnost in neodvisnost« (Meyerson 1998: 114), so zmožni oblikovati in deliti kolektivni pogled na poklicni stres ter znotraj drugačnega diskurza postavljati (nova) vprašanja o naravi dela in delovnih razmerah, zahtevah delovnega mesta, obstoječih strukturah in razmerjih moči znotraj organizacij, zdravju zaposlenih ter uveljavljati drugačne prakse upravljanja s stresnimiemocijami. Delovne skupine nudijo skrb za drugega ter prek konstruiranja alternativnih podob poklicnega stresa presegajo individualistično in s tem tudi apolitično perspektivo dominantnega diskurza. Širše družbene skupine, v katerih si člani nudijo oporo in pomoč ter razvijajo solidarnost, bi lahko bile zgled drugim zaposlenim in spodbudile povezovanje med različnimi skupinami, ki bi lahko izvajale pritiske na delovne organizacije, da na sistemski ravni v celoti implementirajo obstoječe zakone, izboljšajo delovne pogoje in zmanjšajo stres na delovnem mestu.

Za zaključek moramo poudariti, da je kompleksen problem poklicnega stresa treba reševati ne le z vzpostavljanjem organizacijske kulture, ki bi slonela na izražanju stresnihemocij, emocionalni in socialni opori, skupnem reševanju problemov in konfliktov ter izboljševanju komunikacije med zaposlenimi, ampak predvsem na strukturni ravni, kar pomeni, da bi morale delovne organizacije s podporo družbenih, političnih in ekonomskih akterjev ustvarjati več delovnih mest, omogočati varnejše in dolgoročneje zaposlitve, zmanjšati intenzivnost dela, z boljšo organizacijo dela razbremeniti delavce in ustvariti bolj spodbudno delovno okolje, v katerem bi se zmanjšal stres na delovnem mestu, kar bi na dolgi rok pozitivno vplivalo na počutje in zadovoljstvo zaposlenih na delovnem mestu.

SUMMARY

In the modern business world, due to the increasing demands for the best business results, the number of employees who are facing work-related stress, which implies "the requirements of the working environment extend their ability to cope with or control stress" is rapidly increasing (Šprah and Zorjan 2016: 9). Employees feel more work-related stress because of new types of jobs, new forms of employment and overwork, high intensity of work and workload, large emotional burdens at work, poor interpersonal relationships, and bad organization and management of work (Kralj et al. 2011; Eurofound 2015; Šprah and Zorjan 2016; Zorjan et al. 2016). European and Slovenian executive managers are aware that the level of experiencing stress among employees is constantly increasing, nonetheless only 26% of European organizations and less than 20% of Slovenian organizations have put in place procedures for coping with stress in the workplace (Mrčela and Ignjatović 2012). In the historical perspective, the

discourse of individualisation can be attributed to the development of an individualised late modern society. This implies that individuals have to depend only on their competences and ingenuity, since the trend of individuality weakens the central position of collective identities that lose their significant characteristics both in terms of self-awareness and in relation to other groups (Beck and Beck-Gernsheim 1996, 2002). The responsibility for coping with work-related stress is put largely on employees themselves who have to deal with their own problems of experiencing stress at work (Fineman 2003). Organizations through managerial discourses of individualisation put the responsibility for solving professional stress on employees (as individuals) who are encouraged to solve their own problems. However, the employees themselves have difficulty mastering the negative effects of stress, since "stressors do not directly affect the person, but the person who interacts with other people" (Ule 1993: 131). The aim of the article is to address work-related stress, the field of discursive conditions and opportunities that apply specific ways of perceiving stress and practice in connection with it. In the article, we draw attention to the growth of professional stress in post-industrial Western societies, present its definitions and the discourse of the individualisation of stress. We discuss group management of stressful emotions, which can enhance the possibilities of cooperation and solidarity among employees. Employees should be more aware of group emotions in the workplace and collectively manage them and more effectively deal with stress at a group level. Within the group's members experience group emotions and their manifestation is mainly due to the identification of members with the group, group emotional norms and social interaction (Menges and Kilduff 2015). Group emotional culture offers group members social support and safety, and resources to develop and use group emotional norms, strategies, rituals, routines and cultural artefacts in order to effectively managing stress emotions in the workplace. The article also focuses on the fact that work organizations should consider work-related stress as an organizational problem and provide the necessary mechanisms for coping with stress on the primary, secondary and tertiary level. Employees should be involved in the process of assessing psychosocial risk factors, and planning and implementing preventive measures, because for the successful management of stress stimulating work environment and constant communication between employees and their superiors is extremely important. We propose that the problem of work-related stress should also be managed on a structural level. That means organizations should work closely together with social, political and economic influencers and create more jobs, enable more secure employment, reduce work intensity and create a more stimulating work environment, which would decrease stress levels and have a positive impact on the well-being and satisfaction of employees.

Literatura

- Ashkanasy, Neal M., in Humphrey, Ronald H. (2011): Current emotion research in organizational behavior. *Emotion Review*, 3 (2): 214–224.
- Bajt, Maja, in dr. (2015): Duševno zdravje na delovnem mestu. Ljubljana: Nacionalni inštitut za javno zdravje.
- Barbalet, Jack M. (2011): Emotions beyond regulation: Backgrounded emotions in science and trust. *Emotion Review*, 3 (1): 36–43.
- Barsade, Sigal G., in Gibson, Donald E. (1998): Group emotion: A view from top and bottom. *Research on Managing Groups and Teams*, 1 (4): 81–102.
- Barsade, Sigal G., in O'Neill, Olivia A. (2014): What's love got to do with it? A longitudinal study of the culture of companionate love and employee and client outcomes in a long-term care setting. *Administrative Science Quarterly*, 59 (4): 551–598.
- Barsade, Sigal G., in O'Neill, Olivia A. (2016): Manage your emotional culture. *Harvard Business Review*, 94 (1): 58–66.
- Bauman, Zygmunt (2002): *Tekoča moderna*. Ljubljana: Založba /* cf.
- Beck, Ulrich, in Beck-Gernsheim, Elisabeth (1996): Individualizacija in »tveganje svobode«: perspektive in nasprotja k subjektu usmerjene sociologije – prevod. *Teorija in praksa*, 33 (5): 817–838.
- Beck, Ulrich, in Beck-Gernsheim, Elisabeth (2002): *Individualization. Institutionalized individualism and its social and political consequences*. London: Sage Publications.
- Bilban, Marjan (2007): Kako prepoznati stres v delovnem okolju. *Delo in varnost*, 52: 30–35.
- Collins, Randall (2004): *Interaction ritual chains*. New Jersey: Princeton University Press.
- Černigoj Sadar, Nevenka (2002): Stres na delovnem mestu. *Teorija in praksa*, 39 (1): 81–102.
- Delvaux, Ellen, in dr. (2015): Dynamic interplay between norms and experiences of anger and gratitude in groups. *Small Group Research*, 46 (3): 300–323.
- Dernovšek, Mojca Zvezdana, in dr. (2006): Ko te stresa stres: Kako prepoznati in zdraviti stresne, anksiozne in depresivne motnje. Ljubljana: Inštitut za varovanje zdravja Republike Slovenije.
- Dernovšek, Mojca Zvezdana, in dr. (2017): *Spoprijemanje s stresom – Priročnik za udeležence delavnice*. Ljubljana: Nacionalni inštitut za javno zdravje.
- Direktorat za javno zdravje (2015): *Smernice za promocijo zdravja na delovnem mestu*. Dostopno prek: <http://www.varstvo-pri-delu.eu/files/Smernica%20promocija%20zdravja%20na%20delovnem%20mestu.pdf> (10. 3. 2019).
- Eurofound (2010a): *Stres, povezan z delom – Povzetek*. Dostopno prek: <https://www.eurofound.europa.eu/sr/publications/report/2010/work-related-stress> (9. 3. 2019).
- Eurofound (2010b): *Work-related stress*. Dostopno prek: <https://www.eurofound.europa.eu/publications/report/2010/work-related-stress> (9. 3. 2019).

- Eurofound (2015): Prve ugotovitve: Šesta evropska raziskava o delovnih razmerah. Dostopno prek: <https://www.eurofound.europa.eu/publications/report/2010/work-related-stress> (9. 3. 2019).
- EU-OSHA (2015): Obvladajmo stres. Priznanja za dobro prakso Zdravo delovno okolje 2014–2015. Luxembourg: Urad za publikacije Evropske unije.
- EU-OSHA (2019): Psihosocialna tveganja in stres na delovnem mestu. Dostopno prek: <https://osha.europa.eu/sl/themes/psychosocial-risks-and-stress> (11. 3. 2019).
- Evropska komisija (2004): Stres v zvezi z delom. Dostopno prek: <http://www.osha.mddsz.gov.si/resources/files/pdf/Uradni%20prevod%2023%20apr%202008%20ESS%20-%20samo%20v%20slo.pdf> (11. 3. 2019).
- Evropska komisija (2011): Priročnik za preprečevanje stresa. Dostopno prek: http://web.spi.pt/stressless/docs/update/SL/Preprecevanje%20stresa%20Prirocnik_Modeli%20in%20Dobre%20prakse_Skrajšana%20verzija%20SI%201.pdf (11. 3. 2019).
- Evropska komisija (2014): Flash Eurobarometer 398 on Working conditions, summary. Dostopno prek: http://ec.europa.eu/public_opinion/flash/fl_398_en.pdf (10. 3. 2019).
- Fineman, Stephen (2003): Understanding emotion at work. New York: Sage.
- Foucault, Michel (1995): Discipline and punish: The birth of the prison. New York: Vintage Books.
- Gatchel, Robert J., in Kishino, Nancy (2012): Conceptual approaches to occupational health and wellness: An overview. V R. Gatchel in I. Schultz (ur.): Handbook of Occupational Health and Wellness: 3–21. New York: Springer.
- Gross, James J., in John, Oliver P. (2003): Individual differences in two emotion regulation processes: Implications for affect, relationships, and well-being. *Journal of Personality and Social Psychology*, 85 (2): 348–362.
- Jeriček Klanšček, Helena, in Bajt, Maja (2015): Stres, depresija, izgorelost in promocija zdravja na delovnem mestu. *Delo in varnost*, 6: 27–34.
- Kelly, Janice R., in Barsade, Sigal G. (2001): Mood and emotions in small groups and work teams. *Organizational Behavior and Human Decision Processes*, 86 (1): 99–130.
- Kralj, Ana, in dr. (2011): Analiza stanja psihosocialnih tveganj na delovnih mestih v mikro, malih in srednje velikih podjetjih. Univerza na Primorskem: Znanstveno-raziskovalno središče Koper.
- Länsisalmi, Hannakaisa, in dr. (2000): Collective stress and coping in the context of organizational culture. *European Journal of Work and Organizational Psychology*, 9 (4): 527–559.
- Lazarus, Richard S. (1976): Patterns of adjustments. New York: McGraw-Hill.
- Lazarus, Richard S., in Cohen-Charash, Yochi (2001): Discrete emotions in organizational life. V R. Payne in C. Cooper (ur.): *Emotions at Work: Theory, Research and Applications for Management*: 45–81. Chichester: John Wiley.
- Leka, Stavroula, in dr. (2003): Work organisation and stress: Systematic problem approaches for employers, managers and trade union representatives. Nottingham: Institute of work, health and organisations.

- Menges, Jochen I., in Kilduff, Martin (2015): Group emotions: Cutting the Gordian knots concerning terms, levels of analysis, and processes. *Academy of Management Annals*, 9 (1): 845–928.
- Meyerson, Debra E. (1998): Feeling stressed and burned out: A feminist reading and re-visioning of stress-based emotions within medicine and organization science. *Organization Science*, 9 (1): 103–118.
- Mrčela, Mirko (2010): EWCO comparative analytical report on work-related stress. Dostopno prek: <https://www.eurofound.europa.eu/observatories/eurwork/comparative-information/national-contributions/slovenia/slovenia-ewco-comparative-analytical-report-on-work-related-stress> (10. 3. 2019).
- Mrčela Kanjuo, Aleksandra, in Ignjatovič, Miroљjub (2012): Poročilo o psihosocialnih tveganjih na delovnem mestu v Sloveniji. Dostopno prek: https://www.stat.si/StatWeb/doc/sosvet/Sosvet_03/Sos03_s1844-2013.pdf (10. 3. 2019).
- Newton, Tim, in dr. (1995): *Managing stress: Emotion and power at work*. London: Sage.
- Podjed, Klemen (2014a): Obvladovanje stresa med službenim časom. *Delo in varnost*, 59 (5): 40–42.
- Podjed, Klemen (2014b): Proaktivni pristop k promociji zdravja na delovnem mestu. *Ekonomski demokracija*, 18 (4): 13–16.
- Renner, Tanja (2007): Globalizacija, individualizacija in socialna izključenost mladih. *IB Revija*, 2: 40–49.
- Rimé, Bernard (2007): The social sharing of emotion as an interface between individual and collective processes in the construction of emotional climates. *Journal of Social Issues*, 63 (2): 307–322.
- Stets, Jan E., in Turner, Jonathan H. (2010): The sociology of emotions. V M. Lewis, J. Haviland-Jones in B. Feldman (ur.): *Handbook of emotions*: 32–46. New York: Guilford Press.
- Styhre, Alexander, in dr. (2002): Emotional management and stress: Managing ambiguities. *Organization Studies*, 23 (1): 83–103.
- Šprah, Lilijana, in Zorjan, Saša (2016): *Priročnik za obvladovanje psihosocialnih tveganj in absentizma s pomočjo orodja e-Opsa*. Ljubljana: Založba ZRC.
- Thunman, Elin (2015): Managing stress: A matter of proactivity or trust? A thematic study of female-and male-dominated Swedish work settings. *Qualitative Research in Organizations and Management: An International Journal*, 10 (2): 134–152.
- Tiedens, Larissa Z., in dr. (2004): Emotional variation in work groups. V L. Tiedens in C. Leach (ur.): *The Social Life of Emotions*: 164–186. New York: Cambridge University Press.
- Ule, Mirjana (1993): *Psihologija vsakdanjega življenja*. Ljubljana: Znanstveno in publicistično središče.
- Ule, Mirjana, in Kuhar, Metka (2003): *Mladi, družina, starševstvo. Spremembe življenjskih potekov v pozni moderni*. Ljubljana: Fakulteta za družbene vede.
- van Kleef, Gerben A., in Fischer, Agneta H. (2015): Emotional collectives: How groups shape emotions and emotions shape groups. *Cognition and Emotion*, 30 (1): 3–19.

Zakon o varnosti in zdravju pri delu – ZVZD-1 (2011): Sprejet v Državnem zboru Republike Slovenije, v veljavi od 4. 12. 2011. Dostopno prek: <https://www.uradni-list.si/glasilo-uradni-list-rs/vsebina/103969> (9. 3. 2019).

Zorjan, Saša, in dr. (2016): Priročnik za obvladovanje psihosocialnih tveganj in absenzizma s pomočjo orodja e-OPSA. Ljubljana: ZRC SAZU.

Podatki o avtoricah

Jerca Pavlič, doktorska kandidatka sociologije
na Fakulteti za družbene vede, UL
e-mail: pavlic.jerca@gmail.com
tel.: 031 874 350

izr. prof. dr. Zdenka Šadl
Center za proučevanje družbene blaginje
Fakulteta za družbene vede, UL
e-mail: zdenka.sadl@fdv.uni-lj.si

Shulamith Gertel Groome¹, Marjan Hočevár²

LAND AS AN INDICATOR FOR NATIONAL RESOURCE BASED POLICY ISSUES: THE CASE OF SPATIAL RESOURCE DISTRIBUTIONS IN ISRAEL

ABSTRACT

This interdisciplinary geo-spatial overview represents a conceptual foundation for policy research concerning allocations of public commodities as represented by land (settlement) resources. Principles of collective vs. individual rights to benefit from these may pose moral dilemmas for decision-makers. Such a conflict of interests could prompt 'ambiguous' governing decisions that lack clear directives for implementation. The resulting policies might support declarations of multicultural inclusivity while embracing exclusive ethnic communities. A case in point is the Israeli spatial policy on Arab and Ultra-Orthodox minority groups, analysed using primary and secondary sources and statistical data relating to political affiliations, income, housing costs and locational preferences. If land is an adequate indicator of ambiguous resource-based issues, further analyses should define how socio-spatial distributions are decided and at which particular stages of the policy process.

KEY WORDS: *spatial inequality, socio-spatial control, spatial policy, land distribution, spatial resource*

-
1. First author
 2. Leading author

Zemljišče kot kazalnik nacionalnih politik do (naravnih) virov: primer distribucije prostorskih virov v Izraelu

IZVLEČEK

Ta interdisciplinarni geografsko-prostorski pregled predstavlja konceptualno podlago za raziskovanje politik dodeljevanja naravnih dobrin na primeru poselitvenih (prostorskih) virov. Načela kolektivnih nasproti individualnim pravicam do teh virov lahko postavljajo moralne dileme za tiste, ki o tem odločajo. Takšen konflikt interesov lahko spodbuja »dvoumno« odločanje, če ni jasnih smernic za izvajanje distributivnih politik, ki bi bile usposobljene za izvajanje podpor večkulturne vključljivosti etnično izključujočim skupinam. Obravnavan je primer izraelske poselitvene (prostorske) politike glede arabskih in ultraortodoksnih manjšinskih skupin. Analiza je podprta z uporabo primarnih in sekundarnih virov ter statističnih podatkov o politični pripadnosti, dohodku, stanovanjskih stroških in lokacijskih preferencah. Če je zemljišče primeren kazalnik za sicer politično dvoumno zastavljene družbeno-prostorske dileme o naravi virov, bi morale nadaljnje procesualne analize politik pokazati, kako in na katerih stopnjah se sprejemajo odločitve o distribuciji zemljiških (prostorskih) virov.

KLJUČNE BESEDE: prostorska neenakost, družbeno-prostorski nadzor, prostorska politika, prostorski vir

1 Introduction

In social democratic government systems, the finance or provision of public services may be expected to enjoy wide based public support (Jones et al. 2011: 5–16); e.g. targeted funding in favor of schools in socioeconomically deprived areas. Conversely, non-consensus is likely to arise concerning allocations of public commodity resources, such as land rights, to specific cultural, ethnic or minority groups (Zicherman 2016). Historical and symbolic events, regional demographic balance and the safeguard of cultural identity and heritage are cited in support of this practice. Personal liberty is cast as a human right to choose particular ideological, religious or cultural lifestyles expressed as identities within closed communities in geographical space (Kymlicka 1996; UNDP 2004 UNDRIP 2007; UNHCR 2014).³ If land is a commodity and a limited natural resource,

3. The right of self-determination regarding lands, resources and territories, social and economic rights, and non-discrimination are enshrined by UN policy. The 2004 UNDP

distribution of collectively claimed public lands means taking them from an entire state citizenry or national public and redistributing them to select beneficiaries (Portugali 1980).⁴ Actions in this realm, including free market initiatives, may benefit some exclusive populations, powerful lobbies or institutions over others, and are a noted source of conflict in terms of defining the public interest (Oliver 1991; Powell and DiMaggio 1991). Conflict can also be rooted in questions of social ethics, ideologies, and emotions, which are likely reflected by the wide range of potential policy beneficiaries. Analysis of sources relating to the case of land allocations for large minority Arab and Jewish Ultra-Orthodox (Haredi) populations in Israel should help illustrate how land, or more general spatial issues, might represent areas of policy conflict. Israeli national policy decisions regarding practical spatial dispersion issues may accommodate elements of political and ideological ambiguity generically inherent to circumstances of public resource distribution. Specific instances of land allocation should be considered indications for central theoretical and conceptual aspects of policy analysis.⁵

While public policy is influenced by government agents, institutional determinants and dominant social value systems (Gertel and Alterman 1994), various lobbies and interest groups may bring ethnic, cultural, social or economic pressures to bear on policy-makers. Political decisions that draw conflicting views on allocations of public resources can be ambiguous, lacking guidelines for implementation (Hupe and Hill 2016). Richard Matland's *Ambiguity/Conflict Matrix* (1995) establishes "conflict" as conducive to "ambiguity", vaguery or

Report views cultural liberty as a human right, stating that "people's cultural identities must be recognized and accommodated by the state, and people must be free to express these identities." The UNCHR Fact Sheet No.21 (2014) supports freedoms including "the right to choose one's residence, to determine where to live and freedom of movement". The UNDRIIP (2007) perceives protection of indigenous peoples as necessary for their survival, well-being and dignity.

4. Governments may make initial (closed cycle) investments in essential infrastructures, and allocate 'harvester' or 'investor' rights for resource development.
5. While the importance of Palestinian territorial issues representing conflict over international recognition of post-1967 land rights is noted, it falls outside the parameters of this article. Reference to Israeli land issues will relate to the two largest minority populations, Haredi and Arab, as an integral part of the fabric of Israeli society. This applies to territories covered by Israeli state law and populated by citizens and permanent residents eligible for citizenship. Territorial administrative areas A and B outside pre-1967 borders are not included. For expediency sake, area C will be referenced only in relation to the two large Haredi towns of Modiin Illit and Beitar Illit which are situated on the seam of the demarcation line. These towns represent important statistical and secondary information that would be difficult to separate from the larger body of data.

indecision on the part of policy-makers within policy processes. Conflict-oriented policy issues may induce a factor of ambiguity in the form of generalized policy solutions based on political compromise, as a way to balance decisions in situations not clearly articulated by institutional directives.

The purpose of this article is to offer a topical overview identifying land as a spatial commodity for study within relevant decision-making and policy processes. Multidisciplinary geospatial paradigms incorporating economic, political, sociological and ethnographic spatial concepts represent variables that may influence policy process. These should provide a framework of analysis to help us understand the reasons behind spatial (distribution) conflict, thereby enriching the constitution of literature that informs predominant policy models.

2 Applied foundations of spatial policy

Comprehension of sociogeographic allocations and distributions of land rests on paradigms of relative space, place and territory. As some societies ensure their place in space by imbuing land with a sense of cultural importance, locations such as Jerusalem's Old City can affect and be affected by social, historical, political and cultural phenomena (Low 2017).⁶ Israeli spatial conflict between ethnocultural groups denotes this tendency where communities evoke collective appropriation of scarce land resources to harness democratic values, such as equity and inclusivity, to their political advantage.

Nevertheless, even culturally important physical space may comprise land resources as material commodities to be bought and sold at market or regulated prices. Harvey (1990) considers that control of space can be represented by an equation regarding the interaction between space/place, time (history) and money, such that land markets reflect supply and demand as well as controlling interests. Interests may be couched in institutional, community or personal value systems relevant to the spatial policy process (Powell and DiMaggio 1991), or in emotional and transcendental qualities of space that complement aspects of time and money. Low (2008) recalls Giddens' sociological idea of space and time related actions based on rules constituting meaning and sanctioning routine acts powered by resources. Resources can be natural materials or authoritative actors representing personal or institutional interests. Similarly, Leicht and Jenkins (2007) focus on spatial perspectives of sociopolitical processes as they relate

6. As the location of King David's holy temple, Mohammad's rise to heaven and Jesus' crucifixion and resurrection, Jerusalem's Old City bears three different symbolic narratives. These 0.9 square kilometers have influenced and been influenced by sociological forces throughout history.

to power and the distribution of resources, actors with beliefs and ideologies, institutional values and historical, cultural or symbolic linkages.⁷ Howitt's (2003: 150) geographic scale holds spatial configuration in dynamic terms, casting political institutions as actors, economic resources, resource distributors, social networks, protectors of territorial rights and holders of territory. His terms of space constantly change and evolve into "new landscapes of power, recognition and opportunity" (Howitt 2003: 150). Power can determine territorial boundaries, and those in power may use strategies to maintain their positions and grow. As such, policy approaches to pressures from powerful political or commercial entities and internal or external institutions may be significant. Yet weaker competitors might also tactically contest spatial domination, manipulating boundaries to their benefit (Low 2017: 19).

Scarcity of land makes it valuable because space is necessary for both individuals and societies. The properties of land in space are physically defined and finite, such that it's every distribution benefits some by discriminating against others. This relates to Massey's (1994) belief that some communities are empowered at the expense of others who are oppressed or disadvantaged. Refuting the idea that "application of any universal principle of social justice entails an injustice to someone somewhere", Harvey (1996: 347-48), allows for policies of social justice that employ reverse discrimination to confer preferential allocations of scarce resources on minority communities. But could this practice actually be perceived to deplete majority benefits? One such instance of decision-makers' attempt to counter balance minority development and land rights, for the benefit of the majority of citizens, is Israel's Nation-State Law (Government of Israel 2018). Recognizing and encouraging the establishment and consolidation of Jewish land settlement as a national value, this law accentuates competition between homogeneous cultural communities for land resources and alienates excluded minority communities. Ironically, the law was proposed to offset perceived injustice suffered by the Jewish majority resulting from government policies of reverse discrimination favoring minority communities in distributions of public and land resources (i24NEWS 2018).

Perhaps the need to attain an elusive balanced distribution of resources in the face of separate, powerful and conflicting community interests has rendered the Nation-State law a prime example of a declarative policy statement lacking operative guidelines for implementation. As a result, it merely serves to maintain Israeli settlement policy in an ambiguous state. Professional meso level national and regional planning agencies are left to precede macro decisions, using only

7. See also Oliver 1991.

the bare statutory or judicial directives to constitute a basis for implementation of spatial policy. This imperative is in keeping with the Israeli State's Attorney's (2004) directive on procedure for establishing new towns, beginning with professional level spatial feasibility analyses that progress through meso level statutory committees decisions and must ultimately be ratified by government. Thus spatial planning perspectives can be left open to interpretation based on existing or perceived socioeconomic disparities, heritages, cultures and lifestyles so that meso level agencies are in a position to offer professional guidance to conceive spatial order (Tama 35 2015).

A theoretical foundation for such interpretative spatial policy is Lefevbre's (1991) three part concept of Production of Space, including: relations and practices in perceived space, conceived images of space and lived space which rests on the other two tenets. Human geographer Werlen's (2005) focus on social action based organization of space casts local spatial characteristics as dependent on planned human activities to create particular locations in relation to their immediate and extensive surroundings. The political geographer and planner Soja (2010), in *Seeking Spatial Justice*, forms the notion of a comprehensive "Third-space" which is everything social, physical, historical and psychological. These ideas are part and parcel of the spatial policy toolbox supporting the idea that land is a representative commodity resource, apportioned via policy decisions that are subject to sociospatial narrative influencing its planned conception. In the case of Israel, multiple socially constructed perceptions and ideals relating to the same territorial space promote competing land claims that pose ethical policy dilemmas for policy-makers and political strategists. Low (2008: 34–36, 40) uses the example of the Wailing Wall in Jerusalem, where more than one perception can be applied to the same geographic coordinates, to show that different spaces can be created at the same 'locale'.⁸ Here opposing narratives representing meanings and symbolisms, emotional qualities of space and belief systems produce active conflict over land resources, couched in historically documented or imagined geographic closeness or overlap of various ethnicities in regional space.

2.1 The concept of space within regional divisions of states

Referring to the integration or exclusion of communities within geographic space, Held (2005: 331–358) raises two concepts operating simultaneously within modern states. One is the inclusionary integrative city encouraging openness and heterogeneity, and the second is the state itself as it relies on borders

8. See footnote #4.

and boundaries to promote policies defining internal exclusivity. Less attention is paid to homogeneous land distributions or exclusive enclaves within regional divisions of states (Lobao and Hooks 2007). Yet national policies allocating spatial resources among ethnic or cultural groups remain a source of territorial dispute and social conflict within state regions including: Quebec, Northern Ireland, Kurdistan, Israel, and many more (Stavenhagen 1998).

According to Schuerkens (2003: 216–218), place related local cultures vie with incorporated global trends to influence existing life experiences and cultural understandings. She shows that while globalization contributes new perspectives alien to traditional local lifestyles, it can also result in an intensification of local cultural traditions and identities. Preservation of cultural identity then becomes a countertrend to globalization and a political right. Both trends are apparent in terms of Israeli policies on spatial distribution, given inherent contradictions between the desire to emulate modern global multicultural urban lifestyles and the need to protect ethnic, religious and cultural rights defining sociospatial identity.

Examination of policy process for allocation of territorial space within regional divisions of states should widen conceptions related to distributions of population groups that shape the essence of space. In doing so, our frame of reference is unitary state policy within uni-level (non-unionized) centralized national governments, i.e. the State of Israel as a parliamentary democracy with a multi-party unicameral system. Israel's democratically elected government routinely deliberates on policy issues concerning culture, ethnicity and spatial allocations of territories.⁹

3 Political social and ethnographic paradigms of geographical space and place

The following geospatial concepts employ interpretive frameworks to analyze policy allocations and distributions of land and territorial resources. In case analysis pertaining to spatial conflict or non-consensus over commodity resource

9. Israeli democratic deliberation of spatial distribution issues is arguably hindered in the absence of direct regional or local geographic representation by elected members of parliament. Despite this, Israeli democracy holds an efficient separation of powers: the legislature (Knesset); the executive (government); and the judiciary (court system-independent and guaranteed by law). Checks and balances provided by basic laws define citizen and minority rights and governing structures, proportional party representation via democratic election, and freedom of expression in and outside the press (Government of Israel 2018b).

allocations, application of ethnographic, ideological and neoinstitutional paradigms should prove more productive than the socioeconomic paradigm of poverty and welfare. This is because the latter allows for economic based sociospatial mobility as a remedy for assumed political weakness, which is in contrast to the position of cultural and ethnic groups who might wield political influence but may not seek or achieve sociospatial mobility.

3.1 Poverty and welfare in sociogeographic space

Fundamental components of policy for distribution of resources in organized communities and societies are geared towards an understanding of who receives what, where, why and from whom. Here, emphasis is placed on analysis of nation-state governing policies that perpetuate sociospatial inequalities. Lack of 'social capital' in poorer areas may reinforce social gaps relating to quality of public services that make up life chances. This focus assumes a contextual relation to Marxist reasoning on capitalism, labor and means of production. If 'social landscapes' change, globalize or specialize in production of goods, welfare services are affected (Mohan 2003). Within this paradigm, poverty and welfare are studied as a main event. State policies promoting empowerment of particular communities over others, within similar socioeconomic brackets and legal administrations, are discussed primarily in terms of social welfare policy programs with spatial characteristics; e.g. tax-based incentives in targeted locales.

Affluent populations can afford to purchase private welfare services such as education and health (Mohan 2003) and participate in residential markets dictating spatial order based on socioeconomic class. A central concept of the literature on sociogeographic distributions relates to the use of policy decisions to eliminate such exclusionary practices and inequalities in order to promote the public 'good'. Paradoxically, this may include anti-discriminatory policies of social empowerment that perpetuate homogeneous population distributions within segregated catchment areas targeted for financial benefit (Shapira Hellerman 2015). In this sense, government dictated budgetary efficiency alone should not be used to entrench separation of populations along socioeconomic lines because this could amount to ghettoization, as distinct from the political right to establish or preserve communities based on cultural heritage or ethnic identity.

3.2 Power and politics in geographical spaces

Strength, safety, security, self-rule and social development are bases for consolidation of groups that form nations and evolve territorially subject to perpetual historical modification (Elden 2013). Discussing nationalist exclusive and homogeneous perspectives of space, Jones, Jones and Woods (2004) imply

that nations may claim sovereign geographical territory complete with representative physical and meaningful landscape, historic narrative, cultural memories and shared identity. These landscapes are a close derivative of unique old folk cultures that lived on rural lands, attached to “the soil” or “homeland”, e.g. the Jewish nation’s return from exile to the Israeli state and its struggle with Arab and minority groups over land and land related symbolisms (Jones et al. 2004: 88,93). Such nations have loyal citizenries ready to protect their homelands. States, nations and minority groups may strive for nation-statehood by way of violence, political power or economic negotiation.

Nation-states emphasize place-oriented common identities based on social divisions such as race, class, ethnicity, religion, cultural roots or belief systems. Oppressive policies representing a dominant ‘discourse of place’ may use statutory, judicial or targeted economic incentives to organize landscapes by forcefully or bureaucratically restricting or guiding movements of certain populations (Jones et al. 2004: 116–133; Yiftachel 1998). In this vein, Giddens’ (1985) defines the notion of modern bureaucratic control of territories within fixed nation-state boundaries that are protected at the expense of other nations. Only non-nation-states, made up of multicultural inclusionary mixes of culture, are free to operate in the common interest (Anderson 1983: 1–34).

On the sub-national level, certain regions or communities within nation-states, holding common interests and or national identities, may wish to seek territorial integrity or autonomy from the state (Jones et al. 2004; Mlinar 2004: 2). At the very least they might strive to increase their relative power by gaining political, budgetary/economic, or cultural benefits. Amidst questions of affiliation and loyalty, some groups may prefer to combine official recognition of their collective identity with secondary allegiance to the state, as in the case of Israeli Arabs and arguably of Haredi Jews (i24NEWS 2018). Emphasizing strength, and power ‘in numbers’, political issues are viewed in terms of how they impact and advance community interests. Pressure groups and local institutions with common goals can form coalitions to accommodate their accumulation of resources (land). Political coalitions may promote leadership determined by a blend of elite power networks that use control of resources to define beliefs, prejudices and discrimination (Jones et al. 2004: 112–113). Communal cultural isolation by choice or self-segregation can serve as a practical identity sharpening tool to consolidate powerful lobby interests and focus on delivery of exclusive benefits. This type of homogeneous spatial division, often employed by Israeli minorities, is the opposite of ghettoization because it emphasizes empowerment and development of social capital in terms that render populations spatially separate but equally entitled. It is relevant to the Canadian ‘mosaic’ model of spatial distribution (Hyman et al. 2011).

3.3 People and cultures: creation of exclusionary territories within geographical spaces

Ethnographic dialogues on space move beyond socioeconomic and social justice based paradigms to focus on human rights from the point of view of cultural groups in space. Low (2017: 15–19) explains the philosophies of Newton, Leibnitz, Kant and others regarding places as bodies positioned in space that are non-existent “except in relation to time, experience, thought, objects and events”. The built environment is created and shaped using historical, cultural, symbolic or religious variables to identify ethnic populations with particular territories, so that appropriation of space by some groups may entail exclusion of others. The combination over time of physical spaces with space related social interactions, such as language and common memories, can be contested and fought over by competing groups, as in the case of Israeli Jews and Arabs. Low’s (2017: 39) explanatory “social construction” perspectives of space are conceived as a result of social process using political and policy conflicts and control mechanisms to affect group actions and spur spatial processes (e.g. migration). His “social production” perspectives differ in that they explore historic economic and political motives for deliberate physical planning, changing and development of particular spaces. Space is ordered, to shape ‘landscapes of power’, emphasizing and perpetuating dominant political and economic ideologies at the expense of weaker ones (Low 2017: 38, 40–42, 70). A classic example is Haussmann’s Parisian boulevards supporting state controlled capitalist social order to the exclusion of working classes from the city center. Also, “neoliberal spaces” are planned to protect middle and upper class communities who can fund high standard living space for themselves by excluding others (Harvey 1996: 231).

In some states land ownership/tenure is subject to expropriation or reallocation for public purposes. Forman and Kedar (2004) intimate that in establishing the State of Israel, systematic expropriation of absentee lands served to substantiate symbolic control of space. Purposeful ordering of space usually requires access to resources, but may also be used by local bottom-up community or cultural enclaves contesting place and seeking to resist dominant oppression (Low, 2017:19). Accordingly, spatial order as a source of power and domination can design built environments to exert policies of social control, but might alternatively promote liberation from control. We posit that this is part of the sociopolitical processes taking place in the modern State of Israel, as Haredi and Arab minority groups direct political power and global support in favor of their rights to exclusive cultural land claims.

3.5 Paradigms of spatial resource allocation and distribution; rights and benefits

In sum, spatial concepts from multidisciplinary perspectives assume that land is a valuable public commodity resource in space to be distributed by decision-makers in accordance with monetary, social or political power. Werlen's (2000; 2005: 55) model of Spaces in Actions proposes a concise synthesis of various theories by sharpening distinguishing features of creative economic, political and cultural dimensions that dominate spatial boundaries and temporal coordinates, to imply rights of usage, jurisdiction or ownership. The capitalist land market is rational, while the political territorialization of space is government regulated to include/exclude actors and utilities. Cultural communication between geospatial constructs and experience is embedded in symbolic/historical meaning. Space is constructed by dynamic process separating power and powerlessness in relation to socioeconomic status of populations, or by alignment of political power with heritage and tradition respecting ethnocultural community land rights (Leicht and Jenkins 2007). Space can be created and designed by ruling entities for purposes of segregation (ghettoization), but may also be produced by socioeconomic or minority pressure groups to oppose institutions of power and promote spatial 'justice'.

Table 1 applies the conceptual paradigms above to basic questions; what is allocated to who, by whom, when, where, why and how. The compared paradigms are interrelated and tend to overlap, but yield certain distinctions regarding spatial conflict over public lands, which are a scarce commodity resource. Where prevailing ideals can be synthesized, they form a conceptualized fabric basic to this conflict, as a pattern emerges to focus on the rights of specific interest groups to benefit from land resources. In this sense, political scientists employ cultural symbolism to provide reasoning behind the right to claim spatial territory with defined boundaries as the pursued benefit, while ethnologist symbolisms hold emotional/psychological spatial meaning and identification as coveted benefits in their own right. Ethnologists depend on belief systems that create spatially related group consciousness, and sociologists are apt to lean on Marxist conceptions concerning spatial distributions of labor and capital. The 'when' 'where' and 'why' of most paradigms tend to support historical and temporal bases carrying claims to land rights. Distribution of land, territories, spaces, places and services is widely expected to happen within the framework of top-down regulated governance. although ethnologists consider that groups can attribute or ascribe spaces/places to themselves by bottom-up means. Tools and methods of allocation are ultimately rooted in economic, legal or regulative governing principles and policies decided amidst conflicting claims to spatial entitlement.

Table 1: Paradigms for study of spatial resource allocations, distributions, rights and benefits.

	ECONOMICS	POLITICS	SOCIOLOGY	ETHNOGRAPHY
FOCUS	commodity markets	power	poverty, welfare	human rights
WHO pursues rights/ benefits	individual investors, private companies	nations	socioeconomic groups	cultural groups
WHAT rights/ benefits are pursued or allocated/ distributed	commodity or resource, e.g. land or services purchased or earned	exclusive ownership and control of physical territory with boundaries or borders	public services, local spatially targeted public education or health services that make up "life chances"	identification with or ownership of space, place or land couched in symbolic meaning
WHOM by whom are rights/ benefits allocated/ distributed	market forces that are free or regulated	government	governing policies/ governance	top-down government or governance or bottom up community action
WHEN are rights/ benefits pursued or allocated/ distributed	supply exceeds demand or consumption is deemed necessary	now or in the past, subject to perpetual modification, shifting, change in time	disadvantaged populations rise up and force capitalism to pay attention (Marxist theory)	always, now and also in the past, independent of temporal conditions
WHERE are rights/ benefits pursued or allocated./ distributed	wherever there is opportunity to be optimized	existing lands or opportunistically accessible newly declared lands	socioeconomic landscapes comprising 'haves and have nots'	culturally meaningful symbolic landscapes
WHY are rights/ benefits pursued or allocated/ distributed	profit	common autonomy, unity, sovereignty and interests, e.g. strategy for safety, peace, protection, progress	social inequalities	common memories or experiences with common interpretation of events throughout history or based on common value systems

<p>HOW are rights/ benefits pursued or allocated/ distributed (methods, tools)</p>	<p>monetary power</p>	<p>administrative, legal, regulative power or control evolving through process</p>	<p>state incentives, targeted welfare programs, redistribution of monetary resources, preferred or reverse discrimination</p>	<p>stories and language of spatial belonging, planned ordering of space to shape landscapes and built environments</p>
---	---------------------------	--	---	--

The following considerations, based on comparison of multidisciplinary paradigms in Table 1, identify dominant strains of reasoning to explain conflict within constitutions of space, as related to collective or individual rights to benefit from land resources:

- 1- Concerns relating to culture, poverty/welfare and power may produce inequality in space that determines who is included/excluded from which territory or place. This can apply to individuals as well as communities.
- 2- Meaningful historical cultures and symbolisms that affirm a desire to achieve territorial or space related objectives hold an abstract quality that is subjective. These may draw concurrent or competing claims from various communities regarding a specific location.
- 3- Competing operative political and/or institutional driving forces may be powerful, and probably take precedence over sociological theories of inequality in space. Poverty and welfare issues relating to equitable distributions of resources hover in the background of spatial thought, but may not be a deciding factor in actual allocations of space.

4 A study of the two largest minority populations in Israel

Israeli planning for diverse populations is presented here as a case in point, proposing land as an indicator for testing strategic spatial policy actions in relation to institutional decision-making. The spatial dispersion of populations and distribution of lands among Arab and Haredi minority populations in Israel are mapped below, in terms of established socioeconomic indices, demonstrating sociocultural conflict over land. Accepting that land can be an economic, social or cultural commodity as well as a policy tool for control of populations (Low 2017); we address Israeli geographic population distributions to distinguish between institutionally forced socioeconomic or ideological segregation (Yiftachel 1998) and state allocation of territorial rights among politically powerful or bottom-up contenders.

4.1 Spatial dispersion and distribution of lands among Arab and Haredi populations in Israel

According to statistical projections, Haredi and Arab populations will each represent approximately a quarter of Israel's total population respectively within the next 30 years (CBS 2016). Both are presently and potentially large populations with political representation, and are recognized as minority or special groups (Government of Israel 2015).¹⁰ As a way of defending cultural heritage, Israeli law protects the right to homogeneous settlement for special and minority groups (High Court of Justice 1998). The Israeli government has passed resolutions favoring minorities: Resolution number 922 represents a special funding package for planning and development services to Arab populations (Government of Israel 2015), and Resolution number 1823 is intended to provide Haredi communities with planned land for the provision of housing and services (Government of Israel 2016).¹¹

The majority of Arabs and the majority of Haredi live in homogeneous cultural enclave communities of choice (CBS 2016). Those living in mixed towns and cities tend to congregate in homogeneous neighborhoods where culturally specific goods and services are easily accessed. Although a high percentage of those living in mixed Israeli communities are educated, the actual percentage of minorities in integrated neighborhoods is almost negligible (Rekhes 2007). Arabs live mostly in peripheral rural regions while Haredi are drawn to urban living that provides walkability and public transport to education, religious, food and other services tailored to their way of life. Haredi gravitate to their traditional communities in Israel's center, even when living conditions reach densities below 10 square meters per person, which is less than 0.5 rooms per person inclusive of shared living space (Shapira Hellerman 2015). In all Jewish households – including Haredi – the average number of rooms per person in 2014 was 0.82. In Arab households, the average number of rooms per person was 1.35 (CBS 2014).

Arab communities tend to prefer their original historic "home" villages situated primarily in peripheral areas of the country or bordering the territories of Judea and Samaria in less urbanized East Jerusalem (Khamaisi 2013). Approximately

10. Political involvement of minority sectors is manifest in national and municipal elections. Minorities run political and administrative affairs in their own municipalities and further community interests by electing representatives to parliament, where they bolster the status of minority groups and avail of national benefits (Knesset 2015).

11. In Israel 93% of lands are in the public domain, managed and allocated by state agencies.

44% of Arabs live in almost exclusively homogeneous Arab towns and communities in northern Israel, another 20% in the Jerusalem area, 10% in the center of the country, and 12% in the south (Bedouin).¹² A mere 1% reside in the Tel Aviv area (CBS 2014). Homogeneous locales provide them with their own spatial, educational, cultural, communicational (linguistic) and political spheres (Tama 35 2015). There are 129 homogeneous Arab localities in Israel, including seven Bedouin towns established by the State of Israel in the Negev (southern) region between the years 1968 and 1989. The Abu Basma Regional Council, established in 2003, comprises eight family villages. Government planning aims to free-up land for housing and development while allowing populations to remain within defined locations in their ancestral homelands. Additional plans have been approved for a new Arab town and a new Druze village in the Western and Northern Galilee regions (Bouso 2016; Zafrir 2014).

A statistical report by the Israel Democracy Institute shows that approximately 80% of Haredi prefer to isolate themselves within their own enclaves (Malach et al. 2016).¹³ According to a Seker Kehlacha survey, at least 68% of Haredi consciously choose to live in separate towns and a further 13% in separate neighborhoods that provide institutions affiliated with particular religious leaders (Shapira Hellerman 2018). In the words of the Israel Democracy Institute report: "(They) have chosen to erect walls of holiness to separate themselves from society...This voluntary segregation is virtually all-encompassing, extending not only to beliefs and opinions unique to this community but also to spatial, educational, cultural, communicational and political spheres." (Malach et al. 2016: 3). Towns like Elad, Bnei Brak and parts of Beit Shemesh are populated almost entirely by Haredi. The Israeli government plans to build at least three more Haredi towns, while maximizing potential for expansion of existing ones (Zicherman 2016).¹⁴

12. As a subgroup of the Israeli Arab minority population, Bedouin number approximately 250,000 persons. They claim ownership of lands (totaling almost 60,000 hectares) based on historic nomadic tribal wanderings, sometimes drawing economic and other valuable compensation in exchange for land (PMO 2013).

13. In 2013, more than half the Haredi population lived in homogeneous towns at the country's center, exclusive of those living in Jerusalem's homogeneous Haredi neighborhoods (Malach et al. 2016).

14. Despite acute housing shortages for 'separate' Haredi communities, Haredi leaders are reluctant to guide their populations toward new urban developments in peripheral regions, insisting on proximity to main Haredi population centers (Zicherman 2016).

4.2 Housing expenditure and average income

According to Israel's 2015 national household expenditure survey, 24.7% of household expenditures in Israel's main cities were spent on housing. The average income per capita was highest in Tel Aviv, as were monthly household expenditures (CBS 2016). Yet Bnei Brak, a Haredi enclave neighboring Tel Aviv, had the lowest monthly income (comprised mainly of government subsidies) and expenditure per capita. The survey shows that real estate purchase and rental fees are more expensive in Tel Aviv and the central region, while the cost of an average apartment in the five largest most centrally located Haredi communities is lower than in other central towns in Israel (Malach et al. 2016). Comparing average costs of apartments per square meter in various locations, we find this is also true of Arab enclaves at the center of the country, such as east Jerusalem and Kfar Qasim (Madlan 2018). The proportion of apartment owners among Haredi Jews is roughly 75% as compared with the national average which stands at 67% (Malach et al. 2016). For Arab populations, the figure is 85% (CBD 2014).

There is a high rate of homeownership within these minority communities relative to the proportion living beneath the poverty line (equal to 50% of the median disposable income per standard person).¹⁵ The proportion of poor Haredi families is far greater than that of the general population; 52% as opposed to 19% (Malach et al. 2016). The incidence of poverty among Arab families at 49.2% is almost equally prevalent (CBD 2016). Given the large number of children per family unit (5.0 for Haredim and 4.6 for Arabs), per capita income for Haredi and Arabs both is significantly lower than that of the general population (CBS 2014; Malach et al. 2016).

4.3 Summary analysis

Statistics shown in Table 2 indicate that Arab and Haredi populations tend to reside in culturally homogeneous enclaves. Haredi tend to live in high density religious housing communities in the geographic heart of the country, within close proximity of prime real estate, while Arabs tend to concentrate in low density peripheral culturally symbolic areas. The cost of a housing unit in Arab or Haredi enclaves is often lower than it is in nearby mixed areas, perhaps as a result of a perceived separation of housing markets along ethnocultural lines (Tzion 2016; Yubman and Fleishman 2014); or because religious lifestyles clash

15. A family in Israel is considered poor when its disposable income, divided by a number of standard persons, is lower than the poverty line per standard person (Endblid et al. 2016).

heavily with mainstream culture inviting less outside demand for housing within cultural enclaves. There may even be a concerted effort made by residents and municipal representatives to exclude 'alien' sectors (Hason 2017; Shpigel and Huri 2018). Although cheaper housing in the center of the country should be a catalyst for sectorial integration, especially in a soaring market, this is not generally the case. Notably, there is no legal basis for allowing all citizens to enjoy purchasing conditions offered to minorities within the context of reverse discrimination (High Court of Justice 1998; Sofer 2007).¹⁶

Table 2: Poorest sectors in Israeli society achieve housing preferences.

POPULATION	Projected percentage of total population	Projected percentage of total population	Percentage of population below poverty line	Average family size	Percentage of population owning homes	Living density - persons per room	Percentage living in homogeneous enclaves	Members of parliament*
Dates: projected or surveyed	2019	2059	2015	2014	2015	2014	2014-2015	2015 elections
ARABS	21.5	23.1	49.2	4.6	85	1.35	86	13
HAREDI JEWS	12.5	26.6	52	5.0	75	0.50	80	13
JEWS (without Haredi)	66	50.3	12	3.3	42	–	–	–
TOTAL MIXED	100% = 8,843,000	100% = 15,607,600	19	3.72	67	0.82	–	120

(CBS 2014-2016; Knesset 2015)

* Statistics include Arab and Haredi MPs belonging to sectorial political parties only. There are also Arab and Haredi MPs from mainstream parties. Haredi parties joined the 2015 coalition government.

16. Persons outside minority and special populations are not generally eligible for the same (minority) benefits land and space, even if they are of similar socioeconomic backgrounds (High Court of Justice 1998; Sofer 2007).

Despite high levels of poverty among Haredi and Arab minorities, Table 2 documents high rates of homeownership possibly due to government facilitation of favorable conditions to help these populations purchase homes (PMO 2013).^{17,18} Thus Government acknowledgment of sociospatial communal activities and political or human rights lobbies play a role, together with High Court decisions, in protecting cultural ideals.¹⁹ This is accomplished via land distributions that facilitate individual rights within specific collective frameworks (Adalah 2018; Bouso 2015; Knesset 2015; Swirski et al. 1998). While these policies generally emphasize minority land rights, Israel's Nation-state Law supports the premise of land distribution based on cultural heritage by deferring to the rights of a Jewish majority (Government of Israel 2018). Such perspectives may be intended to complement one another, but they are both in direct contrast to inclusionary policy endorsing non-discriminatory multicultural spatial order. The inclusionary principle is also supported by laws and High Court decisions viewing integration as a requirement for equality, and negating the legitimacy of exclusionary land allocations (Government of Israel 2011a; High Court of Justice 2000).

Universally declared goals of equitability, pluralism, social integration and inclusion wield an alluring power for spatial planning in democratic systems. These values address communities and individuals alike, but perhaps in different ways. While appealing to multiculturalism, they may also be interpreted to justify resource allocations that preserve exclusive minority enclaves (Government of Israel 2011a). Ethnocultural considerations can be a catalyst for the creation of regional spaces promoting minority groups, and egalitarian interpretations of social justice may sanction the use of policy and political strategies such as reverse discrimination for equal opportunity divisions of spatial resources. There is however an inherent difference between the two opposing mindsets of declared unlimited rights to cultural and religious freedom of choice in space. The first validates the right to claim and hold spatial infrastructures, serving to actively build and maintain exclusive community cultures as described by Low (2017: 15–19), and the second is enjoyed by all individuals within accepting and

17. Contributing to the necessity of government aid are unique cultural spending preferences and financial pressures, e.g. purchase of a home as a precondition to marriage, also subsidized by family or communal contributions (Malach et al. 2016).

18. An example of government facilitation is the Bill on Bedouin Settlement in the Negev, based on land claims (proven or not), proffering legal provisions for compensation in land and funds, ensuring appropriate housing for generations (PMO 2013).

19. The independent Judiciary regularly rules against government and parliament, overturning decisions perceived to threaten human rights. The state adheres to court rulings (Adalah 2018).

inclusive multicultural spaces. This distinction calls into question spatial policies that grant formal accessibility to lands, exclusively benefitting some communities over others and communities over individuals. For instance, the adoption of policies for reverse discrimination privileging Israeli Arab and Haredi may uphold human rights regarding protection and perpetuation of cultures, in conjunction with individual freedoms to join communities, but those policies would violate the right of individual non-community members who are not entitled to the same spatial resource benefits. In effect, the same state policies that openly regulate or channel sociospatial conditions to support universality and concord may also facilitate liberal individual and collective freedoms to choose, perpetuate and create culturally exclusive communal living spaces (UN 2007). Land benefits could be directed at indigenous minority groups, but should not be at the expense of the rights of other contenders. Policy decisions based on cultural, ethnic, religious and emotional land claims appear less clear-cut in the face of inclusionary idealism and therefore suffer the ambiguity of practical delays and reevaluations. This paradox is couched in specific situations of sociospatial conflict and may epitomize the ambiguity which is discussed by Matland (1995) and encompassed by Israeli policy for land distribution.

5 Concluding remarks

Questions of moral equity might necessarily accompany situations of conflict, confronting policy-makers on issues related to minority versus majority and collective versus individual rights to benefit from spatial commodities. If state policies relating to concepts of physical space draw on social demographics, history, human culture, psychological imagery and symbolism to help explain the distribution of land based commodity resources, the construction of spatial order should rest not only on practical narrative but on active promotion of policies for social equity.

Granting that socioeconomic spatial theory regards homogeneity in space as a prescription for poverty, where affordability of land could enable spatial integration (Ethington 1997; Mohan 2003), policies advocating multiculturalism emerge in response to solidly based petitions for anti-discriminatory ethnic and cultural rights. While segregation creates social and emotional distance in everyday life, space and time (Ethington, 1997), there is scant evidence to suggest that spatial proximity would invoke social proximity. In cases such as Israel, strong historically symbolic narratives and idylls override socioeconomic coincidence. In this regard, reversal of policies promoting separation may remove some barriers to social integration, but this would not necessarily cause funda-

mentally separate groups such as Arabs and Haredi to adopt common interests and live in integrative inclusionary multicultural locales. Perhaps a conceivable sociospatial option might resemble Canadian policies that allow individuals to assimilate in an atmosphere of multicultural inclusivity accorded by divisions in space, forming a cultural or ethnic 'mosaic' to enhance their cultural capital and encourage inter-communal interactions (Hyman et al. 2011). The applicability of this model to regional and local landscapes makes it a mature and honest alternative to the sense of ambiguity defining policies for spatial distribution in situations of sociopolitical conflict, as represented by the case of Israel.

It would indeed be democratically unacceptable to force dispersal of communities into alternate systems of spatial cohesion. If culturally diverse groups in Israel express a mutual desire to live in separate enclaves within the state, on a 'separate but equal' basis, a range of community housing solutions could be offered that openly exclude outside individuals, even at comparable socio-economic levels (Khamaisi 2013; Rekhes 2007). Separate spatial distribution of lands among minority populations in Israel may also promote empowerment, substantiating political lobby for resources, such that economic thresholds expedite the provision of adequate goods and services required by homogeneous communities (Shapira Hellerman 2015). This is somewhat perpetuated at judicial and professional meso levels of implementation (Tama 35 2015). Such ideals garner support from morally driven government resolutions or affirmative action policies (Government of Israel 2015, 2016; Knesset 2015), so that segregations are less likely to be based on top-down political and institutional motivations than on minority ethnocultural pressures with historical overtones.²⁰

Sociospatial divisions can intensify power relations and varying notions of what is in the public interest, thereby producing policy dilemmas. We argue that equitable policies must balance calculated distributions of spatial public resources, comprising unique heritages in specific locales, with the promotion of social and cultural integration in other places. As a commodity resource land/space is conceived by power and the influence of sociocultural input (Lefebvre 1991). Land should be planned and built on responsible practical policy. In doing so, there can and must be policy criteria by which clear and transparent active government policy could be regulated, implemented and administered to support a range of spatial options accommodating various-communities. To bolster this process, meso levels professionals could take a lead role in initiating its implementation.

Finally, the employment of land as an indicator for public commodity resources emerges as a plausible basis for assessment of policy process concerning resource

20. See discussion of politically motivated population distributions in Yiftachel (1998).

allocations and distributions of populations within regions of national geographic space. Land policy decisions must necessarily consider dynamic, historical and contemporary sociocultural political and economic variables. Interested political actors represent specific values along the spectrum of territorial conflict, seeking power to control, protect or pursue coveted commodity resources. Policy-makers, institutions and politicians allocate and reallocate lands in an atmosphere of compromise stemming from multiple ideological and symbolic qualities of space. This article highlights the quest for fair and reasonable policy solutions relating to instances of emotional and practical conflict that generate ambiguous policy platforms (Matland 1995). Further study might concentrate on in-depth analysis of policy processes to pinpoint critical stages that shape decisions and accommodate equitable implementation outputs for spatial distribution within state regions. Research of the extent to which policies are impacted by dominant institutional, professional and private world-views could help identify emotionally charged political or institutional decisions permeated by incongruous contradictory policy decisions. Continued focus on sociocultural issues should contribute to the nominal discourse addressing chronological constructions of conflict-oriented processes to support a reconceptualization of prevailing policy models, and reify policies encouraging spatial diversity and power-sharing, equitable distribution of spatial resources and productive spatial management.

Acknowledgment

We thank Dr. Danica Fink-Hafner, Professor, Chair of Policy Analysis and Public Administration at the University of Ljubljana's Centre for Political Science Research, who provided insight and expertise that greatly assisted the writing of this paper.

Bibliography²¹

- Anderson, James E. (2003): Public policymaking: An introduction. Boston: Houghton Mifflin Company.
- Elden, Stuart (2013): How Should We Do the History of Territory?. *Territory, Politics, Governance*, 1(1): 5-20.
- Endblid Miri, Gotlieb, Daniel, Heller, Oren, and Karadi, Lahav (2017): The Parameters of Poverty and Social Gaps – Yearly Report. Jerusalem: The National Insurance Institute. Available from: https://www.btl.gov.il/Publications/oni_report/Documents/oni2017.pdf (Accessed 02.04.2018).

21. Where titles have been translated from Hebrew, a URL address for the original document is provided.

- Ethington, Philip J. (1997): The Intellectual Construction of "Social Distance": Toward a Recovery of Georg Simmel's Social Geometry. *Cybergeog: European Journal of Geography*, 30. Available from: <http://journals.openedition.org/cybergeog/227> (Accessed 03.05.2018).
- Forman, Jeremy and Kedar, Alexander (2004): From Arab Land to 'Israel Lands': the legal dispossession of the Palestinians displaced by Israel in the wake of 1948. *Environment and Planning D: Society and Space*, 22: 809–830.
- Gertel, Shulamit and Alterman, Rachele (1994): *Ethics for Planners Amidst Political Conflict: The Case of Israel*. Haifa: Center for Urban and Regional Studies, Technion Israel Institute of Technology.
- Giddens, Anthony (1985): *The Nation-State and Violence*. Cambridge: Polity Press.
- Harvey, David (1990): *The Condition of Postmodernity*. Cambridge and Oxford: Blackwell.
- Harvey, David (1996): *Justice, Nature and the Geography of Difference*. Oxford: Blackwell.
- Held, Gerd (2005): *Territorium und Großstadt Die räumliche Differenzierung der Moderne*. Vs Verlag Für Sozialwissenschaften.
- Howitt, Richard (2003): Scale. In J. Agnew K. Mitchell and G. Toal (eds.): *A Companion to Political Geography*: 132–157. Oxford: Blackwell.
- Hupe, Peter L. and Hill, Michael J. (2016): 'And the rest is implementation.' Comparing approaches to what happens in policy processes beyond Great Expectations. *Public Policy and Administration* 121 – 103 :{2}31,.
- Hyman Ilene, Meinhard, Agnes, and Shields, John (2011): *The Role of Multiculturalism Policy in Addressing Social Inclusion Processes in Canada*. Ottawa: Canadian Multicultural Education Foundation.
- Jones, Martin, Jones, Rhys and Woods, Michael (eds.) (2004): *An introduction to Political Geography: Space, place and politics*. London and New York: Routledge.
- Jones, Pip, Bradbury, Liz and LeBoutillier, Shaun (eds.) (2011): *Introducing Social Theory*, 2nd Edition. Cambridge: Polity Press.
- Khamaisi Rassem (2013): Housing Transformation within Urbanized Communities: The Arab Palestinians in Israel. *Geography Research Forum*, 33: 184–209.
- Kymlicka Will (1995): *Multicultural Citizenship: A Liberal Theory of Minority, Rights*. Clarendon Press, Oxford.
- Lefebvre Henri (1991): *The Production of Space*. Translated by Donald Nicholson-Smith. Cambridge and Oxford: Blackwell.
- Leicht Kevin T. and Jenkins, Craig J. (2007): New and Unexplored Opportunities: Developing a Spatial Perspective for Political Sociology. In L. Lobao, G. Hooks and A. Tickmayer (eds.): *The Sociology of Spatial Inequality*: 63–84. New York: State University of New York Press.
- Low, Setha (2017): *Spatializing Culture: The Ethnography of Space and Place*. London and New York: Routledge.

- Low, Martina (2008): The Constitution of Space: The Structuration of Spaces Through the Simultaneity of Effect and Perception. *European Journal of Social Theory*, 11 (1): 25-49.
- Lobao, Linda M. and Hooks, Gregory (2007): Advancing the Sociology of Spatial Inequality. In L. Lobao, G. Hooks and A. Tickmayer (eds.): *The Sociology of Spatial Inequality*: 29-61. New York: State University of New York Press.
- Malach, Gilad, Choshen, Maya, and Cahaner, Lee (2016): *The Yearbook of Ultra-Orthodox Society in Israel - Statistical Report on Ultra-Orthodox Society in Israel*. Jerusalem: The Israel Democracy Institute and The Jerusalem Institute for Israel Studies.
- Massey, Doreen (1994): *Space Place and Gender*. Minnesota: University of Minnesota Press.
- Matland, Richard (1995): Synthesizing the Implementation Literature: The Ambiguity-Conflict Model of Policy Implementation. *Journal of Public Administration Research and Theory*, 5(2): 145-174.
- Mlinar, Zdravko and Stebe, Janez (2005): Mobility and Identification in the Context of Globalisation. Paper presented at: ISA - TG06 International conference Theme: The Sociology of Local-Global Relations, Pultusk, Poland; September 18-19, 2004. *Sociologiceskie issledovania*, 4: 33-42. Available from: <https://ssrn.com/abstract=2198298> (Accessed 10.20.2018).
- Mohan, John (2003): Geography and social policy: spatial divisions of welfare. *Progress in Human Geography*, 27 (3): 363-374.
- Oliver, Christine (1991): Strategic Responses to Institutional Process. *Academy of Management Review*, 16 (1): 145-179.
- Portugali, Juval (1980): Distribution, Allocation, Social Structure and Spatial Form: Elements of planning theory. *Progress in planning*, 14: 227-310.
- Powell, Walter W. and DiMaggio, Paul J. (1991): *The New Institutionalism in Organizational Analysis*. Chicago: The University of Chicago Press.
- Rekhes, Eli (2007): The Arabs in Israel: Together but apart in mixed cities in Israel. Tel Aviv: Tel Aviv University and the Conrad Adenauer Fund. Available from: <https://dayan.org/he/content/4749> (Accesses 10.02.2018).
- Schuerkens, Ulrike (2003): The sociological and anthropological study of globalization and localization. *Current Sociology*, 51(3/4): 209-222.
- Soja, Edward (2010): *Seeking Spatial Justice*. Minnesota: University of Minnesota Press.
- Stavenhagen, Rodolfo (1998): Ethnic conflicts and their impact on international society. *International Social Science Journal*, 50: 433-445.
- Swirski Shlomo, Ety Konor and Yaron Yechezkel (1998): Government Allocations to the Ultra-Orthodox (Haredi) Sector in Israel. Adva Center - Information on equality and social justice in Israel.
- Werlen, Beno (2005): Regions and Everyday Regionalizations: From a Space-centred Towards an Action-centred Human Geography. In H. Van Houtum, O. Kramsch and W. Zierhofer (eds.): *Bordering in Space*: 47-60. Aldershot: Ashgate Publishing Company.

Yiftachel, Oren (1998): Planning and Social Control: Exploring the Dark Side. *Journal of Planning Literature*, 12 (4): 395–406.

Zicherman, Haim (ed.) (2016): Strategic housing plan for the Haredi population 2016–2035. Jerusalem: The Haredi Institute for Public Affairs in conjunction with the Ministry of Construction and housing. Available from: <https://machon.org.il/wp-content/uploads/2016/03/housing-plan-full-book.pdf> (Accessed 12.25.2018).

Sources

State's Attorney (2004): Procedure for decision-making regarding the establishment of new towns, Guideline # 1.1800. Jerusalem: Ministry of Justice. Available from: <https://www.justice.gov.il/Units/YoezMespati/HanchayotNew/Seven/11800.pdf> (Accessed 02.04.2018).

CBS - Israel Central Bureau of Statistics (2008–2016): Statistical publications and yearbooks on Israel: Population and Demography. Jerusalem.

Government of Israel (2011a): Law of Cooperative Societies, Ordinance, Amendment # 8, Jerusalem: Records. Available from: https://www.nevo.co.il/law_html/Law01/002_001.htm (Accessed 01.06.2018).

Government of Israel (2011b): A plan to promote the economic growth and development of the Bedouin population Resolution #3708. September 11, 2011. Jerusalem: PMO. Available from: https://www.gov.il/he/Departments/policies/2011_des3708 (Accessed 04.07.2018).

Government of Israel (2015): Government Activities for Economic Development in the Minority Population in the Years 2016–2020. Resolution #992, December 29, 2015. Jerusalem: PMO. Available from: https://www.gov.il/he/Departments/policies/2015_des922 (Accessed 25.05.2018).

Government of Israel (2016): Planning and Marketing Lands for the Haredi Population. Resolution # 1823, August 11, 2016. Jerusalem: PMO. Available from: <https://machon.org.il/wp-content/uploads/2015/.pdf> (Accessed 14.09.2018).

Government of Israel (2018): Nation-State Law, Jerusalem: Records. Available from: https://fs.knesset.gov.il/20/law/20_Isr_504220.pdf (Accessed 01.08.2018).

High Court of Justice (1998): Association for Freedom of Religion, Conscience, Education and Culture vs. Ministry of Construction and Housing, Decision # 490698. Jerusalem: Ministry of Justice. Available from: [https://www.ruling.co.il-עמותת-4906-98-בג"ץ/2%להופש-דת-2%עם-חופשי-להופש-דת-2%...דחחdc5b83-a7c-7d2d-2b](https://www.ruling.co.il-עמותת-4906-98-בג) (Accessed 01.08.2018).

High Court of Justice (2000): Kadaan vs. Israel Land Authority and others, Decision # 6698/95. Jerusalem: Ministry of Justice. Available from: <http://www.ovdim-tlv.org.il/college/DocLib4/ישראל%מקרקעי%מנהל%נגד%קעאודן.pdf> (Accessed 01.08.2018).

National Outline Plan - TAMA 35 (2015): Integrated National Master Plan for Construction, Development and Preservation. Jerusalem: Ministry of Interior. Available from: https://www.gov.il/he/Departments/General/tama_35_docs (Accessed 10.07.2018).

Shapira Hellerman (2018): Analysis of an In-Market survey of Haredi on the subject of housing preferences as it corresponds to public participation and group interviews. Jerusalem: Ministry of Construction and Housing. Available from: <http://ext.moch.gov.il/books/kasif/> (Accessed: 12.08.2018).

Shapira Hellerman (2015): Analysis of Social and Economic Data. In The Outline Plan for the New Haredi Town of Kasif, eds. Nachum Dunsky. Jerusalem: Ministry of Construction and Housing. (not yet published).

United Nations Development Programme (2004): Human Development Report.

United Nations (2007): Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples. General Assembly.

United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights (2014): Fact Sheet No.21/Rev.1.

Websites

Adalah Legal Center (2018): Arab Minority Rights in Israel. Available from: <https://www.adalah.org/en/content/index/2003> (Accessed 27.05.2018).

Government of Israel (2018b): Facts. Available from: <https://www.israel21c.org/facts-about-the-israeli-system-of-government/> (Accessed 03.05.2018).

Knesset (2015): Israeli Parliament. Available from: <http://main.knesset.gov.il/mk/Pages/current.aspx?pg=mklist> (Accessed 02.04.2018).

Madlan (2018): Property Investment. Available from: <https://www.madlan.co.il/local/> (Accessed 07.06.2018).

PMO - Prime Minister's Office (2013): Policy for Bedouin settlements in the Negev. Jerusalem: Available from: <http://www.pmo.gov.il/policyplanning/closedsubjects/hasdara/Pages/default.aspx> (Accessed 02.04.2018).

News articles

Bouso, Nimrod (2015): Kahlon trapped: Netanyahu and Deri agreed on preferred entitlement to affordable housing for the Ultra-Orthodox. Ha'aretz Newspaper, 12.05.2015. Available from: <https://www.haaretz.co.il/tmr/1.2634196> (Accessed 23.10.2017).

Bouso, Nimrod (2016): The National Council for Planning and Building advise approval of plan for the establishment of a new Druze community settlement in the Lower Galilee. The Marker Newspaper, 05.01.2016. Available from <https://www.themarker.com/realstate/1.2815184> (Accessed 23.10.2017).

Hason, Nir (2017): A new plan to expand Abu Gosh raises fears among the residents to change the character of the village. Ha'aretz Newspaper, 23.10.2017. Available from: <https://www.haaretz.co.il/news/local/premium-1.4532588> (Accessed 23.10.2017).

i24NEWS (2018): Netanyahu promises to re-examine Israel's 'Nation-State' law. i24NEWS, 26.07.18. Available from: <https://www.i24news.tv/en/news/israel/politics/180280-180726-israeli-ministers-mks-and-druze-leadership-say-nation-state-law-must-change> (Accessed 26.07.2018).

- Sofer Ronnie (2007): Boim: why not ask whether a Jew can live in an Arab village? YNET. 19.12.07. Available from: <https://www.ynet.co.il/articles/0,7340,L-3480517,00.html> (Accessed 26.07.2018).
- Shpigel Noa and Huri, Jackie (2018): The Kfar Vradim Council stopped marketing land after half the winners of the tender were Arabs. Ha'aretz Newspaper, 18.03.2018. Available from: <https://www.haaretz.co.il/news/education/.premium-1.5911853> (Accessed 18.03.2018).
- Tzion, Hila (2016): Research; Secular (Jews) pay more for housing. YNET. 22.07.2016. Available from: <https://www.ynet.co.il/articles/0,7340,L-4828478,00.html> (Accessed 18.03.2018).
- Zafir, Rinat (2014): For the first time since the establishment of the State, a new town will be built for the Galilee Arabs. Ha'aretz Newspaper. 27.10.2014. Available from: <https://www.haaretz.co.il/news/education/.premium-1.2468653> (Accessed 18.03.2018).

Authors' data

Author: Shulamith Gertel Groome, M.Sc. Urban and Regional Planning,
Doctoral student, Faculty of Social Sciences, University of Ljubljana,
e-mail: shulamitg@moch.gov.il,
tel.: +972506247982.

Co-author: dr. Marjan Hočevar, Associate Professor,
Chair of Theoretical Sociology, Center for Spatial Sociology,
University of Ljubljana,
e-mail: marjan.hocevar@fdv.uni-lj.si,
tel.: +38615805367

Polina Shevchenko

IMAGES OF MUSLIMS ON LEMONDE.FR DURING THE PERIOD OF TERRORIST ATTACKS IN EUROPE IN 2015–2016

ABSTRACT

The purpose of this study was to analyse images of Muslims appearing in articles published from 2015 to 2016 on the website lemonde.fr. At this time, the country was faced with terrorist attacks that resulted in various government decisions and a complex emotional state of the nation. The study includes 617 articles from lemonde.fr, individually refined through 16 keywords. The quantitative and qualitative content analysis allowed for three main thematic categories of articles to be determined: Muslims as potential terrorists, the incompatibility of Islamic religious symbols with European values, and Islam as an obstacle to secularism in school. Muslims were represented as victims of discrimination or as criminals. These images negatively affected the perception of this religious minority in France and may have led to complications in intercultural communication.

KEYWORDS: *Islam, media effects, images of Muslims in the media, the image of Islam in the media*

Podobe Muslimanov na spletni strani lemonade.fr v času terorističnih napadov v Evropi med letoma 2015 in 2016

IZVLEČEK

Namen te študije je analiza podob muslimanov v člankih, ki so bili od leta 2015 do leta 2016 objavljeni v lemonde.fr. V tem času se je Francija soočala s terorističnimi napadi, na katere se je takratna vlada soočala s sprejemom različnih odločitev in zapletenim čustvenim odzivom prebivalstva. Študija vključuje šeststo sedemnajst člankov s spletne strani lemonde.fr z analizo vsebine šestnajstih ključnih besed.

Kvantitativna in kvalitativna analiza vsebine omogoča določitev treh glavnih tematskih kategorij člankov: muslimani kot potencialni teroristi, nezdržljivost islamskih verskih simbolov z evropskimi vrednotami in islam kot ovira sekularizmu v šoli. Muslimani so bili predstavljeni kot žrtve diskriminacije ali kot zločinci. Te podobe so negativno vplivale na dojemanje te verske manjšine v Franciji in bi lahko pripeljale do zapletov v medkulturni komunikaciji.

KLJUČNE BESEDE: Islam, medijski učinki, medijske podobe muslimanov, analiza vsebine, verske manjšine

1 Introduction

The growing threat of terrorism in the modern world affects the perception of religious minorities in different countries. Mostly, these changes affected Muslims whose religious ideologies are accused of propagating these tragic events.

The terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001, which in terms of the scale and the number of victims exceeded the terrorist attacks known up to this point, were a turning point concerning Islam and Muslims, as well as to their representation in mass media.

America could not recover for a long time after these tragic events. People needed an answer and an enemy against whom they could direct their anger. Muslims became the scapegoat, and the acts of anti-Muslim violence among the population increased. Mass media, not understanding how to depict Muslims after this tragedy, rushed to extremes. It was the main challenge and test for journalism of the early 21st century.

Thus, the American mass media tried to smooth corners and speak as positively as possible about Muslims during this period. American television attempted to cover the lives of ordinary Muslims and Arabs, using a positive connotation in interviews (Alsultany 2013: 161). According to some researchers, the propaganda of such an exaggeratedly supportive attitude towards Muslims and Arabs has created a new kind of rejection and new forms of racism, which looked like anti-racism and multiculturalism on the surface. Many authors in their studies of Muslims images after the 9/11 tragedy spoke about how "positive" and "simplified" images negatively impacted upon followers of this religion (Alsultany 2013: 162).

In 2015–2016, the world again faced the problem of depicting Muslims and forming attitudes towards them through the mass media. A series of terrorist attacks, which shocked the world as a whole, hit Europe. France was the most prominent victim: the country suffered an attack on the satirical magazine Charlie Hebdo which left 12 dead on January 7, 2015, and a hostage-taking in a kosher shop in Paris on January 9, 2015. At the end of the year, on November

13, several terrorist attacks were carried out almost simultaneously in Paris and its suburbs: an explosion occurred near the Stade de France during the football match between France and Germany; a group of armed men opened fire on restaurant visitors in 10th and 11th districts of Paris; and the Bataclan concert club, during which 130 people were killed and 350 were injured. Eight jihadists committed the most massive terrorist attacks in the history of France.

As a consequence of the complex psychological state of the French nation and residents of all European countries, serious government measures were taken to ensure security. These measures were followed by extreme decisions, a state of emergency in the country, and ambiguous legislative initiatives (such as the deprivation of French citizenship to persons with dual citizenship of French origin and the banning of the burkini).

This study aimed to analyse the articles published in the online version of the major French newspaper *Le Monde* to study the representation of Muslims in this period. Such a detailed analysis made it possible to delve into the problem within the framework of one newspaper and more accurately determine the images of this religious minority created during this period.

Under the historical context and the experience of the American mass media, it was essential to evaluate and analyse in detail the editorial policies towards religious minorities during the crisis and in the relatively calm period between the tragic events.

2 Research methodology

In order to study the process of forming images of Muslims on the pages of French media, we chose the online version of *Le Monde*, which today is one of the most frequently visited media sites in France (Alexa 2019). The purpose of the study is to examine the representation of Muslims, formed on the pages of *Le Monde* during the period consisting of several terrorist attacks between 2015–2016, as well as the refugee and immigrant crisis. Selected years include the time of reaction to the first tragic event in *Charlie Hebdo*, a critical situation of the migrant influx, and massive, severe terrorist attacks of July and November 2016. The chosen timeline enabled an analysis of the editorial policy in publishing articles about this religious minority in the context of ethnic relations and compare the tone and the topics of texts throughout the period.

To accomplish the tasks mentioned above and achieve the goal, we used mixed-methods content analyses.

The first part of this study shows the results of quantitative content analysis. For this purpose we selected articles published in the online version of the newspaper

Le Monde on ethnic themes by the keywords: "multiculturalism", "stigmatisation", "racism", "nationalism", "intercultural dialogue", "Islamophobia", "Islamophobe", "antisemitism", "Immigration", "immigrant", "migranti", "integration", "assimilation", "minority", "discrimination", and "ghetto". After the articles unrelated to France were excluded, the sample amounted to 617 articles published from 2015 to 2016.

The choice of keywords was motivated by the desire to see the religious topics in the context of ethnic ones to provide a broader and more profound evaluation of the place that Muslims take in French society.

The manifest content of selected articles was coded according to thematic categories found during the reading. As a result, the thematic categories formed three significant groups: Muslims as potential terrorists, the incompatibility of Islamic religious symbols with European values, and Islam as an obstacle to secularism in school.

The quantitative content analysis also included the evaluation of the frequency of articles revealing the number of texts in which the term "Islam" was used together with the word "terrorism". The Google Trends tool was used as a means for a more in-depth quantitative analysis of the content, which made it possible to compare the popularity and exact wording of search queries about the burkini problem with the number of articles on lemonde.fr about this issue.

As a second part, the quantitative data were analysed using qualitative analysis. We turned our attention to key concepts and terms used in the articles related to the three found thematic categories. Besides, the main aim of this part was to define what was not said but implied (latent content). The quantitative content analysis let us determine the number of specific subtopics related to the image of Muslims in France.

The qualitative content analysis included: evaluation of topics and problems in selected articles, analysis of the texts forms, determination of the central theme and its subtopics in each article, as well as analysis of the modality of chosen texts.

As it was mentioned above, these two parts of the content analysis revealed three thematic categories defined by the actors (men, women or children) and two central roles of Muslims: the role of potential criminal and the role of victim.

3 Representation of Muslims in the media

France had the second-largest Muslim population in Europe after Germany in 2015 (McCarthy 2015). That is why when a series of terrorist attacks took place between 2015 and 2016, a tense situation established in the country between ethnic groups and religious representatives. A wave of discussions about Islam and terrorism swept mass media. The topic of cultural cohabitation became the most popular at this time.

It is no secret that terrorist attacks increase citizens' attention toward mass media. According to the report made in the Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe in 2005:

"Modern terrorism is media terrorism. The media are attracted by extreme terrorist acts not only because it is their duty to report on any major event but also because of the dramatic and spectacular aspect of terrorism fascinates the general public. Today's terrorists exploit this and act in a way which will attract maximum attention around the world" (Jařab 2005).

The mass media act as the only source of information in these tragic and frightening circumstances which have a monopoly on the announcement of the causes and consequences of events. Accordingly, the media can promote a particular opinion, which is perceived by consumers as the majority opinion.

According to a study by Elizabeth Poole (2002: 217), mass media are responsible for the creation and development of a negative attitude toward Muslims. The author believes that "its role in the production of institutional and dominant discourses has resulted in the demonisation of Islam, portraying it as a threat to Western interests, and sustaining the ideology necessary to subjugate Muslims both internationally and domestically". The researcher also lists recutting topics within articles relating to Muslims in British media:

1. Attention to the financing of Muslim schools and religious education in them.
2. The desire to legally discriminate Muslims.
3. Attacks on the desire of Muslims to enter politics.
4. Focus on the relationship of Muslim men with non-Muslim women.
5. Extremist activity.

Another researcher, Suhrab Sadiki (2016: 95), noted that the media initially formed the negative concept of Islam in France. A Muslim in the press is a person who comes from a place where this religion is the main one. The researcher put forth the idea that the media do not pay attention to whether this person is a practitioner, a believer, or someone who does not share the principles of this religion.

The French people first encountered Islam during the Islamic Revolution in Iran, at the same time, associations between this religion and war appeared. Headlines in the media that used Islam, war, and cruelty in a single context also provoked this in parallel, and practically equalised both concepts. The wave of Muslim immigration to France during this period creates associations that migrants are connected with the Algerian war in the media. For two decades, in the public sphere, Islam had an image of problems, war, and immigration crisis. Only in the 1990s, the Islamic Salvation Front started to answer popular

questions asked by the French, while new difficulties with migrants living in the suburbs became evident and disquieting.

At this moment, according to Sadiki (2016: 100), the French media conducted lengthy discussions about the necessity of Muslims to “give up their faith to better assimilate”. In the mid-1990s, Islamic radicals appeared and again attracted negative media attention to Islam, which re-established the associative of Islam to cruelty and murder.

After September 11, Islam fell victim to prejudice and fear. Moreover, Muslims became the target of attacks by the Western World. The media blame Islam for irrationality and backwardness of its followers, and for threatening the Western way of life. Media also expressed fears of the clash between Islamic and Western civilisations.

The situation became complicated at the beginning of the 21st century with terrorist attacks in Madrid and London in 2005 and a scandal with cartoons of the prophet Muhammad. The current state of the issue is not much different from what it was 20 years ago. The media are persistent in pointing out Muslims' problems and issues with Islam, continuing to completely or practically ignore the peaceful aspects of the life of this religious minority. They are stepping up their attention to Muslims when terrorist acts occur. Also, because of the coverage only in moments of crisis, some Europeans today believe that all Arabs are Muslims, and all Muslims are bad.

According to *lemonde.fr* articles, media form this indecent image of Islam, and they are to blame for the prejudice against Muslims. In numerous texts published on the website, the accusations of mass media are revealed by readers. The media show people that “Islam is frightening, terribly frightening” (Chemine 2015), they also develop an idea that antimuslim acts are caused by the fear of Islam (Morcuende 2015). These messages stigmatise the Muslim population, converting them into enemies in the eyes of readers.

Diagram 1 presents the topics that are discussed in the texts published on *lemonde.fr* from the sample

Diagram 1. Sub-topics in articles selected by the keywords "Islamophobia," "Islamophobe," "Antisemitism."




Diagram 1 shows that the violence against the Muslim population was the most frequent topic, which is explained by the choice of the keyword with the negative connotation for our website search ("Islamophobia"). The second most popular topic was the formation of a new Islam or the identity of French Muslims. The frequency of articles about terrorism associated with Islamophobia can be explained by the stigmatisation of this social group being suspected of extremist beliefs.

Comparing these results with topics on the keyword "Antisemitism", one can also see that these articles are also related to terrorism. However, the most numerous articles were written about the departure of French Jews to Israel because of the fear of radical Muslims.

4 Representation of Muslims as potential terrorists on lemonde.fr

Articles on the site of the newspaper Le Monde often mention Islam along with terrorism. The constant use of these two terms together leads to their unification in the minds of people. After analysing this phenomenon, we obtained the following results:

1. 118 articles on the site that talk about Islam without mentioning terrorism,
2. The site has 192 articles in which terrorism and Islam are mentioned together.
3. Islam and terrorism are used together in 62% of these 310 articles during the period 2015–2016.

The data obtained in the course of the study allowed us to make a conclusion about the popularity of online requests with words Islam and terrorism. This phenomenon is explained by the modern technology of promoting articles on the Internet: topics that obtained popularity before appear more often in the mass media as these sensationalised topics drive more clicks and advertisement revenue.

Poole (2002) identified one of the most popular topics about Muslims in the British media as “extremist activity”. The same trend is noticeable in coverage of this social group in the online version of the newspaper Le Monde.

Thus, despite the continued development of mass media and the formation of a specific editorial policy towards the topic of Islam in the media, the articles continue to draw a parallel between Islam and terrorism.

The content analyses of articles showed that Muslim men in 2015–2016 appeared as potential terrorists. They are often suspected and accused of involvement in radicalised structures and subjected to physical and psychological abuse. Mass media are trying to explain, with the help of various experts, the fact that terrorists were European citizens. The attitude of society and government bodies toward Muslims is seen as one of the explanations of this phenomenon. Journalists published biographies of terrorists as a method to understand the radicalisation (Suc et al. 2015).

In the summer of 2016, the media “agreed” on the anonymity of the terrorists. Le Monde refused to show photographs of criminals, while the Figaro and Liberation newspapers opposed the decision, considering such publications as part of the press’s objectivity (Houchard 2016).

After the terrorist attacks of January 2015, French society was called upon not to equate Islam to terrorism. However, after the November 2015 attacks, such calls were heard much less frequently, and a general panic followed, various government initiatives concerning minorities were seen as attempts to further

and officially these minority groups. One of these initiatives was the deprivation of citizenship for persons with dual citizenship who were born in France for participating in the organisation of terrorist attacks. This law had already existed in France before 2015; however, with the help of this initiative, state authorities sought to complicate and strengthen measures as well as increase the circle of people included.

The reaction of *Le Monde* to this measure was unequivocal: "Who can seriously agree that a kamikaze, who wants to detonate a bomb in the centre of the crowd, will take care of the loss of precious French citizenship?" (*Le Monde* 2015a). Deprivation of citizenship in this context can lead to new cultural problems. According to *Le Monde*, this decision does not correspond to republican values (Lozes 2016). Such a measure stigmatises French Muslims, especially of African descent (Hamidou 2016).

Thus, in the period 2015–2016, Muslims often appeared in articles on terrorism, which created an association between these two concepts.

5 Representation of Islamic religious symbols as incompatible with European values

In 2015–2016, the Muslim swimsuit complemented the already existing mediatised problem of the Muslim headscarf. In the early 2000s, mass media mostly supported the prohibition of the Muslim veil by inviting specialists who advocated an anti-veil law. Invited opponents of this state decision were represented by women, who were wearing the headscarf, and Muslim men. Thus, the mass media sent a message that only these categories of citizens can be opponents of such a law (Tevanian 2005).

In 2015–2016, Muslim women's clothing items, their desires and role in modern society were discussed in newspapers, magazines and also on television, as such, they became objects of close attention. Political and religious figures, philosophers, and feminists started to argue about the sacred symbols of Muslim women on the pages of mass media. The voices of Muslim women themselves, in this case, were heard only in 1 out of 5 articles on this subject in the newspaper *Le Monde*.

Discussion of religious symbols in the media also attracts public attention to this topic. During the selected period, the burkini ban became a significant media problem.

Burkini, according to the Cambridge Dictionary is: "a piece of women's clothing for swimming is in two pieces, and that covers the whole body except the face, hands, and feet". In August 2016, this topic replaced that of the headscarf bans in educational institutions, as well as various other "religious" symbols that

could be interpreted as “incompatible with the values of the French Republic and secularism”. The burkini confuses political leaders in at least two components. First, some see this clothing as a symbol of enslavement and lack of women’s freedom (an argument feminists also use), and second, this “religious symbol”, according to some local administrations, contradicts the values of the French Republic (which is, for example, secularism and liberty).

The issue of banning the burkini and other distinctive religious clothes is critical and acute in this period. This fact is explained by the reaction to the terrorist attacks, which put the state bodies in a difficult position. The government of the country, like the local authorities, felt that they had to take action to regain public respect.

Sillier Gartlan Hoff (2017) studied the debates on burkini in August 2016 and noted that in a single month the newspaper *Le Monde* published 46 articles on this issue. Our sample included far fewer articles on this topic since we used the website search of *lemonde.fr* through keywords illustrating intercultural communication issues.

The burkini problem arose in connection with the bans of local administrations of 2016, and media catalysed this issue into becoming a discussed topic throughout France. According to the Google Trend service, where we can see indicators of the popularity that a particular keyword has in a given region and period, burkini became a frequent search from mid-July 2016, and its rate only bottomed out again by mid-September 2016. In 2015, the topic almost did not appear in the search.


The requests themselves are worth attention: in 2015, the most frequently searched phrases using the word burkini were “black burkini” (*burkini noir*), “large burkini” (*burkini grande taille*), inexpensive burkini (*burkini pas cher*); in 2016 – “burkini Corsica” (*burkini corse*), “burkini photo” (*burkini photo*), “burkini Nice” (*burkini Nice*), “burkini prohibited” (*burkini interdit*), “burkini Cannes” (*burkini Cannes*), “prohibition of burkini” (*interdiction burkini*), “image of burkini” (*image burkini*), “sisco burkini” (*sisco burkini*), “burkini Marseille” (*burkini Marseille*).

As we can see, the number of popular queries in 2016 connected with the burkini increased, which was associated with the mediatization of this topic. The ban was carried out in the cities listed above. Many people were looking for pictures of burkini swimwear because they did not even know what it was. It suggests that the French did not hold prejudice against the Muslim swimsuit as it had not affected them on their beach holidays, until the media shed light on the problem, turning the discussion into a widely debated issue.

Diagram 2 presents data about the articles on ethnic topics in which we can see the problem of the burkini. The debate about this Muslim swimsuit began

long before the prohibition. However, during the period from March to September 2016, the burkini was discussed more frequently, and the news about the government actions and attempts to find the right solution to the issue appeared consistently.

Diagram 2. The number of articles in which the topic of burkini was discussed in 2015–2016.



Mediatization of the problem associated with the ban of the burkini takes the discussion to the political level. In the articles of this period, reflections on the Muslim bathing suit are called a “war,” as well as a “political problem”. The burkini issue is associated with the violation of legal rights and the values of the French Republic, thus translating it into the sphere of confrontation between the state and the individual. The removal of this topic from the sphere of religion and secularism allows us to speak about Muslim women in the context of gender rights and relations within the state. Opinion texts published on the site express the attitude towards the problem of the burkini as the stigmatization of Muslim women (Heinich 2016). Thus, the articles of the newspaper *Le Monde* allow us to judge the movement towards convergence of Muslims and the rest of society. The formation of a media boom around the problem of the burkini, statements of the Muslim children, and the prohibition of religious symbols in educational institutions bring a significant number of views and visitors to the sites of newspapers. A more extended mediatization was led by the issue of the Muslim veil, which we mentioned above. One of the most elucidating articles written on behalf of the

minority is a selection of stories of those who wear a headscarf (Dryef 2016), was published in August 2016. The authors of the article interviewed ordinary Muslim women in the centre of Paris about their life in France. Thus, the views of Muslim women on the prohibition of wearing a veil were reflected in the newspaper. The text talks about the choice of Muslim women and the perception of society. In addition, the articles contain a discussion of issues connected with tradition, fashion, parents' attitudes to the veil (including negative), and the prejudices of French society, which consider all Muslim women in Muslim headscarves to be terrorists.

Anne Chemin (2016) also cites the views of ordinary Muslim women through brief indirect and direct quotes, revealing the problems they face in everyday life. The most significant part of the article was awarded to the sociologist Nilüfer Göle, who represented an essential part of the movement for the education of Muslim women. Her presence in this article shows how mass media can facilitate dialogue between Muslim intellectuals, who take a serious position and respond to attacks in their direction.

In 2015–2016, this topic of the veil's ban at the university also appeared in articles within the sample. On April 19, 2016, the newspaper published the article "Banning the veil at the university adds a symbolic barrier to thousands of existing ones". The author of the text was Rosa Port-Royal (2016), a doctoral student at the University of Paris-13, who talked about her experiences with Muslim students and expressed her opinion on the banning at the university. The author emphasises that such government actions complicate access to higher education institutions for Muslims, making them feel guilty for the attacks that are associated in society with their faith.

The texts also raise questions of the prejudices of French society, whose members consider all Muslim women in the veil to be radical citizens.

6 Images of Muslim children on lemonde.fr

French schools have been accepting children of migrants from the end of the 19th century, however, based on recent research methods educational establishments have not yet been adapted to the continually renewing flow, and different types of migrants (Rigoni 2017: 40). It is especially difficult for this institution to define the meaning, functions, and type of secularism, which at this stage, everyone interprets in one's way.

School, without a doubt, is a crucial stage in the adjustment and socialisation of children, especially those who are trying to find themselves in a new culture. Our topic does not include criticism of school curricula and the weak representation

of the colonial past in textbooks. However, the theme of clothing, in particular, Muslim, has vague accusations of "too long skirt" (Le Monde 2015b) and other situations, makes us wonder whether government actions to support secularism and anti-discrimination policies are clear and understandable to school workers and journalists who write about these topics.


From the point of view of some specialists, the integration of migrants is complicated by the ignorance of the French colonisation period, as well as the incorrect image of Muslims in history. Articles show opinions about insufficient attention to the history of migration by schools (Battaglia 2015), which leads to an incorrect assessment of this period by children, mixed feelings amongst immigrants, and the stigmatisation of Islam in French textbooks (Collas 2016).

Religion and school, according to the articles published on the website, should be as separated as possible. This statement shows the main idea of a modern secularism policy defended by European intellectuals.

The issue of wearing religious symbols by Muslim children is a problem created specifically by the media (Tevanian 2005: 28). The articles on this topic do not contain the opinions of minorities themselves on this issue or the opinion of experts on wearing a Muslim headscarf in educational institutions (such as Nasira Guénif-Souilamas, the specialist in questions about women with North African roots in France). In the early 2000s, these discussions were held by only ardent opponents of headscarves among feminists and other representatives of various social and philosophical trends on TV and in newspapers (Tevanian 2005: 127).

Diagram 3 shows the number of articles addressed religion and school issues. We can note that the most active periods of coverage of these problems in lemonde.fr are January-March 2015, October-December 2015, and July-September 2016. This issue began to be discussed more frequently during terrorist acts; thus, the discussion was intensified at this time.

It is noteworthy that the very "victims" of discrimination rarely appear in lemonde.fr. Occasionally, the author, expressing his or her opinion, comes to the argument with quotations from Muslims, chosen from the context by herself/himself and confirming the main idea.

Diagram 3. The number of articles with the topic of religion and school.

Much like adult representatives of religious minorities, schoolchildren from this social group appear on the website from two sides: as the victims of the system and their misfortune or as hostile to French civil and social school laws. Immigrant children, most of whom belong to the Muslim culture, are often portrayed as unwilling to participate in the educational process (Baumier-Klarsfeld 2016) or unable to study for various reasons: they belong to a generation of immigrants (Battaglia and Collas 2016), and the French education system eliminates the motivation to study by discriminating and stigmatising them (Vincent 2016).

Some authors think that the blame for the lack of knowledge lies with the French schooling system, which cannot adapt to the reception of children from other countries (Baumard 2015). *Le Monde* often publishes articles about inequality in schools (Vincent 2016) and poor performance of immigrant pupils and workers. Such indicators stigmatise members of minorities, turning them into objects of statistics. This kind of social division creates conflict. These people are seen as an abstract media image of an immigrant, in which the minorities do not recognise themselves. On the other hand, the media could be a platform for dialogue. By using this platform, the majority and minority could resolve their issues.

The problems of Muslim children are often mediated, especially during the period 2015–2016, when society carefully monitored Islam.

Le Monde published articles about the arrests of children who expressed their radical views at school. In this case, the teacher, having heard such statements by the children, had to inform the school principal, who, in turn, had to decide:

to resolve the problem at the local level or to call the police. Notifying authorities is an extreme measure, which several teachers went to during the terrorist attacks, bypassing the necessary procedures. All this speaks of universal fear, which was directed against Muslims and other minorities. Thus, a teacher who was supposed to play his role as a "mediator between cultures" (Le Monde 2015c) became a servant of the law. Articles dedicated to this issue published exact quotes from children who "support terrorists."

Less mediatised, but also problematic, is the question of a pork-free menu for Muslim children in schools. Some local authorities (the mayor of the city of Chalon-sur-Saône) in France (Le Monde 2015d) tried to ban these meals, as they contradict the principles of secularism (Le Temps 2015).

7 Conclusion

The coverage of Muslims' life in a country where it is not the main one, has changed since the terrorist attacks of September 11. This date was a turning point in the perception of Islam; it complicated the problems of stigmatisation of this religion's representatives. One of the leading conductors of questions and answers in society is the mass media. They have the right to choose what story to tell, and how to prevent the current crisis and attacks on a specific category of the population under challenging circumstances. The image of the enemy, the one who disturbed the peace of the population and came to the peaceful life of people with war, is expected from the mass media during terrorist acts. Despite the fact that almost 20 years have passed since September 11, the mass media has not formed an editorial policy concrete enough to cover such incidents in order to avoid attacks and discrimination of Muslims in the country.

In its online version of the newspaper, Le Monde continues to accuse the mass media of prejudice against Muslims. The media construct the image of Islam, engendering fear of this religion, and creating prejudice.

The Muslim issue is portrayed in the media within the context of terrorist attacks in Europe between 2015 and 2016. The existence of Islamic radicalism is explained by a lack of recognition and a feeling of alienation. However, the media do not offer a way out of this situation, continuing to portray this problem as relevant, problematic and unsolvable. Positive articles on Islam are more likely to show a peaceful "branch" of this religion, speaking of modern Muslims as an exception, contrasting them against religious fanatics.

The opinion of Muslim women is practically not visible on the pages of Le Monde, while representatives of the majority often argue about Islamic symbols. Islam appears alongside terrorism in more than 50% of texts, even if they are not dedicated to the attacks of radicals.

During the period 2015–2016, in the online version of the newspaper *Le Monde*, Islam was discussed continuously along with issues relating to Muslim symbols and problems of communitarianism and secularism. Thus, Muslims appear in the newspaper as a religious minority trying to fight the existing problems in the new state. An interesting fact was that the themes coincide in the studies of different countries: Muslims continue to be portrayed together with extremism and terrorism, and they are condemned for wanting to enter politics and to finance religious education.

During the period of terrorist attacks in Europe in 2015–2016, the image of Muslims on *lemonde.fr* was constructed by mediatization of several events connected with them.

These events can be separated into three main groups: Muslims as potential terrorists, the incompatibility of Islamic religious symbols with European values, and Islam as an obstacle to secularism in school. Muslims on the pages of the newspaper were represented as victims of discrimination or as criminals.

Muslim men were mostly accused and were punished by anti-Muslim acts. In some articles, discrimination of Muslims was seen as one of the reasons for extremist actions. The attitude of the people and government of France to these children of an immigrant generation often explained in *lemonde.fr* the fact that terrorists were born and raised in France. Several articles during this period revealed the biography of terrorists could be seen as attempts to find the reason of radicalisation in actions of society itself. However, these articles also targeted Muslims as potential terrorists.

Religious symbols became the second topic that was connected with Muslims during the chosen period in *lemonde.fr*. The number of articles and constant appeal to the opinion of the French nationalist party led the readers to a conclusion about the incompatibility of Islam traditions (especially in clothing) with Republican values.

The media complete their image of Muslims by showing children who “approved terrorists’ actions.” Moreover, female Muslim pupils have the same problems as women with religious symbols, which are seen as impossible to support in French secular school.

Among all the articles revealing problems that Islam creates in French society, there are texts about representatives of this religion who feel like a part of France and live according to its laws. They try to convince non-Muslims that terrorism has no connection with real faith and religious canons.

The desire for mediatization of potentially popular topics creates a misleading image of ethnic and religious minorities, especially during a difficult period in the world’s history.

Muslims are a large part of French society; however, they are not considered as equals in the media and often seen as a threat or an obstacle to the secular and democratic life of the country. The media, in this case, instead of maintaining peace and creating communicational possibilities, produce new problems which have a short-term limited duration but long-term consequences for social stability and intercultural coexistence.

Bibliography

- Alsultany, Evelyn (2013): Arabs and Muslims in the Media after 9/11: Representational Strategies for a "Postrace" Era. *American Quarterly*, 65 (1): 161–169. Maryland: The Johns Hopkins University Press.
- Poole, Elisabeth (2002): *Reporting Islam: Media representations of British Muslims*. London: I.B.Tauris.
- Rigoni, Isabelle (2017): Accueillir les élèves migrants : dispositifs et interactions à l'école publique en France. *Alterstice: Revue internationale de la recherche interculturelle*, 7 (1): 39–50.
- Sadiki, Suhrah (2016): Islamophobia v amerikanskih SMI. In M. Al'-Djanabi (ed.): *Islamophobia: 80–102*. Moskva: OOO Sandra.
- Tevanian, Pierre (2005): *Le voile médiatique. Un faux débat: l'affaire du foulard islamique*. Paris: Éditions Raisons d'agir.

Sources

- Hoff, Silje, G. (2017): *Le débat sur le burkini dans la presse française. Le médiatique à travers cadrage l'échiquier politique*. Master thesis. Available from: <https://ntnuopen.ntnu.no/ntnu-xmlui/handle/11250/2455495>. (Accessed 1.06.2019).
- Jařab, Josef (2005): Committee on Culture, Science and Education. Report of Committee on Culture, Science and Education. Available from: <https://assembly.coe.int/nw/xml/XRef/X2H-Xref-ViewHTML.asp?FileID=10914&lang=EN>. (Accessed 1.06.2019).

Web pages

- Alexa (2015): *Lemonde.fr Competitive Analysis, Marketing Mix and Traffic*. Available from: <https://www.alexa.com/siteinfo/lemonde.fr> (Accessed 1.06.2019).
- Battaglia, Matteo (2015): *L'histoire de l'immigration, grande oubliée des nouveaux programmes du collège?* Available from: https://lemonde.fr/education/article/2015/11/26/l-histoire-de-l-immigration-grande-oubliee-des-nouveaux-programmes-du-college_4817546_1473685.html (Accessed 1.06.2019).
- Battaglia, Matteo, and Collas, Aurélie (2016): *Inégalités scolaires : pour les enfants d'immigrés, une double discrimination*. Available from: https://www.lemonde.fr/education/article/2016/09/27/inegalites-scolaires-pour-les-enfants-d-immigres-une-double-discrimination_5004118_1473685.html (Accessed 1.06.2019).

- Baumard, Marilyne (2015): La maîtrise du français, facteur clé de l'insertion des enfants d'immigrés. Available from: https://lemonde.fr/societe/article/2015/03/02/la-maitrise-du-francais-facteur-cle-de-l-insertion-des-enfants-d-immigres_4585879_3224.html (Accessed 1.06.2019).
- Baumier-Klarsfeld, Agnes (2016): Intégration des jeunes étrangers en France: "une organisation scolaire inadaptée provoque échec et rancœur". Available from: https://www.lemonde.fr/idees/article/2016/09/27/integration-des-jeunes-etrangers-en-france-une-organisation-scolaire-inadaptee-provoque-echec-et-ranc-ur_5004201_3232.html?xtmc=integration_france&xtcr=56 (Accessed 1.06.2019).
- Chemin, Anne (2015): L'islamophobe est-il un raciste comme les autres? Available from: https://www.lemonde.fr/societe/article/2015/02/26/l-islamophobe-est-il-un-raciste-comme-les-autres_4584090_3224.html (Accessed 1.06.2019).
- Chemin, Anne (2016): Le voile sous toutes les coutures. Available from: https://lemonde.fr/idees/article/2016/09/29/le-voile-sous-toutes-les-coutures_5005415_3232.html?xtmc=islamophobie_france&xtcr=4 (Accessed 1.06.2019).
- Collas, Aurélie (2016): L'islam stigmatisé dans les manuels scolaires. Available from: https://lemonde.fr/religions/article/2016/01/09/l-islam-stigmatise-dans-le-manuels-scolaires_4844401_1653130.html?xtmc=immigration_france&xtcr=17 (Accessed 1.06.2019).
- Dryef, Zineb (2016): Une vie de jeune fille voilée. Available from: https://lemonde.fr/m-actu/article/2016/05/20/une-vie-de-jeune-fille-voilee_4923376_4497186.html?xtmc=immigre_france&xtcr=5 (Accessed 1.06.2019).
- Hamidou, Anne (2016): Déchéance de nationalité : "Pourquoi la France veut-elle nous imposer ses monstres?" Available from: http://www.lemonde.fr/afrique/article/2016/01/14/pourquoi-la-france-veut-elle-nous-imposer-se-monstres_4847233_3212.html?xtmc=immigration_france&xtcr=23 (Accessed 1.06.2019).
- Heinich, Nathalie (2016): Burkini: Il faut combattre le prosélytisme extrémiste et le sexisme. Available from: https://lemonde.fr/idees/article/2016/08/30/il-faut-combattre-le-proselytismeextrémiste-et-le-sexisme_4989810_3232.html (Accessed 1.06.2019).
- Houchard, Béatrice (2016): L'anonymat des terroristes divise la presse française. Available from: <https://www.letemps.ch/monde/lanonymat-terroristes-divise-presse-francaise> (Accessed 1.06.2019).
- Le Monde (2015a): Déchéance de nationalité: attention, danger. Available from: http://www.lemonde.fr/idees/article/2015/12/02/decheance-de-nationalite-attention-danger_4822246_3232.html?xtmc=integration_france&xtcr=3 (Accessed 1.06.2019).
- Le Monde (2015b): Nouvelle polémique sur une jupe longue au lycée. Available from: https://lemonde.fr/religions/article/2015/05/06/nouvelle-polemique-sur-une-jupe-longue-au-lycee_4628972_1653130.html?xtmc=islamophobie_france&xtcr=3 (Accessed 1.06.2019).
- Le Monde (2015c): De part et d'autre de l'Atlantique, l'école à la peine face aux identités plurielles. Available from: https://www.lemonde.fr/idees/article/2015/02/19/de-part-et-d-autre-de-l-atlantique-l-ecole-a-la-peine-face-aux-identites-plurielles_4579858_3232.html?xtmc=integration_france&xtcr=35 (Accessed 1.06.2019).

- Le Monde (2015d): Le maire de Chalon-sur-Saône supprime le menu de substitution à la cantine. Available from: http://www.lemonde.fr/politique/article/2015/03/17/le-maire-de-chalon-sur-saone-supprime-le-menu-de-substitution-a-la-cantine_4595188_823448.html?xtmc=stigmatisation&xtcr=48 (Accessed 1.06.2019).
- Le Temps (2015): A Chalon, le menu sans porc est une atteinte à la laïcité. Available from: <https://www.letemps.ch/monde/chalon-menu-porc-une-atteinte-laicite> (Accessed 1.06.2019).
- Lozes, Patrick (2016): Mieux vaudrait une déchéance pour tous. Available from: http://www.lemonde.fr/idees/article/2016/01/07/mieux-vaudrait-une-decheance-pour-tous_4843427_3232.html?xtmc=discrimination_france&xtcr=224 (Accessed 1.06.2019).
- McCarthy, Nial (2015): Europe's largest Muslim populations. Available from: <https://www.statista.com/chart/3338/europes-largest-muslim-populations/><https://www.statista.com/chart/3338/europes-largest-muslim-populations/> (Accessed 1.06.2019).
- Morcuende, Adrian (2015) : Islam, voile, immigration... Les désaccords de Rachida Dati avec son camp. Le Monde. Available from: http://www.lemonde.fr/politique/article/2015/07/07/islam-voile-immigration-les-desaccords-de-rachida-dati-avec-son-camp_4674054_823448.html?xtmc=stigmatisation&xtcr=92 (Accessed 1.06.2019).
- Port-Royal, Rosa (2016): L'interdiction du voile à l'université ajouterait une barrière symbolique aux mille existantes. Available from: https://lemonde.fr/idees/article/2016/04/19/l-interdiction-du-voile-a-l-universite-ajouterait-une-barriere-symbolique-aux-mille-existantes_4904895_3232.html?xtmc=stigmatisation&xtcr=191 (Accessed 1.06.2019).
- Suc, Matthieu, et al. (2015): Les frères Kouachi et Coulibaly, des pionniers du djihadisme français. Available from: http://www.lemonde.fr/societe/article/2015/01/10/des-pionniers-du-djihadisme-francais_4553301_3224.html?xtmc=ghetto_france&xtcr=110 (Accessed 1.06.2019).
- Vincent, Catherine (2016): Ecole: pourquoi les garçons issus de l'immigration ont autant de mal. Available from: https://www.lemonde.fr/immigration-et-diversite/article/2016/01/28/ecole-pourquoi-les-garcons-issus-de-l-immigration-ont-autant-de-mal_4855509_1654200.html (Accessed 1.06.2019).

Authors' data

Polina Shevchenko, Specialist degree in Journalism of Lomonosov Moscow State University, Master degree in Information and Communication of Sorbonne Nouvelle III University in Paris, Ph.D. student (Aspirantura) at Lomonosov Moscow State University
Lomonosov Moscow State University, Journalism Department
Mokhovaya 9, Moscow, 125009, Russia
e-mail: Polinshevchenko@gmail.com



RECENZIJJE KNJIG
BOOK REVIEWS



Jasmina Šepetavc

**Roman Kuhar in David Paternotte (ur.):
Anti-Gender Campaigns in Europe: Mobilizing against Equality.
Rowman & Littlefield International, Ltd., Lanham, Maryland in
London, 2017 (trda vezava)/2018 (mehka vezava).
292 str. (ISBN 978-1-78348-999-2), 38,54 EUR**

Zbornik *Anti-Gender Campaigns in Europe: Mobilizing against Equality* stanje sodobne Evrope opisuje tragično natančno. Knjiga gre onkraj svojega naslova in fokusa na spol oz. pokaže, da je zasebno še kako politično in da je postalo v zadnjih letih verjetno najmočnejše mobilizacijsko orodje skrajne desnice. Delo je tako v prvi vrsti izjemno potrebno mapiranje nacionalnih in mednarodnih kontekstov, v katerih so skupine, ki se borijo proti t. i. »ideologiji spola«, vzniknile, dobile družbeno pozornost in uspele bolj ali manj vplivati na družbeno-politično vzdušje v posameznih evropskih državah. Knjiga predstavi dvanajst študij primera, ki temeljijo na analizah zgodovinskih, političnih in kulturnih dejavnikov vzpona opisanih konservativnih skupin. Opisane študije zajemajo Avstrijo, Belgijo, Hrvaško, Francijo, Nemčijo, Madžarsko, Irsko, Italijo, Poljsko, Rusijo, Slovenijo in Španijo. Dve poglavji sta namenjeni urednikoma, ki v uvodu bralce sistematično vodita skozi temeljne vsebinske poudarke, v zaključnem poglavju pa vsa poglavja sintetizirata v primerjalni analizi med državami. Čeravno imamo večji del knjige opravljen s posameznimi nacionalnimi analizami, vsi avtorji opozorijo na pomembnost mednarodnih povezav nacionalnih skupin. Ključen prispevek knjige je opozorilo, da posameznih dogodkov ne smemo gledati izolirano, jih pripisati posameznim državam (ki jim radi pripišemo še pejorativno vrednost »zaostalega« Balkana ali Vzhoda); s tem bi gibanja proti »ideologiji spola« resno podcenjevali. Poanta, poskuša pokazati zbornik, ni le v spremembi družbenega ozračja v posameznih državah, ki je v zadnjih letih omogočila, da se je denimo sredi središča Ljubljane lahko vrtel film proti splavu, da je francoska legalizacija istospolnih porok vzpodbudila množične proteste po francoskih mestih ali da je boj proti »ideologiji spola« v Rusiji naletel na vsesplošno javno odobravanje in našel svoj prostor v akademski sferi. Srž argumenta zbornika, ki bralko najbolj pretrese, je mednarodna usklajenost akcij, neverjetna prilagodljivost in organiziranost njegovih ključnih akterjev, ki v razprševanju homofobnih, transfobnih in seksističnih diskurzov uporabljajo vedno nove strategije, tehnologije in zaveznišтва, ki so v tistem trenutku najbolj smotrna.

Konservativne skupine, opisane v posameznih študijah primerov, trdijo, da se borijo proti t. i. »ideologiji spola«, ki navadno zajema boj proti spolni enakosti in pravicam LGBT oseb, bolj specifično proti splavu, umetni oploditvi, nadomestnemu materinstvu, istospolnim porokam, posvojitvi otrok za istospolne pare, spolni vzgoji v šolah in učenju študij spolov v akademskem okolju ipd. Kot nekomu, ki je odraščal v poosamosvojitveni Sloveniji in v medijih skozi leta poslušal teorije zarote o komunističnih bunkerjih v spalnem naselju ljubljanskih Murgel – podoba, ki jo je zabavno »potrolal« Lovro Matič v

svojem epskem stripu Sokol in golobica –, se je ideja skrivnih sestankov in skupin, ki sprevačajo demokratične temelje, vedno zdela nekoliko bolj na strani fikcije kot realnosti. A pričujoči zbornik pokaže, da te skupine zares obstajajo, le da so se v paranoji pred tem, da bi »gejevski«, »feministični« ali »komunistični« lobi »dosegel svoje« – v kontekstu paranoičnega diskurza je to po navadi izbris spola, »preveč« emancipirane ženske, sprevačanje otrok v brezspolne homoseksualce in splav za vse – oblikovale ravno na desnici. Definicije »ideologije spola« se berejo kot fiktivna blodnja – sploh če si predstavljamo, kot si predstavljajo nekateri od skrajno konservativnih aktivistov, da feministični lobi vodi Judith Butler – če ne bi bile tako resne in potentne: težava je namreč, da skrajno konservativni aktivisti v svojem diskurzu uporabljajo argumente, ki jim je težko oporekati. Kot je na primer teoretično pokazal že Lee Edelman v knjigi *No Future*, figura otroka, ki ga je domnevno treba zaščititi in je definiran kot »naša prihodnost«, v javnem političnem diskurzu zavzema posebno mesto onkraj možnosti kritike: »Otrok ostaja večni horizont vsake priznane politike, fantazmatski upravičenec vsake politične intervencije« (2004: 3). Te intervencije, pravi Edelman, pa so fiksirano heteronormativne, kar je najbolj vidno ravno pri anksioznosti glede odraščanja otroka, za katerega še ne vemo, ali bo odrasla_el v heteroseksualko_ca: ko skrajno konservativni aktivisti govorijo o zaščiti otrok, jih »ščitijo« pred homoseksualnostjo; ko govorijo, da gre za otroke, govorijo o specifični prihodnosti, ki jo Edelman imenuje »reproduktivni futurizem«, torej o ohranitvi specifičnega patriarhalnega in heteronormativnega reda v prihodnosti. Če bi nas zdravorazumski vzgib peljal v smer sklepa, da gre za nižje razrede, ki jih je zadnja ekonomska kriza najbolj prizadela in ki se poskušajo oklepiti še zadnjih družbenih privilegijev, primerjalna analiza pokaže, da stvari niso tako enoznačne. V Franciji na primer jedro aktivistov sestavljajo bogatejši konservativni katoliki, v Rusiji akademiki in celo nekaj milijarderjev. Niti ni enoznačna povezava med gibanji proti »ideologiji spola« in religijo: v večini opisanih primerov je pomembna akterka boja proti spolni enakosti in enakosti seksualnih manjšin nedvomno Rimskokatoliška cerkev, v Rusiji pa tudi Ruska pravoslavna cerkev. A če v Rusiji ni težave s polarizacijo med cerkvijo in javnostjo, ki se glede neenakosti za manjšine in ženske strinjata, pa se vidnost vpletanja RKC v skrajno konservativni aktivizem med državami razlikuje glede na javno (ne)zaupanje ljudi v RKC, ki so jo v zadnjih letih zajeli finančni škandali in razkritje množičnih zlorab otrok, žensk itd. Medtem ko na primer na Poljskem ali v Italiji Cerkev še vedno uživa ugled, so se drugod skrajno konservativne skupine namenoma »rebrandale« v civilna združenja »zaskrbljenih državljanov in staršev«, ki imajo v realnosti še vedno močne religiozne povezave. Cerkev tudi ni homogena združba, znotraj nje pa se bijejo boji med bolj konservativnimi in bolj liberalnimi strujami, nemalokrat ravno skozi mobilizacijo pod označbo »ideologije spola«. Zanimiva je tudi mnogovrstna uporaba islama v konservativnih diskurzih, ki jo avtorice_ji nakažejo, bi pa zahtevala verjetno svojo analizo: medtem ko se islamske organizacije v večini držav niso aktivno mobilizirale proti »ideologiji spola«, je v konservativnih diskurzih nekaterih držav islam poleg »totalitarizma spola« postavljen v prvo vrsto groženj evropskim vrednotam kot, paradokсно, ravno tisti, ki naj bi ogrožal enakost Evropejk in LGBT oseb, ki naj bi bile – ko je to politično priročno – pomembne evropske vrednote.

V času, ko pišem to recenzijo, je skrajno desna španska politična stranka Vox prvič vstopila v španski parlament s 24 poslanci. Isti teden je portal Open Democracy (Provost in Ramsey 2019) objavil podatke o madridski skupini CitizenGo, najbolj poznani po svojih spletnih kampanjah proti splavu, istospolnim porokam in spolni vzgoji mladostnikov, za katero se je izkazalo, da je mnogo več kot le manjša skupina v Španiji: organizacija naj bi s pomočjo skrajno konservativnih in bogatih ameriških in ruskih podpornikov (so)koordinirala ter finančno podpirala kampanje skrajne desnice v Evropi. Zakaj je to pomembno za pričujoči zbornik? Med prispevki, ki opisujejo in analizirajo stanje kampanj proti »ideologiji spola« v posameznih evropskih državah, najdemo tudi španski primer, v katerem Monica Cornejo in José Ignacio Pichardo Galán optimistično pišeta o razmeroma šibki mobilizacijski moči skupin, ki se borijo proti spolni enakosti, splavu, pravicah LGBT populacije in spolni vzgoji. To malo moč pripisujeta »popularnemu antiklerikalizmu«, ki so mu botrovali povezanost Cerkve in Francovega režima, množična sprejetost sekularnih vrednot in to, da stranke, ki se borijo proti »ideologiji spola«, nimajo predstavnikov na regionalni ali nacionalni ravni. Španija, ki je poleg Irske edina država z močno katoliško sredino in legalizirano poroko homoseksualnih parov ter je bila v času pisanja zbornika eden bolj spodbudnih primerov, utegne v prihodnjih letih postati učna demonstracija, da doseganje pridobljenih pravic za manjšine in ženske nikoli ni nepovratno.

Literatura

Edelman, Lee (2004): *No Future: Queer Theory and the Death Drive*. Durham in London: Duke University Press.

Provost, Claire in Adam Ramsey (2019): *Revealed: the Trump-linked 'Super PAC' working behind the scenes to drive Europe's voters to the far right*. Dostopno prek: <https://www.opendemocracy.net/en/5050/revealed-the-trump-linked-super-pac-working-behind-the-scenes-to-drive-europes-voters-to-the-far-right/> (27. 4. 2019).

Marko Ribac

**Charles Wright Mills: Sociološka imaginacija.
Ljubljana: Fakulteta za družbene vede, 2018.
259 strani (ISBN 978-961-235-839-6), 21,00 EUR.**

Za največje sociološke klasike, predvsem pa za velika sociološka imena 20. stoletja je značilno, da so poleg svojih analitičnih in empiričnih del (nekakšnih *thèse principale*) objavili tudi poglobljene epistemološke in metateoretske refleksije svojega dela, nekakšne metodološke *thèse complémentaire*, ki so spremljale objave njihovih empiričnih analiz. Mesto, ki ga v opusu Pierra Bourdieuja potemtakem zaseda zbornik *Le Metier de sociologue*, v delih Norberta Eliasa knjiga *On Sociology* ali kar je v zapuščini Zygmunta Baumana njegova *Thinking Sociologically*, je v opusu Charlesa Wrighta Millsa monografija *Sociološka imaginacija*. Millsova klasika, napisana jasno in enostavno, točno tako, kot je sam zahteval od sociologov in sociologinj, je v grobem razdeljena na dva (večja) tematska dela: v prvem delu (2.–6. poglavje) poskuša sociološko imaginacijo locirati v polju, ki ga zamejuje dialektična enotnost temeljnih družbenih antinomij (posameznik – struktura; metoda – teorija ipd.) in prečijo ključne razprave vede (npr. razprava o pomenu vrednot v raziskovanju; razprava o intelektualnem in praktičnem angažmaju znanstvenic in znanstvenikov ipd.). V drugem delu knjige (7.–10. poglavje) na podlagi analize dejanskega stanja v družboslovju Mills opredeli koordinate in parametre ključne sintagme njegovega dela: sociološke imaginacije. Ali kot pravi sam: po obravnavi nekaterih značilnejših odklonov v družboslovju (od 2. do 6. poglavja) se v nadaljevanju (od 7. do 10. poglavja) vrača k njegovemu potencialu (str. 55). Rdečo nit Millsove klasike je zato na omejenem mestu, ki je na voljo v recenziji, najbolje zamejiti v tri ključne in najpomembnejše razprave, ki jih bom izpostavil v nadaljevanju. Te tri edinstvene točke v polemiki s ključnimi antinomijami družboslovja tudi vzpostavljajo *Sociološko imaginacijo* kot kanonizirano klasiko znotraj sociološke tradicije.

Prva ključna točka je Millsova opredelitev specifičnega empiričnega in normativnega družbenega fenomena, ki ga poimenuje sociološka imaginacija. Ta je pravzaprav nekakšna vzpostavljena in trajna intelektualna dispozicija, etos, orientacija, izkušnja ali »lastnost uma« (str. 37). Tisti ali tista, ki ima sociološko imaginacijo, razume sociozgodovinsko realnost, razume, kako sociozgodovinski dejavniki strukturirajo številne institucionalne rede (družine, vere, vojske, ekonomije ipd.) in miljeje, ki nas obkrožajo, razume povezave med njimi (str. 37, 42) in razume, kako strukturirajo naše neposredne in notranje svetove ali biografije. Vzpostavljanje habitusa s sociološko imaginacijo je tako socializacija v družboslovno zgodovino in sociološko tradicijo, vzpostavljena imaginacija pa rezultat intelektualnega napora družbenih ved. Zato Mills kasneje v knjigi razvije tudi seznam praktičnih tehnik, ki sociološko imaginacijo kultivirajo in privzgapajo (str. 242–247). Ker je pojem postal del splošne sociološke govornice, se z nereflktirano vsakdanjo rabo (ki postane fraza) in pozabo njegovih ključnih dimenzij izgubljajo tudi njegove ključne lastnosti. Zato velja ob tem izpostaviti vsaj dva Millsova poudarka.

Sociološka imaginacija ni omejena na tiste, ki so končali in končale študij sociologije, še manj se omejuje zgolj na tiste, ki jo predavajo (gl. str. 46 in 50). Sociološka imaginacija ob tem ni zgolj *ena* v nizu dispozicij, političnih ali znanstvenih ideologij, temveč *poglavitna* lastnost uma, ki obljublja udejanjanje razuma v človeških zadevah (str. 46).

Druga ključna točka monografije je razprava o treh koordinatnih točkah, ki omogočajo ustrezno preučevanje družbenih fenomenov. Mills to razpravo odpre tam, kjer se vrne k potencialom družboslovja, tj. v 8. poglavju svoje knjige. Trdi, da družboslovje lahko (in mora) ključna empirična vprašanja postavljati na križišču najpomembnejših spoznanj posameznih družboslovnih intelektualnih tradicij. »Psihološka vprašanja družbenih ved« (str. 190) ter »zgodovinsko raznovrstnost« (str. 176) je treba postavljati znotraj problemskega področja, ki osebne biografije misli v vzajemnem razmerju z zgodovino, to razmerje pa nujno znotraj dinamike družbenih struktur. Le v tako oblikovanem zgodovinskem kontekstu, znotraj družbenih struktur, lahko ustrezno preučimo empirično raznovrstnost vzpostavljenih oblik historičnih skupnosti in psihičnih procesov, ki strukturirajo človeka in njegove možnosti: od malih predkapitalističnih ali nekapitalističnih skupnosti do ustaljenih in trajnih poklicnih miljejev, od enostavnih institucionalnih redov do skupnosti, ki se diferencirajo znotraj strukturne in politične forme, ki ji rečemo nacionalna država.

Tretja točka, ki jo moram izpostaviti, je posebej pomembna za pisca pričujoče recenzije, vajenca raziskovalne obrti. Govorim o razpravi, ki sledi vsebinskemu delu knjige in zaključuje metateoretsko razpravo o sociološki imaginaciji, tj. o Dodatku o intelektualnem mojstrstvu (str. 225–256). Gre za del knjige, ki je napisana v obliki pogovora, na razpotju med nasvetom in sociološko refleksijo. Mills tu razvije izredno dragoceno razpravo o mnogih nalogah in dimenzijah intelektualne produkcije, ki ji pravimo družboslovno raziskovanje: o samem raziskovalnem procesu (str. 226–228 in 240–241), o prijavljanju raziskovalnih projektov (str. 227), o branju (str. 229 in 241), o pisanju (str. 250–251), o predstavljanju rezultatov svojega dela (str. 253), o praktičnih tehnikah in načinih, ki spodbujajo sociološko imaginacijo (str. 242–247). Tako ne dobimo le fragmentov in zgodovinskega vpogleda v delo klasika sociologije, temveč tudi ilustracijo njegovih intelektualnih veščin ter neposredne dokaze o visoki stopnji refleksije, ki jo je imel. Ta del Millsa vzpostavlja kot klasika, ki je hkrati tudi mentor, ki poskuša sociologe in sociologinje socializirati v raziskovalno prakso in poklic na način, da ti postanejo resnični znanstveniki in znanstvenice (ne pa tehniki, faktografski prenašalci oziroma prenašalke znanja in teoretskih fragmentov, agensi dominacije ter hierarhij ipd.).

Tako Mills »natančno, strokovno, ekonomično in jasno« (str. 250) opravi pot od definicije sociološke imaginacije (teza) preko kritike slepih peg intelektualnih družboslovnih tradicij (antiteza) do vzpostavitve ključnih koordinat družboslovja, ki je praktična materializacija sociološke imaginacije (sinteza). Toda ali znotraj te daljnosežne obrambe in utemeljitve sociološke vede obstaja kaj, kar je Millsu ušlo? Pozornega bralca in bralko definitivno zmoti, da ameriški sociolog ne razvije poglobljene in argumentirane razprave o praktičnem doseganju avtonomije v družboslovju, pa čeprav je jasno, da se tega problema zaveda (gl. str. 197–200) in (moralno) avtonomijo postavi celo za temeljni problem družboslovja (str. 207). Vprašanje avtonomije je namreč v

samem bistvu imanentno povezano z razpravo o doseganju ključnih političnih idealov družboslovja: svobode in razuma. Ravno tu je Mills premalo materialističen in ekspliciten, zato prevečkrat ostaja normativen in abstrakten – brez navezave na »patologije profesionalizacije« (Burawoy, str. 27) ali ozko specializacijo družboslovnih disciplin. Ključnega cilja – dejanskega udejanjanja tako svobode kot razuma ne formulira kot rešitev, ki jo moramo navezati na problematiko *boja* – za (znanstveno) avtonomijo – ali *razmerij moči*, ki jo omejujejo.

Rekel bi, da Millsovi argumenti, razviti v *Sociološki imaginaciji*, danes niso nič posebnega (izjema je njegov Dodatek o intelektualnem mojstrstvu). Vse temeljne antinomije družboslovja, ki jih prikaže, so (vsaj na papirju) dobro znane in v polju epistemologije družboslovja sistematično razdelane. Če nas zanimajo kompleksnejše epistemološke razprave vede, je celo bolje, če v roke vzamemo refleksije socioloških antinomij, ki so jih obdelali Bauman, Bourdieu ali Elias. Toda vprašanje Millsove poante ni v sami razdelavi vprašanj in razvijanju kompleksnosti sociologije, temveč v praktičnih učinkih, ki bi jih morala imeti vsebina njegove knjige. Knjiga je bolj nevarna, če/ko v njej razdelana načela razumemo in jih začnemo udejanjati v znanstveni *praksi* (kot so to storili Millsovi bralci Bourdieu, Elias in Baumann). Takrat lahko (z ustreznim preučevanjem, poznavanjem in preobračanjem tradicije) nekdo, ki je kultiviran v sociološko imaginacijo, povzroči prelom z birokratsko logiko in etosom, ki prežema številne raziskovalne institucije, ter stori rez s kanonizirano neumnostjo, ki jo reproducirajo akademske klike. V znanstveni praksi Millsova knjiga lahko pomaga omogočiti »revolucije« (Kuhn, 1998) v družboslovju, prakticanje razuma in svobode v zgodovini ali zagotovi resnični napredek znanosti, ki jih šest desetletij po izdaji njegove knjige onemogočajo avtomatizem birokracije in slepa reprodukcija logik scientizma.

Literatura

Kuhn, Thomas (1998): *Struktura znanstvenih revolucij*. Ljubljana: Krtina.

Polona Sitar

Ana Tominc: *The Discursive Construction of Class and Lifestyle: Celebrity chef cookbooks in post-socialist Slovenia*. Amsterdam, Philadelphia: John Benjamins Publishing Company, 2017. 174 strani (ISBN 978 90 272 0666 4), 99 EUR

Čeprav so od zgodnjih 80. let prejšnjega stoletja dalje mnogi_e sociologi_nje napovedovali_e konec razredov zaradi družbenih sprememb, povezanih s postmodernizmom, globalizacijo in individualizacijo, je v zadnjih letih mnogo avtorjev_ic zavzelo stališče, da je analiza razreda še kako aktualna. To dokazuje tudi pričujoča knjiga Ane Tominc o diskurzivni konstrukciji razreda in življenjskega stila na primeru kuharskih knjig in oddaj, ki se pokaže za aktualno temo v poplavi sodobnih kuharskih življenjskostilnih oddaj in resničnostnih šovov.

Temeljni argument knjige je, da so življenjski stili neločljivo povezani z družbenim razredom. Avtorica ugotavlja, da je družbeni razred opredeljen s simbolnimi pomeni, ki mu jih pripišemo – z okusom, oblačili, umetnostjo, hrano itd., kar Pierre Bourdieu (2002) umešča pod kulturni kapital. Življenjski stil poraja simbolne meje in prispeva k neenakosti, saj jih pomaga reproducirati skozi statusni simbol. Kot opozarja Couldry (2011: 34), se moramo osredotočiti ne le na reprodukcijo razreda, ampak tudi na njegovo »naturalizacijo«. Avtorica najprej analizira standardne slovenske kuharske knjige iz let 1980 in 1990, ki so zasidrane v strokovnih nasvetih ideologije znanosti o prehranjevanju, kasneje pa se loti še analize »slavnih« kuharskih knjig slovenskih kuharjev_ic po letu 2000.

Avtorico zanima, kako reprezentacija družbenih akterjev_k in priročniki o življenjskem slogu skozi konstrukcijo jezikovnega stila kot življenjskega stila konstruirajo in reflektirajo ne le sodobno hegemonsko reprezentacijo hrane kot zabavo in užitek, ampak tudi razredno specifičen življenjski stil. To pokaže na primeru slovenske postsocialistične kulinarične transformacije skozi žanrsko hibridizacijo s proučevanjem prevoda znamke Jamieja Oliverja *The Naked Chef* iz angleškega v slovenski jezik, priljubljene kuharske oddaje *Ljubezem skozi želodec* (na POP TV se je predvajala med letoma 2009 in 2011) ter kuharskih knjig *Sodobna družinska kuharija* (2010), *Po zdravi pameti* (2011) in *Preprosto slovensko* (2012).

Avtorica v knjigi podaja argument, da se je diskurz o hrani, povezan s kuharskimi knjigami, v Sloveniji v obdobju postsocializma spremenil zaradi vpeljave globalnega življenjskostilnega medijskega formata v obliki televizijskih kuharskih šovov. To prikaže s tematsko in jezikovno analizo. Kuharske knjige in oddaje avtorica proučuje skozi perspektivo transformacije lokalnih diskurzov kot posledico globalnih medijskih intervencij v postsocialistični prostor. Knjiga skuša zapolniti raziskovalno vrzel, zato raziskuje ne le transformacije v smislu življenjskega stila in postsocializma, ampak tudi transformacije na poti od samoupravnega socializma do »demokratskega« kapitalizma.

Temeljna ontološka podlaga te knjige je, da jezik konstruira, ne zgolj reflektira pomen, s čimer je knjiga še ena v nizu znanstvenih del, ki sledijo lingvističnemu obratu

v družbenih vedah. Kot navaja avtorica, se zaenkrat knjiga še nahaja izven večinske usmeritve metode kritične analize diskurza (KAD), a več kot odlično pokaže, da je njena uporaba za proučevanje jezika in življenjskega stila legitimna odločitev. Čeprav diskurzivna konstrukcija razreda in življenjskega stila običajno ni v središču raziskovalnega zanimanja KAD, ki se raje ukvarja z bolj »resnimi« oblikami komunikacije, knjiga pokaže, da se življenjski stil in oglaševanje nahajata v samem jedru neoliberalne kapitalistične ideologije in politik moči.

Avtorica z analizo kuharske oddaje *Kuhinja do nazga* (angl. *The Naked Chef*), katere protagonist je Jamie Oliver, pronicljivo pokaže, kako je Jamie kot televizijska osebnost diskurzivno konstruiran v angleškem izvirniku. Osredotoča se na jezikovni stil, uporabljen za konstruiranje življenjskega stila in razredne distinkcije, zanima pa jo tudi, kaj to pomeni za življenjski stil in uprizarjanje razrednosti pri občinstvu srednjega razreda v Sloveniji. Jamie Oliver v svoji kuharski oddaji »običajnemu« gledalcu prodaja ideale, okus, spol, družinske vrednote in moralo. Ne le da na novo uokvirja kuhanje kot moško opravilo (v družbi prevladuje dojemanje kuhanja kot ženskega opravila), ampak obenem kuharski poklic povezuje s srednjim družbenim razredom, za katerega kuhanje običajno ni poklicna izbira. Avtorica ugotavlja, da pride po prevodu oddaje v slovenski jezik do pojava drugačne blagovne znamke Jamie Oliver, ki reflektira ne le ideologijo slovenskega jezika, ampak gradi tudi na kulturnem simbolizmu generacije, ki po letu 1991 v Sloveniji predstavlja urbani višji srednji razred. Zanj povezuje s to kuharsko oddajo zaradi izkazovanja orientacije do trendovskih zahodnih diskurzov pomeni tudi večji kulturni kapital.

Kot navaja avtorica, pride v 60. letih prejšnjega stoletja do preobrata, saj se na slovenski televiziji pojavi prvi moški, ki je kuharski mojster (prej so za kuharske avtorite te veljale predvsem nune, tudi gospodinje). Od takrat dalje so na slovenski televiziji v kuharskih oddajah, namenjenih ženskemu občinstvu, kuhanje učili samo profesionalni kuharski mojstri, čeprav so, paradoksalno, v največji meri doma kuhale ženske, ki pa v družbi niso bile prepoznane kot mojstrice kuhanja. To mesto je namreč ostalo rezervirano za moške. Tega paradoksa žal avtorica nikjer ne naglasi in problematizira, čeprav je prisoten v analiziranih primerih. Povezava med spolom in družbenim razredom bi lahko bila v knjigi bolje demonstrirana, saj bi s tem do izraza prišel tudi pomen interseksionalnosti, ki omogoča razumeti večplastne raznolikosti in družbene neenakosti in skozi katero ljudje različnih razrednih, spolnih, rasnih, etničnih in nacionalnih pozicij izpogajajo moč in enakost v družbi (glej Tsing 2009: 152). Poleg družbenega razreda med vzroke za družbene neenakosti znotraj struktur moči namreč prištevamo tudi spol, etničnost, ruralnost, urbanost, tradicijo, lokalno pripadnost itd.

V analizi kuharske oddaje *Ljubezen skozi želodec*, katere protagonista sta Luka in Valentina Smej Novak, avtorica ugotavlja, da je poleg lokalne in domače hrane portretiran tudi kozmopolitanski okus protagonistov (npr. hrana iz Tokia in Pekinga). Njuna kuharska knjiga demonstrira ne samo hrano, ampak tudi to, kje sta protagonista potovala in kaj sta medtem počela, s čimer razkazujeta svoj kulturni kapital. Novakova svojo avtoriteto kot slavni osebnosti in televizijska kuharska mojstra gradita diskurzivno, da bi se končno pozicionirala kot novi avtoriteti v slovenskem kuhanju. Avtorica meni,

da je to poteza, ki potrjuje, da so življenjskostilni mediji pravzaprav vrsta razredne podjetnosti, skozi katero predstavniki_ce srednjih razredov promovirajo lastne okuse kot splošno sprejete in poželenja vredne življenjske stile. Protagonista oddaje želita biti dojeta kot del višjega srednjega razreda s tem, ko se sklicujeta na umetnost, literaturo in potovanja, kar velja za karakteristiko samoreprezentacije slovenskega srednjega razreda. Novakova svojo znamko gradita s ciljem pozicioniranja v višji srednji razred, ki temelji na predpostavki Pierra Bourdieuja, da je kulinarični in lingvistični kapital dejavnik pri konstrukciji razredne distinkcije.

Avtorica protagonista oddaje umesti v srednji družbeni razred, pri čemer ne problematizira dojemanja razreda kot fiksne in statične kategorije, kar je po našem mnenju problematično. Družbeni status ni materialna stvar, ki jo poseduješ in razkazuješ, ampak način uprizarjanja. Protagonisti_ke kuharskih oddaj se aktivno samoumeščajo v družbene razrede oz. pozicije in svoje vedenje prilagajajo različnim družbenim situacijam, zato moramo družbeni razred razumeti tudi skozi perspektivo samoreprezentacije in družbenega uprizarjanja. Pri tem pa seveda ne smemo pozabiti, da je družbeni razred vedno pogojen z družbeno pozicioniranostjo posameznika_ce, katerih zbiranje so vedno omejene z razredom in dostopom do kulturnih, ekonomskih in simbolnih virov.

Čeprav življenjski stil Novakovih daje vtis, da sta kozmopolitanska in prefinjena, protagonista hkrati stremita k temu, da sta dojeta kot »običajna«. To avtorica v knjigi sicer omeni, vendar ne problematizira, da njuna »liminalna« pozicija med razredi ponuja prostor pogajanj za uprizarjanje in vrednotenje heterogenih vidikov spola, razreda, urbanosti/ruralnosti itd. Z identificiranjem s skromnostjo in običajnostjo protagonista oddaje tudi pri gledalcih_kah spodnjih družbenih razredov iščeta spoštovanje in javno priznanje. Tako v eni izmed oddaj v obliki zgodbe iz otroštva protagonistka razkrije svoje poreklo in odraščanje v Prekmurju, »kjer itak jedo pretežno paprikaš«, prav tako nas večkrat na svoj izvor (namerno) opomni s svojim prekmurskim naglasom. Poleg tega skušata protagonista demokratizirati jedi, nekoč povezane z višjim družbenim razredom, kot so npr. račja jetra, in jih narediti širše dostopne ljudem. Skratka, tudi če imata protagonista možnost, da se vedeta kot srednji razred, občasno prevzameta stil samopredstavitve in izražanja običajnosti nižjih družbenih razredov, da bi dosegla širše občinstvo. Povezava z ljudmi iz višjih družbenih pozicij lahko včasih velja za vir obsojanja in posmeha pri ljudeh na nižjih družbenih pozicijah, kar Collins (2004: 258) imenuje obratno snobstvo oz. antistatus. Kljub vsemu pa protagonista oddaje kot kulturna posrednika in kulinarična omnivora večino časa reproducirata specifičen kulinarični kapital, namenjen pripadnikom_cam slovenskega novega srednjega razreda, ki ima tudi sicer na voljo dovolj ekonomskega in kulturnega kapitala za prisvojitev življenjskega stila, prikazanega v oddaji.

Pričujoča monografija je zagotovo pomemben prispevek k področju proučevanja diskurzivne konstrukcije razreda in življenjskega stila na primeru kuharskih knjig in oddaj v obdobju poznega kapitalizma, v katerem je postmoderna kultura hrane postala kultura strahu in skrbi glede tega, kako jesti »pravilno«. Prav tako je tematika knjige izjemno aktualna, saj je hrana povezana z mnogimi sodobnimi problemi, kot je individualizirana skrb za zdravje, s potrošnjo, življenjskim stilom in tudi s tiranijo izbire.

Literatura

Bourdieu, Pierre (2002 [1979]). *Distinction: A Social Critique of the Judgement of Taste*. Cambridge (Massachusetts): Harvard University Press.

Collins, Randall (2004). *Interaction Ritual Chains*. Princeton University Press.

Couldry, Nick (2011). Class and Contemporary Forms of 'Reality' Production or, Hidden Injuries of Class 2. V B. Skeggs in H. Wood (ur.): *Reality Television and Class*: 33–44. Basingstoke, New York: Palgrave Macmillan.

Tsing, Anna (2009). Supply Chains and the Human Condition. *Rethinking Marxism: A Journal of Economics, Culture & Society*, 21(2): 148–76.

Sara Pistotnik

**Mary Douglas: Kako mislijo institucije.
Ljubljana: Pedagoška fakulteta, 2018.
156 strani (ISBN 978-961-253-223-9), 20 EUR.**

Knjiga Mary Douglas *Kako mislijo institucije* je nastala na podlagi šestih predavanj v seriji Abrams Lectures na Univerzi Syracuse marca 1985, kar daje knjigi strukturo posameznih zaključenih enot. Poglavja so nastajala počasi, tudi ob drugih priložnostih, a sledijo osnovni niti, ki išče odgovor na vprašanje razmerja med posamezniki in družbenimi institucijami. Natančneje, avtorico, ki pripada strukturalistični tradiciji, zanima, ali ima človeško spoznavanje družbeno podlago oziroma do katere mere je naše razmišljanje odvisno od institucij, s čimer se dotika samih temeljev vzpostavitve in delovanja družbenega reda. Argumentirati skuša sklenjen proces, pri katerem je družbeni red utemeljen na človekovem spoznavnem procesu, človekov spoznavni proces pa odvisen od družbe, ki bi veljal tako za pogosto idealizirane majhne skupnosti kot za na videz bolj kompleksne družbe. Vendar pri tem za razliko od zgodnejšega antropološkega funkcionalizma, ki je domneval samostabilizirajoči model, v katerem vsak element igra svojo vlogo pri vzdrževanju družbenega reda, poudarja, da družbe niso statične, temveč nenehno grajene skozi kupčevanje in pogajanje.

Pri razvijanju svoje teze se avtorica naslanja na mnoge pisce, a ključna sta Émile Durkheim in Ludwik Fleck. O družbi sta pisala, kot da je povečan um, medtem ko je zanj prejšnji vsak um pomanjšana družba. Osredini se na njun premislek o povezavi med družbeno solidarnostjo in skupnim miselnim slogom članov družbe. S tem odpira izjemno zanimivo smer razmišljanja, ki v osnovi nasprotuje še danes prevladujoči teoriji racionalne izbire, pri kateri je vsak misleči posameznik suveren v delovanju, ki mu najbolj koristi. To naj bi veljalo tudi za solidarnost, ki naj bi bila zgolj plod maksimiranja koristi. Tezo zavrne z argumentom, da ta teorija ne zmore prepričljivo razložiti radodarnosti in skupnega delovanja, lastnih večini človeških družb, pri katerih posamezniki svoje interese podredijo dobremu drugih, zato pozove k drugačni interpretaciji.

V svojem iskanju si avtorica postavi izhodiščno vprašanje, zakaj in kako se v skupinah določena prepričanja vzpostavijo kot skupna. Dokazuje osrednjo vlogo institucij in pravi, da so te proizvod posebnega miselnega sloga, ki so ga skupaj vzpostavili člani, obenem pa povratno oblikujejo razmišljanje članov, zato vztraja, da je družbi lastna skupna osnova védenja. A ta proces se ne odvija premočrtno in sam od sebe. V osnovi je institucija – lahko je to družina, igra ali obred – nekakšen sporazum, vrsta usklajevanja in samonadzora, povezana z zahtevo po redu in obvladovanju negotovosti, ki pa za svojo legitimnost potrebuje vzporedni spoznavni proces. Avtoriteto ji lahko podeli oseba ali skupno pripoznavanje določenega načela, a za njeno trajnost je nujno, da vir legitimnosti ostane skrit. Zato je potreben vpis ključnih družbenih razmerij v fizični, nadnaravni svet, ki zasenči družbeni izvor institucije. Ta naturalizacija družbenih razmerij se zgodi z razvrščanjem na podlagi analogije, kar pomeni, da nobena lastnost ni inherent-

tna, ampak je vedno rezultat delovanja institucij, ki podeljujejo koncepcije podobnosti, različnosti, enakosti, pa tudi pravilnosti. Nenehna uporaba istega načela pripelje do vzajemnega podpiranja kategorij, kar daje videz, da je cel sistem utemeljen v naravi in da so vpeljana pravila edina primerna. Slednje pomeni zlasti skladnost z delovanjem drugih kategorij, ki so v določenem trenutku dominantne, sami pa jih utrjujemo tudi tako, da drug drugega nadzorujemo, saj so nam formule razvrščanja, s katerimi osmišljamo svet, družbeno posredovane. Institucije so tako del pogona osrednjih, legitimirajočih načel, ki se zaradi skritega družbenega izvora zdijo univerzalna in nespremenljiva, ta shema pa omogoča ustvarjanje določene različice narave in s tem sestave družbe, ki bo po inerciji odločala v imenu posameznikov.

S postavitvijo tega temelja delo Mary Douglas pridobi aktualnost. Če se najprej zdi, da zaradi svojega poslanstva – razviti univerzalno teorijo, ki bo povezala posameznika in družbeni red skozi vlogo institucij, torej najti skrite mehanizme delovanja družbe, ki bi veljali za vse človeštvo – danes deluje preživeto, pa ga nadaljnja izpeljava umesti ne le med tehtne znanstvene razmisleke, temveč med intervencije, zanimive za širše družbene dileme. Začetni vtis, da se osredotoča na podrobnosti tehnične narave, preseže dejstvo, da avtorica odpira povsem aktualna vprašanja o delovanju družbenega reda in možnostih njegovih sprememb. Tako poudari, da je osnovna funkcija institucij kodiranje informacij in reševanje rutinskih problemov, s čimer namesto nas opravijo veliko razmišljanja in sprejemanja pomembnih odločitev. Čeprav gre za vnašanje predvidljivosti v družbeno življenje, pa nam to obenem onemogoča alternativne izbire. Kadar so institucije učinkovite, namreč po besedah Mary Douglas posamezniki v večji meri prilagajamo svoje obnašanje institucionalni matrici, kar sistematično usmerja naša zaznavanja v oblike, skladne z njihovo organizacijo življenja. To pomeni, da so vse možnosti našega delovanja že znotraj nabora njihovih izkušenj. Avtomatično prevzemanje kategorij za opisovanje sveta tako resda služi možnosti sporazumevanja med člani določene skupine in upravičevanju njihovih izbir, a le zato, ker potrjuje legitimnost in logiko institucij. Pomembno spoznanje je, da na družbo gledamo predvsem prek poznanih kategorizacij, ki so nam vnaprej vsiljene kot skrajni horizont znanega sveta. Na ta način nam pomaga uzreti najglobljo raven osmišljanja sveta in družbene strukture, ki prežema vse njene vidike in zato odseva v slehernem delovanju. Avtorica trdi, da če želimo biti intelektualno samostojni, se moramo institucijam upreti: ugotoviti, »kako institucije naš um držijo v primežu« in s svojo nevidnostjo odsevajo družbeno strukturo. Če jih hočemo proučiti, moramo to, kar je skupno, povezati z vsakdanjimi izkušnjami avtoritete in dela. Čeprav hkrati pravi, da nam zaradi povezave med razvrščanjem in institucijami umanjka osnovni aparat, s katerim bi lahko iznašli nove kategorije, je njeno analizo treba vzeti zelo resno. Živimo v času, ko teorija racionalne izbire v svoji neoliberalni obliki dominira vsem poljem življenja in slika specifično obliko sveta tako na družbeni kot na ravni vsakdanjih načinov življenja, pri čemer je osrednje sporočilo, da si alternativ ni vredno niti zamišljati. V tem smislu poskusi seganja onkraj znanih horizontov pomenijo politično delovanje, ki lahko sproži drugačno osmišljanje sveta, začenši z diverzifikacijo oblik življenja.

Pripisovanju osrednje vloge institucijam navkljub je tako napak, če jim pripišemo vso tvornost, saj s tem sami sebe prisilimo v pasivno vlogo brez možnosti izbire ali vpliva na

kakršnekoli spremembe družbenega reda. Slednje se namreč dogajajo tudi zato, ker se ljudje skušamo izogniti družbenemu nadzoru. A se zaplete, ko spremembe postanejo del ustaljenega razvrščanja. Po Mary Douglas, ki se pri tem približa Foucaultovi biopolitiki, pojav novih kategorij ustvarja nova bitja, saj osebe svoje vedenje prilagodijo novemu poimenovanju in v novemu sistemu, katerega del so te oznake, ustvarjajo novo realnost institucij. Njihovemu preživetju pa je inherentno, da vse procese vprežejo v lastno potrjevanje in zato ponovno omejijo svobodno delovanje. Vedno znova sprožijo spoznavni proces, ki določa meje spremenjenih razvrščanj in svoj vpliv zakrijejo z naturalizacijo. A v življenju v pluralni družbi obstaja dvom o njihovi legitimnosti, ki daje nekaj upanja, pa tudi napotek za spodbujanje alternativ: »Ko se posamezniki o osnovni pravičnosti ne strinjajo, moramo ta njihov najbolj nerešljiv spor razumeti kot spor med institucijami, ki temeljijo na nezdružljivih načelih. Hujši ko je konflikt, bolj nam pride prav, če razumemo institucije, ki opravljajo večino razmišljanja. Prigovarjanje ne bo pomagalo. /.../ Pomaga lahko le spreminjanje institucij. Nasloviti bi morali njih, in ne posameznike, nenehno, in ne le ob krizah« (str. 121).

